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Abstract 
The main focus of this PhD project is the development and validation of a 
psychometric instrument for the measurement of individual dispositions towards rules 
and principles. 
Literature review and focus groups were used to generate insights into the reasons 
why individuals prefer rules and principles. On the basis of that review, an initial item 
pool was created covering the conceptual space of dispositions towards rules and 
principles. 
The final instrument consists of 10 items, 5 items each for the rules and principles 
subscales. The psychometric analysis suggested that it is valid and reliable.  
The instrument has sound predictive power and was able to significantly predict 
individuals’ behavioral intentions in relation to rules and principles across contexts. I 
found there were gender and ethnic differences in the relationship between 
dispositions towards rules and principles scores and behavioural intentions. 
This PhD is relevant to an emerging literature in behavioural accounting research that 
examines how practitioners’ personal characteristics and styles affect financial 
reporting practice. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the PhD 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the entire PhD project and reflects on the 
research journey taken by the researcher. In the process, it will make clear both the 
need and rationale for the study, and introduce the research design the researcher 
intends to follow. This chapter is introductory and designed to give some overview of 
issues.  
1.1.1 The objective of the present PhD 
The main focus of this PhD project is the development and validation of a 
psychometric instrument for the measurement of individual dispositions towards rules 
and principles. The grounding of the instrument development is inter-disciplinary, and 
draws on debates concerning rules and principles in law, accounting and business, 
social-psychology, and philosophy.  
1.1.1.1 My prior research journey 
The decision to develop such an instrument had two main inspirations. Firstly, in my 
MRes research work I tried to use individuals’ ‘regulatory focus’ scores (see Higgins, 
1997) to predict their behavioural responses to rules and principles-based scenarios. I 
had expected that individuals’ regulatory focus orientations, as measured by Higgins’ 
regulatory focus questionnaire, would be a good proxy for the dispositions towards 
rules and principles and capture a good deal of the variation in individuals’ responses 
to rules and principles. My MRes results did not confirm the initial expectations. In 
reflecting on MRes findings, I realised that various factors might plausibly be 
expected to bear on individuals’ dispositions to rules and principles, and that whilst 
there are various psychometric instruments that might reasonably be thought to be 
relevant to the issue; there was no instrument tailor-made for the purpose of 
measuring individual dispositions towards rules and principles.   
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Secondly, prior studies suggested that individual dispositions, in addition to directly 
affecting behaviour, have an impact on, for example, preferred learning styles and the 
types of learning experiences under which particular individuals perform best, and an 
effect on judgment and decision-making (Ge, Matsumoto, & Zhang, 2010; Booth & 
Winzar, 1993; Ramsay, Hanlon, & Smith, 2000; Fuller & Kaplan, 2004; Ho & 
Rodgers, 1993). According to Ge, et al (2010, p.7), it is important to recognise the 
extent of individual-specific factors, e.g., dispositions and biases, affect decision-
making (see also Hambrick, 2007). I concluded that in order to facilitate convincing 
work addressing the prediction of individuals’ responses to rule- and principle-based 
situations, the most useful contribution I might make, in the first instance, would be to 
develop, an instrument specifically designed to reliably and validly measure 
dispositions towards rules and principles.   
The decision to develop a general psychological instrument in contrast to developing 
a situation-specific test is based upon my conviction that basic underlying 
psychological dimensions provide a sufficient basis for measuring dispositions to 
rules and principles.  
1.2 The organisation of the chapter 
This chapter offers a brief introduction to this thesis. The remainder of this chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 1.3 introduces the research context of this project. 
Section 1.4 explains, in a little more detail, the important motivations driving this 
research. 1.5 outlines the research questions and their theoretical justifications. 
Section 1.6 introduces the chosen methodological approach and briefly explains why 
it is appropriate. Section 1.7 provides some introductory discussion and explanation 
of the meaning / definitions of the concepts of rules and principles as used in the 
thesis. Section 1.8 outlines the chapter contents of the whole thesis. Section 1.9 
identifies the main contributions of the research. Finally, section 1.10 provides a brief 
conclusion to this chapter. 
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1.3 Rules vs. principles after the Global Financial Crisis 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that began around middle of  2007 and continued, 
in its most intense phase, until the end of  2008 resulted in the collapse of some major 
retail and investment banks, and required governments to provide massive financial 
support to a banking system on the verge of total collapse
1
 (Barth & Landsman, 
2010). The state of regulation was certainly not solely responsible for the financial 
crisis, but it is commonly recognised as having been one of the factors that in 
combination with others made it possible, and the crisis has thus given rise to calls for 
significant reassessment of systems of financial regulation (Black, 2010, p. 2). 
The recent shift to a more rules-based regulation can be seen as a reflexive response 
to the loss of trust associated with the credit crisis (Ford 2010; Black 2008; Guiso, 
2010). However, Ford (2010, p.22) argues that the principles-based regulation (PBR), 
as such, did not fail in the face of the GFC. She suggests that the lesson we should 
take from the GFC is that regulators failed to effectively implement PBR, failed to 
participate actively and sceptically in the interpreting and monitoring process 
necessary to the effective implementation of the PBR, and failed to sustain good 
‘regulatory conversations’ with the regulated parties (Black, 2008). She notes that the 
financial markets are too fast moving and complex to be regulated in a ‘command-and 
control’ manner, and that we should not risk another Enron type of scandal associated 
with gaming rules (Ford, 2010). Moreover, a straight-jacketed rules-based regulation 
would be more likely to create a suspicious and low-trust environment since it 
reinforces the perception that “if increased regulation is justified then the people 
being regulated must be suspect; guilty before proven innocent” (Swinson, 2004, cited 
by Arjoon, 2006, p.68).   
                                                 
1
 For a timeline of the crisis, New York Times, “A Year of Financial Turmoil,” (11 September 2009) 
online: NYT (11 September 2009; accessed Nov 2010) online: NYT 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/09/11/business/economy/20090911_FINANCIALCRISIS_T
IMELINE.html?ref=businessspecial4 accessed on the December 2012.  
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In the face of the recent credit crisis, the FSA’s PBR approach does not appear to have 
changed or to have been considered as one of the areas where the FSA needed to 
improve in light of the crisis (Turner Report, 20092). The review, though recognising 
the challenges that the crisis has posed for PBR in ‘a difficult year’, provides that the 
UK’s regulatory difficulties and the crisis have not in any way undermined FSA’s 
general approach to regulation (Turner Review, 2009). Furthermore, the US seems to 
be inching ever closer towards a final commitment to the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards, and from a relatively rules-based US GAAP to a more 
principles-based IFRS system (Cohen et al., 2011). Countries such as Korea, China, 
and India are already in the process of transforming to the adoption of IFRS (data 
from IFRS website, 2012): Suffice to say, the rules and principles debate is still 
meaningful and relevant. 
1.3.1 Research Background 
The recent corporate scandals of Enron, World.com and Royal Ahold (Beest, 2009) 
prompted an effort to identify characteristics of accounting regulation that might have 
contributed to the scandals (Madsen & Williams, 2012; Leigh, 2003). Rules-based 
standards have been seen as, and especially criticised for, having fostered “a check-
the-box mentality to financial reporting that eliminates judgments from the 
application of the reporting” (Herdman, 2002): The Enron debacle is often taken as a 
prime illustration of this problem: Whilst the reports were in compliance with the 
letter of the rules (at least in many respects), they were in breach of the spirit of the 
law (Sama & Shoaf, 2005). According to Bhimani (2008), if the accountants had 
exercised the ‘substance over form’ principles in their report, Enron’s SPEs (special 
purpose entity) would have been included in consolidated financial statements as 
Enron had economic control over the partnerships.  
                                                 
2
 Hector Sants, former chief executive of the FSA, speaking at the 2008 Securities and Investments 
Institute annual conference asserted that “the recent events have demonstrated both the value of a more 
principles-based approach to supervision and the risks of deviating from it.” He argued that those firms 
that had taken an outcomes focussed PBR approach were doing better during those difficult times than 
firms that had not. 
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Whilst also suffering some scandalous corporate failures, including, for example, 
Polly Peck, Maxwell, and BCCI, the UK experience of accounting scandal was 
somewhat less traumatic than that of the US. It was seen by many as having been to 
some degree protected by its more principles-based approach to standards (Kershaw, 
2005). The apparent problems of a rules-based approach and UK’s ‘success’ with 
principles-based regulation prompted SEC’s push for the enactment of provisions 
within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (SOA) 2002, designed to move the previously very 
much rules-based US’s accounting standards towards a more principles-based 
standard. Since 2002 there has been a worldwide tendency, not yet complete, towards 
convergence in accounting standards (Beest, 2011).  
The IFRS is a principles-based regulatory approach which primarily focuses on 
providing a conceptual framework for accounting practitioners to follow (Wustemann 
& Wustemann, 2010; Alali & Cao, 2010). Accounting practitioners are therefore, 
expected to exercise their judgment in applying IFRS to access the ‘substance’ of a 
transaction (Alali & Cao, 2010; Carpenter, Backof, & Bamber, 2011). This movement 
prompts a question of whether the accountants and auditors familiar with operating in 
a rules-based accounting system will be comfortable, confident and capable when 
confronted and required to work with a more principles-based system (or vice versa). 
This raises the issue of what Jamal and Tan (2008) called a ‘fit effect’ between the 
nature of the accounting regulation and the mentality of the accounting practitioners 
required to use it, which they argue demands fuller and closer examination.  
1.3.2 Research Gap 
Cohen et al. (2011) argue that there is a need for more substantial research designed 
to develop our understanding of how a shift in the nature of regulation affects 
accounting practitioners’ behaviour. Despite the fact that there is some evidence 
showing an increase in empirical studies in exploring the nature of financial 
regulation (rules vs. principles) in relation to practitioners’ behavioural change in the 
context of earning management and aggressive reporting (Mergenthaler et al., 2012), 
the results are somewhat mixed and inconclusive. Furthermore, the discussion on the 
advantages and disadvantages of rules- and principles-based regulation systems are 
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mostly argued from a conceptual perspective, and with arguments tending to lack 
clear empirical support.  
Jamal and Tan’s (2008) research was among the first important empirical work done 
on examining the ‘fit effect’. In that study, they examined the effects alternative types 
of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), that is, of principles- versus 
rules-based accounting standards, on the judgments of chief financial officers (CFOs), 
and how those effects were moderated by the characteristic of the audit partner 
overseeing the audit. They classified auditors into three categories: rules-, principles-, 
and client-oriented. Rules-oriented auditors are those “with a relatively greater 
proclivity towards going by well-specified rules rather than employing judgment to 
capture the underlying substance of the transaction” (p.4). The focus of this type of 
auditor on compliance can tend to become excessive (Essaides, 2006 and Scott, 2006 
cited by Jamal & Tan, 2008). Principles-oriented auditors, on the other hand, are more 
concerned with the substance of transactions than with just compliance with the letter 
of rules. The so called client-oriented auditors, the last category, are mostly concerned 
with pleasing clients (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006). Jamal and Tan’s 
(2008) results showed that when the CFO expects to be working with a client-oriented 
auditor, there is no effect of GAAP type on the CFO's tendency to carry the debt off 
balance-sheet. With a principles-oriented auditor, the CFO's tendency to take the debt 
off balance-sheet is lower when GAAP is also principles-based rather than rules-
based. With a rules-oriented auditor, the CFO's tendency to take the debt off balance-
sheet is lower when GAAP is rules-based rather than principles-based. 
The empirical evidence from Jamal and Tan, 2008, and Herron and Gibertson, 20043, 
suggests that there may be “fit” and/or “misfit” effects between types of standards and 
                                                 
3
 Herron and Gilbertson (2004) found a match and mismatch effect between the judgment and the type 
of professional conduct code in application; rule or principles-based. In particular, when there was a 
match between the form of the professional conduct code (rules-based or principles-based) and the 
moral development stage of the participants were “more likely to reject a questionable audit 
engagement” (p. 499); however, when there was a mismatch between the form of the code and the 
moral reasoning stage of the participants, the professional conduct code had no behavioural impact. 
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users’ preferences regarding using rules- or principles-based standards. Further 
empirical studies have been carried out in order to explore the ‘fit effect’. Jamal and 
Tan (2010) considered how the type of auditors (principles- vs. rules-based) affects 
financial managers' reporting decision under rules- and principles-based standards. 
They found that the auditor-type had no effect on reporting decisions under a rules-
based standard. However, under a principles-based regulation, financial managers are 
less likely to report aggressively when the auditors are also relatively more principles-
based. They concluded that improved financial reporting will happen only if a move 
toward more principles-based standards is accompanied by a shift in auditors’ 
attitudes toward being more principles-based. The research by Jamal & Tan (2008; 
2010) is significant but also suffers a few limitations: 1) their attempt to categorise 
rules-oriented; principles-oriented and finally client-oriented auditors is half-hearted; 
they lack reliable and valid means to categorise auditors empirically and 
convincingly; 2) the different mental orientation (rules vs. principles vs. clients) as 
they set it out may be just a state of mind, in other words some momentary states (like 
mood), therefore lack stability. Jamal and Tan have not shown that such mentality 
could be related to stable individual characteristics such as personality and cognition, 
which would suggest some stability across contexts and timelines.  
Despite the notable ‘fit’ and ‘misfit’ effects between the practitioners’ rules and 
principles preferences and the type of regulations (rules versus principles) detected by 
Jamal and Tan (2008; 2010), there is no reliable measurement instrument available 
that can readily categorise individuals as either rules-oriented or principles-oriented. 
In summary, it is concluded that there is a gap in the knowledge related to our 
understanding of dispositions to rules and principles, which gives rise to the research 
questions forming the basis of this research study. 
1.4 Research Motivation   
Based on the arguments presented by Jamal and Tan (2008), I believe that in some 
circumstances there may be considerable value in making a “fit” between personal 
dispositions and the types of regulations, and in particular the balance of rules and 
principles, with which the individual is required to work. The instrument I have 
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developed in this PhD project is designed, amongst other things, to help facilitate the 
creation of such fit. The study of the measurement of the individual attitudes / 
dispositions towards rules and principles is supported by the increasing numbers of 
recent empirical behavioural studies in accounting, of variation in practitioners’ 
behaviour in response to the rules and principles-based regulation (Cohen et al., 2011; 
Peecher et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2011; Jamal & Tan, 2008; 2010; Pasros & Trotman, 
2004; Nelson, 2002 & 2003). 
The current research takes inspiration from Higgins’ concept of ‘regulatory fit’: In my 
view, fit effects such as that reported by Jamal and Tan are analogous to the 
‘regulatory fit’ effects reported by Higgins and his colleagues (2003, 2004) in the 
motivational psychology literature. People experience a regulatory fit when they use 
either vigilant or eager goal pursuit means that fit respectively with their prevention or 
promotion regulatory orientation. Such regulatory fit can affect individuals’ 
evaluation of alternatives (Camacho et al., 2003, p. 499). Further, a feeling of ‘fit’ can 
spill over into a feeling of ‘rightness’, and even a ‘moral rightness’ (See Higgins et al., 
2003; Camacho et al., 2003). Higgins and his colleagues found that regulatory fit 
produces an experience that what is being done is correct or proper (this adds an 
element to the experience that is more than just a positive feeling). In other words, 
“regulatory fit affects what feels right or wrong, and this transfers to what people 
experience as being right or wrong (fit violation produces an experience that what is 
being done is wrong or improper)” (Camacho et al., 2003; Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 
2004; Higgins, Idson, & Forster 1998; Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002; Freitas, 
Spiegel, & Molden, 2003; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins 2004). Where there is 
regulatory fit the value that a person will derive from a choice, holding the outcome 
of the choice constant, will be greater, simply by virtue of the fact that the choice is 
made in a manner that is in alignment with the person’s regulatory orientation.     
Camacho et al. (2003, p.498) argue that “individuals can pursue the same goal activity 
with a different regulatory orientation and in a different manner”. In relation to the 
current project, both rules- and principles-based regulation in accounting can be seen 
as aiming at the same goal of a ‘true and fair’ reporting of the economic reality of the 
business entity (Financial reporting Council, 2011). Similarly, two auditors might 
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have the same objective of testing the truth and fairness of a set of accounts, but have 
different preferences for rules- or a principles-based approach towards the identical 
objective. An auditor with a positive personal disposition towards principle-based 
approaches, might derive or feel a sense of ‘rightness’ when adopting a more 
principle-based approach (regulatory fit) in the formation of professional judgment 
(Bratton, 2004, p.32). The same auditor may experience a sense of discomfort or 
tension when she has to work with voluminous concrete rules. Such tension or 
discomfort may transfer to a feeling of ‘wrongness’; a lack of ‘rightness’ that may 
spill over into her substantial audit judgments concerning truth and fairness. 
Conversely, a rules-oriented auditor may experience a sense of fit, and ‘rightness’, 
using a rules-based approach that may spill over into her substantive audit judgments. 
A misfit, non-fit, may occur when such an individual has to work with abstract and 
broad-brush principles. The misfit may transfer to a feeling of wrongness, and 
ultimately, in this case, into a less positive evaluation of the audit evidence. 
Higgins’ focus was on individuals’ regulatory focus, dispositions towards a promotion 
or towards a prevention orientation. He developed an instrument to allow the 
measurement of an individual’s promotions and prevention orientation - their 
regulatory focus (see appendix seven). His work does demonstrate the value of having 
a reliable measure of individual dispositions, and has inspired me to attempt to 
develop a reliable measure of individual dispositions towards rules and principles. I 
see this as a potentially valuable, and necessary, resource for researchers, who like 
me, are interested in exploring the rule and principle ‘fit’ effect. Such an instrument 
will also enable more empirical work to be conducted on this topical issue.  
1.5 Research Questions 
Most of the debate on rules versus principles has been conducted in narrative or 
conceptual terms. It is slowly being recognised that there are opportunities for more 
empirical testing with respect to this debate. Thus, the central research goal and task 
of this PhD project is the development and validation of a reliable instrument for 
measuring individual dispositions to rules and principles. There are various research 
questions associated with this primary goal: 
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Underlying my efforts to develop an instrument to measure individuals’ dispositions 
towards rules and principles (DRP), and any value such an instrument might have, is 
the presumption that such dispositions exist (of necessity with some stability). 
Because dealing with rules and principles is an essential part of daily life, of external 
discipline and self-regulation (Bandura, 1991; Twining & Miers, 1999). I begin by 
assuming that such dispositions exist and, of their nature, persist over time and 
situations with some consistency, individuals also exhibit an intention to demonstrate 
that they do. I define dispositions4, in a preliminary way at this stage, as an 
individual’s inherent preference for, and comfortableness with, rules and principles, 
and that individuals will carry their dispositions into different, rule and principle 
related, situations with real effect on how they respond to situations. My later 
empirical work will in effect test this underlying assumption.  
RQ 1: Do individuals have (stable) dispositions towards Rules and Principles? 
The concepts of rules and principles are rather complicated and often contested 
among scholars (Raz, 1975; Dworkin, 1967; Hart, 1977). One line of research argues 
that rules and principles are two extremes, polar points even, but essentially residing 
on a continuum (Korobkin, 2000, p.30; Sunstein, 1995, p.961). For instance: Verheij 
et al (1998) argue that the differences between rules and principles are “merely a 
matter of degree” (p.3). Scholars (see Burgemeestre et al., 2009, p.1; Cunningham, 
2007; Kaplow, 2000) who hold this view, generally take the position that whilst rules 
and principles have different behavioural effects when applied in practice, they have 
essentially identical logical structures. 
Another line of research and reasoning, taken for example by Dworkin (1967, 1979) 
and his supporters such as Braithwaite (2002a, 2004) and Alexy (2000), is to argue 
that principles and rules are distinctive from each other. They provide an orthogonal 
view on rules and principles. On this view rules and principles are different in kind - 
not just degree. They do not lie on a simple continuum and it would be logically 
possible for an individual to be positively, or negatively, disposed towards both rules 
                                                 
4
 The psychological concept of disposition will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
32 
 
32 
 
and principles. The discussion by Dworkin and his supporters helps me to identify a 
number of important conceptual dimensions that affect individual attitudes to rules 
and principles. His conceptions of rules and principles have deeply influenced my 
own view. 
RQ2: Are individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles 
independent and distinctive? In other words, does the relationship between 
individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles tend to be orthogonal? 
An instrument measuring such dispositions is liable to be more useful and reliable if it 
captures, or reflects, the important dimensions underlying the dispositions 
(Cunningham, 2007). I proceed with an ‘open mind’ concerning the nature of 
individual dispositions towards rules and principles and the dimensions of such 
dispositions. I recognise that such dispositions may have unconscious or intuitive 
dimensions; however it seems likely that they also have rational aspects. It seems that 
individuals have, at least to some extent, reasons for their dispositions towards rules 
and principles and that those reasons are liable to be reflected in debate (Cunningham, 
2007; Black, 2001). 
As discussed previously, I am interested in the interaction between decision-makers’ 
psychological characteristics and characteristics of the decisional situations. Literature 
has indicated that rules- and principles-based regulation tend to have distinctive 
characteristics, as reflected, for example, in perceptions and discussions of the relative 
strengths and weakness of each approach (Cunningham, 2007). The emphasis on 
fairness and morality of a principles-based approach has been recognised by many 
scholars (Cunningham, 2007; Black et al, 2007; Dworkin, 1967; Ford, 2010). One 
might also note, and credit, the benefits of the comparability and predictability often 
seen to be associated with a rules-based regulation (ICAS, 2006b; Cunningham, 
2007). Some individuals may value rules highly because they tend to associate them 
with efficiency; others may value principles highly because they associate them with 
creativity and feeling of empowerment. I will review this literature in some detail in 
later chapters (chapter seven for in-depth review). 
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 My initial considerations of the literature suggests that whilst the dimensions may 
have conceptual independence, it may be that certain dimensions are systematically 
related one to another, and may be grouped as factors underlying dispositions to rules 
and principles. Different dimension, and perhaps factors, may have more or less 
significance in the make-up of an individual’s dispositions to rules and principles.  
RQ3: What are the conceptual structure generally underlying individuals’ 
dispositions to rules and principles (DRP)?  
If we were able to establish that the individuals’ dispositions towards rules and 
principles do not change dramatically over time, in other words, they are a relatively 
stable aspect of their make-up as individuals, then we would hypothesise that such an 
individual disposition would have meaningful and significant effect on individuals’ 
behaviour in relation to rules- and principles-based decision-making. 
My exploration of the predictive power of the DRP instrument will for the purposes of 
this PhD project be limited, for the most part, to that necessary to convince one of the 
‘predictive validity’ of the instrument. In other words it will be conceived as a test of 
the instrument. The main development of the use and application of the instrument I 
conceive as being reserved for work subsequent to this PhD project. 
RQ4: Are dispositions towards rules and principles predictive of individual’s 
actual behaviour in response to rules- or principles-based social cognitive tasks / 
situations? 
Individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles (DRP) can come under the 
research umbrella of cognition and personality in psychology. The psychological root 
of such disposition will be explored and explained in detail in chapter five. 
Accordingly, I am interested in examining the relationships between one’s 
dispositions to rules and principles (DRP) and other cognitive styles and personality 
traits. There is sufficient evidence from prior studies which directly or indirectly 
suggest a relationship between one’s DRP and, for instance, thinking style as 
measured by Sternberg’s thinking inventory, need for closure cognition, dialectical 
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thinking style, Higgins regulatory focus orientations as well as the Big5 personality 
traits such as openness and conscientiousness (an overview on the proposed linkages 
between DRP and individual proposed psychological construct see chapter five).  
The focus here, which is to examine the relationships between DRP scores and same 
individual’s scores on certain other psychological measurements, will essentially be 
confined to that considered necessary to establishing the convergent and divergent 
validity of the DRP instrument. That is, to confirm that the DRP correlates positively 
with measures that logic suggests it ought to correlate positively with and vice versa, 
and that it does not correlate with measures that logic suggests it should be unrelated 
to. In this work I expect to find predicted correlations, but not such high correlations 
as would suggest that the DRP is simply re-measuring constructs already specified by 
existing instruments. 
The following six psychological constructs were chosen based on the speculated 
linkages between them and people’s rules and principles dispositions as implied by 
prior literature (more detailed discussions see chapter five). In order to support the 
evidence that DRP is not just a replicate of measuring people’s attitudes toward social 
approval, I will also test for the relation between DRP and social desirability in 
chapter nine part two. 
RQ5: Whether the DRP will show a meaningful relation with one's other 
psychological characteristics and relevant measurements, such as one’s 
thinking style and personality trait? 
1. What is the relationship between DRP and Higgins' regulatory focus 
orientations? 
2. What is the relationship between DRP and need for closure cognition? 
3. What are the relationships between DRP and Big5 personality traits? 
4. What are the relationships between DRP and Sternberg's thinking styles? 
5. What is the relationship between DRP and dialectical thinking style? 
6. What is the relationship between DRP and socially desirability test? 
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Research in various areas of academia has found that there are both personality and 
cognitive differences between the genders (Chung & Monroe, 1998; Gilligan, 1982). 
Within the personality research arena, research has found that women score higher on 
the Big5 personality trait model of Neuroticism and Agreeableness (Costa, 
Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001). The former suggests that women tend to be more 
sensitive to a variety of negative effects and their emotions and feelings are therefore 
reflect the contextual cues more acutely than men. The latter reflects amicability, 
altruism, peace-making, and women’s interest in maintaining the harmony of the 
environment by compliance (Chapman et al., 2007; Huang, 2002). Further, it has been 
found that women are more affected by the environment as they look for more 
contextual cues, and dedicate more time to consider different factors when reaching a 
decision, whereas men are more dominant, assertive, objective, and realistic 
(Lizárraga, Baquedano, & Cardelle-Elawar, 2007). 
Asian countries such China and India are in the process of adopting the IFRS5. Ethnic 
background may also be an aspect that affects one’s dispositions to rules and 
principles and requiring further empirical examination. Sama and Shoaf (2005) 
observed that rules-based approaches are more commonly found in societies (or 
organisations) favouring bureaucracies, while principles-based approaches are more 
commonly found in societies characterised by strong and operative social controls. In 
addition, recent cross-cultural research has suggested that there are systematic cultural 
differences in the habitual ways of people reasoning in relation to context: North 
Americans and Europeans are more analytical, thus the attention is focused on 
objectives and features of the contexts (such as precedents and rules), and their 
reasoning is decontextualised. In contrast, East Asians tend to be more holistic in their 
reasoning, that is attention is dispersed to the field and reasoning is contextualised 
(Buchtel & Norenzayan, 2008, p.264).  
                                                 
5
 In an article for the Risk & Regulation, London School of Economics, Summer, 2009, p.4-5. 
http://issuu.com/carr/docs/riskregulationsummer2009?mode=embed&layout=http%3A%2F%2Fskin.is
suu.com%2Fv%2Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true 
 
36 
 
36 
 
My exploration of gender and cultural differences will be directed towards the 
development of an understanding of the properties of the DRP instrument. 
RQ6: Are there any gender and cultural differences in terms of individuals’ 
dispositions to rules and principles?  
1.6 Research design and methods 
This project is designed from an inter-disciplinary perspective in the sense that I 
attempt to capture the underling elements which could affect people’s dispositions to 
rules and principles from various theoretical sources and not limited to consideration 
of the accounting literature. Because of the rules versus principles issue and debate 
have significance for many spheres. I intend to develop a general instrument to help 
answer these research questions. The instrument will not require training in any 
particular field, such as accounting, to allow its completion, and it will have the 
general form typical of an attitude or personality-type measurement instrument. I will 
therefore rely on and follow the guidance in the attitude questionnaire literature for 
the process of creating the initial draft questionnaire as well as the process of 
developing and validating the instrument.  
Many of the empirical studies on rules versus principles in the existing accounting 
research literature have employed experimental vignettes involving hypothetical 
accounting problems or situations needing professional judgments and solutions. Such 
vignettes are useful in dealing with specific accounting issues such as earning 
management or aggressive reporting (Mergenthaler, 2010; Psaros, 2007; Beest, 2009; 
Cohen et al., 2011; Segovia, Arnold, & Sutton 2009). Nonetheless, due to the highly 
technical nature of such scenarios, the results obtained from them tend to suffer from 
relatively low external validity and limited generality (Tan, 2001).   
I have also dismissed the option of adopting a scenario analysis based approach, such 
as Kohlberg’s moral reasoning scale (1975) as well as the alternative, Rest’s Defining 
Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1986b). Although both have been used heavily in the 
accounting / ethics research (Sweeney & Roberts, 1997; Ponemon & Gabhart, 1990; 
McKernan, Dunn, & O’Donnell, 2003), they both suffer from low predictive validity 
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and are limited in scope (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a). In addition, 
because their focus is primarily on moral reasoning ability, they are therefore too 
narrow for the purpose of this current project. I propose that there are other 
conceptual dimensions which could lead one to prefer one approach over another 
beyond the moral consideration which has not been tested empirically in the 
accounting ethics literature (see chapter seven for an overview). I will subsequently 
utilise suitable research methods that enable the possibility of factor grouping and test 
the significance of such dimensions empirically (see chapter two for an overview). 
I am aware of the philosophical and psychological debate concerning the role of 
intuition and reason in moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). I am prepared to acknowledge 
that intuition may have a large role in moral decision-making, and that it may even 
have priority in that region. I am however interested in a wider range of settings, 
including areas like practical decision-making / problem-solving, where intuition 
clearly holds less sway. Nevertheless, I recognise that intuition may be seen as an 
alternative to both rules and principles. And I expect that some individuals may have 
low or negative dispositions towards both rules and principles, because in fact they 
prefer to be guided by intuition. 
 1.7 Definitions of rules and principles as based on legal regulatory discussions 
Legal scholars have long been interested in the optimal choice of legal forms: in terms 
of relative effectiveness of a rules-based versus principles-based regulation 
(Korobkin, 2000; Cunningham, 2007). Such legal and regulatory scholarship and 
theory can shed light on the understanding of rules and principles in the accounting 
debate. The on-going discussion on rules and principles in the domain of accounting, 
discussed in chapter threes, can be seen as an extension of this legal debate. 
Rules and principles in the accounting context are inherent in some of the 
characteristics of the rules and principles being defined in Law. According to a 
number of prominent legal scholars leading with Dworkin (also see, Sunstein, 1995; 
Cunningham, 2007; Braithwaite, 2002a & 2004), rules are considered as concrete and 
detailed prescriptions. Rules are associated with exceptions and “bright lines” and 
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they are “applicable in all-or-nothing fashion”, i.e. “if the facts a stipulated rule are 
given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be 
accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision” (Dworkin, 
1967, p.25).  
Principles, on the other hand, have weight and reflect a wide spectrum of factors to be 
taken into consideration by the decision-makers (Wustemann & Kierzek, 2007, p.20; 
Dworkin, 1997 & 1967). This characteristic of principles reflects the fact that they are 
composed in order to encourage the use of judgment (Dworkin, 1967). Thus, 
principles are more abstract and general (Black et al., 2007).  
1.8 Chronology of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised into nine chapters. I explain the 
methodological basis on which I have developed a research instrument for measuring 
dispositions towards rules and principles in Chapter two. Part of that methodology 
was to explore various research literatures, including psychology, law, philosophy, 
and accounting, with the object of developing an understanding of rules and principles 
and an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages, 
articulated in debate and otherwise claimed for each. I report on this analysis of 
literatures and debate, in chapters three, four, five, and seven. Each of these chapters 
deals with a different literature stream and has a different emphasis. The empirical 
core of the thesis reported on in chapters six, eight and nine. Concluding remarks will 
be made in chapter ten. 
Chapter two explains the methodology followed in this project. In particular, it 
outlines the steps which this project follows to develop and test the instrument. A 
survey method is identified as best suited to the research objectives. The common 
problems with survey research are explained and some solutions to the problems are 
also provided. 
Chapter three focuses on the rules-based versus principles-based debate in the context 
of accounting regulation. It serves to contextualise the thesis. The aim of this chapter 
is to provide a synthesis of the important arguments for and against rules and 
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principles in recent years in accounting. An important observation is that the majority 
of the work done in relation to the rules and principles debate in accounting is 
conceptual.  
Chapter four identifies and justifies the particular conceptualisation of rules and 
principles underlying the development of the instrument. Legal and regulatory theory, 
in particular the ideas advanced by Dworkin (1967, 1997) provide the main 
conceptual foundation on which the understanding of rules and principles, and the 
distinctions between them, reflected in the instrument development, is based. 
Chapter five explores the psychological roots of individuals' dispositions to rules and 
principles. I identify various personality traits, cognition, attitude and values/cultural 
differences which have impact on individuals’ dispositions towards rules and 
principles. This chapter also serves an important need for the later empirical work: 
identifying relevant psychological constructs which are used to help establish the 
divergent and convergent validity of the instrument (DRP).  
Chapter six discusses the use of focus groups in testing and expanding on my 
understanding of what are seen to be the reasons underlying preferences for rules and 
principles. It explains the rationales and steps in using focus groups to filter the 
theoretical elements or dimensions which are derived from chapter three and also to 
check: 1) whether the literature review has covered the concepts under study, and that 
there is no immediate and obvious missing elements; 2) whether the conceptual 
dimensions correspond to the way people perceive rules and principles in real life.  
Chapter seven synthesises the elements espoused in the academic literature and the 
focus groups. In particular, in this chapter, I provide an extensive discussion on the 
dimensions which are introduced in chapter three, four, five and six. Therefore, 
chapter seven is the framework, foundation and literature source for the subsequent 
empirical work; this includes the theoretical source for item generation for the 
development of the DRP instrument. Empirical research at later stages is used to 
confirm or reject these conceptual dimensions. 
Chapter eight creates an initial item pool based on the identified 14 dimensions from 
the previous chapters. In this chapter, I describe the research methods and steps are 
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adopted to test the face and content validity of the items. Subsequently, at the 
quantitative phase of the study, a series of statistical procedures were carried out for 
further item reduction and establish the reliability of the DRP.  
Chapter nine reports the main empirical findings of this PhD: A factor analysis 
conducted on an independent sample with the objective to check whether an identical 
factor structure emerges; test for divergent and convergent validity of the refined 
instrument; internal consistency reliability and test-retest procedures. The predictive 
validity of the instrument was established via experiments using cognitive task based 
scenarios. A demographic variables analysis focused on - gender and ethnicity 
differences in relation to rules and principles-based approaches.   
Chapter 10 summarises the main findings and contributions of this PhD. Some 
speculations on the potential implications of the DRP are offered. In addition, it 
proposes some further research ideas and points out the limitations of the current 
research. 
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Figure 1 Overview structure of the thesis 
 
1.9 The intended contributions of this research 
This PhD project is designed to make a contribution to the rules versus principles 
debate which in various manifestations has been an important and unresolved concern 
in the domains of accounting and law for many years. In particular, in chapter seven, 
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dispositions towards rules and principles makes a valuable contribution, in its own 
right, to the research in regulatory theory. Furthermore, within the domain of social 
psychology, rules and principles are often implied to being linked to stable personal 
characteristics (need for closure, some dimensions of the thinking styles as well as 
some of the traits from the Big5 personality trait model). However the presumptions 
lack clear empirical evidence. This PhD unprecedentedly attempted to explore these 
psychological linkages and provided empirical responses to these presumptions. 
Rather than simply focusing on the phenomenon of which kind of regulation is 
‘better’ and ‘fairer’, one needs greater understanding of the compatibility and ‘fit’ 
between different types of regulations and individuals’ dispositions to rules and 
principles. This remains an important research issue for empirical studies examining 
the effectiveness of rules versus principles-based regulation. For example, research is 
needed on how individuals’ dispositions to rules and principles affect their investment 
and reporting decisions. If we were able first of all, to prove and establish empirically 
that individuals exhibit a relatively stable disposition towards rules and principles, 
then subsequently we would be able to classify regulation users as either rules-
oriented or principles-oriented. Therefore we would then be able to study more 
systematically the relationship between the individuals, in particular their rules/ 
principles preferences or dispositions, and their behaviour. Such knowledge could 
have significant implications for the design of appropriate, and ‘fitting’ regulatory 
systems. To achieve its full potential a psychometric instrument such as that which I 
aim to develop needs to be general enough to be widely applicable and not narrowly 
domain specific. The main task is to develop the instrument; later researchers can 
apply it in accounting, auditing and other fields where the problem of rules and 
principles has significance.  
Further this research will deepen and widen our understanding of factors that affect 
individuals’ attitudes towards rules and principles in a more general sense. The extant 
studies have solely focused on the ‘moral reasoning abilities’ aspect of ethical 
decision-making in the context of rules versus principles (Herron & Gilbertson, 
2004). They dismissed the possibilities of a range of other factors which may 
influence such dispositions. One of the contributions of this PhD project will be to 
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explain and predict that some individuals may be attracted to certain factors, 
reflecting features of rules and principles, while others may be repelled by them. Such 
information should be of interest to accounting firms and regulatory bodies who may 
need to take consideration of such individual variation in the situations of recruitment 
and regulatory training.  
I intend to develop an instrument able to produce scores of satisfactory measurement 
qualities. In the context of this research, accounting regulators, recruiters as well as 
accounting educators will be able to use this instrument to predict with some certainty 
how individuals are actually likely to behave in specific situations in relation to rules 
and principles. For instance, my instrument can be used to understand how accounting 
practitioners' dispositions to rules and principles might affect their competence and 
the person-job match (the degree to which an individual's dispositions to rules and 
principles can be reconciled to the behavioural demands of their job without stress 
creation). In addition, the empirical findings regarding the ethnicity and gender 
differences of individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles will contribute to 
one relatively new stream of behavioural accounting research which focuses on 
examining gender and ethnicity differences in terms of decision-making related to 
accounting and or auditing issues (Francis, Hasan, Park, &Wu, 2013). 
1.10 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has sought to provide a description and brief explanation of 
the   substance of the present PhD project. It has conveyed the initial six research 
questions which serve the central objective of designing and validating a 
psychometric instrument, measuring individual dispositions towards rules and 
principles. I explained that there is a research gap, as recognised by the Jamal and 
Tan’s (2008&2010) experimental studies, which examined and established that there 
is a ‘fit effect’ between the mentalities of practitioners and the types of the accounting 
regulations. Undoubtedly their study is significant, yet suffers major weakness as they 
lacked valid means to categorise auditors empirically and convincingly. Thus, 
Higgins’ regulatory focus theory, and in particular the concept of regulatory fit, 
inspired the researcher to develop an instrument to fill that gap. The rest of the chapter 
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proceeded by justifying the use of survey design as the main method for this project, 
introducing Dworkin’s position on rules and principles which forms the conceptual 
basis of this project, outlining the main content of the remaining nine chapters, and 
proposing the potential contributions that this project would make.
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Chapter 2: Methodology and Methods 
2.1 Objective for chapter and overview of content 
In this chapter I will explain and discuss, in broad terms, the methodology and 
practical methods employed to address the research questions set out in chapter one. I 
will also, in this chapter, attempt to uncover and briefly explain the methodological 
stance adopted. It is not the intention to ‘justify’ my own position here, but merely to 
bring its features into the open.
6
 
Fuller explanation of each method employed can be found in individual chapters 
dealing with specific project phases: chapter six - focus groups; chapter eight - 
creating and testing the initial items pool; chapter nine - further refining and 
confirming the instrument factor structure and other validity related tests/ results. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 to section 2.5 outlines a range of 
issues related to the development and validation of an instrument, such as the 
methodological assumption underpinning this project; providing a critical evaluation 
on the mixed research methods adopted here and a brief explanation of the way they 
complement each other; research design as well as validation issues. In addition, I 
point out the strengths and weakness of survey and offer some remedies could 
potentially alleviate the limitations. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Overall steps taken in this project 
The instrument development and refinement process follows, in broad terms, the 
classic paradigm for developing and validating measurement of constructs, as set out 
                                                 
6
 I recognise that there seems to be unending debate within accounting research regarding the nature of 
the reality that accountants deal with and the best way of exploring and knowing it. Differences in this 
debate are often exacerbated by researchers’ failure to clearly state their ontological, epistemological 
and methodological assumptions (Bisman, 2010, p.5). I have no plan to contribute to this debate as 
such, but will endeavour to make the assumptions guiding my own research clear. 
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for example by Churchill (1979), and elaborated in subsequent research dealing with 
attitudinal scaling (see for example DeVellis, 1991; Netemeyer, et al., 2003). This 
process comprises three main stages: 
1. The development, through an analysis and or examination of prior research and 
literature, of a preliminary view of the structure and dimensions of dispositions 
towards rules and principles (DRP). Detail of this work can be found in chapters 
three, four, five and seven. 
2. The development of a preliminary research instrument and initial work to reduce 
the size of the item pool. This stage involves the following steps: The generation 
of a large pool of survey or questionnaire ‘items’ based on the analysis of prior 
literature (referred to above) and focus group discussions. The subjection of the 
initial item pool to expert review and peer review sessions is to “weed out” 
weak and unclear items and reduce number of the items to a more manageable 
level. The collection of a large sample of responses to the preliminary 
questionnaire, is based on the refined but still large item pool, using online 
survey. The performance of statistical procedures including the calculation of 
Cronbach’s alphas and an EFA, all facilitating the elimination of redundant 
items and the production of a first draft of the DRP instrument. Further the 
initial empirical testing of the hypothesised structure underpinning the 
dispositions to rules and principles is presented (chapter eight).  
3. The confirmation and validation of the reduced sized questionnaire, involving: 
another factor analysis based on a new sample to confirm the structure that 
emerged from the first preliminary factor analysis; predictive tests, and test-
retest, and tests of convergent and divergent validity based on a large sample 
analysis of the correlation of the DRP instrument, and a battery of carefully 
selected research instruments (chapter nine).  
Note: the process of attitude questionnaire design is a continuous and iterative process 
(see Churchill, 1979). 
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2.2.1 Conducting literature review for the generation of initial item pool 
To derive the conceptual dimensions underlying individual’s dispositions to rules and 
principles, a systematic literature review is conducted.  
 
In order to generate items for each dimension, I have adopted an approach which 
basically taking inspirations from prior research. To ensure the conceptual space 
would be adequately covered, I consulted the following sources: 1) a search of rules 
and principles debate in accounting & law using Google scholar; 2) identifying recent 
papers which have referenced the key publications on rules and principles debate in 
the domain of accounting and legal philosophy; 3) searching rules and principles as 
key words within one of the biggest and most authoritative psychometric database: 
PsycTESTS
7
, by the American Psychological Association; 4) Furthermore, some 
items were created based on the participants’ experiences with rules and principles as 
discussed in the focus groups (chapter six). A full list of items, and their sources can 
be found in appendix one. 
2.2.2 Steps adopted in this project 
There is an agreement amongst researchers on procedures for developing a good scale 
which is valid and reliable (Churchill, 1979).8 There are seven major steps in the 
design and development of the current instrument (see figure 2):  
                                                 
7
 http://www.apa.org/science/programs/testing/find-tests.aspx 
8
 A common approach to the development of a scale is to modify an existing scale, by for example or 
introducing a new set of items to the scale, to fit a specific purpose, context, or conceptual perspective. 
This approach is not appropriate in this case because, as previously explained, our review of the 
previous research and literature shows that there is no existing scale / instrument designed specifically 
for measuring individuals’ dispositions to rules and principles. 
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Figure 2 A flow chart depicting the DRP development processes 
 
Specifying the construct domain - literature & theory (chapter 3, 4 &5) 
•Legal regulatory 
•Accounting and auditing 
•Philosophy 
•Psychological origins of the dispositions to rules and principles 
Specifying the construct domain - focus groups (n=19) (chapter 6) 
•Checking the dimensions against prior litertuare 
•Qualitative insights 
•New fresh dimension which understated in literature  
Generating initial item pool reflecting the domain (chapter 8)  
• 14 dimensions 
•Each has rules and principles subscales 
• 16 items per dimenson (4 per quadrant : negatively worded  & positively worded) 
•Had twice as many  items for the initial testing 14 x 16 x 2 = 448  
Generating initial item pool - Checking for face and content validity (chapter 8)  
•  Peer review sessions (n=11) 
•Subject matter experts interviews (n=6) 
•Reduced items to 323 before it went  online -for a larger sample size 
•Testing Dworkin's rules and principles conceptulisation (n=55 using online survey) 
Refining the Measure - Prelinimary statistical analysis with sample size  (n=90)  
(chapter 8) 
•Normality analysis 
•Reduced 323 items to 160  items via item analysis (Cronbach's alpha) 
•Conducting preliminary factor analysis on 160 items 
•Reduced to 15 items 
• 2 clear factors 
•Split half analysis 
 
Assessing the measure with new data -  Factor analysis for confirmatory  and refining 
purpose (n=474) 
(chapter 9, part 1) 
•Refined instrument:10 items 
• 5 items each for rules and principles subscale 
•Confirmed 2 factor structure in the previous factor analysis 
 Assessing the measure with new data - tests of construct validity with the 10 items instrument 
(chapter 9, part 2 and 3) 
•Divergent and convergent validity 
•Eight scenarios designed to use for predictive validity testing 
•Correlation analysis between the scores of  participant's DRP and her eight scenarios 
•One-way ANOVA analysis 
•Multiple regression analysis 
•Demographic variables analysis: gender; ethnicity; age 
•Gender and ethnicity impacts on behavioural intentions 
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Table 1 A summary of the sample size for each step of empirical work 
Empirical step Sample size Reference 
Focus groups N=19 Chap 6, p.123 
Peer review sessions & Experts reviews N= 17 Chap 8, p.162 
& p.165 
Testing Dworkin’s rules and principles 
distinctions 
N=55 (subsample of 
the 90 sample) 
Chap 8, p.169 
Online survey (preliminary item pool) for 
item reduction purpose 
N=90 Chap 8, p.168 
Shortened instrument for confirmatory 
and validating purpose 
N=474 (new sample) Chap 9, part 2, 
p.197 
Predictive validity tests with eight 
scenarios 
N=89 (subsample of 
the bigger 474 
sample) 
Chap 9, part 3, 
p.225 
Test –re test of the instrument N=30 (subsample of 
the 89 sample) 
Chap 9, part 1, 
p.202 
 
2.3 Basic methodological assumptions underlying the research 
Positivistic research refers to a research that is “scientific, structured, has a prior 
theoretical base, seeks to establish the nature of relationships and causes and effects, 
and employs empirical validation and statistical analyses to test and confirm theories” 
(Bisman, 2010, p.5). Positivist research generally aims at generalisability and at the 
deduction of universal principles. The theories derived in this manner consequently 
are judged by their capacity to explain and or predict phenomena.  
Positivistic research views “‘reality’ as a concrete structure and ‘people’ as adapters, 
responders, and information processors to achieve efficiency and the goal of an 
organization” (Morgan & Smircich, 1980, cited by Hoque, 2006, p.1). Accounting 
research from such perspective, views accounting control systems such as budgeting 
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as a means to achieving low cost, efficient operations. Research of this school of 
thought normally apply an arms-length research method, statistically categorises key 
variables and then attempts to retrieve meaning by ex post facto interpretations of 
tests of significance (Tomkins & Groves, 1983, p. 362 cited by Hoque, 2006, p.1).  
Interpretivist approaches to research, on the other hand, typically “assume that people 
create and associate their own subjective and intersubjective meanings as they interact 
with the world around them”. Interpretive researchers thus attempt to understand 
“phenomena through accessing the meanings participants assign to them” (Orlikowski 
& Baroudi, 1991, p5). Interpretivist research seeks interpretations, and finely 
contextualised explanations and rich understanding of actions and events that do not 
fit into the existing theories or models (Bisman, 2010, p.7). Because interpretivist 
analyses are finely contextualised, they are typically not designed to offer findings 
that can be generalized in a very direct way. Nevertheless, this research has the 
capacity to provide powerful insight and lessons of general value. From a 
methodological perspective, interpretivist work requires in-depth study of a specific 
meaningful context. Symbolic interactionism, grounded theory and 
ethnomethodological approaches are the examples of such school of thought 
(Laughlin, 1995). 
The current project is dominantly positivism in nature but is complemented with some 
of the interpretivist approaches in the forms of focus groups and subject matter 
expert’s interviews. I acknowledge the existence and interaction between the social 
and psychological worlds and the outside physical world. On the other hand, I believe 
that the role of human actors play in the material world (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). I 
believe that human beings have the ability to utilise languages, labels, and other 
means of culturally specific actions to interpret, modify their environment, in turn 
contributing to the enactment of a reality (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). With regard to 
the current research phenomenon, namely individuals’ dispositions to rules and 
principles, I focus primarily on the degree to which individuals relate to rules and 
principles differently and what are the dimensions or elements underpinning those 
individual differences. More importantly, I hope to develop a reliable instrument 
which is able to capture and measure such individual differences.  
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In summary, the majority of the empirical work in this PhD will be survey research 
taking a predominantly- positivist epistemological stance. It is quantitative, and data-
driven, it utilises statistical analysis, and aims to draw patterns from large data 
samples (Bryman, 2004; Bisman, 2010). On the other hand, qualitative and inductive 
methods such as experts and peer review sessions and focus groups are used to derive 
a conceptual framework as a basis for item generation and for the survey design. 
2.4 Methodology: Mixed method 
This project applies both qualitative and quantitative methods at various stages of the 
research. Mixed method means working with different types of data. In essence, 
triangulation of different methods is mainly used for enhancing construct validity, or 
the extent to which theoretical concepts and their operational definitions adequately 
capture underlying properties of the research phenomena (Jick, 1979). 
The qualitative research method (focus groups discussion) are conducted as the 
supplementary method to the survey, more specifically they are used in order to filter 
through the theoretical assumptions and claims made in rules and principles debate, 
primarily drawn from the legal regulation, moral philosophy, and accounting and 
auditing literatures, and checking whether there are any themes that were not being 
explicitly identified or discussed in the prior literature. Expert review sessions are 
adopted to establish the face and content validity of the items in the initial pool. The 
qualitative steps have facilitated a more accurate instrument calibration for this 
project. The administration of the survey and subsequent analysis was essentially 
quantitative as are most of the final stages of the process of deriving the DRP 
instrument, exploring its psychometric properties, and testing its reliability and 
validity, using a series of statistical techniques such as factor analysis, the analysis of 
Cronbach’s alpha, correlation analysis as well as regression models.  
2.5 Main research method: survey 
The choice of the design reflects the research interests and objectives pursued. The 
goal here is to develop and validate a generic instrument that will have reasonable 
predictive power, can be used to predict individuals’ behaviour in relation to real-life 
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tasks. I aim for a simplified factor structure that could explain reasonable 
variance/portion of the individuals’ dispositions to rules and principles.  
2.5.1 Demonstrating the validity and reliability of the instrument 
Concern for the representativeness, or generalizability, of research, for its reliability, 
or consistency and replicability of measurement, and for its validity is typical of 
positivist approaches
9
 however as I have noted that, this study is not entirely positivist 
as it also applies qualitative methods such as focus groups and the experts review 
sessions. Validity refers to whether a questionnaire is measuring what it purports to 
(Bryman & Cramer 1997). While this can be difficult to establish, demonstrating the 
validity of a developing measure is essential. There are several different types of 
validity (Bowling, 1997; Bryman & Cramer, 1997). Face validity: whether the item 
appears to be about what you want to assess. Face validity is essentially a matter of 
appearances and whether an instrument ‘seems’ valid (Loewenthal, 1996). Content 
validity, on the other hand is a matter of real substance, it concerns the extent to 
which the elements of the assessment instrument are relevant to and representative of 
the target construct. In this study some assurance concerning content validity is given 
by subject expert review of the item pool; which itself was drawn from a careful 
analysis of relevant debates. 
Face and content validity are the initial steps in establishing validity, but they alone 
are not sufficient. Convergent and discriminant validity must also be demonstrated by 
correlating the measure with related and/or dissimilar measures (Bowling, 1997). 
Convergent validity10 refers to the degree to which measures of constructs that in 
theory ought to be related are in fact correlated (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). 
                                                 
9 Such concerns are typical of any social research that aspires to be at all like the hard sciences; 
whether or not strictly speaking positivist. 
10
 If the DRP were to have convergent validity, thus the scores on DRP are expected to correlate highly 
in the predicted direction with older, well-established test measures designed to measure theoretically 
related concepts such as need for closure measure; Big5 personality traits such as openness and 
conscientiousness; Sternberg’s thinking style, etc.,. 
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Discriminant validity11, on the other hand, refers to tests of the degree to which 
constructs that theoretically ought not to be related are in fact un-related, or 
uncorrelated (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). These tests help to show that the 
construct I attempt to develop and measure is unique enough and not a mere 
duplication of another existing construct. Construct validity relates to how well the 
items in the questionnaire represent the underlying conceptual structure (Rattray & 
Jones, 2007). In other words, it focuses on how well the items created by the 
researcher to represent “a hypothetical construct really capture the essence of that 
hypothetical construct” (Proios, 2010, p.197). Factor analysis is one statistical 
technique that can be used to determine the factor structures for the construct.  
Tests of the predictive validity of the instrument included analysis of the correlations 
of subjects’ the DRP instrument scores with their responses to eight scenarios (see 
appendix six) designed to measure their behavioural intention in relation to real-life 
situations involving rules and principles. 
Instrument reliability is concerned with consistency, including replicability, of 
measurement. The internal consistency reliability reflects the degree to which each 
item is intercorrelated with the other items in the pool designed to measure the same 
construct facet (Bryman & Cramer 1999). Internal consistency reliability is assessed 
here by calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and examining or comparing the 
factor structures using a split-half technique. External reliability concerns the degree 
of consistency of a measurement over time. It refers to the degree to which a research 
instrument is able to produce reliable and consistent results if repeated applications 
are made (William et al., 1989). Test-retest was carried out to establish the reliability 
of the instrument. 
                                                 
11
  If the DRP were to have divergent validity, thus DRP scores are expected show marginal 
correlations with scores on tests that are designed to measure concepts that are unrelated theoretically 
such as social desirability test; Higgins’ regulatory focus questionnaire and the emotional stability trait 
of the Big5 personality model. 
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2.5.2 The main research method: Survey 
2.5.2.1 The strengths of survey 
The choice of the design reflects the research interests and study objectives pursued. 
In particular, the main research objectives of this study are to develop a valid and 
reliable way of measuring individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles and 
then to explore underlying structures of these dispositions, and their relationship to 
rule and principle related behaviour. The aim is to generate an instrument that can be 
used with some justified confidence, to measure dispositions to rules and principles 
and to predict actual rule and principle related behaviour: that is, how individuals are 
likely to respond to, or handle, rules and principles. Hence, ultimately, a quantitative 
approach based on statistical theory is more suitable to achieve the objectives of the 
study. 
There are other associated benefits of using survey as method of data collection are 
they usually relatively quick to complete, are relatively economical and are usually 
easy to analyse (Bowling, 1997). Nelson (2002) argues that good surveys elicit 
detailed information from large populations. Thus, it is an approach that provides rich 
insights into the practical setting with high generalisability.  
The main ethical considerations of using a self-administered survey include the data 
privacy and the anonymity of the participants (a detailed discussion on this see 
chapter eight, section 8.4.1). 
2.5.2.2 The weakness of survey and potential remedies  
A common criticism of survey-based research is that it sometimes lacks contextual 
and historical depth in its approach to the phenomenon of interest. The qualitative 
dimension of this study may remedy this potential limitation by providing richer 
insights (Yin, 2003). The focus groups, for example, provided comparatively rich 
qualitative insights in relation to the construction of our understanding of the 
dimensions underlying dispositions towards rules and principles. 
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Another main criticism associated with questionnaire research is that “it assumes that 
the researcher and respondents share underlying assumptions about language and 
interpret statement wording in a similar manner” (Rattray & Jones, 2007, p.235). This 
shortcoming will be remedied by the use of peer review and subject matter expert 
sessions (chapter eight), in which, amongst other things, readability and familiarity 
with the language used in pool items were specifically considered. Furthermore, I 
have tested across different groups in terms of age, gender and ethnicity for 
equivalence. The results showed that the instrument does not discriminate people 
from different demographic groups.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter explanations and justifications have been given of the basic 
methodological paradigm adopted in this project: The method used and described 
being essentially positivist with some use of qualitative methods where appropriate in 
some phases of the work. This was followed by the introduction to the main research 
steps employed by the project, and an introductory discussion of the means by which 
validity and reliability will be pursued, and of certain disadvantages associated with 
the survey method and how they will be addressed.
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Chapter 3: Rules vs. Principles in Accounting 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a critical discussion of the on-going rules versus principles 
debate in the context of accounting and auditing literature. The debate over the pros 
and cons of the principles versus rules-based accounting and auditing regulation has 
drawn considerable attention from regulators, academics and the accounting 
profession (DiPiazza et al., 2008). However, little attention has been paid to the roles, 
capacities and inclinations of the practitioners required to implement and work with 
the regulations and standards in question (Jamal & Tan 2008; 2010). As discussed in 
chapter one, it is not simply a matter of which kind of regulation or standard (rule-
based or principle-based) is better or more effective. Rather, the likely interaction (fit 
or misfit) between the kind of standard and the individual dispositions towards rules 
and principles needs to be considered (Jamal & Tan 2008; 2010). It becomes 
potentially important  for matters such as the pursuit of accounting and audit quality, 
that we have means of assessing and understanding the dispositions of individuals’ 
towards rules and principles, and that this is taken into account at the general level by 
standard setters and at the more local level by managers and or HR allocating tasks. 
In this chapter, in to order to establish the context for this project, I will describe an 
array of reasons emerging from the research, theoretical and experimental, for and 
against rules and principles. Thus, I am not attempting to draw conclusions as to 
which arguments are ‘best’ in any objective sense. I acknowledge that the reasons 
presented here are not exhaustive. Nonetheless, an extended and systematic literature 
review shows that these are the reasons most commonly cited in the debate. Later on, 
in chapter six, I will empirically test these conceptual dimensions against individuals’ 
practical experiences dealing with rules and principles (chapter six: using focus 
groups to double check the dimensions and elicit new insights). Finally, the analysis 
developed will provide one source for generating individual “items” to be used in the 
development of the DRP instrument. 
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3.1.1 The organisation of the chapter 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 gives an overview of the 
importance of the “rules versus principles” debate in the context of financial 
regulation and emphasises the significance of the debate for the maintenance of the 
all-important commodity of trust in financial contexts. Section 3.3 delineates and 
elaborates the definitions and characteristics of a rules- and a principles-based 
regulation in the sphere of accounting and auditing. Here I also discuss the cultural 
and legal contexts of the two approaches. Section 3.4 (3.4.1-3.4.13) proceeds to 
describe the theoretical dimensions underpinning the preferences towards a rules- and 
principles-based approach, as emerging in debate in the accounting and auditing 
context.  Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Trust and the debate 
The prior research has implied that the regulatory choice between rules- and 
principles-based regulations reflects the level of trust or faith the regulatory agencies 
and stakeholders involved put in the regulated firms (Black, 2008; Sama & Shoaf, 
2005; Roth et al., 2011). The recent regression to a rules-based regulation reflects a 
deteriorating level of trust or “collapse of confidence” (Hutter & Dodd, 2008, p.4). 
The risk with rules is that this approach is considered to foster a culture of 
“opportunistic behaviour and serious frauds” (Guiso, 2010, p.1). Therefore, the 
challenge remains as to how the regulators “restore corporate integrity and market 
confidence without overacting and stifling the dynamism that underlies a strong 
economy” (Coglianese, Healey, Keating & Michael, 2004, p.2).  
The regulators face a choice between rules and principles to restore the ‘trust’ (Black, 
2008). A rules-based approach reflects a more distant and less trusting regulatory 
relationship between the regulators and the regulated (Black, 2008; Guiso, 2010). In 
contrast, it has been argued that a principles-based approach would be more beneficial 
for enhancing the trust between the regulators and the regulated players because it is 
designed to prompt re-framing of the regulatory relation from ‘controlling’ to ‘mutual 
trust’, and the regulated would adopt a self-reflective approach in their own business 
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practices to meet the regulatory goals. Consequently, both regulators and the regulated 
players would “trust each other to fulfil their side of this new regulatory bargain” 
(Black, 2008, p.8). Meanwhile, a ‘mutuality’ of the perspectives of the regulators and 
the regulated players will be emphasised, on shared interpretations regarding the 
meaning of principles with respect to the appropriate behaviour (Coglianese et al., 
2004).  
3.3  Definitions of rules- and principles-based regulation  
Despite the long-standing prominent debate regarding the effectiveness of rules-based 
and principles-based accounting standards, “the exact meaning of their distinctions is 
still not clear and settled” (Hail et al., 2010, p.376). In addition, there has been 
considerable variation in terminology, used to express substantially similar ideas: 
Principles-based regulation (PBR) has been called a ‘substance–over-form12’ 
approach (Psaros & Trotman, 2004); an ‘objective-based approach’ (Benston, 
Bromwich, & Wagenhofer, 2006; FASB, 2004); a ‘less precise and general standard-
approach’ (Nelson, 2003); and a ‘risk-based’/an ‘outcome-based’ approach (Wallison, 
2007).  While, a variety of definitions of the term principles-based approach have 
been suggested13, this PhD project takes the view of ICAS  which sees an accounting 
principle as “a general statement, with widespread support, which is intended to 
support truth and fairness and acts as a guide to action; and contains no “bright-line” 
or anti-abused provisions” (2006, p.1-2). With this view, principles announce “broad-
brush” directives. The implicit expectation is that they will be appropriately 
                                                 
12 The IASB has used the term “substance over form” to describe the importance of exercising 
professional judgment in accounting (IASB, 2009). “Substance over form” refers to business 
transactions that are accounted for and presented in accordance with their substance and economic 
reality and not merely their legal form (IASB, 2010, Framework, para. 35). For instance, International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) 17 states that “whether a lease is a finance lease or an operating lease 
depends on the substance of the transaction rather than the form of the contract” (para. 10).  
13 I believe that all above mentioned approaches share the common underlying characteristics that 
constitute a principles-based approach. It is the one characterised by, for example, an orientation to 
outcomes and regulators’ acceptance of the fact that there is more than one way to achieve a regulatory 
goal. 
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interpreted and applied in various circumstances through the use of professional 
judgment and expertise developed through professional practice and dialogue (Ford, 
2010) and, over time, will take account of other pertinent regulation and law (Jackson, 
2004). In this way, regulators can maintain focus on the high-level regulatory 
objectives whilst allowing for 1) variations in the application to each individual case 
to take proper account of circumstances (Bratton, 2003, p. 1037); and 2) deviation 
from the accounting standard when required in order to achieve ‘true and fair’ 
reporting (IASB, 1989, p.4614; Beest, 2009). Fundamental to principles-based 
regulation is the “development of a functional and effective ‘interpretative 
community’ that includes industry participants, regulators and other stakeholders in 
on-going communication around the content of the regulatory principles” (Ford, 2010, 
p.4).   
In contrast, a rules-based regulation tends toward formalism, with the content of the 
rules dictating both the regulatory objectives and the particulars of the given context 
(Bratton, 2003). It is defined as “a means of establishing an unambiguous decision-
making method. There can be no doubt about when and how it is to be applied” 
(ICAS, 2006, p.4). In other words, the rules-based approach can be characterised as 
tending to favour ‘form over substance’. In this approach, not the economic substance 
but literally and mechanically following the letters of the rules determines how to 
recognise accounting events. Moreover, a rules-based approach has been referred to as 
‘a cookbook’ (Alexander & Jermakowicz, 2006), in which all the right answers are 
prescribed in a lot of detailed and interpretive implementation guidance. This 
guidance is often necessary because it describes the application of the exceptions. A 
further aim is to eliminate ambiguities by giving clear instruction of how and when 
the rules should be applied. Thus, a rules-based approach has been criticised for 
offering minimal opportunity for the application of professional judgment (Duchac, 
2004 cited by Bhimani, 2008, p.447; ICAS, 2006a & 2006b). 
                                                 
14 “Financial statements are frequently described as showing a true and fair view of, or as presenting 
fairly, the financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an entity” (IASB, 1989, 
p.46). 
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I acknowledge the fact that no workable system consists entirely of rules or of 
principles, but different systems can be comparatively more rules-based or more 
principles-based (Ford, 2010, p.7): The regulatory approach of the UK Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) and the accounting standards developed by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) can be broadly classified as being principles-
based (Leone, 2007; Sawers, 2008), whereas standards created by the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) can be classified as being predominantly rules-
based (Schipper, 2003; Leone, 2007). Hence, auditors using US like GAAP or IASB-
like GAAP regimes are exposed to standards that vary in terms of being principles-
based or rules-based. 
3.3.1 The characteristics of a rules-based and a principles-based standard 
Table 2 The characteristics of rules- and principles-based standards 
Rules-based standard Principles-based standard  
Bright-line threshold: numeric threshold, 
usually presented as 1) criteria, 2) condition, 3) 
provision, 4) requirement, 5) percentage 
Qualitative as opposed to “bright line” rules: 
evaluative terms such as fairness, reasonable, 
with care, professional judgment. 
Scope and legacy exceptions:  numerical 
thresholds, exceptions, exemptions.  
They have broad application to a diverse range 
of circumstances; no exceptions or exemptions. 
Large volumes: prescription and instruction 
with regard to how rules should be implemented 
and operationalised. 
Expressing the reason behind the rules, 
application involves higher involvement and 
investment of judgment.  
Concrete and detailed expression. High level of generality and abstractness. 
Top-down, prescriptive and ‘box-ticking’ 
regulatory style. 
Embedded in and derived from a community 
that shares the interpretations of the principles. 
Based on Mergenthaler (2009), Black, et al (2007; 2008), Ford (2010) and Tweedie 
(2007). 
3.3.1.1 Principles increase judgment and accountability 
Research on the motivational and cognitive effects of process accountability suggests 
that since the application of a principles-based standard requires higher levels of 
judgment, it concurrently increases the sense of accountability of those involved. 
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Accountability can have a “positive effect on decision performance as it overcomes 
biases and increases attention and effort duration” (Wynder, Baxter, & Laing, 2012, 
p.3). Moreover, a principles-based standard increases auditors’ epistemic motivation 
in comparison with a rules-based standard (Cohen et al., 2011). This is an important 
finding since epistemic motivation is linked directly to the “desire to obtain a 
thorough and accurate understanding of the task at hand” (De Dreu, Beersma, 
Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006, p.928). A high level of epistemic motivation has been 
found to “stimulate decision-makers to search for ‘the truth’ because of concerns 
about possible invalidity of their judgment” (Cohen 2011, p.7). 
Chapman et al. (2009, p.296) reviewed a number of behavioural studies on earning 
management and accounting choices and suggest that a more principles-based rather 
than a rules-based regulation “will be likely to mitigate earning management 
behaviour” (p. 296; see also Peecher et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2011). This is because 
the former will require more informed and transparent disclosure on how the 
judgment has been used in arriving at the accounting decision. This conclusion was 
further testified in Carpenter et al (2011), who found that auditors using a more 
principles-based approach are less likely to consent to a client’s aggressive reporting 
preference. This is because a principles-based approach encourages counterfactual 
reasoning which requires practitioners to explicitly consider the argument against the 
client-preferred method of accounting treatment. 
3.3.2 Institutional and political contexts of the rules vs. principles debate 
Because an accounting system is a complementary component of the country’s overall 
institutional system (Ball, 2001), accounting issues such as rules versus principles are 
clearly affected by country-specific factors such as complex cultural, institutional and 
legal structural differences between countries (for example, between the United 
Kingdom and United States) (Jamal & Tan, 2008, p.5). The task of examining and 
comparing two jurisdictions is obviously beyond the scope of this PhD project. 
However, it is necessary for me to point out certain significant differences between 
these two regulatory systems without going into a great deal of depth.   
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It is widely accepted that the nature of the legal system in a country influences its 
accounting practices (e.g. Salter & Niswander, 1995; Donelson, McInnis, & 
Mergenthaler, 2012). A rules-based preference in accounting decision-making is 
closely related to the litigious environment in the US, since accounting practitioners 
might be reluctant to increase the level of professional judgment applied for fear of 
subsequent lawsuits. This is supported by a recent empirical study by Donelson et al 
(2012), whose work confirmed that rules-based standards are associated with a lower 
threat of litigation. In addition, America also has the highest numbers of multinational 
companies which have subsidiaries around the world (Donelson et al., 2012), which 
leads to a greater desire for rules for the purpose of comparability. In contrast, the 
European legal environment is different as in “lacking class actions, contingent fees, 
or the ’American rule’ that generally precludes fee-shifting against the plaintiff” 
(Coffee, 2004a, p.61). Thus, Europe “experiences little securities litigation and hence 
can tolerate abstract generality in the formulation of its accounting rules” (Coffee, 
2004a, p.61).  
3.4 Overview of the dimensions  
The literature makes it clear that there are various reasons underlying preferences for 
one approach over another. In the following sections, I present an array of underlying 
reasons for causing one to prefer one approach over another. 
3.4.1 Need for security 
Prior literature involving accountants’ behaviour has shown that auditors seek 
protection through ‘rule following’ behaviours (Houghton & Hronsky, 2001; Öhman 
et al., 2006). This type of auditor belongs to the camp which favours structured 
quantitative algorithms over auditor judgment (Sullivan, 1984 cited by Smith, Fiedler, 
Brown & Kestel, 2001, p.40). To these auditors, a rules-based approach creates a 
buffer against litigation risk and potential accusations, as auditors are able to match 
their standard of care to specific guidelines (Schipper, 2003; Taub, 2005; Pentland, 
1993). In this way, auditors feel the shift in accountability reduces their anxiety about 
being held liable for any potential loss or wrong doings (Mergenthaler et al., 2012); 
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rules-based regulation, therefore, is seen as a ‘safe harbour’ against the risk of 
litigation and criticism (Houghton & Hronsky, 2001; Schipper, 2003; Mergenthaler, 
2010; Mergenthaler et al., 2012; Bratton, 2004). It has been noticed that if auditors 
claim that they have followed the rules, the chances of being sued are diminished 
(Shortridge & Myring, 2004; Mergenthaler et al., 2012). However, the opposing 
argument is that rules sometimes result in a ‘gotcha’ enforcement mentality (Dickey 
& Scanlon, 2006, p.1515). That is, any accidental rule-breaking can be more likely to 
be viewed as intentional and will consequently be punished more severely. Therefore, 
despite the fact that rules protect individuals from potential backlash, they also 
provide a ‘roadmap’ for lawyers/regulators to better detect any errors or mistakes one 
would accidentally commit (see Mergenthaler et al., 2012 for an in-depth analysis). 
 
Some scholars believe that a principles-based approach better protects practitioners 
because in the principles-based standards, objectives are clearly outlined, “thus, the 
range of responses in which professional judgment can fall is tightly bounded, thus 
significantly mitigating this [litigation] risk” (SEC study 2003, cited by Dickey & 
Scanlon, 2006, p.14). Furthermore, a principles-based approach allows users to justify 
their decisions/rationales under challenge, thus, it is less likely to result in 
restatements (Bogoslaw, 2008; Mergenthaler et al., 2012; ICAS, 2006; Maines et al., 
2003; Ng, 2004; Arjoon, 2006). The bottom line with operationalising with a 
principles-based approach is that the ground for litigation should not be held on the 
basis of compliance, but rather it should be based on whether practitioners exercise 
their professional judgment correctly or not (Hall & Renner, 1991, p.63).  
Principles-based approaches can cause a feeling of insecurity for practitioners because 
of their inherent ‘exposure risks’ (Dickey & Scanlon, 2006, p.16). In other words, 
people fear that the ex-post nature of the principles-based standard will “open them up 
to more litigations as they depend on their own judgment rather than a set of strict 
rules” (Somerville, 2003, online press16; Mergenthaler et al., 2012, p.35). It is a 
                                                 
15 Remarks of Linda Thomsen, Sec Director of Enforcement, at 2006 Securities Regulation Institute, 
January, 2006. 
16 http://www.bizjournals.com/triad/stories/2003/03/03/focus2.html?page=all 
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challenge since auditors and accountants “may be less able to predict how regulators 
or courts will apply these principles in particular contexts” (Coglianese, 2004, p.15). 
This is also referred to as ‘interpretative risk’ by Black (2008). The vagueness and 
context-sensitive principles could lead to multiple interpretations of one particular 
situation (Black, 2008) and since the principles “are open to interpretation, it will also 
be more challenging to identify when a principle has been breached” (Barrass, 2007 
cited by Carter & Marchant, 2011, p.162).  
3.4.2 Need to ensure uniformity vs. flexibility 
The preference for rules could also be viewed as reflecting a collective accounting 
professionals’ value system which emphasised uniformity (Gray, 1988). Gray suggests 
that accountants’ preference is for uniformity, which is referred to as “a preference for 
the enforcement of uniform accounting practice between companies and for the 
consistent use of such practice over time, as opposed to flexibility, in accordance with 
the perceived circumstances of individual companies” (Gray, 1988, p.8). 
Ball (2005) sees two problems, however, with this ‘one size fits all’ approach. For a 
start, it ignores the fact that firms differ on a myriad of dimensions such as strategy, 
investment policy, financing policy, technology, size etc. Further, standardised rules-
based regulation overlooks some of the country-specific factors such as the 
political/legal and cultural/social differences. For these reasons, he concludes that “It 
has never been convincingly demonstrated that there exists a unique optimum set of 
rules for all” (p. 8). Moreover, a rules-based accounting approach could lead to 
“illusory comparability” (SEC, 2003; FASB, 2004) or practitioners to assume that 
‘comparability in appearance’ is equivalent to ’comparability in substance’”17 
(Sawabe, 2005, p.180). In this way, “rules often do not only fail to provide the most 
relevant information about the economic substance of transactions and events, but 
                                                 
17 Sawabe (2005) suggests two reasons for that: 1) use of complex financial engineering to circumvent 
the rules may reduce the comparability of underlying economic substance; 2), if two arrangements are 
fundamentally the same but one meets the bright-line tests while the other does not, they may still be 
accounted for differently. 
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they may also require economically different issues to be accounted for identically 
and thereby create a pseudo-comparability” (Wustemann & Kierzek, 2007, p.24; 
Benston et al., 2006, p.169-170; Nobes, 2005, p.10). 
Principles-based regulation has been praised for its ability to be adaptable and 
dynamic gap-filling (Carter & Marchant, 2011, p.165). A principles-based approach 
provides firms with more options and freedoms for conducting business and achieving 
both their own and regulatory goals (Black, 2008; Carter & Marchant, 2011). Each 
firm, therefore, has the flexibility to determine how each principle applies to their 
products, practices and business (Kershaw, 2005; Carter & Marchant, 2011). The 
additional freedom which comes with using the principles-based approach will lead to 
more co-operation and willingness to comply with the regulatory goals (Ford, 2008; 
Black, 2008).  
There are some concerns with the flexibility aspect of a principles-based approach; 
one is that it does not guarantee the comparability of the financial information being 
reported (Aliali & Cao, 2010). Indeed, some people argue that the flexibility of the 
principles causes diversities in reporting quality which leads to inconsistencies 
between companies and different timelines (Gordon & Gallery, 2008).  
3.4.3 Need for predictability and certainty 
Auditors may have a higher tendency to avoid uncertainty and, as a result, come to 
rely on rules to deliver more certainty and predictability (Hofstede, 2001, p.145). 
However, rules are liable to fail in situations which are not known or anticipated by 
the rules in advance (Black, 2001; Ford, 2010). Moreover, rules-based approaches 
tend to “drive uncertainty ‘underground’ and make problem-solving less explicit” 
(Ford, 2010, p.49).  
Ford (2010) argues that in a complex, real life situation where the market is fast 
changing, the principles-based approach is a more promising long-term solution to 
alleviate the associated uncertainties. It is able to deliver more certainty for the 
individual player for the reason that it facilitates and bridges an on-going dialogue 
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among stakeholders within the community, in the sense that each player could 
participate in the negotiation process and have a clearer view on whether the 
outcomes emerging would take note of their needs and interests (Ford, 2010; Black, 
2008; Okamoto, 2011; Cunningham, 2007).  
One aspect of principles-based regulation causing unpredictability is the concern for 
backlash because of the high level of uncertainty associated with what is expected by 
applying the principles across a wide range of different situations (FSA, 2007; Black, 
2008; Cunningham, 2007). In particular, an individual company faces uncertainty 
regarding the degree to which its conduct is in compliance with the regulator’s 
interpretation of the principles (Black, 2008; Schawarcz, 2008; Coglianese et al., 
2004). Furthermore, there is also the uncertain question of how tolerant regulators will 
be of a company’s divergent interpretation (Carter & Marchant, 2011, p.162). 
Consequently, “one fear is that companies will be blamed in hindsight for actions that 
may have seemed like reasonable and good-faith interpretation of the principles at the 
time the decision was made” (Gray, 2009; Cunningham, 2007 cited by Carter & 
Marchant, 2011, p.162). This fear is closely linked to the need for security when 
applying principles as discussed in section 2.5.1. 
3.4.4 Need for innovation 
One of the common arguments in favour of principles-based regulation is that it 
supports innovation (Ford 2010, p.37). Black argues that PBR provides a flexible 
regulatory regime which can facilitate innovations for both firms and regulators 
(Black, 2008). In her view, for firms, PBR can facilitate innovations and enhance 
competitiveness. For regulators, the innovation can be seen as a new way of 
supervision, which enables the responsiveness and the durability of the regulatory 
methods in a rapid changing market place, and enhances its own competitiveness 
(Ford, 2010, p.22).  
The FSA (2007) rejected, or at least downplayed, the role of prescriptive rules. The 
FSA held the view that prescriptive rules were unable to keep up with the constantly 
changing pace of the market and practices and could eventually, in some cases, hinder 
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market innovation. In summary, a rules-based regulation is “hard pressed to respond 
to a rapidly changing and diverse market place” (Carter & Marchant, 2011, p.164).  
There is, however, question over the claim that a principles-based approach is 
beneficial for innovation (Carter & Marchant, 2011). It is the question of whether a 
principles-based approach may sometimes lead to a more conservative approach; in 
other words, when people are dealing with a vague standard (principles-liked feature) 
they tend to become more cautious (Shavell, 1987). As a result, this overly cautious 
mentality may potentially “hamper innovation and stifle competition if the companies 
are unwilling to take risks or are unwilling to do the research that will make their 
experiments and proposed products comply with the principles” (Schwarcz, 2008 
cited by Carter & Marchant, 2011, p.164).   
3.4.5 Concern for complexity 
Tweedie (2007) criticises that the existing accounting standards are unnecessarily 
complex for users18. In an empirical study, Mergenthaler et al (2010) support the 
complexity view and argue that a rules-based system is too complex and difficult to 
implement because of its inherent linguistic characteristics (see section 2.4 and 2.4.1 
for in-depth description on the characteristics of a rule). A rules-based system 
continues to proliferate in order to cover new conceivable situations19 (Sawabe, 2005, 
p.179-180; Bagshaw, 2006). Subsequently, rules-based financial reporting has become 
exceedingly complex in terms of scope, exceptions and alternative treatments, in 
                                                 
18 This point is illustrated by a real life example given by Douglas Flint (2007), in the Principles into 
Practice ICAS 2007, New York conference, who is Group Finance Director, HSBC Holdings Plc. He 
provided, as an example, the annual accounts at HSBC which have now exceeded 400 pages as a result 
of following the introduction of IFRS in 2004, and it is too heavy to deliver by conventional post. 
19 Furthermore, the dynamic interactions among rules cause further complication: in the context of 
financial reporting standards, Nelson (2003, based on Wood, 1986) summarises that the increase in the 
number of rules and the number of 'exceptions to the rules' affect “component complexity,” 
“coordinative complexity,” and “dynamic complexity”. Component complexity increases with more 
rules; coordinative complexity increases when a new rule must be considered in light of existing rules; 
however, dynamic complexity increases by changing the pattern of rules over time. 
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order to keep up with the growing complexities of operations of companies and the 
economic conditions (Bhimani, 2008, p.447; Sawabe, 2005, p.180). 
Nelson, Elliott, & Tarpley (2002) conducted a combination of survey and 
experimental research and investigated the effects of detailed rules upon the 
relationship between managers and auditors. Their finding is that “as rules become 
more detailed, the precision of rules improves while complexity also increases20” 
(cited by Sawabe, 2005, p.182). The increases in the volume and complexities of the 
accounting rules cause what Black (2001, p.28) refers to as ‘rules overload’ for the 
practitioners. Mental burden resulting from 'rules overload' could cause deterioration 
in judgmental accuracy and consistency (Black, 2001) leading to coping strategies 
that reduce mental processing (Nelson, 2002), weakening the interactions between 
users and standard setters (Shaw, 1995; Beresford, 1999; Sawabe, 2005), reducing 
users’ ability to limit aggressive reporting (Hammersley et al., 2010) and to 
communicate the financial information accurately (Sawabe, 2005). In addition to all 
these negativities of ‘rules overload’, the complex rules reduce the comprehensibility 
and relevance of financial information (Madsen & Williams, 2012). Complexity 
resulting from a rules-based regulation is further criticised for leading to higher 
compliance cost (Simpson, Meeks, Klumpes, & Andrews, 2000; ICAS, 2010).  
Principles-based regulation, on the other hand, is proposed with the aim of 
simplifying the current financial system (Ford, 2010; Dickey & Scanlon, 2006). When 
there are conflicts, the abstract principles can be used to mediate multiple conflicts of 
interest in many areas by objectifying a goal so that the decision-makers/different 
                                                 
20 Rule precision and complexity affect two functions of financial accounting standards: communication 
and constraint (Sawabe, 2005, p.182). According to Nelson (2003, p.92) communication refers to “the 
role of standards to provide a ‘shared understanding’ of the meaning of financial reporting”, while 
constraint refers to “the role of standards to discourage biased communication by serving as the 
benchmark”. Consequently,  as time passes, more rules, exceptions to rules and/or guidance will be 
added to the existing rules, thereby creating communication problems that offset the communication 
benefits provided by increased precision (Nelson, 2003, p.6). 
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parties can choose their own actions to achieve that goal while balancing other parties’ 
interests. There is a competing view, however, that principles themselves, due to the 
difficulties of professional interpretations they allow, can potentially generate their 
own problems and could potentially cause complexity and become more difficult and 
costly to enforce (Herz, 2003). In addition, there are opposing views from the audit 
firms complaining that with a principles-based regulation, they will have to make 
complex arrangements to accommodate compliance (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
report, 2007 cited by Carter & Marchant, 2011) including hiring expensive specialists 
with expertise in complex transactions, putting together a monitoring audit committee 
and arranging vigilant enforcement agents (Bratton, 2004, p.35; Ford, 2010). 
3.4.6 Concern for manipulation 
Rules reduce discretion on the individual decision-makers, making it less likely that 
their judgment will be incentivised by their own personal desires and gains 
(Coglianese, et al., 2004, p.12). However, the danger is that the formalistic rules-
based approach encourages a perception, in some quarters, of accounting regulations 
as mere technicalities; to be ‘avoided’ whenever necessary (Dunn et al., 2003). This is 
referred to as ‘creative compliance’ or ‘creative accounting’ (Jameson, 1988; Balaciu, 
Bogdan, & Vladu, 2009; Shah, 1996). Some commentators find rules are more 
vulnerable to manipulation because of their ‘open texture’21 characteristics (Bhimani, 
2008, p.447; ICAS, 2006a & 2006b; Schauer, 1991; Kershaw, 2005). This 
characteristic of rules in effect causes people to find loopholes and ways to “evade 
narrow and specific rules” (Coffee, 2004a, p.61; Macnamara & Banff, 2004; 
Okamoto, 2011). Besides, “even if newer and tighter rules were drafted, practitioners 
would predictably stay one step ahead of regulators by finding new ways to play the 
game and evade narrow and specific rules” (Coffee, 2004a, p.61). In addition, a rules-
based approach focuses on compliance by a ‘check-list’ approach, which undermines 
auditors’ ability to assess fraud risk (Pincus, Bernardi, & Ludwig, 1999). Therefore, a 
                                                 
21 Rules do not anticipate and dictate solutions for all the possible circumstances (Hart, 1961, The 
Concept of Law). 
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rules-based approach has been criticised as the root reason for companies to invent 
and commit more technically advanced schemes and manipulation, which are often 
hard to detect (Okamoto, 2011; Dickey & Scanlon, 2006).  
Shifting to a principles-based system is seen as a conscious strategy to counter 
creative accounting (Somerville, 2003; McBarnet & Whelan, 1999, p.1). Principles-
based accounting was perceived to give the most “authentic presentation” of financial 
information and represent economic reality (ICAS, 2010, p.8). That is because by 
using a principles-based approach, auditors will have to explain and disclose the 
rationales behind their decisions (Benston et al., p.167; ICAS, 2006; Maines et al., 
2003). In this way, this process would entail a “critical and reasoned evaluation made 
in good faith”, including the consideration of the substance of the economic 
transaction and the pros and cons of different accounting treatments (CIFiR, 200822, 
p94-95 cited by Carpenter et al., 2011). Accounting behavioural researchers have used 
experiments and surveys to examine the behavioural effects of rules- and principles-
based regulations on practitioners’ responses to aggressive earning management. For 
example, Agoglia et al. (2010) conclude that financial statement preparers are more 
likely to report aggressively under rules-based than under principles-based standards. 
Mergenthaler (2009) finds that the magnitude of earnings management is greater in 
rules-based standards than under principles-based standards. Jamal and Tan (2010) 
show that preparers report less aggressively under principles-based standards, but 
only if the auditor is principles-oriented, as opposed to client-oriented or rules-
oriented. Finally, Segovia et al., (2009) find that auditors are more willing to allow 
clients to manage earnings under a more rules-based standard (SFAS 121) than under 
a more principles-based standard (ARB 43).  
                                                 
22 There is a concern to the degree, the courts and investors will trust auditors’ judgments when they are 
not supported by precise rules (PCAOB, 2008 cited by Carpenter, et al., 2011). In response to these 
concerns, the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (CIFiR, 2008 cited by 
Carpenter et al., 2011) provides guidance on the elements of a well-formed professional judgment to be 
used to support and evaluate auditors’ judgments. The goal of the proposed guidance is to encourage 
auditors to form a disciplined process in making judgments.  
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Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the imprecise nature of principles could be a 
‘double-edged sword’ (Carpenter et al., 2011) in that the “latitude allows managers to 
choose accounting methods that reflect their informed understanding of the 
underlying economics of the transitions, but it also permits managers to 
opportunistically advocate reporting methods that do not necessarily capture the 
economics of the transactions” (Maines et al., 2003 cited by Carpenter et al., 2011 
p.9).  
3.4.7 Legitimacy issue
23
  
Because principles-based regulation is relatively young compared with an established 
rules-based regulation, the issue of legitimacy is a major concern. For a principles-
based regulation to be perceived as legitimate by the regulateed and participants who 
are subject to it, it has to be democratic in the way it is enacted and implemented. A 
principles-based regulation emphasises the need to widen and strengthen 
shareholders’ participation (Hill, 2007; Black, 2008; Ford, 2010). The democratic 
nature of principles is reflected in the way it invites dialogues and inputs from 
industry players and experts (Ford, 2010, p.20). For instance, in the sphere of 
corporate governance, Hill (2007) argues that a principles-based approach increases 
the obligations of the accounting profession to the stakeholders, since it provides 
stakeholders with “greater consultation and information flow” (p.10).  
3.4.8 Concern for Ethics  
Lampe and Finn (1992), and Eynon, Hill, & Stevens (1997) provide evidence 
showing that accountants were more oriented towards maintaining rules and norms in 
making moral judgment than to engage in principled moral reasoning. The rules-based 
regulation has been criticised as contributing to a string of auditing failures in 
America (SEC, 2003; Benston, 2003). Satava et al (2006) argue that “recent high 
profile events indicate that the accountants and auditors involved have followed rule-
                                                 
23
 A more elaborate discussion on what I mean by legitimacy in the context of this research see chapter 
five, subsection 5.4.2. 
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based ethical perspectives and have failed to protect investors and stakeholders – 
resulting in a wave of scandals and charges of unethical conducts” (p. 271). 
A principles-based approach is considered more effective in promoting more ethical 
decision-making and behaviour (ICAS, 2006). Rasmussen and Windsor (2003) show 
that auditors with higher moral reasoning ability have the disposition to act fairly on 
principles when subject to moral dilemmas. According to Sweeney and Roberts 
(1997), auditors who think at a higher moral level think in a way that resembles 
principles-based thinking, in that they are more prone to draw contextual factors into 
their decision-making, while technical rules are not able to cover all realistic 
situations. These auditors had to form their decision independently from rules and 
they were less anxious about the penalties associated with noncompliance. 
Nonetheless, findings by Dunn et al (2003, p.37) show the profession’s lack of 
reasoning capacity in a move towards a more principles-based reasoning. It concludes 
that simply changing the form of accounting regulation to a more principles-oriented 
one will not be effective in triggering higher levels of ethical behaviour (Herron & 
Gilbertson, 2004). Thus, “a principles- based approach will only work if those 
charged with its implementation have the necessary outlook and aptitude to operate in 
that way”(Dunn et al., 2003, p.5).   
3.4.9 Effectiveness  
The effectiveness dimension is focused on addressing the quality of the specific task 
being performed (Salterio, 1994, p.521). In particular, there is an increasingly urgent 
emphasis on improving auditors’ ability to detect fraud (SAS No. 53, 1988; SAS No. 
82, 1997; Pincus, 1999, p.123).  Rules are effective in the sense of eliminating and 
minimising individual users’ mistakes and errors, as well as helping to verify the 
financial statements effectively (Coffee, 2004a). However, this approach has been 
criticised as being suboptimal (Pincus, 2000). Rules have the tendency to be 
ineffective when the users become rule-bound, leaving no space for discretion and 
freedom (Pincus, 2000, p.247; Mergenthaler et al., 2012). 
A principles-based approach, on the other hand, is particularly effective in detecting 
and deterring “loophole behaviour and checklist style approaches” (Carter & 
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Marchant, 2011, p.160).  However, the drawback of principles is that because of their 
vague and ambiguous nature, they may be not so effective in decision-making or 
problem solving (MacNeil, 2010; Gray, 2009).   
3.4.10 Efficiency 
Rules are efficient in helping decision-making and problem solving because they are 
simpler and easier to follow than principles. They “demarcate a clear line between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour” (Coglianese et al., 2004, p.11). They also 
spare users the debate issues of value and fact every time someone does something 
which has social consequences. By following rules one could eliminate the necessity 
for making extra investigations and calculations. For instance, a highly structured 
audit programme (detailed and concrete audit procedures and step by step 
instructions) is being associated with increased efficiency (Pincus et al., 1999).  
However, rules could also cause inefficiency due to their ex-ante nature, which 
attempt to specify outcomes before particular cases arise; such characteristics lead to 
the consequences of producing both injustice and inefficiency (ICAS, 2006).  
A flexible principles-based approach could be efficient because it is addressed more 
proactively and with feedback from the regulator (Kovacevich, Dimon, James, & 
Renyi, 2008), eradicating duplications and contradictory rules. It is also efficient 
because it can be integrated into the regulated players’ own systems (Carter & 
Marchant, 2011, p.161). However, a principles-based approach could potentially lead 
to a delay in reaching closures in terms of decision-making. An application of 
principles will have to take consideration of the uniqueness of each individual context 
and weigh the pros and cons of each alternative treatment (Carpenter et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, modifying the approach to suit each individual context is more of a 
costly deliberation process and if any relevant new information later on emerges or 
any errors have been detected, decision makers have to go back and revise their 
original decision-making in an ex-post manner (Cunningham, 2007). Thus, the time 
and other resources devoted to such deliberation may cause an inefficiency problem. 
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3.4.11 Need to reach closure 
This is a dimension concerned with the rules’ and principles’ respective ability in 
reaching a closure in the context of decision-making and problem solving. The 
expanded focus for more cues to support their justification is referred to as an 
individual difference in psychology, namely, ‘need for closure’ (NFC; more details 
please see chapter 5, section, 5.5.3.1). This concept has been well researched in 
psychology but has not yet been widely studied in the accounting or business 
literature (Bailey et al., 2007).   
A study by Bailey et al. (2007) on NFC in auditing sheds some light in helping to 
understand how NFC relates to dispositions to rules and principles. It has been argued 
that when facing uncertainty, auditors are likely to follow precedents, even at the risk 
of misreporting in favour of their clients (Mayhew et al., 2000). Rules are believed to 
release users from the burden of making judgment under uncertainty (Bratton, 2004). 
Therefore, when there is a pressure of audit fee/deadline, auditors would prefer to 
apply straightforward rules to close the case (Bratton, 2004; Bennett, Bradbury, & 
Prangnell, 2006). 
In contrast, a principles-based approach represents a more elaborate and thorough 
decision-making process (Cohen et al., 2011, p.28). The users of principles will be 
more likely to resort to their professional judgment and experiences rather than simply 
follow explicit rules. These people tend to have lower NFC. 
3.4.12 Abstractness vs. concreteness  
A typical rule is expected to include “specific criteria, ’bright-line’ tests, numerical 
thresholds, examples, scope restrictions, exceptions, subsequent precedents, 
implementation guidance, etc.,” (Nelson, 2003; Mergenthaler, 2009 & 2010; 
Schipper, 2003; SEC, 2003; FASB, 2002). Rules tend to be concrete and prescriptive.  
On the other hand, principles are abstract and broad in nature (Cunningham, 2007). 
They are behavioural statements and often stated in qualitative terms (Black et al., 
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2007). They provide decision makers “with a common foundation and basic reasoning 
on which to consider the merits of alternatives” (Preface to ‘Statements of Financial 
Accounting Concepts’ cited by Wustemann & Kierzek, 2007, p.7).  They do not 
prescribe detailed action plans to the users in the way rules do. 
3.4.13 Need for procedural fairness 
Procedural fairness is concerned with the fairness of decision-making procedures. It 
deals with the perceived fairness of procedures or processes applied to achieve the 
desired outcomes (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Wentzel, 2002 both cited by Zainuddin 
& Isa, 2011, p.642). The individuals’ dispositions towards rules- and principles-based 
approaches affect their perceptions of the fairness of the organisational procedures. 
The principles-based approach rejects the presumption of a ‘one size fits all’ approach 
for a given transaction (Dickey & Scanlon, 2006, p.17). Instead, it is more sensitive to 
the particular context, allowing for individual differences in terms of varying value 
and ways of doing things, permitting a more flexible and attuned practice (Bratton, 
2003; Wustemann & Kierzek, 2007; Levitt et al., 2005).  
It is, therefore, considered as a fairer approach because it is an approach which 
ensures each event is treated idiosyncratically. Thus, the use of a principles-based 
approach may be associated with increased procedure fairness (Ford, 2010, p.9).  
To the degree to which one is complying with rules, one can create the perception of 
procedural fairness (Proios, 2010). The criticism for such an approach is that it may 
fail to take account of the particularities or substance of the individual transaction 
(Bratton, 2003, p.1037); by treating all cases using an identical method, it may create 
unfairness.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed in broad features the rules versus principles debate, 
particularly as it has emerged in relation to accounting regulation. And I have 
identified many of the arguments used for and against both rules-based and principles-
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based regulation. Consistent with Dworkin’s distinctions between rules and principles 
in legal regulation, the definitions and distinctions of a rules- and a principles-based 
accounting regulation are based on the position held by ICAS (2006). 
This chapter is closed by reiterating that it has not been my objective to come to any 
conclusion in respect of this debate or to take up any position of my own, except to 
say that I agree with the view put forward by ICAS (2006) that: “it is possible to 
conclude that neither approach is fundamentally superior to the other, but each has its 
strengths in application and enforcement” (p.49). There is a huge demand from the 
accounting profession for detailed rules-based guidance. Many practitioners believe 
rules protect them from litigation and increase the value of accounts by promoting 
comparability and compliance. However, ICAS (2006a&b) argues that rules do not 
help accountants to stand up to pressure in conflict situations and a mechanical rule-
following ethic will ultimately damage the profession. Meanwhile, I have also 
explored the weaknesses associated with the rules-based approach such as its 
tendency to lead to complexity, and a proliferation of ever more rules, sub-rules and 
exceptions, and to its facilitation of ‘creative compliance’.  
In contrast, a principles-based approach, in the view of many, seems in theory to have 
the potential and characteristics necessary to enable higher quality financial reporting 
and audit, and particularly so when applied properly in good faith. The findings from 
recent behavioural accounting (section 2.4.1.1) has shown that principles-based 
standards may be associated with high auditor epistemic motivation and 
accountability, and may thereby contribute to a better professional judgment and will 
result in better reporting quality. Nevertheless, there is also evidence of practitioners’ 
lack of competence and confidence in working with principles. Other benefits 
associated with a principles-based approach are inherent flexibility and space for 
creativity. Therefore, such an approach provides more feeling of empowerment for the 
practitioners. Again, the downside of this is that it may increase the interpretative and 
exposure risks because of its imprecise nature. 
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Chapter 4: Rules and Principles in Law 
 4.1 Introduction  
This chapter draws on the analysis of literature in legal philosophy in order to develop 
and deepen the clarification of the logical distinctions between rules and principles. 
The regulatory literature on rules and principles is truly vast and it would be 
impossible to address it within the scope of this chapter in anything approaching a 
“comprehensive” way. Therefore, I primarily focus on Dworkin’s view on rules and 
principles, using his position to clarify and solidify the conceptual distinctions 
between rules and principles.  
 
The focus of this PhD is on rules and principles as prescription, as distinct from 
description (Schauer, 1991a
24
), and more specifically as they are normative and 
regulative. My focus, then, is on the aspect, or kind, of rules and principles which 
moral, political, and legal thinkers have been most concerned with. I am primarily 
interested in the regulative, as distinct from any constitutive role, of rules and 
principles. I recognise that rules and principles often play a constitutive role; the rules 
of chess are instrumental in constituting the social reality of the game. Once the game 
is in place, of course, the constitutive aspect of the rules is not something the players 
attend to; they do need to make their moves in accordance with the regulatory rules of 
the game, otherwise they cannot be playing chess. It is this regulative aspect of rules 
and principles that this PhD focuses upon. The regulative rules and principles that I 
am interested in are also distinct from what Raz (1975) called the permissive and 
power conferring rules (such as the rules granting parliament power to legislate, or 
common people power to make wills). I am also not concerned with specific technical 
or descriptive rules or protocol such as instructions for how to bake a cake or operate 
a computer. 
 
                                                 
24
 Schauer, Playing by the Rules, p.17-18 (1991) (discussing the distinction between prescriptive and 
descriptive rules). 
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4.1.1 Overview of the chapter  
The organisation of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 examines the jurisprudential 
debate between formalism and anti-formalism, which helps to locate the theoretical 
discussion of the comparison of rules and principles. Section 4.3 primarily focuses on 
outlining Dworkin's position. In doing so, I identify an important point of divergence 
between Hart's positivism and Dworkin's Naturalism, this helps to understand the 
origin of the orthogonal view on the distinction between rules and principles as 
postulated by Dworkin, in contrast to the opposing view that rules and principles are 
dichotomous. Section 4.4 introduces the distinctions and definitions of rules and 
principles as proposed by Dworkin, and critically examines the interplay between 
them. Section 4.5 provides some criticism of Dworkin’s view of rules and principles. 
Section 4.6 outlines distinctions between rules and principles and the other commonly 
entangled concepts such as analogy, heuristic and policy/rights. Section 4.7 concludes 
and summarises the chapter.  
 
4.2 Formalism vs. Anti-Formalism 
According to McBarnet and Whelan (1991), the debate over rules and principles in 
law reflects two competing stances on the nature of law, and how legal control should 
be operated: formalism and anti-formalism. Legal formalism is a way of viewing legal 
philosophy and jurisprudence from the perspective of legal positivism. I have taken 
the definition of the formalism defined by Alexander. He says that “by formalism I 
mean adherence to a norm’s prescription without regard to the background reasons the 
norm is meant to serve (even when the norm’s prescription fails to serve those 
background reasons in a particular case).” He continues that “a formalist looks to the 
form of a prescription-that it is contained in an authoritative rule-rather than to the 
substantive end or ends that it was meant to achieve. A norm is formalistic when it is 
opaque in the sense that we act on it without reference to the substantive goals that 
underlie it” (Alexander, 1999, p.531). In view of this definition, in this PhD, a 
formalist view is that the rules would be applied literally without the need to go 
beyond them in search of other grounds for interpretation of the rules. It is an 
approach that emphasizes much on “uniformity, consistency and predictability, on the 
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legal form of transactions and relationships and on literal interpretation” (McBarnet & 
Whelan, 1991, p.848). 
 
The core of a formalist approach lies in a rules-based decision-making  (Schauer, 
1988, p. 509-510), where the rules involved are typically codified with specific 
linguistic formation: If X then Y (see Twining & Miers, 1999). In formalism, the 
“literal” meaning of a rule is followed, even though it does not serve the underlying 
spirit of the law / regulation. In other words, “to be formalistic … is to be governed by 
the rigidity of a rule’s formulation” (Schauer, 1988, p.535). Formalists argued that 
rules should be “read literally, that the appliers and interpreters of rules should not be 
empowered to modify the rules at the point of application” (Cunningham, 2007, p. 14-
15). Thus, rules-based systems fall easily into formalism, even when they include 
overarching principles, because “the exhaustively articulated rules that treat, 
categorise and distinguish complex transactions invite mechanical application” 
(Bratton, 2004, p.12). Mechanical application holds a certain promise of fairness, 
understood in terms of treating like things alike, uniformly. The need for efficiency 
and certainty in the legal decision-making draws many to a preference for, legalism, 
rules-based approaches. However, many have argued that principles handle better in 
complex situations where the virtues of fairness
25
 and flexibility outweigh the need to 
uniform decision-makings (Diver, 1983; Ford, 2010; Cunningham, 2007). 
 
Formalism also assumes that law is an intelligently coherent system in a sense that it 
is capable of operating in a closed fashion, which isolates it from other ethical and 
social-political factors (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991). The ‘legalism’ of many lawyers 
contributes to the isolation of the operation of a rules-based legal system. The concept 
of legalism refers to the legal profession’s outlook and attitude towards morality: 
“moral conduct is a matter of rule following, and moral relationships consist of duties 
and rights determined by rules” (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991, p.849). Consequently, 
Shklar (1964) as cited by McBarnet and Whelan (1991) describes the mentality of 
formalism as causing lawyers to be ‘rule-preferrers’ and ‘rule-followers’ (p.848). 
                                                 
25
 Different perceptions of fairness dependent on following through a rules- or a principles-based 
approach can be found in chap 7, section 7.2.3. 
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4.2.1 The problems with the formalism 
The two notable problems with the rules-based formalism are: 
Formalism dealing with uncertainty 
Several legal commentators have pointed out; one of the notable problems associated 
with adopting a formalist approach is the complexity issue resulting from the limited 
ability of rules to handle uncertainty (Weisbach, 1999; Braithwaite, 2004; 
Braithwaite, 2004 & 2002a), especially its results from cat-and-mouse game-playing, 
which generates contrived complexity (Braithwaite, 2004). 
 
Braithwaite argues that “when the type of action to be regulated is complex, changing, 
and involves large economic interests, principles tend to regulate with greater 
certainty than rules (2004, p.2). In contrast, he believes that when the type of action to 
be regulated is “simple, stable and does not involve large economic interests, rules 
tend to regulate with greater certainty than principle” (p.2). In addition, another view 
expressed regarding rules causing uncertainty is that in the event of loopholes or new 
situations, there are not any existing rules. In such cases the reliance on rules only 
create more uncertainties and unpredictable exercise of discretions (Braithwaite, 
2004, p.11-13).  
 
Formalism leads to creative compliance 
It is to avoid the uncertainty created by broad principles that regulators seek precision 
in detailed rules. However, the formalist approach does not prevent avoidance, but 
shifts it to a new level, involving game-playing and ‘creative compliance’ (McBarnet 
& Whelan, 1991; McBarnet, 2004). The problem of creative compliance thrives on 
both a narrow legalistic approach to rules and legal control and a formalistic 
conception of law (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991, p. 848). In other words, the formalist 
approach creates a favourable climate for creative compliance, that is, the artificial 
combination of specific rules and an emphasis on legal form and literalism, designed 
in a manipulative way to circumvent or undermine the spirit of the regulation 
(McBarnet & Whelan, 1991, p. 849). Creative compliance highlights the weakness of 
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formalism as a legal control strategy: “A formalistic approach, which relies upon a 
‘cookbook’ or code of specific and rigid rules and emphasises the legal form of 
transactions, can ‘fail’ to control for a variety of reasons” (McBarnet & Whelan, 
1991, p. 850). In particular, they (1991, p.850) proposed six reasons why formalism 
could fail: 1) complying with rules according to their literal interpretation may not 
help to achieve the overall purpose of the law; 2) the letter of the rules may not serve 
the spirit of the law; 3) a literal application of the rules may not lead to a desirable 
outcome and instead be counter-productive; 4) rules may not be effective because 
they have gaps, omissions or loopholes; 5) rules may be out of date or no longer 
relevant to the changing dynamic reality; 6) the last but not least is that the form of a 
transaction or a relationship can misrepresent its underlying economic substance. 
 
4.2.2 Anti-Formalism 
Anti-formalism has been adopted as an alternative approach to respond to the trend of 
creative compliance and problems associated with formalism. It is “more flexible, 
open-ended and policy-oriented” (Johnston, 1991, p. 342) .And it puts “emphasis on 
the substance of transactions and relationships, on the purposes and 'spirit' of 
regulation and on the need for dynamic responses” (McBarnet & Whelan 1991, 
p.851). Further, the formalism versus anti-formalism debate reflects some of the 
differences existing in different legal cultures (Cunningham, 2007, p.14-15). In his 
opinion, in a legal culture where benefits of specificity and predictability outweigh the 
values of flexibility and adopting in fast changing environment, a formalism approach 
is preferred. Anti-formalism prevails in cultures where reaching the fairness of each 
individual case is more important than the uniformity brought by complying with 
detailed rules (Cunningham, 2007, p.15). 
 
4.3 Justification of choosing Dworkin’s positions 
My own intuition and experience of the phenomena, as well as insights from focus 
group discussions (chapter six), suggest that there are important differences between 
rules and principles. I am therefore drawn to analyses that cast the difference in strong 
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terms, as positive difference in kind, and in particular I use analysis of the differences 
between rules and principles presented by Richard Dworkin as a conceptual anchor 
for the development of my own views. Dworkin’s view of rules and principles has 
been subject to a good deal of debate and competing interpretations. Nevertheless, I 
agree with Tolonen that Dworkin’s ideas, whilst perhaps initially apparently 
ambiguous, on reflection “appear to form a consistent and clear entity” (Tolonen, 
1991, p.290). 
 
This project is premised on the notions of rules and principles that were proposed by 
Dworkin (1967). For him, rules and principles are different in kind, not merely 
degree, and his theoretical position on the distinctions between them enables me to 
propose that conceptually, individuals are liable to possess distinct / separate 
dispositions towards rules and principles. In other words I can propose dispositions 
towards rules and principles as orthogonal, statistically distinct, possibly even 
independent, factors. I find Dworkin’s view of the rule versus principle distinction, 
and in particular the feature noted above, persuasive, and I have made use of it in this 
project to help clarify the rule and principle distinction and to help guide item 
generation for the instrument development.  
 
4.3.1 Dworkin: A Philosophical Basis 
Dworkin is one of the most important contemporary legal philosophers and probably 
his most significant contribution is his attempt to explain how judicial reasoning 
works in jurisprudence. Dworkin’s perhaps most influential work, Law’s Empire 
(1986), offers an uplifting image of law as ultimately grounded in the best moral 
interpretation of existing social practices. Dworkin’s work has consistently been 
concerned with judicial interpretation of law and the role of judges. Dworkin is clear 
as to the political values he is committed to. His philosophy stresses a ‘rights’ 
approach over utilitarian calculations. His theory of justice is that all political 
judgments ought to rest ultimately upon the injunction that, people are equal as human 
beings, irrespective of the circumstances. For this reason, Dworkin has been 
considered as a liberal political theorist, he believes that: “the rights of an individual 
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receive absolute priority over “collective” social goal/ policy” (Tolonen, 1991, p. 
283). In other words, Dworkin believes that “the central focus of the judiciary is and 
should be the individual” (Baker, 1980, p.841). 
 
In challenging the legal positivist view of law as rules, Dworkin develops the concept 
of principles as part of law, and he argues that a legal system has the moral aim of 
securing rights and ensuring justice and not just “maintenance of behaviour that is 
specified by rules” (Turiel, 1983, p.77). Dworkin uses two famous cases to illustrate 
that principles that inform rules within the legal system: Riggs v. Palmer (1889)
26
 and 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors (1960)
27
. 
 
 4.3.2 Legal Positivism on rules 
There are two competing legal philosophical positions on the role of rules and 
principles in the judicial reasoning.  The legal positivism camp includes Austin (1983 
/ 1954), Hart (1961), Raz (1975), and they make a strict separation between the rules 
of legal systems and moral rules and principles (Alexy, 2000). Legal positivism is a 
“collection of theories that law consists of a set of rules produced by the sovereign, 
rather than from some higher place” (Hovenkamp, 1990, p.818)28.The basic premise 
of legal positivism is that law can and needs to be separated from morality and other 
                                                 
26
 In Riggs v. Palmer (1889), a New York court decided a case in which a grandson who murdered his 
grandfather and according to the rules apparently stood to inherit. The court found that he could not 
inherit, even though there were no written statutes to support the decision. Instead, the court appealed 
to moral reasoning, citing the principle that no one should be permitted to profit from his own 
wrongdoing. This decision was to become a landmark for many other cases (Dworkin, 1977, p. 75). 
27
 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960) case, a New Jersey court, finding no applicable 
rules, decided that automobile manufacturers could not limit their liability for defective parts and the 
damages caused by them. The court based its decision on the principle that automobile manufacturers 
have a special obligation because, among other reasons, cars are so essential (Dworkin, 1977, p. 75-
76). 
28
 More details read: Hart, The Concept of Law (1961); Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (1970); 
Shuman, Legal Positivism: Its Scope and Limitations (1963). 
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social aspects such as economics and politics (Hovenkamp, 1990, p.818). Alexander 
and Katz for instance, believe that formalism, in essence, refuses to look beyond the 
letter of the law to its spirit or purpose, which will inevitably come with high moral 
cost (Farber, 1999, p.598). In other words: “Positivist maintains that law is 
distinguishable from other social standards, including etiquette and conventional 
morality” (Lyons, 1977, p.417).  
 
The criticism has been made that “legal positivist studies a society’s law without 
attempting to determine the truth or falsity of the moral propositions upon which that 
law is based” (Hovenkamp, 1990, p. 818).  For Schauer (1991, cited by Farber, 1999, 
p.598), the key to formalism is “a determination to ignore the inevitable misfit 
between a rule and its background justifications”. Schauer’s version of formalism 
therefore suggests that decision-makers’ moral dilemmas will be resolved by 
prescribing rules (1991), and positivists will only accept the judicial decision as 
“legitimate only to the extent that they strictly follow the rules laid down” (Farber, 
1999, p. 598). Thus, for strict positivists, “the rule of law is, essentially, the law of 
rules” (Easterbrook, 1998 cited by Farber, 1999, p.599).  
 
4.3.3 Dworkin’s attacks on Positivism 
Dworkin’s theory of rules and principles was developed as a response to a positivist 
view of judicial discretion. In legal positivism, the rule of recognition, which was 
developed by Hart, serves as the formal criterion. Dworkin’s central attack on this 
was “rules are recognised (as being valid) on the basis of formal criteria” (Tolonen, 
1991, p.275; Shapiro, 2007). He disagrees with Hart’s doctrine that law essentially 
consists of  ‘rules’; that legal rules are identified via a ‘rule of recognition’29; that 
where a rule does not determine a case judges have discretion, and no party has legal 
                                                 
29
 The “rule of recognition” is a secondary rule used to identify primary rules of obligation (Hart, 1961, 
p. 94ff). Shapiro (2009, p.4): Hart claims that in every legal system, there is one rule that acts as the 
test of validity of that system. Further, “any norm that bears one of the marks of authority set out in the 
rule of recognition is a law of that system and officials are required to recognise it when carrying out 
their official duties.” 
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right to prevail. “When Dworkin sets out to understand and depict the nature of 
adjudication in (some) advanced common law systems, his focus was on the rule of 
recognition, or what he called the ‘pedigree’ of a legal rule” (Schauer, 2006, p.872; 
Baker, 1980, p.849). His critique reflects his views on the nature of rules and 
principles and on the basis on which they can claim legitimacy. 
 
The full scope of the arguments between positivism and Dworkin’s naturalism is not 
necessary for this project. I only need to present the aspects of arguments that relevant 
to the purpose which to use Dworkin’s view as a framework to distinguish between 
rules and principles.  
4.4 Dworkin’s position on rules and principles  
Dworkin’s 1967 article “Two models of Rules” is often regarded as a starting point 
for the discussion on rules and principles (Tolonen, 1991, p.271). His main purpose is 
to distinguish principles in the generic sense from rules. Alexy supports Dworkin’s 
emphasis on principles by arguing that the difference between rules and principles is 
one of quality and not only one of degree (Alexy, 1996, p.77). Further, they differ in 
the character of the direction they give (Dworkin, 1967, p.22).  
 
Rules, in Dworkin’s view “are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a 
rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it 
supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the 
decision” (1977, p.24). An example of a typical rule, Dworkin argues, is “a will is 
invalid unless signed by three witnesses”.  
 
Principles, on the contrary, “do not conclusively dispose of cases to which they 
apply” (Lyons, 1977, p.418). Principles “have weights, they function as reasons for 
deciding cases” (p.418). They can be overridden without losing their validity. 
Principles can be in conflict with each other and they contribute to a case by their 
different relevance or weights (Lyons, 1977). There may be counter instances to a 
principle, and there are in this case, but we don’t try to capture all the counter-
instances to a principle by extending its statement, and if we did try to do so it would 
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not “make for a more accurate or complete statement of the principle” (Lyons, 1977, 
p.418). A principle like “no man may profit from his own wrong-doing” does not 
purposely set out a condition that makes its application explicitly necessary, in if x 
then y style, instead it's a “justification for doing certain things; a reason for action 
among other reasons” (Dworkin, 1967, p.26). Principles are “to be observed, not 
because it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed 
desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality” (Dworkin, 1967, p.22). 
4.4.1 Two distinctions between a rule and a principle 
Table 3 Two distinctions between rules and principles as identified by Dworkin 
Distinctions Rules Principles 
Recognition 
Conditions: 
Validity 
Formal recognition by institutional 
procedures; Encourage minimum ethical 
compliance / developed when old rules 
become obsolete or novel situation 
requires new rules. 
Related and consistent with social 
culture and value/ institutional 
support and moral consideration. 
Application 
Conditions: 
Relevance 
All or nothing, un-ambiguous, 
definitive; analyse issues as ‘black and 
white’; operating in hierarchic manner. 
Can be in conflict with another 
principle; decision is made by 
relevance “dimension of weight 
(strength)” and “value” appropriate 
to the circumstances in (actual) 
situation/ analyse ‘grey’ issues. 
Based on Tolonen (1991, p.276), Alexy (2000), Dworkin (1967). 
4.4.1.1 Recognition conditions: validity 
A rule derives its validity, partly from the group’s acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
rules and the associated sanctions; partly from the perceived fairness of procedures for 
the stipulation of rules (Hart cited by Turiel, 1983, p.76). Hart believes that the 
validity of law, as rules, is entirely dependent on the way they are enacted and 
perceived by the group. For this reason, Hart argues that rules of a legal system are 
separated from moral rules and principles. In other words, positivism is “a system of 
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law is based on acceptance of the authority of existing procedures for adopting and 
enforcing them and not on anything else” (Turiel, 1983, p.76). According to Coleman, 
Raz basically argued that “if the rule of recognition identifies law according to its 
content as opposed to its pedigree, then it will fail in its identifying function”, because 
“a content-based rule of recognition will fail adequately to provide the information 
ordinary citizens need” (Coleman, RSF, p.720 cited by Sebok, 1998, p.288). The 
reason is, Raz considers that “the adoption of a contentful standard into the rule of 
recognition could not guarantee that it could be used by an ordinary citizen to 
determine his or her legal duties” (Sebok, 1998, p.288). In summary, positivism posits 
law consists only of ‘rules’ and judges have no discretion but to follow legal rules 
(Shapiro, 2007, p.8).  
 
Lyons (1977, p.418) provides a succinct summary of the main points of the validity of 
the rules from the perspective of positivism: First, new rules are identified and 
developed by their ‘pedigree’ or the manner in which they were adopted or developed. 
Secondly, legal standards are considered and implemented as rules. Thirdly, because 
of the ambiguities and vagueness in the loopholes and gaps inherited by a rules-based 
system, in some cases rules are indeterminate (Picciotto, 2007). Therefore, judges 
have to make new rules by exercising ‘judicial discretion’. Fourthly, because the 
rights and duties are determined by rules, when there are indeterminate rules, there 
will be no “pre-existing rights or duties to be enforced”. 
 
The validity of principles is related to and consistent with social culture and value/ 
institutional support and moral consideration (Dworkin, 1977a, p.40 and p.64-68). For 
Dworkin, principles emphasize considerations of fairness, rights, and contextual 
sensitivity, and promote individual rights among regulated actors (Cunningham, 2007, 
p.10). Individual principles are typically embedded within broader sets of principles, 
with more or less social coherence, from which they might be derived. The broader 
principles of social organisation, sustaining and guiding the interpretation of the 
principle that ‘No man may profit from his own wrong-doing’, might include 
principles of liberty and justice, that frame moral life (Sockett, 2006, p.15). In 
Dworkin’s view, the validity of rules should not only be dependent on whether the 
rules themselves have a certain legitimacy by virtue of the means of their creation, a 
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rule of recognition, or consensus of usage, but also depends on their relation to 
underlying principles and to the coherence of their interpretation in context of those 
underlying principles. In addition, it’s worth noting a distinction between moral and 
legal principles. The idea of moral and legal principles is somehow entangled in 
Dworkin’s conceptualization. Tolonen in particular points out that the “legal 
principles are not identical with moral principles” since the kinds of legal principles 
we are concerned with here are embedded and guided by “institutional conditions” 
(1991, p.276
30
). In other words, the substantive and evaluation criterion that is typical 
of the reorganisation of a principle cannot be merely the subjective opinion of an 
individual: "the criterion must be more or less institutionalised” (Tolonen, 1991, 
p.276).  
4.4.1.2 Application Conditions: relevance 
Alexy (2000) argues that the difference between rules and principles emerges most 
clearly when one turns to collisions of principles and conflicts of rules. They differ 
most fundamentally in their respective solutions to the conflict.  
 
According to Alexy (2000), the conflict between two rules can only be solved by 
either introducing an exception clause into one of the two rules or declaring at least 
one of them invalid. Hence, a rule which operates in ‘all or nothing’ manner, it either 
dictates a specific behaviour or outcome or it contributes nothing to the decision-
making (Dworkin, 1967). In this way, rules “establish legal boundaries based on the 
presence or absence of well-specified triggering facts”. Consequently, decision-
making with rules will deliver more “certainty ex ante” (Korobkin, 2000, p.25).   
 
In contrast, a collision of principles is solved in an altogether different way. To solve 
the conflict between principles, we need to consider the “dimension of weight”. “…in 
terms of their significance and value that they are assigned in respect of one another 
when applied in practice” (Tolonen, 1991, p, 276). An emphasis on freedom, for 
example, often comes at the expense of equality and social justice (Sockett, 2006, 
                                                 
30
 Dworkin, 1977a, p.40 and p.64-68. 
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p.15). Therefore, “a case of conflicting principles is resolved on the basis of both 
substantive and evaluative criteria” (Tolonen, 1991, p.278). In other words, principles 
are relevant to the decision-making, dependent on the weight/value that is deemed 
appropriate to apply in the given circumstances - in both the general and contextual 
sense (Tolonen, 1991, p.276). Consequently, “the court solves the problem by 
determining a conditional priority of one of the colliding principles over the other 
with respect to the circumstances of the case” (Alexy, 2000, p. 296). However, as a 
result, decision-makers of principles cannot know with “certainty ex ante where a 
legal boundary would be drawn in the event a set of specified facts come to pass” 
(Korobkin, 2000, p.26).  
 
Ford (2010, p.6-7) explained this difference between a rule and a principles using a 
well-known example involving driving speed limits. A rule-based approach regarding 
speed limits will be like ‘no faster than 90 km/h’. A principles-based approach will be 
more like “drive reasonably and prudently in all the circumstance”. In this way, a rule 
attempts to command, in advance and with precision, what conduct is allowed or 
required. The user of the rule (in this case, perhaps a police officer) will only need to 
check one fact: was this driver exceeding the 90 km/hr limit or not at the time of 
being caught out. On the other hand, the user of principles (in this case the principle 
of reasonableness) needs to determine whether a driving offence has occurred taking 
account of an array of factors such as the road conditions, time of day, traffic, 
weather, conditions of the car, driver experience, etc. There is a weighing process 
involved in the use of principles, involving the user balancing all the important factors 
and then making a decision that is fair to the driver.   
4.4.2 Rules and Principles interplay 
There is some temptation to see principles as optional, as rules of thumb designed to 
aid the decision-maker. We might be tempted “to treat principles as summaries of 
what most judges "make it a principle" to do when forced to go beyond the standards 
that bind them’ (Dworkin, 1967, p. 30). This is not Dworkin’s view. As we have 
stressed above he sees principles as a real part of law and as binding, he insists that 
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their application, where appropriate, is obligatory, and that there can be “right 
answers” (see Dworkin, 1977b). 
 
Dworkin points out that the confusion on the form of a rule and a principle should not 
cancel the difference between them.  Dworkin (1967) argues that “Sometimes a rule 
can appear to look like a principle by having words such as ‘reasonable’, ‘negligent’, 
‘just’ and ‘significant’. These words function in a way to ensure the applications of 
the rule base on its underlying principles. But they do not turn a rule into a principle” 
(p.28-29). As such although these “‘multiple-factor balancing tests’ are less pure and 
more rule-like because they specify ex ante (to a greater or lesser degree of 
specificity) what facts are relevant to the legal determination”. They still fall within 
the category of principles, because “they do not specify how adjudicators should 
weight the relevant factors” (Korobkin, 2000, p.28). 
 
4.5 Criticisms of Dworkin’s rules vs. principles 
The main criticisms against Dworkin and his camp have been focused on: 1) the 
empirical accuracy of Dworkin’s depiction of judicial reasoning; 2) the notion of a 
principle. 
 
The first attack is focused on the difficulty inherent in empirically testing Dworkin’s 
distinctions between rules and principles. In relation to this issue, Smollett (2002, 
online essay
31, p.5) is sceptical about Dworkin’s assumption that judges are obligated 
to consider principles when making judicial decisions, and she claims that the task of 
empirically examining the question is fraught with difficulty. Smollett questions the 
empirical accuracy of Dworkin’s depiction of judicial reasoning, suggesting that 
Dworkin offers one picture of the ideal judge and that his theory is a series of 
normative claims about how he thinks judges should act. 
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 http://www.yellowpigs.net/philosophy/dworkin (accessed on the June 2009) Accessed on the July of 
2010. 
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Another significant criticism of Dworkin’s theory, for Tebbit (2005, p.60) is that he 
has never been able to clarify his notion of a principle satisfactorily. Therefore, there 
are a few questions left to be asked regarding his rules and principles distinction. 
Sunstein argues that the legal status of principles is “obscure” (1995, p. 966), and that 
there is more than one kind of principle involved in law. On the one hand, principles 
give justification, usually moral or political, to rules which can assist us in the 
interpretation of the rule. Such principles in a sense “lie behind” rules and as such are 
not directly applied to cases. On the other hand, there are explicitly formulated 
principles, of the “No man may profit from his own wrong-doing” sort, that can be 
directly applied to cases. He accepts that generally such principles may be more 
flexible than rules and that they “tend to bear on cases without disposing of them” (p. 
966). He warns us not to overestimate the significance of this distinction, noting that 
rules themselves do not always unequivocally dispose of cases, and that principles can 
be vital to the determination of cases.  
4.6 Distinguishing principles and rules from other concepts 
The concepts of rules and principles are sometimes confused with related concepts 
such as: analogies, heuristics, rights and policies. Therefore, it is necessary to have 
some discussion on the distinctions between rules and principles and those above 
mentioned concepts.  
4.6.1 Analogies vs. rules and principles 
Reasoning by analogy is perhaps “the most familiar form of legal reasoning” 
(Sunstein, 1996, p. 741), although like rules- and principles- based reasoning it arises 
in other contexts. Reasoning by analogy is typically used where there are some 
common characteristics in the facts of the present and previous cases which are 
considered relevant to decision-making in the present case
32
. Sunstein (1995, p. 967-
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 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/#Pri (accessed on the November, 2010). Accessed on 
the July 2012. 
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968) provides an explanation of the nature of analogy and how it differs from rules; 
analogy is an important tool that helps provide a clue to how law often operates. Legal 
reasoning by analogy typically occurs where shared characteristics and context allow 
the reasoning that settled the prior case to be extended to the present case in a process 
in which the decision makers evaluate both the similarities and differences between 
the cases. The analogical process may itself yield a rule that can be applied to future 
cases. In the analogical process of comparing cases, rules, standards and principles 
will be considered, but when reasoning analogically one cannot be bound by a rule 
specified in advance of the process of analogical thinking. Sunstein (1995) argues, 
however, that it is unusual, for analogical thinking to yield rules.  
 
Rules and analogies also differ in the fact that rules typically either do or do not apply 
to a case in a categorical fashion; analogies in contrast vary in strength. Analogies 
vary in strength from very close analogy (in which strong resemblance in cases 
supports the grounds for a similar conclusion in both cases) to more remote analogy 
(in which there are only remotely resembling features from which relatively weak 
connections can be drawn). Analogical arguments further differ from rules and 
principles as they are not binding. They must be considered along with rules and 
principles. The use of analogy is largely dependent upon the relevant rules and 
principles leaving interpretive space for the operation of analogical reasoning. Such 
room is obviously available if the case falls beyond the existing rules, and where the 
justification for the earlier decision, whilst having relevance to the case does not apply 
as a mechanical rule-like precedent, in such cases opportunity for the application of 
analogical reasoning emerges. 
 
One influential view on analogy is that it is grounded in the principles that underlie 
the existing cases (Sunstein, 1996). A body of cases can be considered to determine 
which principle (or a body of comprehensive principles) explains and justifies those 
decisions. The difference between analogies and principles is that principles may 
apply with equal force to two separate cases which do not share much common 
features, but analogies on the other hand, can only be used when there are some 
common features in both cases. 
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4.6.2 Heuristics vs. rules 
Amir and Ariely (2003, p.2) argue that the mechanism of rules has some resemblance 
to the use of heuristics, but also some important differences. Frederick (2002) 
contends that heuristics are general procedures used by decision-makers to simplify 
decisions (to limit the amount of information processed or to reduce the complexity of 
the ways in which it is combined). In this vein, Amir and Ariely (2003, p.24) note that 
“heuristics are useful for simplifying computations under uncertainty, when cognitive 
resources are scarce, or when full computation is infeasible.” In comparison, rules 
provide prescriptive ‘do and do not do’ action plans in a specific situation, the 
primary objectives are enforcement and compliance rather than serving to simplify the 
decision-making process
33
. 
 
The second main difference is related to preferences. Heuristics are supposed to 
balance competing preferences. With the aim, in particular, of maximising the 
preferences under multiple constraints such as: time, cost of thinking and input of 
efforts. A typical heuristic-based decision model is a trade-off between accuracy and 
effort (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). In contrast, rules are used to guide 
decision-making regardless of the complexities of a particular context or the cost-
benefit tradeoffs for different individuals.  
 
4.6.3 Rights, policies vs. rules and principles  
A policy in his view is a standard setting out a goal to be achieved, usually for the 
economic, social or political well-being of the community. A principle, on the other 
hand, sets individual rights above collective well-being and imposes a standard of 
justice or fairness or some other moral dimension34. In essence, for Dworkin, 
“principles lay down rights directly; policies do not. Policies do not entail any rights” 
                                                 
33
 On this view, objective that might appear with rules of conserve decision-making resources would 
appear as secondary. 
34
 Whilst Dworkin draws a distinction between principles and policies, he notes that (1977) majority of 
principles could be framed as policies and most policies can be written as principles. 
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(Lyonss, 1977, p.431), and, individual rights weight more than utilitarian goals, the 
exception is where in the cases of major emergencies where goals will be given 
priority over rights in order to restore the state of peace. In general, Dworkin suggests 
that judges should reserve the right to use principles and rights, and leave the matter 
of making policy and goals to the elected legislatures.  
Dworkin (1977) distinguishes right from rules. Rights are more fundamental than 
rules in a legal system. Rules express rights but the rights exist before their expression 
in the form of rules. This is opposed to Hart’s view where rights develop from legal 
rules. The reason why Dworkin considers rights are more important is because rights 
develop in the legal system through the working out of the political morality. 
 
Dworkin conceptualises principles as protecting individual rights against potential 
state interferences - even interference for the general good or in the pursuit of policy. 
We then have a basis of two different forms of justifications - arguments of principles 
and arguments of policy: “Arguments of principle are arguments intended to establish 
an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a 
collective goal” (Dworkin 1977a, p.90). 
4.7 Conclusion 
Legal scholars continually struggle with the rules and principles debate and 
assessment of their relative merits (Cunningham, 2007, p.7), and have done so for 
decades. In this chapter, I have undertaken a focused review giving consideration to 
some key points of the debate and to its root in two opposing approaches to how legal 
control operates: formalism vs. anti-formalism. At the heart of this chapter is an 
outline and examination of Dworkin’s positions on rules and principles. The basic 
premise of this PhD project is that rules and principles are different concepts and they 
are independent of each other, instead of the view that rules and principles vary only 
in terms of degree. I justified this position by explaining Dworkin’s views on the 
distinctions between a rule and a principle. I recognise the issue of the interplay 
between rules and principles, and I also acknowledge the imperfections of, and some 
of the criticisms of, Dworkin’s views. However, as delineated in the above chapter, I 
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believe Dworkin’s conception to be best suited to the purpose of the PhD project. In 
this way, I have identified the conceptual distinctions between a rule and a principle. 
Finally, I have also clarified some confusion between rules and principles and other 
similar concepts such as analogies, heuristics, policies and rights.  
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Chapter 5: Psychological roots of rules and principles 
5.1 Introduction 
A literature review of the psychological roots of dispositions to rules and principles is 
necessary for the project as a whole for the following three reasons: 1) A search on 
the biggest psychometric instruments database - PsycTESTS Database
35
, by the 
American Psychological Association, and literature on rules and principles, revealed 
that there were no instruments specifically designed to measure dispositions towards 
rules and principles. There were instruments which have some items relating to rules 
and principles (e.g. Need for closure scale, Sternberg’s thinking style scale, etc.36), but 
they do not tap into the exact dimensions underpinning dispositions towards rules and 
principles; 2) This stream of literature is one of the multiple streams of literature 
which inspires the generation of items for the initial item pool (see chapter seven for 
14 dimensions, and appendix one for initial items pool); 3) Later empirical work in 
chapter nine will examine the statistical linkages between dispositions to rules and 
principles, and the other relevant instruments, to establish empirically that the 
instrument is not just replicating an existing instrument.   
Despite intense scholarly interest and recent financial regulatory reform, few attempts 
have been made to examine the rules versus principles debate from a social-
psychology perspective. Bonner (1999) reminds us that “it is the valuation of 
individual auditor’s or audit firms’ performance that matters to judgement and 
decision-making related outcomes such as compensation and legal fines.” Thus, “it is 
important to continue the relatively recent work on the evaluation of auditors’ 
decision-making” (p.395). 
My premise in this project is that, dispositions to rules and principles would be 
relatively stable, and associated with stable individual characteristics. Thus, I start 
                                                 
35
 http://www.apa.org/science/programs/testing/find-tests.aspx 
36
 They have items touch on rules and principles but the intention of these scales are not devised for 
measuring dispositions to rules and principles constructs. 
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with the expectations that individuals can be validly characterised in terms of their 
preferences to rules and principles, that those preferences will have significant 
stability across decision types and contexts, and that they will be linked to, and shaped 
by, individual characteristics that are trans-situational and consistent across time, such 
as some of the prominent personality traits and cognitive styles. A primary aim of this 
chapter, accordingly, is to review the linkages that the literature suggests, that a 
number of well-established psychological constructs have with dispositions towards 
rules and principles. The second aim of this chapter is to provide some specific 
propositions regarding the relationships between the DRP and these constructs. 
Certain psychological constructs will subsequently be selected and used to help 
establish the convergent and divergent validity of the instrument (DRP) in chapter 
nine. By exploring the psychological linkages between DRP and other well-
established psychological constructs, some of the groundwork is laid for justification 
and validation of the DRP as a psychological instrument. 
Although my review draws out linkages between dispositions to rules and principles 
and other psychological constructs in ways that I believe are novel, it follows a large 
literature on related topics. Whilst suggestive of links, the extant studies in this 
literature cannot not give empirical evidence of a kind that would have statistical 
significance, on the connections between dispositions towards rules and principles 
and individuals’ characteristics. I aim to be able to give such evidence by virtue of the 
DRP measure. Further, the review of these studies revealed that there is no synthesis 
of the psychological constructs related to dispositions towards rules and principles, 
and I attempt to make some contribution towards filling that gap. 
5.1.1 Organisation of the chapter 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 elaborates on the nature of 
dispositions. Section 5.3 explores how different parental styles may affect and shape 
one’s dispositions towards rules and principles. Section 5.4 distinguishes between the 
concepts of values, traits and cognitive styles. In this section I will also briefly discuss 
how differences in the values reflected in and prioritised by different cultures may 
tend to lead to different dispositions towards rules and principles. I will define the 
concept of legitimacy. Subsection 5.5 elaborates an array of personality traits 
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including the five main traits as described in the five factor model. Section 5.6 
discusses psychological constructs such as empowerment and locus of control. 
Section 5.7 focuses on exploring a range of cognitive styles and demonstrates their 
linkages to dispositions towards rules and principles. Section 5.8 concludes the 
chapter.  
5.2 The nature of dispositions 
In this study, disposition
37
 refers to the tendency to behave and think in a particular 
categorisable pattern
38
; all else being equal, individuals are predisposed towards 
choosing certain approaches (rules vs. principles) in decision-making and problem-
solving situations. According to Katz (1993), a disposition is “a tendency to exhibit 
frequently, consciously, and voluntarily a pattern of behaviour that is directed to a 
broad goal” (Katz, 1993, p. 2). Haynes et al (2008, p. 86) further contend that 
“individuals are - or can be - consciously aware of their preferences and have a 
measure of control over their behavioural manifestations”. The individual’s relatively 
                                                 
37
 Although I have used attitudes and dispositions interchangeably throughout the thesis, there are a few 
noted differences between these two concepts: 1) Attitudes are more temporary in nature than 
disposition and personality trait. 2) Attitudes carry a “point of view”, meaning that they tend to assign 
an evaluation to either a specific or abstract entity such as attitudes towards sex before marriage, 
attitudes towards gender equality, etc., (Oppenheim, 1992). 3) Attitudes are generally positive or 
negative, express favour or disfavour, (Oppenheim, 1992); dispositions on the other hand are generally 
relatively neutral. The idea of attitudes is important because as one will see in chapter 8, the attitude 
questionnaire development literature provides us with structures in terms of the steps and statistical 
procedures I will carry out in the process of developing and validating my psychometric instrument 
(DRP). 
According to Kim & Hunter, 1993, note 1. p.357: Contemporary researchers tend to agree that the 
characteristics attribute of attitude is both dispositional and evaluative in nature. Ajzen (1988) defines 
an attitude “as a disposition to respond favourably or unfavourably to an object, person, institution, or 
event”; Rokeach (1968) defines an attitude as “a set of interrelated predispositions to action organised 
around an object or situation”.  
38
  I use the term “preferences”, perhaps a little loosely, throughout this thesis to refer to disposition. 
The notion of a “disposition” carries a sense of relative stability. The term “preferences” invokes 
relatively less stability: our preferences may reasonably be quite variable. 
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stable complex of dispositions will tend to affect their behaviour in characteristic 
ways in almost all common situations (Haynes et al., 2008, p.86). 
Individuals naturally display and employ their preferred mental functions and 
dispositions, yet they are also able to take consideration of the requirements of the 
context or tasks for which their primary preferences may or may not be well suited or 
fitting (Stetson, 2007; Haynes, et al., 2008). In addition, dispositions can be 
strengthened or weakened by the reinforcement of training or environment (Katz, 
1993). In other words, there is a dynamic interaction between individual differences 
and contextual cues, and situations can activate certain specific behaviours (Haynes et 
al., 2008, p.88). For instance, a principles-based accountant may readily and 
competently use rules in the context of book-keeping (strong context: the job requires 
one to follow clear cut rules with little discretion), despite her dominant natural 
preference for using principles (Stetson, 2007). 
5.3 Literature review on parenting style 
Supporting the earlier research, Haynes et al (2008), argue that the development of 
relatively stable preferences and dispositions begins to take shape in the very early 
years of an individual’s life. Parents exert important influences on, for example, 
children's early development of self-regulatory competence. Different parenting styles 
are likely to encourage children to develop differing self-regulatory behaviours. The 
definition of parenting style is consistent with early research on socialisation 
(Gleitman et al., 2007). It assumes that the way parents relate to the children affects 
the development of their individual differences (Steinberg & Darling, 1993). 
Although there is no specific theoretical framework explicitly linking parental styles 
and individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles, we can tentatively identify 
some relations between aspects of rules or principles preferences and parenting styles: 
Figure 5.1: Parental styles (cited from Gleitman, Reisberg, & Gross 2007, p. 411) 
 
 
 
Authoritative 
Reasonable demands, consistently enforced 
with sensitivity and attentiveness to attend 
to the children's needs. 
Authoritarian 
Many rules and demands, few explanations 
and little sensitivity to the children’s 
perspective. 
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An authoritative style refers to having reasonable demands on children, and 
consistently enforcing them with sensitivity and attentiveness to the children's needs 
(Baumrind, 1966; 1967; Lewis, 1981). Grolnick and Ryan (1989) citing Baumrind 
(1967, 1971) argue that the children who were brought up by the authoritative parents 
were found to be more self-reliant and independent. The authoritative style is echoed 
in what Baldwin (1949) called democratic style: it implies an active approach in 
which the child's views are taken into account and information is provided to facilitate 
choice toward appropriate behaviour. 
The authoritarian parenting style, on the other hand, is described as prescribing many 
rules and demands, yet providing very few explanations and having little sensitivity to 
the child's perspective (Gleitman, et al., 2007).  For Maccoby and Martin (1983), 
rearing styles have two control dimensions: 1) gaining compliance; 2) consequently, 
providing timely feedback on the degree of obedience. According to this idea, 
authoritative parents are high in both demandingness and responsiveness. 
Authoritarian parents are high in demandingness but low in responsiveness. Practical 
examples include some parents explaining their instructions (“go to bed, so you have 
energy for school tomorrow”), some parents asserting their authority (“go to bed, 
NOW, because I told you so”).   
Maccoby and Martin (1983) have also empirically found the ‘permissive style’ which 
is high in responsiveness but low in demandingness. Becker (1964) identified a 
permissive style as the other end of the restrictive dimension, described as a lack of 
control and a passive approach to child. The fourth type of parenting style has been 
identified by Gleitman, et al (2007) based on the work by Baumrind (1967) and 
Maccoby and Martin (1983), as uninvolvement. In this style, very few rules or 
principles are given to the children and parents are uninvolved and insensitive to their 
needs. 
Permissive  
Little structure in regulating children’s life, 
children are allowed much freedom by 
indulgent parents. 
Uninvolved 
Few rules or principles, parents are 
uninvolved and insensitive to the children’s 
needs. 
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In conclusion, I have discussed the existing theorising dimensions in parental styles, 
from Baumrind's authoritative-authoritarian - permissive typology, to Maccoby’s and 
Martin’s (1983) demandingness and responsiveness. All four styles include the use of 
rules and principles but they differ in the frequencies and intensities of usage during 
the parent and child interactions. The participants of our focus groups recognised that 
their own experiences with, and orientations to, rules and principles have a 
relationship with the parental styles they have been brought up with (see chapter six). 
 A rules-oriented approach in child rearing implies high  ‘control’, ‘structure’, and 
‘demandingness’, while too extreme a rules-governed rearing may lead to low 
responsiveness to children’s needs; rules refers to parental authority, hierarchy, 
rigidity and absolute obedience (Baldwin, 1990; Cunningham, 2007). In such 
instances, rules are assigned to children in a top down way and reinforce the family 
structure by emphasising the “might makes right” mentality - “because I said so”, “I 
am the parent, so you have to listen”. Rules are externally enforced on the children 
and, usually, once the rules are set, they prohibit the possibility of question, 
adaptation or exception. 
In contrast, a principles-oriented rearing approach may reflect ‘autonomy’ and 
‘democracy’ and be both high in the demands it makes of children and in 
responsiveness to their needs. Further, a principles-oriented rearing would give some 
emphasis to autonomous judgment and adaptability to circumstance that take the child 
beyond the clear lines of rules. Principles, as I have cast the idea in this thesis (see 
Dworkin, 1979; Rawls, 1971; see chapter 4), can be seen as representing a synthesis 
of individual rights, fairness and morality that once agreed upon, provides an internal 
governance of conduct. Principles need to be internalised and understood in order to 
apply consistently across different circumstances in one’s life (Turiel, 1983). 
I take the view that different parenting styles systematically affect dispositions 
towards rules and principles. I see the origins of dispositions to rules and principles as 
significantly lying in parenting styles. I have not included parental style as a separate 
individual dimension for the instrument development because I recognise parental 
style as having a wide ranging influence on individuals’ psychological characteristics 
and behaviour in many areas of life (social and professional). Hence, its effects are 
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manifested or reflected indirectly in the psychological constructs I will proceed to 
discuss and draw directly into the development of the instrument. 
5.4 Traits vs. Values vs. Cognitive styles 
Focused on moral reasoning, Turiel suggested that individuals’ dispositions to rules 
and principles are partially rooted from one’s early childhood rearing experiences and 
shaped by one’s personality traits and cognitive style (1983). The divergence in the 
preference of rules and principles represents an individual difference. Another way to 
put this is that individuals relate to rules and principles differently based on their 
unique personal characteristics such as traits, values/cultural background, as well as 
cognitive styles.  
Personality traits, values and cognitive styles are closely linked, yet different, 
concepts. Below, I attempt to give some explanation of each of these concepts with a 
view to clarifying how dispositions towards rules and principles are potentially related 
to these psychological constructs. 
Personality traits have been argued to be a key player in determining an individual’s 
capabilities, in the sense that a person’s personality traits are likely to predispose them 
to certain competencies (Wheeler, 2001; Wheeler et al., 2004a cited by Andon, 
Chong, & Roebuck 2011, p.254). Recent research indicates that personality traits are 
“endogenous basic tendencies tied to the underlying bio-physiological response 
system” (Olver & Mooradian, 2003, p.110; also see Zuckerman, 1998, for a recent 
thorough review of bio-physiological theories and research). Olver and Mooradian 
(2003) reviewed a number of studies on traits and concluded that traits are 
evolutionary survival strategies, therefore, they are heritable, persistent in the face of 
social pressure and generally stable throughout one’s lifetime. This definition reveals 
that traits are innate and can be inherited genetically.  
Values are learned through socialisation and viewed as ideal or self-regulatory 
standards that are used to judge the actual behaviour displayed by individuals 
(Rokeach, 1973; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). When “all else is 
equal”, people strive to behave according to their values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
1994). Individuals use values when they wish to justify choices or actions as 
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legitimate or worthy; in other words, values provide people with enduring motives for 
behaving in certain ways (Knafo et al., 2002; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). 
Further, value is directly linked to culture, and cultural differences, as reflected in 
values, can directly affect one’s dispositions (Christie et al., 2003). For instance, a 
person raised in a particular culture may acquire and cultivate certain predispositions 
without questioning their validity (Christie et al., 2003, p.265). 
Cognitive style is defined as “an enduring characteristic way of thinking, which can 
serve an explanatory role in accounting for the observed regularities and consistencies 
in solving cognitive problems” (Fjell & Walhovd, 2004, p. 293). In other words, 
cognitive style is a way of perceiving, thinking, problem solving and decision-making 
(O’Brien, 1994). It is not an ability, but rather a preferred way of using the abilities 
one has (Sternberg, 1997, p.8). Such preferences are also indications of the type of 
environment in which one feels most comfortable and works best (Barkhi, 2002, 
p.678). Cognitive style has been studied predominantly in the field of decision-
making science which examines “the way in which an individual perceives and 
comprehends stimuli and how she chooses to respond” (Ahangar, 2010, p.956).  
Another question I am trying to address here is to understand at which level 
dispositions towards rules and principles should be placed, in comparison with 
cognitive styles and personality traits. Fjell and Walhovd (2004) suggest that the 
difference between personality traits and thinking styles is a matter of scope. If so, 
they argue that “while the personality traits influence our everyday actions, the 
influence of thinking styles will be limited to the situations where we have to 
approach and solve cognitive or intellectual problems” (p.293). The use of rules and 
principles, I believe, is primarily concerned with decision-making and problem 
solving, which are essentially cognitive processes driven by one’s cognitive 
preferences, shaped perhaps by personality traits, values and cultural background. 
From this position, the DRP instrument should be considered as an instrument for 
measuring an aspect of preferred thinking style, or cognition, rather than a measure of 
traits or values. In the later chapter (chapter nine), I will empirically assess whether 
the correlations between the DRP and cognitive constructs are of larger magnitude 
than the correlations between the DRP and personality traits constructs.  
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5.4.1Values and cultural difference - DRP 
Prior cultural studies have shown that individuals from specific cultural groups have a 
tendency to think and act in specific ways that differ systematically from members of 
other cultural groups (Gray, 1988; Hofstede, 1980; Doupnik & Riccio, 2006). A 
culture affects the way that its members think, feel and act and it thus has the potential 
to greatly influence the success and applicability of the chosen financial reporting 
framework (Hofstede, 1980).  
One theoretical perspective to examine the cultural differences is dialectically 
oriented versus analytical thinking. Recent empirical studies seem to suggest that East 
Asians tend to be more holistic thinking and Westerners tend towards analytical 
thinking (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Analytical and holistic thinking 
patterns correspond to dual-process accounts of cognitive reasoning strategies, namely 
“rules-based” versus “associative thinking” (Sloman, 1996, cited by Buchtel & 
Norenzayan, 2008). According to Nisbett et al (2001), East Asians have a greater 
tendency to rely on context to make decisions, while, given the identical task, 
Westerners tended to de-contextualise, using feature-based and rule-based strategies 
(Nisbett et al., 2001). The reasons, as suggested by Spencer-Rodgers, Wang, & Hou 
(2004, p.1417) are that East Asians more readily tolerate psychological contradictions 
and express greater ambivalence. Such cultures are referred to as dialectically oriented 
cultures; they accept and recognise the “duality in all things (yin/yang)”. This is based 
on three fundamental pillars: “the principle of contradiction (two opposing 
propositions may both be true), the principles of change (the universe is in flux and is 
constantly changing), and the principle of holism (all things in the universe are 
interrelated)” (p.1417); in contrast, Western cultures “tend to be more linear or 
synthetic in their cognitive orientation: they consider both sides of an opposing 
argument and then they search for synthesis and the resolution of incongruity” (Peng 
& Nisbett, 1999 cited by Spencer-Rodgers, et al., 2004, p.1417). As result of such 
beliefs, Westerners are generally “less comfortable with contradiction and attitudinal 
ambivalence is associated with psychic tension and conflict” (Spencer-Rodgers, et al., 
2004, p.1417). 
The significant implication of naive dialecticism is that Westerners seek to “reconcile 
inconsistencies”, in that they aim to eliminate inconsistencies in their cognitions and 
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behaviours, which manifests itself as a ‘need for consonance’ (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 
2009), p.30). In contrast, East Asians
39
 tend to be more comfortable with a higher 
level of internal inconsistency in their judgment and thinking. Spencer-Rodgers et al 
(2009, p.30) summarised a number of prior studies on cross-situational consistency of 
the self-concept, and they found that East Asians “use more situational modifiers 
when characterising the self, viewing themselves differently on the Twenty Statement 
Test (TST) depending on the context”. In other words, East Asians hold more 
‘context-specific’ self-beliefs (p.30).  
In chapter nine, section 9.19.4, I will examine whether there will be differences in 
terms of variations in the DRP scores between different ethnical groups in relation to 
context: the Western group versus the Asian group.  
5.4.2 Legitimacy of rules and principles being studied in this project 
I am interested in individual differences regarding dispositions to rules and principles 
in ordinary times and situations in which, broadly speaking, their use has certain 
social “legitimacy”. The questionnaire does not seek to investigate our relationships 
with rules and principles in extreme situations of gross unfairness, oppression and 
exploitation. Legitimacy is, therefore, a fundamental embedding psychological 
property for the kind of the rules and principles being studied here. Tyler (2006, 
p.377) defines legitimacy as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”. In other words, it is the “acquired 
belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper 
and just” (Tyler, 2006, p. 376). It is a property that can be possessed, and which will 
be internalised within an individual to have an effect on her cognitive behaviour. In 
addition, legitimacy has also been studied as a cognitive need by French and Raven 
(1959), who found that the activation of legitimacy is induced by feelings of ‘should,’ 
‘ought to,’ or ‘has a right to,’ i.e. by appeals to an “internalised norm or value” 
(p.264). 
                                                 
39
  Countries include China, Japan and Koran???. Major religions include Buddhism and Confucianism. 
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The idea of legitimacy is essential in understanding voluntary compliance. Tyler 
considers it as “the primary alternative to power as a source of compliance necessary 
for the functioning of an institution” (Hamm, Pytlik-Zillig, Tomkins, Herian, 
Bornstein, & Neeley, 2011, p.98). Further, “in the absence of citizen’s trust in policy-
making institutions the legitimacy of those institutions is endangered and the 
probability that citizens commence to undermine the authority of those institutions 
become more likely” (Kaltenthaler et al., 2010, p.1261 cited by Roth, et al., 2011, 
p.2). Tyler’s (1997) model proposes that legitimacy is connected with voluntary 
compliance and a sense of obligation to comply. Recent studies suggest that having 
legitimacy facilitates the ability to gain decision acceptance and to promote rule 
following (Tyler, 1997, p.338). One risk of internalised literal obedience to prescribed 
rules from official or institutional sources, however, is that individuals may replace 
their own sense of morality and judgment with authoritative demands from 
institutions or organisations without critically questioning the ‘rightness’ or the 
rationale behind that demand (Kohlberg, 1975). This may lead to destructive 
consequences. This point is exemplified by the famous Milgram’s experiments, that 
people often obey authorities even when they personally dislike or are aversive 
towards the tasks (Milgram, 1965). 
5.5 Personality Factors  
The current dominant model in personality research is the five factor model (FFM) 
(Knafo, et al., 2002; McAdams, 1992). Taggar and Parkinson (2007) recommend that 
more studies in accounting should be done using the FFM model for analytical and 
predictive research. The model is made up of five stable structures in the personality 
of most people, which permeate all areas of behaviour including work behaviour 
(Levy, et al., 2011). Based on the personality framework posited by McCrae and 
Costa (1990) and Goldberg (1992), there are five stable, orthogonal dimensions 
underlying individual personality differences (Premuzic, Furnham, & Lewis, 2007, 
p.242). See table 4 for an overview of the five traits. The Big Five structure has 
provided researchers with a reliable psychometric instrument to assess the predictive 
validity of personality traits in many settings, including companies and universities.   
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In addition, many prior researches in accounting have used MBTI
40
 (Bealing, Baker, 
& Russo, 2006) which is similar in many ways to the Big5 model except it divides 
people into four categories instead of five.  
Wheeler et al (2004a) have argued that MBTI is well suited for research exploring 
relation between cognition of information processing and personality. Some 
influential work testing the effect of accountants’ cognitive styles on their judgement 
using MBTI see Cheng et al., 2003; Fuller &Kaplan 2004. Similarly to individuals’ 
rules and principles preferences: The MBTI is not necessarily an indication of 
individuals’ capabilities to utilize either their most or least preferred personality  
functions, but rather is only an indicator of preference (Kovar et al. 2003).   
Evidence from studies using MBTI measuring the personality type of the accounting 
practitioners seem to correspond to a such perception, as the most common type is the 
‘STJ (sensing, thinking and judging)’ (Wolk and Nikolai, 1997; Bealing, Baker and 
Russo 2006; Landry, Rogers and Harrell 1996; Stetson, 2007). Kovar et al., (2003) 
elaborates that “accountant’s primary strength… remains collecting actual 
information from the events in a business (an inherently sensing function), creating 
logical categorizations and aggregations (an inherently thinking function), and finding 
ways to communicate it in an organized fashion and to use it to facilitate effective 
decisions (a function requiring an individual focused on Judging)” (p. 92). 
Table 4 The Big5 personality traits 
Traits Descriptions 
Openness Curious, original, intellectual, creative, and open to new ideas 
Conscientiousness Organised, inclination to adhere to company norms, rules, and values, 
achievement oriented, sense of doing the ‘right’ thing, being moral 
Extraversion Outgoing, engaging, sociable, and tendency to be sociable 
Agreeableness Affable, tolerant, sensitive, trusting, cooperative and participative in a group 
                                                 
40
 MBTI (Myers-Briggs Type Indicator): a survey instrument consisting of over 120 questions designed 
to access an individual's perceive information and make decisions in four primary ways: 
introvert/extrovert, sensing/intuitive, thinking/feeling, and judging/perceiving. The theory is that each 
individual has a predisposed preference to one of each of the above pairs. Thus, each individual can be 
put into one of the 16 categories (Bealing, Baker, & Russo, 2006). 
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situation, propensity to work as a team 
Neuroticism/emotional 
stability 
Anxious, irritable, temperamental, and moody, reflects overall level of 
adjustment, ability to function effectively under conditions or job pressures 
and stress 
Based on Levy et al (2011, p.240). 
Certain traits of the five factor model seem most likely to be related to individuals’ 
dispositions towards rules and principles. Prior theory and research suggest that 
openness to experience and conscientiousness are the traits that may be most relevant 
for self-regulation and conformity to cope with situations (Costa & McCrae, 1992; 
Feist, 1998; McCrae, 1987; McCrae & Costa, 1997; Roccas et al., 2002). 
Conscientiousness is the trait that has the strongest and most consistent relationship 
with job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hogan & Ones, 1997). Further, 
openness and extraversion have an impact on the performances of accounting 
professionals (Levy et al., 2011). The other two traits are not considered to have a 
direct impact on individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles behaviour for 
the following reason. Neuroticism is one’s tendency to experience negative emotions 
such as anger, anxiety and depression. Highly emotional/ neurotic individuals may be 
more prone to stress and suffering (Lev et al., 2011). Such an individual tends to be 
more volatile emotionally (Levy et al., 2011). Agreeableness is concerned with the 
willingness to cooperate with others in a team rather than a preference for an 
independent, solitary work style (Levy et al., 2011).  
5.5.1 Conscientiousness 
Conscientiousness is a global term consisting of multiple facets: dependability, will to 
achieve, self-control, prudence, constraint, reliability, self-control, industriousness 
and trustworthiness (Costa &McCrae, 1998; Levy et al., 2011; Moon, 2001; see 
MacCann, Duckworth, & Roberts, 2009 for a review of these facets). This trait 
influences the way in which we control, regulate and direct impulses (Olver & 
Mooradian, 2003). The concept of conscientiousness can also be viewed as 
comprising both a sense of morality and responsibility (Norman, 1963).   
Within the context of accounting, conscientiousness has been argued to exert an 
impact on the ethical decision-making process of accountants positively (Sennetti et 
al., 2007). In particular, the empirical findings of Levy et al (2011) confirmed 
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previous research on conscientiousness and performance in accounting and they 
concluded that: 1) individuals with higher levels of conscientiousness tend to “respect 
and adhere to idealistic ethical standards in the workplace and are less likely to 
circumvent established norms for personal gain” (p.244); 2) accountants higher in 
conscientiousness would be “more sensitive to perceived unfairness and 
inconsistencies, since they tend to value trustworthiness and consistency” (p.244).  
Conscientiousness is a complex, multiple-faceted construct, I therefore expect that the 
facets displaying an orientation for rules and compliance will correlate positively with 
preference for rules; however, the facets of conscientiousness associated with 
morality and striving to do the right thing will correlate positively with principles. 
5.5.2 Extraversion 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) recommended a top 
five “core competencies” accounting professionals will need to possess in order to be 
successful in the current economic climate. Among them were: communication and 
leadership skills, being responsive to dynamic changes in client and market needs, and 
ability to interpret the broader context of financial and non-financial information 
(summarised by Levy et al., 2011, p, 239). An empirical study by Wheeler (2001) 
found that the personalities of accountants tended to be generally introverted, logical, 
structured and detailed rules-driven; Brown (2006) arrived at a similar result and, 
further, he found accounting students prefer things to stay the same and have clear cut 
answers: they are less flexible compared with students in other disciplines.  Based on 
the above reasoning, I propose that: 
1) Extraversion will correlate positively with preference for principle.  
2) Extraversion will correlate negatively with preference for rules. 
5.5.3 Openness to experience 
Considering multiple perspectives and working with openness to different viewpoints 
will fit well, it seems to me, with the psychological profile of an individual who is 
predominantly principles-oriented. Such an individual would be expected to be more 
receptive to new information and open to unfamiliar situations characteristics with a 
high degree of novelty (Baer & Oldham, 2006). As a result, their rules-following 
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behaviour will be minimal in that they tend to think ‘outside of the box’ to get access 
to a variety of experiences and perspectives and would respond with elevated 
creativity to time pressure (McCrae & Costa, 1997). In contrast, individuals with low 
openness might be intimidated by the uncertainties or flexibilities when being 
exposed to a new experience and circumstances. This is to say that in such situations 
the sense of security and familiarity of individuals with low openness suffers, and she 
may become increasingly anxious as a result of lacking precise coping strategies 
(McClelland, 1967). These individuals tend to find more comfort in the status quo and 
in following rules that reduce uncertainty (George & Zhou, 2001). 
Based on the above theoretical reasoning, I therefore expect the following: 
1) Openness will be positively related to preference for principles. 
2) Openness will be negatively related to preference for rules. 
5.6 Overview of constructs positively related to principles-orientation 
In this section, psychological literature on locus of control, self-efficacy and 
empowerment is used to shed some light on the psychological perspective of 
preferring a principles-based approach. The discussions on these psychological 
constructs strike some commonalities with Dworkin’s conceptualisation of principles 
(see chapter four). Furthermore, the themes that emerged from the focus groups (see 
chapter six) also confirmed the association between the use of principles and the 
psychological constructs focusing on one’s intrinsic motivation and feeling of 
competency.   
5.6.1 Locus of control 
Locus of control represents an individual’s perception of whether she has the ability 
to bring about change through her own efforts or abilities (Rotter, 1966). People with 
a strong internal locus of control may take more responsibility for their actions and 
depend more on their own value structure, skills and abilities. They believe that their 
actions can bring about change (Beu, Buckley, & Harvey, 2003, p.93; Hodgkinson, 
1992, p.311). People with an external locus of control, on the other hand, feel that 
their actions are insignificant, and feel that change is largely governed by external 
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forces such as luck, fate or other people’s actions (Rotter, 1966). Such people are 
much less likely to act organically, since they believe that it is meaningless and 
insignificant.  
 
The internal locus of control theoretically implies the use of a principles-based 
approach, which is viewed as fostering more ethical professional conducts (Trevino & 
Youngblood, 1990). The external locus of control may be related to reliance on using 
rules to help decision-making or error avoidance. In particular, there is some evidence 
which shows that people who have an internal locus of control tend to behave more 
ethically than those with an external locus of control (Hegarty & Sims, 1979; Trevino, 
1986).  
 
5.6.2 Empowerment and self-efficacy 
The extent to which individuals feel comfortable or competent about themselves in 
relation to rules and principles can differ. Perceived self-efficacy refers to one’s 
perception of the degree of difficulty for someone to act in a certain way, and how 
much confidence she has in her ability to perform that task (Bandura, 1991; Bandura, 
1998, p.624). Empowerment assesses an individual's sense of meaning, competence, 
choice and impact (Yukl & Becker, 2006). Empowerment involves “relaxed (or 
broad) controls and an emphasis or internalised commitment to the task itself” 
(Thomas & Velthouse, 1990, p.667). The broader definition of empowerment also 
includes self-efficacy as one factor in producing this intrinsic motivation (Thomas & 
Velthouse, 1990, p.668). The person derives a sense of motivation and satisfaction 
from assessing the task itself, rather than from the context of the task or from the 
rewards or penalty mechanisms. Based on the conceptual connection as discussed, I 
believe that the use of principles signals a higher level of empowerment, because it 
tends to increase the individuals’ involvement and investment of judgment and 
interpretation (Cohen et al., 2011; Black, 2001). 
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5.7 Overview of cognitive styles 
Recently there has been increasing interest in investigating individual cognitive styles 
in relation to accounting performance and decision-making. Such a stream of 
literature provides us with a general context with which to understand DRP and its 
associated cognitive constructs in the domain of accountancy (Hartmann, 2005).  
There are many different types of cognitive styles that could be conceptually relevant 
to the DRP. Rules and principles are mostly means to achieve goals such as reaching a 
closure in decision-making and providing guidance in drawing boundaries regarding 
factors to be considered for decision-making. The dispositions towards rules and 
principles are therefore more likely to be related to cognitions such as need for closure 
and tolerance for ambiguity. The preferences towards rules and principles are usually 
reflected in one’s thinking styles in particular: One’s tendency to process with abstract 
vs. more prescriptive information; global vs. local level information; being more 
creative in seeking new solutions vs. taking orders and following the status quo. On 
this basis, I would expect DRP to be related to one’s thinking styles as being 
measured by Sternberg’s thinking style. Furthermore, rules and principles are 
distinctive means for achieving strategies, for different people a rules-based approach 
may ensure ‘correct rejections’ and ensuring against errors of commission or ‘false 
alarms’ whereas, a principles-based approach involves ensuring maximising ‘hits’ and 
ensuring against errors of omission or ‘misses’. This characteristic is expected to be 
related to individual’s regulatory focus orientations.  
5.7.1 Cognitive style - Need for Closure 
The need for closure reflects an essential reason for the desire for rules: to avoid 
ambiguity and have clear-cut answers/solutions to decision-making or problem 
solving. According to Kruglanski, ‘need for closure’ (NFC) is defined as “a subject’s 
desire for a firm answer to a question; a firm answer, in contrast to a confused ‘and 
or’ ambiguous one” (Kruglanski et al., 2007, p.188). Depending upon their 
psychological state, subjects differ in their ‘degree of tolerance’ for lack of closure. 
The need for closure plays a motivating role in people’s tendency to avoid researching 
alternatives, and to reach a conclusion without consulting new emerging evidence in 
decision-making tasks (Kruglanski et al., 2007, p.188). Webster and Kruglanski 
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(1994) adduce a five factor structure which underlies the construct of NFC, they are: 
preference for order and structure; affective discomfort caused by ambiguity; 
decisiveness of judgments and choices; desire for predictability; and closed-
mindedness.   
Individuals with high NFC tend to acquire information rapidly, iterating through 
mental images in order to reach a definite conclusion. According to Mannetti, Pierro, 
& Kruglanski (2007, p.188), individuals with a strong need for closure tend to commit 
to their views ‘permanently’; to ‘seize’ upon limited information, as the basis for 
making judgments. In other words, as information is always limited, the subject’s 
perception becomes biased by the acquired information; attention becomes ‘frozen’ 
upon such judgment (Van Hiel & Roets, 2007, p.267). As a result, an individual will 
be less likely to be open-minded and less likely to seek new information (Kruglanski 
& Webster, 1996). Such subjects have shown strong ‘judgmental commitments’ and a 
high level of confidence in their judgments (Bailey, Daily, & Phillips, Jr., 2007). In 
contrast, subjects with a strong need to avoid closure will always be aware of the 
emergence of new information, thus, they feel more comfortable keeping their options 
open. Such subjects display a relatively high tolerance in accepting the agony of 
indefinite views (conclusions) (Van Hiel & Roets, 2007).  
Based on the theoretical arguments of the NFC, our theoretical expectation of its 
relationship with DRP will be that people who are predominantly rules-oriented 
would correlate positively with high need for closure, order and associated factors, 
such as: need for structure; affective discomfort caused by ambiguity; desire for 
predictability; and closed-mindedness. Further, the relationship between disposition 
towards rules and decisiveness is expected to be negative, as the more indecisive one 
is the more likely to need to rely on rules to provide clear cut answers in decision-
making. In contrast, people who are predominantly principles-oriented would 
correlate negatively with need for closure and its four factors (need for predictability; 
order; avoid ambiguity as well as close-mindness). The exception is that disposition to 
principles will correlate positively with decisiveness.   
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5.7.2 Cognitive Thinking style 
The way individuals relate to rules and principles also reflects an individual difference 
in thinking style, as individuals have different preferences in relation to information 
processing and decision-making. Thinking styles refer to a person’s preferred way of 
thinking and using abilities (Sternberg, 1997). Thinking styles are encompassed by 
intellectual styles which also embrace cognitive styles, learning styles and problem-
solving styles (Zhang & Sternberg, 2006). Individuals differ in the strength of their 
preferences (Sternberg, 1999). 
 The most authoritative study on thinking style is the one by Sternberg and his 
colleagues, which addressed a comprehensive range of dimensions on cognitive style 
and self-governance (Zhang, 2000, p.273). Sternberg (1999, p.139) argues that the 
mental idea of self-governance (MSG) can serve as a bridge between intelligence and 
personality. Intellectual functioning could be viewed as mental self-government. 
MSG is based on a metaphor between the way that individuals organise their thinking 
and the way that society is governed (Sternberg, 1999). A brief description of each of 
the thirteen thinking styles are identified and organised in five dimensions: function, 
forms, levels, leanings and scope of mental self-government (see Table 5 overview of 
thinking styles based on Sternberg (1999). 
Table 5 Dimensions of the thinking style 
Dimensions Thinking styles (Description); for more details see (Sternberg, 1999) 
Functions Legislative (prefer problems that are not pre-structured for them, rather they can use their 
judgment and creativity). 
Executive (prefer to be giving guidance as to what to do or how to do what needs to be 
done; like to enforce rules and laws). 
Judicial (prefer to evaluate rules and procedures and to judge things both on structure and 
content). 
Forms Monarchic (tend to be single-minded and driven by whatever they are single-minded 
about). 
Hierarchic (tend to be motivated by a hierarchy of goals, and prioritising goals by 
attentions and resources). 
Oligarchic (tend to be motivated by several, often competing goals, while have trouble 
deciding how to prioritising these goals). 
Anarchic (tend to be motivated by a wide range of needs and goals that are often hard for 
others and themselves to sort out; they tend to be anti-systematic). 
Levels Global (tend to focus on the bigger picture and abstract information). 
Local (tend to deal with details and concrete issues, sometimes at the price of missing the 
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bigger picture). 
Learning  Liberal (prefer to go beyond existing rules and procedures and seek to maximise change; 
being comfortable with ambiguous situation and unfamiliarity). 
Conservative (like to adhere to existing rules and procedures, minimise change, avoid 
ambiguous situations where possible, and prefer familiarity). 
Scope Internal (focus on tasks rather than others around them, and socially less sensitive than 
other people). 
External (prefer team work and more extroverted and people-oriented). 
Sternberg (1999, p.19) argues that we do not have a style; instead we have a profile of 
styles. People may function at similar levels of abilities yet have very different styles. 
When an individual’s style matches the requirement of a particular context, he or she 
may be more comfortable and be perceived to have better abilities when, in fact, what 
is being recognised is not ability but the fit or misfit between the individual’s style 
and the task they are confronting.  The studies on thinking style help us to understand 
why certain people are a better fit for certain activities or jobs and others are not 
(Sternberg, 1999, p.19). Sternberg’s thinking styles inventory has been used primarily 
in the field of education in particular, in examining the students’ learning styles and 
how their thinking styles related to their personality types (Zhang, 2000; Zhang & 
Sternberg, 2000). The subjects for the inventory are often university students (Zhang 
& Sternberg, 2000). 
More specifically, the following hypotheses are advanced in the present study, with a 
brief rationale provided for each proposition. 
In terms of functions:  
The individual with rules-orientation will tend to have an executive style, which is 
characterised by more concern for the proper implementation of tasks within a set of 
guidelines, i.e. need for clear guidelines and being organised (Sternberg, 2009). A 
rules-preference could also be correlated positively with judicial style, which is shown 
as having a preference to evaluate rules and procedures and to judge things 
(Sternberg, 1999). 
The individual with a principles-orientation will tend to have a legislative style, which 
is characterised by preferring tasks that require creative strategies and generating new 
approaches and new alternative solutions to traditional ones (Sternberg, 2009). 
116 
 
116 
 
In terms of levels: 
A rules-based approach will fit more to the description of a local thinking style, which 
is characterised with enjoying concrete problems and a requirement to deal with 
details, avoiding conceptual abstract analysis and experiencing difficulty in 
prioritising tasks by importance (Sternberg, 2009).  
A principles-based approach will be more connected to a global thinking style, which 
is characterised by the preference to deal with relatively abstract and broad issues, and 
ignoring details (Sternberg, 2009; Zhang & Sternberg, 2001). 
In terms of learning styles: 
Individuals with a high principles-orientation will tend to have a liberal thinking style, 
which is characterised by going beyond existing rules and structures. Liberal thinkers 
tend to be attracted to carrying out tasks that require breaking with the status quo. 
Rules-oriented individuals will tend to have a conservative thinking style, which is 
reflected in preferring familiar tasks that require the application of and adherence to 
existing rules and structures, to avoid ambiguities and show a relatively higher level 
of resistance to novelty (Zhang & Sternberg, 2000).  
In term of forms: 
According to Sternberg (1997), individuals with a monarchic style prefer engaging in 
activities that require focus on one thing at a time. Those with a hierarchic style prefer 
distributing their attentions and energies towards several tasks that are prioritised; 
individuals with an anarchic style prefer focusing on the segments or fragments of 
parts of a bigger task, without any systematic approach. One consequence of that 
focus is that sometimes they fail to see how the task at hand contributes to the whole 
objective. Finally, those with an oligarchic style tend to have difficulty in prioritising 
and in allocating resources. They especially need extra guidance or assistance to 
provide them with some structures or procedures on time management because they 
have a tendency to pay attention to several non-prioritised tasks at the same time 
(Sternberg, 2009).  In a way, an oligarchic style rests in between a monarchic style 
and a hierarchic style. 
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In terms of scope: 
A high rules-orientation individual will tend to display an internal style, which is 
characterised by preferring tasks that require working independently of other people. 
Previous research has shown that accountants are not as comfortable in team-based 
tasks (Brown, 2006). On the other hand, a high principles-orientation will tend to 
display an external style, as people with an external style will tend to prefer activities 
that allow for interaction with others (Sternberg, 2009; Zhang & Sternberg, 2001). 
One of the key skills for successful application of principles is to be able to express 
and communicate with others and with clients (Levy et al., 2011).  
5.7.3 Higgins regulatory focus and the DRP 
Regulatory Focus theory holds that self-regulation operates differently when serving 
fundamentally different needs, such as the distinct survival needs of nurturance (e.g., 
‘nourishment’) and security (e.g., ‘protection’). Differences in socialisation can 
produce chronic individual differences in regulatory focus (see Higgins & Silberman, 
1998). Nurturing parenting engenders a promotion focus in which self-regulation is 
concerned with accomplishments, hopes and aspirations (i.e., ‘ideals’). It involves 
concern for the presence of positive outcomes (e.g., ‘bolstering’) and the absence of 
positive outcomes (e.g., ‘love withdrawal’). Secure parenting engenders a prevention 
focus in which self-regulation is concerned with safety, duties and obligations 
(‘oughts’). It involves concern for the absence of negative outcomes (e.g., 
‘safeguarding’) and the presence of negative outcomes (e.g., ‘criticism’). 
Regulatory focus theory also distinguishes between different strategic means of goal 
attainment. It distinguishes between an eager strategy and a vigilant strategy (see 
Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1997; 1998). In signal detection terms (see also 
Trope & Liberman, 1996), an eager strategy involves ensuring ‘hits’ and ensuring 
against errors of omission or ‘misses’, and a vigilant strategy involves ensuring 
‘correct rejections’ and ensuring against errors of commission or ‘false alarms’. 
Because an eager strategy ensures the presence of positive outcomes (ensure hits; look 
for means of advancement) and ensures against the absence of positive outcomes 
(ensure against errors of omission; do not close off possibilities), it fits promotion 
focus concerns with the presence and absence of positive outcomes (Liang et al., 
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2007; Halamish et al., 2008; Higgins & Siberman, 1998). Similarly, because a vigilant 
strategy ensures the absence of negative outcomes (ensure correct rejections; be 
careful) and ensures against the presence of negative outcomes (ensure against errors 
of commission; avoid mistakes), it fits prevention focus concerns (Liang et al., 2007; 
Halamish et al., 2008; Higgins & Siberman, 1998).  
Regulatory focus questionnaire (RFQ) is designed to measure individuals’ strategic 
orientation in attaining their goals (prevention focus orientation vs. promotion focused 
orientation) (Higgins et al., 2001). The majority of the subjects for the studies 
involving the use of RFQ have been university students. Nonetheless, because the 
generic nature of the instrument, it can be used on general populations (Love, Staton, 
Chapman & Okada, 2010). The actual instrument has been used in areas such as 
decision-making and risk-taking in the domain of marketing and brand management 
(Love et al., 2010).  
Relating regulatory focus theory to DRP, I expect that individuals who are 
predominantly rules-based will prefer a ‘vigilance’ approach which is characterised as 
thinking in terms of all-or-nothing (loss vs. non-loss contingencies). Therefore, they 
are more sensitive to the absence and presence of negative outcomes. Prevention 
oriented individuals are likely to be drawn to the security provided by the clear lines 
of concrete rules which can afford the individual assurance that she has done her duty 
and avoided the negative outcome. For example, responsibilities within a prevention 
focus are usually described in a rather concrete fashion, so that one knows what 
should be avoided in order to attain security or fulfil duty (Förster & Higgins, 2005, p. 
632). Therefore, prevention oriented people will be drawn to prefer a rules-based 
approach to many situations. The prior literature was not clear in determining the 
relationship between promotion orientation and principles orientation, thus, the 
question will be addressed empirically in chapter nine, part three.  
5.8 Conclusion 
A systematic search shows that there were no instruments designed specifically for 
measuring the dispositions towards rules and principles, therefore, my efforts to 
develop such a psychometric instrument is innovative. A review of prior research on 
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psychological constructs, which seem to me to bear logical relationships with 
dispositions towards rules and principles, provides some insight into the nature and 
psychological origins of individual disposition to rules and principles and gives 
support for my contention that the DRP can pick out a significant concept that 
deserves investigation. As shown in the subsections on each individual psychological 
construct, I have explained and proposed the conceptual linkages between the DRP 
and some of the constructs. Those specific constructs were chosen because of their 
logical or prima facie relevance for rule and principle dispositions.
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Chapter 6: Focus groups 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter primarily explains and discusses the use of focus groups in the process of 
developing our research instrument (DRP). In addition to the eclectic literature review 
across three disciplines (accounting, legal and psychology), I feel by conducting an 
qualitative method such as focus groups, I will be able to examine whether people in 
real life could resonate or make sense of the conceptual dimensions as elaborated in 
chapter two and four; furthermore whether some ‘fresh’ dimension(s) that is (are) not 
studied in prior literature would be unveiled. Thus, the focus groups play a 
complementary role and serve as a supplementary source of items. Moreover, the use 
of focus group at an early stage of study will help to improve the phrasing of item 
stems and reduce measurement errors (Ping, 2004). All in all, the uses of focus groups 
will facilitate a more accurate instrument calibration for this project 
 I found, through content analysis, that the discussions that took place in the focus 
groups were broadly in agreement with the theoretical views about rules and 
principles emerged from the prior literature (chapter two). Nonetheless, I discovered a 
new interesting dimension primarily concerned with individuals’ motivation and 
feeling of empowerment, emerged more vividly from the focus group discussion 
rather than from prior theoretical debates. 
6.1.1 Overview  
The chapter is organised as follows: sections 6.2 to 6.4 deal with issues concerning 
the rationales and practicalities associated with carrying out the focus groups; section 
6.5 describes data transcription and data analysis; section 6.6 presents the focus 
groups discussions; Section 6.7 concludes the chapter. 
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6.2 The focus groups 
6.2.1 The nature and aims of focus groups 
The research methodology literature, related to instrument development suggests that, 
focus groups can be used as a secondary and supplementary source for generating and 
sounding out items for the questionnaire (Morgan, 1988). It is recognised that the 
observation of interactions between participants in a focus group can provide much 
richer information comparing with the outcome of a one-to-one face interview (Bloor 
et al., 2001). Thus, the literature suggests that the use of focus groups in the 
preliminary stages of this research will help to achieve some of the stated research 
objectives, and in particular will help in: 
 obtaining general qualitative insights into the characteristics of individuals 
preferences for rules and principles, 
 discovering and exploring extra dimensions that have not been covered / 
discussed by prior literature, 
 identifying the phrases and words used by participants to describe their 
attitudes towards rules and principles 
 confirming or verifying the dimensions that have been derived from prior 
theories  
6.2.2 The abstract questions probing approach in focus groups  
General context specific scenarios have been used to probe and ‘lure’ participants to 
discuss their experiences and operationlization with rules and principles. Participants 
will answer a series of very general open-ended questions about processes and 
individual experiences associated with using rules and principles. The discussion 
offered by participants will then be verified against a list of main conceptual themes I 
have already derived from prior literature (see chapter two).  
Note: the discussions on the use of rules and principles start off from participants’ 
professional life, but I do not intend to limit the discussions in that domain only.  
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6.3 The practicalities of conducting focus groups  
This section explains the practical issues related to the use of focus groups. It starts 
with the preparations before carrying out focus groups and follows with the actual 
operations of the focus groups and finishes with analysis of the focus groups 
discussions.   
6.3.1 Recruiting participants and organising each focus group  
Participants were approached in the public lecture and theatres as well as the 
University library, University of Glasgow, Scotland, subsequently contacted by email. 
This recruiting strategy offered two main advantages: 1) it saves labour input and time 
compared with more extensive recruiting techniques, and 2) it is economic. It should 
be noted however that, with this approach, the selection of participants was not 
random.   
Specifically, participants of the focus groups were full-time students from the 
University of Glasgow; therefore they are likely to share similar university 
experiences. The only requirement is that they have a good level in spoken English 
adequate for higher study at the University of Glasgow.  
Given the objectives of the study a student sample is deemed to be appropriate / 
adequate (more info on the use of student sample can be found in chapter eight 
section 8.5.2).  
6.3.2 Managing attendance  
In order to ensure a good attendance rate, an introductory message was handed to 
potential participants. The message included a brief background of the study and 
researcher’s contact details. This enabled the researcher to make contact with the 
participants to deal with specific queries and for assuring participation. 
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6.3.3 The size and number of the groups 
Examination of the literature (Morgan, 1988) reveals that it is generally agreed that 
four participants per focus group is the minimum size for a group. The number of 
focus groups to be undertaken is determined by practical issues such as how easily 
participants can attend each meeting. At the same time it depends on the array of 
research themes that need to be covered using focus groups (Krueger, 1994). Based 
on these considerations, I decided to conduct four focus groups with a minimum of 
four people for each group. Each session lasted between 45 and 60 min (Bloor et al., 
2001). 
6.3.4 Data privacy and anonymity 
All data obtained were treated on an anonymised basis. The recordings of the focus 
groups were accessed by the primary researcher only. The recordings were transcribed 
and analysed, and only the anonymised transcription / analysis will be included in any 
research reports. At no stage will the recordings be broadcasted to a wider audience 
(beyond the researcher). Participants were informed of the voluntary nature of their 
participations as well as of the confidentiality of the information or pictures gathered.  
6.3.5 The role of Moderator and observer  
According to Krueger (1994), I needed a moderator to create a climate where 
participants are willing to share their feelings and experiences. The moderator must 
also ensure that all topics are covered (Krueger, 1994). The PhD supervisors of this 
PhD project acted as the moderators of the focus groups and they present the focus 
group participants with a series of questions. 
The research student acted the role of observer which is to observe the dynamics of 
the group discussions; make extra comments on some specific points to ensure 
clarifications; assist the moderators whenever backup question or illustrative 
examples might be called for or be helpful in explaining or clarifying things for 
participants. 
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6.4 The actual operationlisation of the focus groups 
At the beginning of each focus group, participants were shown and asked to sign the 
standard departmental ethical consent form, if they were to agree with the form. I also 
explained to the participants that the session would be recorded both by a voice 
recorder as well as a video-recorder (to ensure the qualities of both voice and 
picture)
41. All four sessions were carried out in the secondary PhD supervisor’s office 
in the Psychology department, university of Glasgow. 
When the session started, the moderator first introduced himself as the PhD 
supervisor of the researcher. He then gave a brief introduction of the current research 
topic, including the background and implications of this PhD research. He used some 
accounting example to illustrate the conceptualizations of rules and principles that are 
adopted by the current research.  
Participants sat around a round table, forming a circle in order to ensure everyone 
would have a roughly equal chance of speaking. The researcher provided beverages, 
snacks and fruits throughout the focus group sessions. This has also helped to promote 
a relaxed and friendly environment for people to open up and be more willing to talk. 
These were vital factors for the success of the focus groups.  
6.4.1The descriptive summary of the participants for 4 focus groups 
Including the pilot focus groups, I have organised four focus groups, 19 students have 
attended the focus groups in total. The following table summarizes the basic 
                                                 
41
 The transcripts and videos were used as supporting documents in assisting me to gain a better 
understanding of the focus groups discussions. Thus they were coded based on a coding structure I 
have derived from prior literature. Nonetheless, the primary purpose of conducting focus groups at this 
stage of the PhD is to ‘double check’ the themes which have been discussed explicitly in the prior 
literature; while attempting to elicit some new insights if there were any. I do not intend to treat them 
as a primary source for the item generation. The records are safely stored and kept in the research 
student’s office. They can be accessed and cross-examined upon request.  
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demographic characteristics of the participants. The sizes of each focus groups are: 
5,5,5 and 4. For the last session, two participants had cancelled the attendance at the 
last minute.  The average time for each session was 45minutes.  
Table 6 The overview of the demographic data of the sample for focus groups 
Sample size 19 
Average age 27 
Average educational level 17 years formal education 
Male vs. female 11 vs. 8 
Asian 5 
White 14 
6.4.2 The general questions which have been covered by the focus groups: 
The moderator did not necessarily follow a structured question-answer approach. 
Therefore, the observer (the research student) made special notes about the 
discussions which appear to be confirming or adding new insights to prior literature. 
The following list of questions was merely a rough guide to help the discussions flow 
more freely.  
Questions guidance: 
1) What does a rule-oriented approach mean to you? 
2) What does a principles-oriented approach mean to you?  
3) Can you briefly explain to me in your own words, the main distinctions between a 
rule and a principle? 
4) Which one do you prefer to apply in general in your life?  
5) Can you give me some of your experiences where you specifically preferred to be 
dealt by rules/ or principles?  
6) Can you give me some of your experiences where you specifically prefer to apply 
rules/ or principles to deal with/ or resolve the problem at hand? 
7) Which approach gives you more satisfaction, and what is the reason(s) for that?  
8) Do you have anything extra to say about rules and principles? 
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 This is when I expect some new dimension being raised by participants that could 
have not been covered by the literature review. 
6.5 Transcribing Focus Group data  
Broadly speaking, there are divided views as to how to go about transcribing 
qualitative data. One view is that it’s not always necessary to transcribe the whole 
focus group word for word; the researcher just needs to take some notes while 
listening to the tapes in conjunction with the notes taken at the time of the focus group 
and memories of the facilitator (Krueger, 1994). An alternative view is that the 
researcher should carry out the full detailed transcription without losing the richness of 
the data otherwise one could run the risk of being subjective or superficial in the 
analysis (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2004). In this research, I have adopted the former 
approach, where the research student focused on making notes on significantly 
relevant details of the discussions instead of transcribing data word for word. 
6.5.1 Data Analysis 
Because the focus groups were carried out after an extended and systematic literature 
review on the dimensions underlying rules and principles (see chapter three) had been 
undertaken, my understanding of rules and principles thus has been significantly 
shaped by the prior literature. I have become somehow alert to the key words and 
themes that were covered in the literature review. Therefore, for the current project, I 
used the rules versus principles debate literature surveyed in chapter three, four and 
five as a general analysis guide. The pre-conceived dimensions underpinning rules 
and principles may run the risk of limiting the scope of the research. Nonetheless, the 
primary purpose of conducting focus groups at this stage of the PhD is to ‘double 
check’ the themes which have been discussed explicitly in the prior literature; while 
attempting to elicit some new insights if there were any. I do not intend to treat them 
as a primary source for the item generation.  
There are a range of techniques for analysing data (see Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, 
Leech, & Zoran, 2009 for an overview): classical content analysis, key-words-in-
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context, discourse analysis as well as constant comparison analysis. Since I examine 
the data against some general theoretical themes, keywords-in-context is the method I 
have applied to the data analysis. There are two stages in the analysis;1) generation of 
key words, phrases, and quotes that fit in or support the conceptual descriptions of 
each theoretical dimension (flexibility, ethics, certainty, security, judgment, abstract, 
creativity, fairness; see chapter three for an overview);2) Identification of additional, 
new themes relevant to people’s preferences for rules and principles that have not 
been spelled out explicitly by prior research (accounting literature in particular), e.g. 
feeling of empowerment, parental influence, experiences / maturity, cultural 
differences.  
6.6 Discussions: results of the preliminary study 
The theoretical discussion on rules and principles as previously presented is important 
here because the researcher has referred to it in the process of analysing data. The 
emerging categories for the content analysis are discussed in the following sections. 
Theme 1: Distinctions between rules and principles confirming our view (chapter four 
for an overview) 
Participants recognised and agreed with our position on the distinctions between rules 
and principles (see chapter two and four). Some participants expressed the perception 
of seeing principles-based approach as an approach which allowing space for personal 
judgment and freedom, whereas rules might constrain judgment.  
“A principles-based approach tends to just encourage everyone to be a bit more 
expressive, that way we got lots of freedom to explore what we want to do in the 
department and every one really enjoys it.” (Participant D in group 2). 
 “So I guess you should like (to arrange for) all employees in the company to have 
some sort of educations nowadays, to take principles into account and use more of 
their judgment rather than (mechanically) sticking to rules.” (Participant E in group 
2). 
128 
 
128 
 
 “… (my part-time job) was very strictly controlled by rules…we had to start off by 
saying a particular piece of script and I mean it’s a bit like be on an answer machine, 
you did not have any choice, what you are saying just responding to other customers 
have said.” (Participant M from group 2). 
“… principles are more for on-going context dependent situation, where I have to 
exercise my own judgment on (determining) whether something is wrong or right or 
what should I do.” (Participant S from group 4). 
“…a principles-based approach, they kind of give police officers more responsibilities 
to use their judgments to say, ok this is a minor offence, we are not going to spend 
hours on it; but (we need to) focus on more serious crimes.” (Participant A from 
group 3). 
These views expressed by participants regarding their perceptions of principles are in 
line with the nature of principles as conceptualised in this project. If one takes on 
Dworkin’s (1979) view, then applying principles implies to be able to take account of 
a spectrum of multiple or even conflicting factors all of which could have ‘weights’ 
contributing to the final decision-making to some extent. Moreover, the use of 
principles tends to be context-specific and gives rise to the use of judgment, which in 
turn increases one’s sense of accountability / responsibility (more details see chapter 
three & four). 
Theme 2: Need for Certainty 
Some people perceive that rules provide them with a sense of certainty and 
predictability. For these people, clear-cut rules help them with understanding what is 
expected from them, and the procedures, steps they therefore can take to tackle 
problems. Some participants echoed a sentiment in which the presence of rules 
increases their level of feeling of certainty.  
 “This is the rule and the principle behind this rule, so it's a useful guide, especially 
early on when you cannot quite grasp principles maybe at much depth that might be 
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help, it’s useful to have the points (rules) to tell you if in doubt, what you should do.” 
(Participant H from group 2). 
“I wonder especially not many people feeling like they probably have too much good 
control of it, so that's the thing when I need rules to rely on, (because of rules) I can 
predict how well I am going to do.” (Participant M from group 2).  
“While I guess if you were in a position to give rules to others under you, you need to 
be more sure that they going to do what you ask them to do. So you kind of say 
(prescribe) more detailing, more detail, and say exactly what you want them to do, so 
that for your to enhance your certainty.” (Participant F from group 3). 
However to others, a different sentiment was raised as to rules’ ability to deliver 
certainty. They argued that rules are not capable of delivering certainty because of the 
complexities inherent in the current ever changing world and unpredictable nature of 
human behaviour. 
“The problem has always been that human behaviours are too complex to be reduced 
to certain sets of rules.” (Participant S from group 4) 
 “What I’d say is (that) a vague principle of instead of detailed rules, answer that 
everybody knows what they are doing and should do in the future.” (Participant M 
from group 2). 
Theme 3: Manipulation problem 
Some participants recognise that in some cases, rules are not applied to serve the 
underlying principles. In these situations, rules are being complied in the form of 
‘creative compliance’ but the spirit of principles is breached.  
 “I think sometimes the rules do not serve the principles… So if the principle is to 
serve the customer, how do you serve the customer? If only what you do is what the 
rule says, there are certain situations where you have to understand, you can make it 
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looks like you comply with the rules, but the customer is still not happy, it’s because 
you did not achieve the principles.” (Participant E from group 2). 
Theme 4: Rules are concrete and prescriptive  
Versus 
Principles are general and broad  
Some participants put forward that rules were associated with concretion and are often 
applied in a prescriptive manner. These people also identify principles as being 
general and broad.  
 That was all scripted, it was not like you have to adapt to anything, you just follow 
the rules exactly.” (Participant M from group 2). 
“in practice,  a rule is may be more important than a principle, because sometimes 
when you doing something, rules are very clear for the employees to follow and, 
organise things, but principles are something, for my experiences, principles are too 
broad and not have some clear directions for people, and that’s my experience.” 
(Participant A from group 1). 
Theme 5: Cultural aspect 
There seems to be a divergence in the preferences to rules and principles between 
participants from Asian and European cultures. Consistent with prior research, 
generally speaking, Asian participants tend to have higher preferences towards rules; 
whereas, European participants seemed to prefer principles to rules.  
 “I mean in China, when I was a child, the teachers gave me more rules than 
principles, they always ask you to do something or not to do something, because they 
think children do not have the enough ability to understand principles and know how 
to do something, so they need to be given some rules to make sure they do not make 
too much mistakes in their life and in education, I mean in eastern country, children 
are more likely to be given more rules than principles, this is also dependent on the 
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background, it’s different, maybe it’s different with western countries.” (Participant 
CL from group 1).  
“Coming from a Mediterranean country42, where principles are important but not 
rules.” (Participant E from group 2).   
Theme 6: Feeling empowered by principles 
Versus 
Feeling disempowered by rules 
Evidence from the discussions of the focus groups has showed that rules sometimes 
disempower people: for instance, some participants did not feel they could have any 
individual input or autonomy with the decision-makings. For that reason, they feel 
disconnected from the more meaningful underlying purposes of the task; as a result 
they did not attach much commitment or energy to rules-based tasks. One participant 
suggested that when people are not involved in the decision-making, they tend to feel 
less responsible and accountable for the success of the task, and this could result in 
less desirable outcomes for the organisation.    
“In cases of applying rules, I have no feeling; just have to be done, because they are 
rules.” (Participant M from group 1). 
“It’s also gave a relief to the employee that in a way that this is what I should do, I 
should just do this, following the rules, I will not get more involved, so in that way, if 
you don't get more involved, it’s highly unlikely you increase your degree of success 
you going to bring to the company.” (Participant E from group 2). 
“Normally I just like you, obey the rule, I don't feel empowered to break or challenge 
the rule, even I don't agree with it.” (Participant V from group 4). 
                                                 
42
 This participant is from Greece. 
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In addition, participants recognised that, compared with rules, principles are more 
empowering because they foster a feeling of community and shared experience for all 
involved parties.  
“… and (principles-based approach) would have been able to may be even more 
helpful or to do our job better, we would have been allowed more freedom and to do 
the best we can.” (Participant M from group 3). 
“…principle promote more engagement and responsibilities among employees.” 
(Participant E from group 2). 
“Even by just saying principle, I think it allows the individual to interpret how they 
want and I think it’s what this generation desires, in support of freedom: I want to do 
what I want to do, you know, so if I just had this guideline, I can push it, push it, push 
it. Whereas rules are just like yes or no, it’s like I cannot do it.” (Participant C from 
group 1).  
Theme 7: Legitimacy 
It has been argued that rules do not derive their legitimacy from a democratic 
approach, as opposed to principles. Rules are perceived to embody more legitimacy 
because they are prescribed by officers from authoritative positions and their 
pedigree. People who are more sceptical towards the legitimation of rules often feel 
powerless in that they feel that they have no impact on the way rules are being applied 
to them.  
“It is not something I have any impact / choice, this is the rule you have to do, if you 
want to use the service or whatever.” (Participant M from group 4). 
 “…You probably (will have to be) higher up to have more decision-making power, 
then you can look at the principle behind this to change the rule or modify them.” 
(Participant CL from group 1). 
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“Then it comes to the level of power, when we standing at this kind of premise… 
normally goes like top guys leading and applying rules, and poor guys at the bottom 
doing the hard work” (Participant M from group 2). 
Theme 8: feeling of security associated with using rules: 
People commented that by following rules, they feel a sense of security, because if 
they do something wrong, they can shift the blame to the rule. Rules also protect them 
from backlash.  
“The only satisfaction I have got was knowing I was safe from any backlash or 
anything could be going wrong that I would walk to anyone in charge and say, these 
are the rules I have been given, I have to do it this way, maybe I could have done it 
differently but I really did not have any choice.” (Participant M from group 2) 
Theme 9: Fairness associated with using rules 
Rules were being recognised as capable of providing a sense of fairness to people. It 
is perceived as a fair approach because everyone who is subjected to a certain rule 
undergoes the same treatment. Rules are also designed to standardise actions and 
ensure everyone is on the same page about how to go about doing things.  
 “I think when you get a rule that has to be true to everyone, like it does not work if 
you have a rule and someone obeys it and someone does not, it is not fair.” 
(Participant M from group 4). 
 “Rules are very helpful, because without it, everyone will not produce work the same 
standard.”(Participant L from group 3).  
Theme 10: Creativity associated with principles  
Participants perceive principles, rather than rules, tend to encourage their creative 
thinking. 
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 “I think principle rather than rule tends to promote new ideas, creative thinking. I 
think I’d rather allow someone to do it than limit them with certain set of rules.” 
(Participant S from group 3). 
6.6.1 Key words 
The analysis of the qualitative data also revealed that there are frequent, consistent, 
specific patterns in terms of the words used by participants to describe their 
experience with rules and principles (see table 7 for an overview). This evidence 
shows some agreement between the prior theoretical themes and the practical 
experiences with rules and principles reported by participants. Such patterns are also, 
broadly speaking in line with the conceptual arguments that I have presented and 
synthesised in chapter two, four and five. 
Table 7 presents the key words pattern as identified via key words searches in the 
notes the research student has taken for the four focus groups. Since I have become 
accustomed to the key words, which repeatedly showed up in the rules and principles 
debate, I made a note on the keys distinctive words, used by individuals when 
describing their experiences with rules and principles. I have also counted the 
frequencies of these single based on her notes. A cut off count three (same key words 
appear more than three times in the notes) was chosen. Key word search function of 
the Microsoft word was performed on the notes to count for the occurrences of the 
theme words. 
Table 7 Key words patterns associated with expressions of rules and principles 
respectively 
Patterns associated 
with rules and 
principles 
Rules: these words are 
identified as associated 
with rules 
Principles: these words are 
identified as associated with 
principles 
Key words Rigid, strict, control, 
predict, scripted, higher 
up, power, backlash, fair, 
complex, detail, certainty. 
Freedom, judgment, vague, broad 
principles, more involved, 
increased responsibility, 
empowered, creativity, individual, 
interpretation. 
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6.6.2 Summary of the analysis of the focus groups 
Other dimensions emerged from the discussion are effectiveness, efficiency, need for 
closure and complexity issues associated with rules and principles. In general, the 
participants’ observations and experiences are in agreement with the theoretical 
arguments. For instance, rules are perceived as more effective than principles, because 
using principles requires weighing and contemplating an array of relevant factors, 
which may delay the decision-making process. Nonetheless, participants argued that 
individuals sometimes do not understand the reasons behind the rules, they misapply 
rules and this could lead to ineffectiveness. The efficiency dimension also emerged 
during the discussion of rules sometimes they make life easier by telling someone 
what to do; whereas principles take more learning and time, hence may hinder the 
decision-making process. The complexity dimension was illustrated during the 
discussion on rules lead to bureaucratic issues, which complicate the decision-making 
process.  
I appreciate that for some people the dimensions may mainly operate at the sub-
conscious level. I found that quite commonly participants would agree with the 
theoretical dimension when it was drawn out and articulated in discussion yet say that 
they rarely think of things this way themselves although the dimensions made sense to 
them. For instance, the need for closure, where some people agonize over rule-less 
situations under the pressure to close a decision; in contrast, some people have a 
higher tolerance for using a principles-based approach to close a decision-making, yet 
individuals disposed either way will not always diagnose the situation in an explicit 
way.  
Note not all 13 dimensions were explicitly covered in the discussion; for instance the 
ethical dimension was not discussed explicitly in the focus groups. But I feel there is 
sufficient evidence from prior research, both conceptual and empirical, to show 
support for the linkage between rules and principles and ethics. 
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6.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have explained the rationale and practicalities of using focus groups 
for the purpose of filtering through the identified theoretical dimensions as described 
in previous chapters (chapter three, four and five). I also gathered a sense that 
individuals seem to have some stable preferences towards rules and principles across 
different contexts.  
 Through the focus groups, I were able to ‘empirically’ test, in a qualitative way, the 
conceptual themes which were derived from the prior literature, and to gain better 
understanding of how they feature in the dispositions to rules and principles of the 
focus group participants. Further, I learned that there are some elements not being 
discussed explicitly in the literature but which do seem to have weights in the real life 
of participants’ and have effects on their preferences such as feeling of empowerment 
in relation to rules and principles. Together with the 13 conceptual dimensions as 
discussed explicitly in chapter two, I now have 14 dimensions in total. Chapter seven 
will tie and synthesise all the 14 dimensions together to form the conceptual 
framework that can be used for the generation of items for the preliminary item pool.  
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Chapter 7: Framework of the dimensions underpinning disposition 
towards rules and principles 
7.1 Introduction  
The objective of this chapter is to layout the working framework of the dimensions 
underpinning individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles, used in the 
development of a measure of those dispositions. This identification of the conceptual 
dimensions was theory driven, with some supplementary confirmations and insights 
drawn from the focus groups. As a result, in this chapter, I integrate here all the 
dimensions of preference and aversion towards rules and principles which have been 
previously discussed in chapters three, four, five and six. These dimensions reflect the 
reasons and motives that the literature suggests are likely to underlie preference and 
choice regarding rules- or principles-based approaches to decision-making or problem 
solving.  
If the disposition towards rules and principles instrument (DRP) is to persuasively 
pick out and measure preference for rules and principles as a construct, it is important 
that the questions built into the instrument should systematically cover the various 
'dimensions' of individuals’ preferences for rules and principles. Essentially, this 
chapter provides a conceptual apparatus that guides the overall research effort in 
pursuit of answering the research questions (see chapter one), and developing the 
main source for the subsequent empirical work; particularly including the guidance of 
item generation for the development of an instrument for the measurement of the 
individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles. Empirical research at a later 
stage (chapters eight and nine) is used to confirm and refine these conceptual 
dimensions.  
The outcomes of the analysis of the focus groups discussions of individuals’ 
preferences towards rules and principles generally confirmed and corroborated the 
findings drawn from the literature review and existing theory. Thus, my observation 
was that the themes/dimensions that emerged from individual participants’ 
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experiences, and views they expressed in the focus group meetings, by and large 
agreed with the literature. Consequently, the majority of the dimensions emerging 
from these two sources are, broadly speaking, overlapping. I did find, however, that 
the dimension of empowerment in particular emerged more vividly from the focus 
group analysis than from the literature, and especially the accounting and legal 
literature.  
In addition to their role in the DRP instrument development, I hope that the 
identification and articulation of these conceptual dimensions makes a valuable 
contribution, in their own right, to the research in regulatory theory. 
7.1.1 Overview 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 7.2.1 - Section 7.2.14 proceeds to 
discuss each dimension. Section 7.3 briefly proposes the possible inter-relationships 
between the dimensions.  Section 7.4 offers concluding remarks on the chapter.   
7.2 Overview of the 14 dimensions 
This section focuses on delineating the 14 dimensions as identified and emerging 
from prior literature and the discussions of the focus groups. I acknowledge that there 
are probably more than the 14 dimensions being presented here, underpinning 
individuals’ preferences towards rules and principles. Nonetheless, according to my 
extended investigation, these are the ones that appeared most frequently and have the 
most potency in the rules and principles debate cross disciplines.  
7.2.1 The ethical dimension  
My view of ethics is broadly speaking conceptualised within the realm of professional 
dilemmas, individual-decision-making models, and professional codes. The literature 
suggests that there is likely to be variation in individuals’ propensity to favour rules 
and principles decision-making styles in view of perceived differences in the ethical 
considerations. Thus, the behavioural norms that are matched with the ethical 
framework of the intended population would improve decision-making and 
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performance (Ponemon & Gabhart, in the book edited by Rest & Narvaez, 2009, 
p.107). 
Some people seem to believe that rules’ following is necessary and even sufficient to 
ensure ethical decision-making and behaviour. This type of person might, for 
example, embrace a formalist philosophical doctrine (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991; see 
chapter 4, section 4.2). Under such doctrine, “individuals subscribe to a set of rules 
for guiding behaviour” (Schmicke et al., 1997, p.1193). As such, this type of person 
may be inclined to apply rules “without regard to questions of background morality” 
(Alexander, 1999, p.544). Their mental position assumes that rules themselves would 
be enough to settle the moral dilemmas that fall within its scope (Alexander, 1999, 
p.544). In accounting, this formalistic approach is reflected in accountants’ attitudes to 
accounting manipulation (Fischer & Rosenzweig, 1995 cited by Amat et al., 1999), as 
they perceive ‘doing things the right way’ as more important than ‘doing the right 
thing’ (Ohman et al., 2006). The formalist approach may appeal because it seems to 
offer a certain clarity about what is the right thing to do in the form of rules which, 
“as long as they are complied with, one is morally ‘safe’, even if one knows that 
compliance will bring about results that morally speaking are suboptimal and 
undesirable” (Alexander, 1999, p.556; Beu et al., 2003; Ohman et al., 2006). 
Moreover, auditors with this type of mentality would tend to “follow the rules to 
defend themselves against allegations of wrongdoing or audit failure” (Ponemon & 
Gabhart, in the book edited by Rest & Narvaez, 2009, p.107). 
The literature suggests that some other people may be inclined to see a mentality of 
rule compliance as morally dubious and associated with insulation from, or even 
disregard for, the consequences of action, and an inappropriate limitation of 
responsibility (Cunningham, 2007; Black, 2001; Essaides, 2006; Scott, 2006 cited by 
Jamal & Tan, 2008). The application of rules is recognised, and objected to, by some 
as not requiring moral reflection or much contemplation at all: “the knowledge of the 
rule itself and the instantiation of the concepts involved suffice” (Burgemeestre et al., 
2009, p.3). The application of rules may, in fact, produce a suboptimal result in moral, 
or other, terms. Compliance with rules sometimes comes at the price that the rule may 
be applied in some situations where it does not ideally, or at all, serve the underlying 
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purpose (ICAS, 2006): a price some may be less willing to pay than others. Herron 
and Gilbertson (2004, p.505), for instance, point out that “CPAs tend to follow a rule-
based approach even when it was not the course of action they considered to be 
morally right”. Furthermore, there is a danger that the focus on the detail and 
complexities of rule application and compliance is liable, in some situations, to 
distract attention from, and even cause us to lose sight of, the original ethical intention 
behind the rule (Barnett & Vaicys, 2000), and, again, this is a danger that some may 
be more sensitive to than others.  
Some people may believe an ethical decision can only be achieved by an approach 
that allows space for exercising their individual discretion and judgment (see chapter 
three, section, 3.3.1.1; Arjoon, 2006; Paine, 1994). Kohlberg’s moral reasoning model 
can also be used to explain this type of person and her preference for using principles 
to achieve ethical decision-making. According to the model, this type of person would 
tend to be one who thinks at the autonomous level (Kohlberg, 1975). In other words, 
this is the type of individual who “knows the rules, understand the underlying 
principles, and makes a decision that is guided by the principles rather than by the 
rules” (Ponemon & Gabhart, in the book edited by Rest & Narvaez, 2009, p.106). 
Sweeney and Roberts (1997, p.339) attested that auditors exhibiting a greater 
tendency towards principled moral reasoning would also be more likely to behave 
ethically. Furthermore, people who reason with principles are more prepared to alter 
and depart from rules if the decision can be justified on universal and moral grounds 
(Schatzberg et al., 2005, p.243; Gaa, 1992, p.35). This conclusion is consistent with 
the proposition the researcher made in chapter five (psychology), where she discussed 
the psychological construct of locus of control (section 5.5.2.1). The psychological 
studies imply that a person who is high in internal locus of control and sense of 
autonomy may be attracted more to a principles-based approach.  
7.2.2 The legitimacy dimension 
The legitimacy dimension is concerned with how individuals perceive the relative 
‘rightness’ to actions/ decision-makings associated with rules and principles-based 
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approach. The psychological construct of legitimacy has been discussed in chapter 
five, section 5.4.2. 
The literature suggests that some people may prefer rules because they see legitimacy 
and legitimate power in them that can secure some order and respect for authority 
without requiring them to be personally involved with those who are being subjected 
to the rules (Black, 2001). This type of individual believes that the prescriptive formal 
structure in itself provides adequate legitimacy to the rules they apply (Power, 2003). 
The pressure from some quarters for the use of rules can be understood in terms of the 
legitimacy that their application can confer on decision-making, and the fact that a 
clear structure affords those at the centre of complex organisations some measure of 
control, at a distance, and with the capacity to predict accurately, the behaviour of 
other members of the organisation (Power, 2003). Individuals with authoritarian 
personalities, understood as “favourable to the authority as opposed to that of 
individual freedom” (p. 96, Ray, 1972 cited by Rigby, 1982, p.195), are liable to 
exhibit such preference. It has been argued that people with authoritarian personalities 
are more likely than others to adhere to the traditional social conventions and exhibit a 
need for unequivocal rules (Rubinstein, 2003). In chapter five (section 5.3), I have 
touched on how an authoritarian parental style could potentially cause one’s 
preference and need for rules.  
Individuals who prefer principles may tend to be lower in authoritarian personality, as 
the application of principles requires a certain level of introspection and acceptance of 
personal responsibility for judgment, whereas one of the characteristics of the 
authoritarian personality is anti-introspection (Rubinstein, 2003, p.698). Further, as 
conceived by Dworkin (chapter four, section 4.4), people who value and find 
legitimacy in the application of principles are also likely to value ‘individual rights’ 
and ‘democracy’ highly. The application of principles has the attraction for being 
compatible with democracy as well as allowing space for judgment, deliberation and 
debate (Ford, 2010). Principles therefore, are appealing to many because they have 
the potential to tap into the power and legitimacy of democracy in situations where 
their operation is a “collaborative, dialogic experience” (Ford, 2010, p.47). The use of 
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principles could further be seen as a platform to provide more voicing opportunities 
for minority groups (Ford, 2010).  
Some people, however, would question the legitimacy of principles. For example, 
people who are low in propensity to trust (propensity to trust is a dispositional 
willingness to rely on others. Individuals differ in their propensity to trust: Mayer et 
al., 1995) may have a harder time to agree with and trust in the legitimacy of 
interpretations of the principles and the meanings given to them. In situations where 
the presence of mutual trust is lacking, such an individual would be highly likely to 
question the degree to which a principles-based approach could truly represent 
minority group interests. After all, the legitimacy of the principles and their active 
interpretation, insofar as it is drawn on the power of democracy, is dependent on 
engaging a diverse and inclusive interpretive community which has a certain degree 
of mutual trust (Ford, 2010).  
7.2.3 Procedural Fairness
43 
Some people are likely to prefer rules because they see them as “fair”. Fairness for 
such people is likely to be judged in terms of the degree to which the decision made 
follows from the rules, and specifically a strict, even legalistic, application of rules 
(Proios, 2010). These people will tend to believe that as long as rules have been 
complied with strictly and rigorously, unfair treatment will be eliminated: that is, they 
tend to favour a ruled-based procedural view of fairness. Others may have been struck 
by the fact that applying homogeneous rules to idiosyncratic cases, sometimes leads 
to the effect of failing to capture the particularities of the individual case. 
Subsequently, they are likely to result in substantive unfairness. The reasoning for that 
is highlighted by Bratton (2003, p.1037): “a procedurally correct result not reflecting 
the underlying substance of the situation and the applicable principles”. This type of 
                                                 
43 
I focus on the procedural fairness instead of outcome fairness, rules and principles are essentially 
applied as part of the procedures; further, people rarely have the information regarding the outcomes of 
others, in which situation, they rely on the evaluation of the fairness of the procedures to indirectly 
assess the fairness of outcomes (Van Den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 1997) 
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person will tend to have reservations and be concerned by the substantive unfairness 
that can occur if rules-based approaches are to be implemented.  
Some people will prefer principles-based approaches because they value the sense of 
individualised justice that can derive from particularistic reasoned decision-making 
(Schauer, 1991a). It is an approach that pays greater sensitivity to the particular 
context, allowing for individual differences in terms of varying values and ways of 
doing things. It focuses more on what is constitutionally and democratically agreed 
upon and how well their individuals ‘rights’ and ‘values’ have been addressed in the 
procedure (Bratton, 2003; Wustemann & Kierzek, 2007; Levitt et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the use of a principles-based approach may entail more engagement and 
give room and opportunity for people affected to express their views, hence, 
contributing to the increased overall perception of procedural fairness, and perhaps 
increased substantive fairness (Zainuddin & Isa, 2011, p.642).  
On the other hand, there are reasons why we might distrust the propensity of 
principles-based approaches to deliver fairness: and these may be the aspects of a 
principles-based approach emphasised by some, particularly those individuals with a 
low propensity to trust. These people may see the principles-based decision-making 
process as inevitably value laden and associated with individual biases and interests 
(Ford, 2010; Carter & Marchant, 2011). Ultimately, for them, the use of a principles-
based approach would create an uneven ground for competition between ordinary 
users and more powerful elites who are good at justifying themselves (Carter & 
Marchant, 2011).  
7.2.4 Concreteness vs. abstractness  
This dimension is concerned with an individual’s propensity to process information 
and decision-making, using either concrete rules-based approaches or more abstract 
principles-based approaches. A rules-based approach often presents information in 
concrete and detailed form. This method of acquiring, assimilating and analysing data 
may appeal to a certain type of person whilst for others; a broad and abstract 
principles-based approach is more attractive. 
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Construal level theory developed in psychology has been used to shed some light on 
how auditors make decisions under either rules-based or principles-based approaches 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998 & 2003). The theory posits that the same event or object 
can be approached and represented at two levels of construal: a concrete, low level vs. 
abstract, high level construal of events (Liberman & Trope, 2003; Trope et al., 2007 
cited by Carpenter et al., 2011). Based on the construal level theory, some people may 
be drawn to rules because they prefer information represented in a low construal 
which focuses on prescribed details of the accounting transaction.  
On the other hand, the type of person who prefers principles would be more likely to 
be comfortable working with high-level construal, which is to understand and 
represent the essence of the event in more abstract terms. The rationality is that 
principles do not prescribe solutions to a particular person at a particular time in a 
particular context (Alexander, 1999). Instead, principles are high-level construals and 
“apply to a broad array of examples and selectively include relevant and exclude 
irrelevant features of those objects and events… therefore capture the superordinate, 
central features of an object, and abstracting these high level, immutable features 
conveys the general meaning of the event” (Trope & Liberman, 2003, p.352). In this 
way, people who prefer working with the high construal would primarily be focused 
on considering ‘why’ a transaction should be accounted for in a certain form 
(Carpenter et al., 2011, p.14).  
7.2.5 Uniformity versus Flexibility  
Some people may hold the view that uniformity is desirable, hence, rules are essential 
for that purpose (Bhimani, 2008, p.451). This preference is consistent with a 
preference for strong uncertainty avoidance, leading to a need for concrete rules and 
rigid codes of behaviour (Gray et al., 2006, p.47).  
Some people may see the limitations of a rules-based ‘one size fits all’ approach 
(Ball, 2005). Rules are non-reflective in nature, which means that people do not really 
need to take heed of whether the application of certain rules is really appropriate for 
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the contexts. The consequence of adopting that mentality is that applying rules would 
result in a ‘pseudo-uniformity’; ‘pseudo-comparability’ (Amir & Ariely, 2007, p.143).  
Some people may prefer a principles-based approach for the reason that it is an 
approach that supports flexibility. It enables people to engage their own discretion to 
determine how best to achieve goals in each individual setting (Black, 2008; Ford, 
2008; cited by Carter & Marchant, 2011, p.160). This reflects my expectations 
regarding the linkages between preference for principles and personality traits such as 
openness and extroversion (chapter five, section 5.5.2 & 5.5.3). My proposition is that 
because of the flexibility associated with a principles-based approach, individuals 
who are predominately principles-oriented would also tend to be more open and 
extravert. Hence, people with principles orientation would have greater agility in 
adapting to new situations (Better Regulation Task Force 2003 cited by Carter & 
Marchant, 2011, p.161); The flexibility of principles also enables individuals to focus 
on the desirable ‘outcomes’ and ‘objectives’ they are endeavouring to achieve, 
“without being overburdened by attempts to stay in compliance with an inflexible 
rules-based system” (Ford 2008; Hopper & Stainsby, 2006 cited by Carter & 
Marchant, 2011, p.161 ).  
7.2.6 Need for certainty and predictability  
Different people are likely to be attracted to rules and principles differently because of 
their varying abilities in delivering certainty and predictability.  
Within the legal arena, certainty and predictability imply that “laws and, in particular, 
adjudication must be predictable: laws must satisfy requirements of clarity, stability, 
and intelligibility so that those concerned can with relative accuracy calculate the 
legal consequences of their actions as well as the outcome of legal proceedings” 
(Paunio, 2009, p.1469). Based on this line of reasoning, people who have a higher 
tendency to eschew uncertainty and structure are liable to be attracted to rules, and 
more prepared to rely on them, in the expectation that they will deliver more certainty 
and predictability (Hofstede, 2001, p.145). A structured approach in auditing is 
characterised by “a prescribed, logical, sequence of procedures, decisions and 
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documentation steps” (Cushing & Loebbecke, 1986 cited by Smith et al., 2001, p.40). 
In addition, individuals with a lower tolerance of ambiguity will be less likely to 
break with rules even when doing so would serve the underlying spirit of the rules 
themselves - if not their ‘letters’; on the other hand, individuals with a higher 
tolerance of ambiguity are more likely to tolerate, and even relish, the ambiguity of 
the outcomes, in the absence of clear rules (Cohen et al., 1993).  
I expect that individuals with a higher tolerance of ambiguity and lower need for 
closure are likely to be more positively disposed towards principles. This unstructured 
approach is associated with use of more judgment by the practitioners (Smith et al., 
2001). These people appreciate and may prefer the fact that principles could afford 
flexibility in response to complex and chaotic real-life situations with low 
predictability where all sorts of uncertain and unanticipated factors may arise in fast 
changing environments. Such people may feel or find that by using a principles-based 
approach, they are better able to cope with any unpredictability and chaos that arises. 
Some people are more likely to be concerned with the relatively high level of 
imprecision sometimes associated with principles; they may, for example, feel 
principles give them insufficient guidance, leaving them exposed and, for example, 
having to speculate on how their superiors would expect a particular principle to be 
interpreted and applied in a particular case. In these situations, the degree of tolerance 
of the superiors towards an individual’s interpretation and judgment is uncertain. 
Consequently, they would fear the backlash they may face as a result of applying their 
judgment. This point was reinforced by the experiences shared by the participants in 
the focus group who pointed out the sense of uncertainty associated with using 
principles when making decisions.  
7.2.7 Complexity 
Response to complexity is one dimension underpinning individuals’ difference in 
preferences towards rules and principles.   
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Some people find themselves reluctant to work with rules for the reason that they 
view rules-based systems as burdening and unnecessarily complex. This phenomena 
is sometimes referred to, in accounting and elsewhere, as ‘rules overload’ Black 
(2001, p.28). The mental burden resulting from 'rules overload' would have 
undesirable implications. Examples of some of the undesirable implications are: 
deteriorating judgmental accuracy and consistency; coping strategies which reduce 
mental processing; weakening the interactions between users and regulators; reducing 
users’ ability to constrain aggressive reporting and to communicate the financial 
information accurately (Nelson, 2002; Sawabe, 2005). Others, however, may find 
rules are extremely helpful in complex situations by providing them with clear 
structures and instructions to follow. This type of person may show a higher need for 
structure and concrete information. They tend to process information in a linear and 
hierarchical manner, rather than taking a network of information with competing 
importance (Hartmann, 2005; Sternberg, 1999).  
Abstraction and simplicity are associated and sometimes conflated. Some people 
prefer to work with principles because they are drawn to what they take to be their 
simplicity (Ford, 2010; Dickey & Scanlon, 2006). Consistent with the construal level 
theory (section 7.2.4), this type of person is likely to be more comfortable with 
information presented at a high construal level, and with principles, which are 
typically written in simple and straightforward language that avoids the complications 
associated with exceptions, and sub-rules, encountered heavily in a rules-based 
approach (Tweedie, 2007; Ford, 2010, p.14). Nevertheless, there are people with the 
view that principles themselves, due to the difficulties of professional interpretations 
they allow, can potentially generate their own problems and complexities (Herz, 
2003). Consequently, this kind of person may resist as too difficult and complex, the 
weighing and balancing, without precise clear-cut guidance, required by the 
application of principles (Carter & Marchant, 2011). 
7.2.8 Need for security  
Need for security involves the concerns that some individuals will have regarding 
whether rules or principles will protect them from potential criticism or litigation. 
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Some people will tend to prefer rules because they value or need, and feel protected 
by, the structure and clear guidance that rules can provide. In particular, a preference 
towards formal structure can also be related to individuals’ search for certain 
protection against any potential accusations (Pentland, 1993), expressing an attitude 
of ‘it's not my judgment; it's the rules that tell us this is wrong’. These are the 
individuals who welcome the avoidance of responsibility for decisions that can be 
associated with a heavy reliance on rules, rather than principles, and an effective 
abdication of judgment (Ohman et al., 2006, p.105). This type of individual will also 
tend to be low in openness and flexibility. They would be uncomfortable with the 
uncertainty or ambiguity that can be associated with new or changing 
tasks/environments because in such situations there is usually a lack of clear 
structured rules to supply the feeling of security.   
People who are more comfortable with the uncertainty and ambiguities may prefer to 
rely on a principles-based approach to protect them from litigation or attacks or other 
challenges to their judgment. These individuals are likely to be comfortable in 
justifying the rationales behind their decisions rather than just seeking protection in 
complying with regulation and the status quo. Principles allow some autonomy within 
a framework, and this type of person will welcome that freedom which in itself gives 
decisions some protection from criticism. This is shown in the recent argument put 
forward by a number of prominent scholars, “principled professional judgments made 
in good faith on the basis of the professionals interpretation of the facts and the 
application of principles can be especially difficult to challenge as it will often be 
impossible to identify any specific point in which in any sense they are ‘wrong’” (Hall 
& Renner, 1991, p.63, see also Black et al., 2007; Jackson, 2004; ICAS, 2006; 
Dworkin, 1979; Carpenter et al., 2011).  
Sennetti and his colleagues proposed that when auditors are required to work under 
principles-based regulation, the principles attribute puts more internal responsibilities 
onto the auditors (Sennetti et al., 2007). "They have more latitude in the application of 
principles and may be held more personally accountable for the results” (p.4). For that 
reason, some people may feel more vulnerable when applying principles with the 
potential threats such as backlash or criticism. Their own personal judgment is at 
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stake rather than an impersonal rule - in which their “self” is not at stake. The 
imprecise nature of principles would “open people up to more threats as they depend 
on their own judgment rather than a set of strict rules” (Somerville, 2003, online 
press
44
). As a result, Schipper and Sennetti note that a principles-based regulation is 
likely to increase liability-risk concerns, (Schipper 2003; Sennetti et al., 2011, P 
168
45
). 
7.2.9 Need for closure 
NFC (need for closure) is referred to as “a subject’s desire for a firm answer to a 
question; a firm answer, in contrast to a confused ‘and or’ ambiguous one” 
(Kruglanski et al., 2004, p.6; more details please see chapter 5, section, 5.7.1). Rules 
may be attractive to some individuals because of their desire or need for closure of 
problems; avoiding ambiguity and having clear-cut answers/solutions to decision-
making or problem solving (Kruglanski et al., 2004, p.6). The need for closure as a 
psychological construct can be measured by an instrument called the ‘need for closure 
scale’ (NFCS) developed by Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem in 1993, (for more detail 
on the instrument please see chapter nine, section 9.11.2.2).         
Applying the NFCS instrument in studying the behaviour of auditors, Bailey and his 
colleagues observed that auditors who score lower in NFC spend relatively more time 
on the deliberative, judgmental tasks such as hypothesis generation.  Further, together 
with the findings from a later study, they found that subjects higher in the NFC 
instrument generate fewer and lower quality hypotheses yet demonstrate a higher 
level of confidence in the decision subsequently reached based on those hypotheses 
(Bailey et al., 2007; Bailey et al., 2011). This further supports the notion that people 
who are lower in NFC tend to be more comfortable with ambiguities and unstructured 
tasks: we would expect such individuals to be comfortable with and to prefer the 
relatively unstructured nature of principles-based approaches. Furthermore, Frenkel-
                                                 
44
 http://www.bizjournals.com/triad/stories/2003/03/03/focus2.html?page=all  (Mar 3, 2003, 12:00am 
EST) 
45
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BexOcYmZFxwC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summa
ry_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false 
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Brunswick (1949 cited by Leone, Wallace, & Modglin, 1999, p.555) posited a type of 
characteristic of persons “who are intolerant of ambiguity as tending toward 
premature closure and toward remaining closed-minded thereafter”.  
Based on the empirical findings of Bailey et al. (2007), I therefore expect that people 
who exhibit a higher need for closure would tend to prefer concrete and clear cut 
rules. This type of person may also prefer to work with more precise and structured 
information such as in the form of concrete rules, implying a relatively low tolerance 
of ambiguity (by Hartmann, 2005). Whilst for others, who have a lower need for 
closure, my expectation of them would be to have more tolerance with respect to 
taking a relatively longer time to collect evidence and weigh and balance different 
factors required by principles-based approaches (Cohen et al., 2011, p.28; Dworkin, 
1977).    
7.2.10 Efficiency  
Some people prefer rules because they believe rules can help them to reach decisions 
and solve problems in an efficient manner. Rules are viewed as efficient because: 1) 
they are clear cut and operate in an ‘all or nothing’ fashion (Dworkin, 1979, see 
chapter four, section. 4.4, for more details); 2) they are considered as “a summary of 
past good decisions”. Therefore, by using rules, “people could save time because they 
would not need to start afresh and debate issues of value and fact every time some 
new factor arises” (Sunstein, 1995, p.1022). In addition, rules prescribe the problem 
and the information/data required for its resolution and can afford certain efficiency 
by eliminating the necessity for making extra investigations and calculations 
(Braithwaite, 2004). Furthermore, rules provide instructions for prescribing actions 
one should take in unfamiliar or novel situations (Alexander, 1999, p.543). 
Nonetheless, a potential problem that may arise from this way of rationalisation is that 
as users no longer require to “consult the reasons behind the settlement in determining 
how to act, they are also required not to heed those reasons, even if they may disagree 
with the rules” (Alexander, 1999, p. 533). In effect there is a potential trade-off 
between efficiency and the optimality of decision-making. For this reason, people 
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may find that rules oversimplify decision-making and inevitably fall short in one way 
or another (Farber, 1999, p.601). 
Some people may find, and react against, a certain inefficiency in the ex-ante nature 
of rules (Braithwaite, 2002a; Kaplow, 2000), which attempts to reasonably 
comprehensively specify outcomes before particular cases arise (Sunstein, 1995, 
p.961). Some people will be struck by the inefficiency of the pre-packaged rules-
based solution approach and by the requirement it imposes on the people who are 
subject to them. Thus, procedurally cumbersome rules undermine the individual’s 
ability to quickly and astutely assess the context, perhaps on the basis of principles, 
which is important in the particular situation, and respond ecologically in terms of 
gathering the ‘important’ information (Sunstein, 1996, p.62).  
Some people will be predisposed to feel that the principles-based approach helps to 
make decision-making processes more efficient. They may, for example, feel that 
once principles have been internalised they can be easily and quickly integrated into 
their habitual decision-making process with less bureaucratic formality and inefficient 
constraint (Korobkin, 2000, p.33). However, using principles means one needs to be 
prepared to modify one’s approach to suit each individual context/problem, and gather 
and weigh the necessary context specific information (Alexander, 1999, p.544), 
inefficiently ‘reinventing the wheel every time’ (Korobkin, 2000, p.33). Thus, the 
time and other resources devoted to such deliberation may cause inefficiency problem 
(Alexander, 1999, p. 536).  
Principles tend to be more efficient when there is ‘heterogeneity’ across decision-
making; they will also be more efficient where constant changes happen over time, a 
situation referred to as ‘chronological heterogeneity’ by Korobkin (2000, p.34). For 
different types of people, relying on rules may be appropriate for decision-making 
under one fixed and familiar condition; whereas for others, thinking with principles is 
a more efficient way to cross conditions and temporal differences. 
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7.2.11 Creativity 
Creativity is likely to be another factor driving people’s preferences in respect of a 
rules-based or a principles-based approach. Creativity requires one to be open-
minded, non-conventional, and prepared to exercise one’s initiative: all the 
characteristics that are the opposite of a pre-packaged, rules-based approach. A pre-
prescribed package tends to motivate individuals to ‘fix’ their attentions on complying 
with rules or avoiding breaking rules and, hence, hinders their ability to think in a 
novel and adaptive way (Carter & Marchant, 2011). A person who opts for a rules-
based approach might tend to be high in close-mindedness, adherence to conventions 
and conservatism, characterising the authoritarian personality (Rigby, 1982). 
The space allowed by principles for creativity and innovation might be the one 
important factor that attracts some individuals to a principles-based approach (Ford, 
2010, p.37). A principles-based approach enables users to adapt to the rapidly 
changing market place and continue to develop better financial products (ICAS, 
2006). Since the use of principles requires a certain level of flexibility and creativity 
in individuals’ thinking, I would expect that people who are high in creativity would 
be more able to cope with the demands, for creativity, of a principles-based approach 
and for this reason, be more likely to prefer principles (Ford, 2010). On the contrary, 
other individuals may express concerns over their ability to make effective use of 
principles as they may be not as comfortable or competent in dealing with less 
precise/abstract information and the demands that interpretative creativity principles 
can place on users (Carter & Marchant, 2011).  
7.2.12 Empowerment 
The feeling of empowerment could be another reason drawing individuals towards 
one approach rather than another. The psychological construct of empowerment has 
been explored in detail in chapter five, subsection 5.6.2.   
 
Some people will be drawn to rules because they feel rules empower them, especially 
the type who is high in authoritarian personality. Such people may tend to see rules as 
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providing them with institutional approval and power in situations such as negotiation 
or when confronted with demands or views which challenge their own.  
On the other hand, some people will feel disempowered by rules because they feel 
their input has no impact in the way tasks are approached when using prescribed rules 
(Yukl & Becker, 2006, p.213 and focus groups, chapter six).  The type of person who 
might find rules constraining and disempowering would be someone who dislikes 
working with routines and overly specialised tasks (Yukl & Becker, 2006, p.212). 
They may also have a difficult time in assessing how their individual work could be 
contributing to the overall company objective (Ohman et al., 2006). This may result in 
an undesirable situation where individuals would develop a sense of personal 
detachment from tasks that are handed down from their superiors. 
Principles have appeal for some people because they see them as empowering them in 
decision-making or problem solving. I expect this type of person would be high in 
internal locus of control as well as capable of reasoning autonomously. Consistent 
with my observations, Kohlberg (1975, p.670) argues that a principles-based approach 
promotes a sense of autonomy, which refers to an increased sense of self-
determination or the freedom of practitioners to choose their own direction. And the 
reason for that is because it is an approach which allows and encourages their 
personal ‘touch’/‘perspective’ on the task.  
Conversely, people who feel powerless when using principles are more likely to be 
the type of people who have an external locus of control, who believe external, 
uncontrollable factors such as luck, nature and authority govern and determine and 
give meaning and significance to their behaviour (Rotter, 1966).  Such people are 
likely to feel the application of principles as unpredictable, outside their control and 
perhaps in the hands of external forces, or that their own use of principles is liable to 
be subject to unpredictable external criticism. Consistent with prior study, participants 
in the focus group expressed the view that, when subject to principles, they tended to 
feel powerless because of lack of a trusting working environment and supporting 
supervisors. In particular, some participants remarked that to be able to use principles 
in decision-making, one really has to have the support of a good manager.  
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7.2.13 Effectiveness 
Arguably, the type of people most likely to find rules “effective” are those who are 
most rule-bound, rather than rule-guided (Pincus, 2000, p.247). However, for other 
people, a rules-based system is inherently suboptimal - less than ideally effective 
(Pincus, 2000). Such people will tend to see rules as a compromise made to fit the 
generality and, therefore, always liable to be less than just quite right for the particular 
case being considered. Such people will see principles as more capable of being 
tailored closely to the particular case and more capable of delivering the “right” 
solution. People drawn to principles for this kind of reason are likely to see the 
inherent problem of rule generality, only compounded when rules are applied without 
any effort being made to understand the rationale behind them i.e. compounded in 
situations where the interpretation and application of rules is not informed by a proper 
regard to their underlying objectives and rationales (Alexander, 1999).  
Effectiveness may be a reason for some people to prefer principles, in particular in the 
field of auditing fraud detection (MacNeil, 2010; Gray, 2009). Some people may have 
the attitude that “I think principles are more effective than rules, simply because it’s 
easier to get around a rule than get around a principle”. This is because these people 
believe that principles predispose people using them to “obtain a thorough and 
accurate understanding” of the task at hand (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 
2006; Kruglanski, 1989), which is an approach focused more on substance rather than 
form (Backof, Bamber, & Carpenter 2010; Cohen et al., 2011; ICAS, 2010). On the 
other hand, there are people who dislike the vague and ambiguous nature of 
principles, as they reckon principles do not provide a structured approach in which to 
be effective in helping decision-making. 
7.2.14 Manipulation  
This dimension is concerned with the forms of approach which would encourage or 
discourage users from taking advantage of a specific approach which consequently 
has good or bad social ramifications. 
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Some people like rules as they believe rules are able to deter manipulation. Detailed 
and prescribed rules enhance transparency in the decision-making process (Bratton, 
2004, p.30), which is perceived to reduce, or in some cases eliminate, opportunistic 
malpractices (Jackson, 2004).  Some people find rules are easy to manipulate and 
compliance with rules fosters a “check-list” mentality which undermines these 
people’s ability to detect manipulation. For instance, in the case of auditing fraud 
detection, auditors trained and reinforced to audit a fixed set of financial statement 
items, transactions, or internal control processes, by using a limited number of 
procedures may not be able to recognise alternative audit procedures even when they 
are ostensive. Users of these rules-based procedures may feel frustrated, as the 
manipulative aspects of using rules tend to undermine their ability in detecting 
potential frauds.  
Some people prefer principles for their ability to combat manipulation. Whilst there 
will always  be some room for debate about how a rule should be applied, rules tend 
to put an end to conversation and debate with, for example, the blunt fact/statement 
that “that’s the rule”. Principles-based approaches are intrinsically open. One has to 
justify and makes an effort to disclose the decision/rationales behind his or her 
judgment, it leaves minimal opportunity for manipulation and malpractice (Benston et 
al., 2006, p.167; ICAS, 2006; Maines et al., 2003).  
‘Self-serving bias’ is less problematic in a rules-based decision-making model, as 
there are clearly specified legal boundaries. In contrast, in a principles-based decision-
making model, such bias means that the users of principles are perceived to be more 
likely to interpret ambiguous information in ways that benefit themselves (Korobkin, 
2000, p.46). As a result, people who are sensitive to such biases would tend to 
perceive a principles-based approach as associated with manipulation. Their reasoning 
will be, nonetheless, distinctive from the reason why they would think rules are 
manipulative (Wustemann & Kierzek, 2007, p.7; Sawabe, 2005). I would expect this 
type of person to be someone who is low in trust propensity and high in need for more 
complete/precise information in order to reduce the uncertainty associated with the 
interpretative risk of using principles. 
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7.3 The possible inter-relationships 
Through my work with focus groups and review of the literature, I have identified 14 
dimensions underlying dispositions towards rules and principles. Whilst these 
dimensions are, I believe, conceptually quite distinct, the focus groups and my review 
of the literature clearly suggest that they will inter-correlate in various ways. I see 
many connections and potential relationships between these dimensions, some of 
which I will discuss below and, on the basis of my reading, will very loosely group 
the dimensions in terms of four proposed, or hypothesised, factors. Because of the 
complexity and multiplicity of the conceptual overlapping and the intricacies of the 
inter-relationship of the dimensions, it seems to me that interactions among these 
dimensions cannot be sensibly conceived of as operating in a hierarchical fashion. 
The reality is, I expect from my preliminary work a rather complex network, or 
matrix, relation. In addition, I would expect that the active relation between the 
dimensions and the ‘weight’ they contribute in the shaping of preferences would 
conceivably vary depending on context. In other words, I acknowledge that context is 
liable to bring into focus certain dimensions and shapes and sharpen preferences.  
Based on the conceptual linkages between these 14 dimensions, and the cogency of 
the arguments concerned as expressed in the literature and in focus group discussions, 
the following expectations are very tentatively proposed regarding the factor structure 
underlying dispositions towards rules and principles. The factor structure is finally an 
empirical question and it will be examined as such in chapters eight and nine. It is 
important at this stage, for sampling reasons, to have a working sense of the number 
of factors I expect might emerge. 
The first factor I propose centres on preference for rules and draws together 
dimensions reflecting various characteristics and features of that preference: 
individuals who appreciate the concrete and specific nature of rules may feel they are 
better at providing them with more professional security (Ohman et al., 2006), fulfil 
their needs for closure (Bailey et al., 2007) and uniformity (Ball, 2005; Gray, 1988). 
Clear cut rules working in an ‘all or nothing’ manner also provide more certainty and 
make the decision-making process more efficient in terms saving time on 
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deliberations and investigations (Pincus et al., 1999). However, too many rules and 
the dynamics among rules themselves may cause complexity for decision makers 
(Nelson, 2003; Black, 2001). I expect that concerns will systematically cluster around 
these issues.  
The second factor centres on preference for principles and draws together dimensions 
reflecting various dimensions of preference for principles. It is grounded in the prior 
literature and the observations of the focus groups. Principles-based approaches offer 
fewer and more abstract standards of conduct (Levitt et al., 2007, p.120). Such an 
approach allows for individual discretion and flexibility to tailor decision-making or 
problem solving according to the uniqueness of the context. The flexible nature of the 
principles supports creative thinking (Ford, 2010); users will feel a sense of increased 
commitment and accountability to the task (Black, 2008; Arjoon, 2006; Hill, 2007). 
The increased involvement and commitment, and the focus on substance rather than 
form, associated with principles can also be seen to lead to increased effectiveness 
and compliance (Yukl & Becker, 2006). The more involved an individual is in 
decision-making that is important to them, the greater is likely to be their sense of 
self-empowerment and investment in the decisions made.  
The third factor I expect will cluster around concerns for fairness and legitimacy. 
Prior literature has indicated that ethics, legitimacy and procedural fairness tend to be 
related at least at a conceptual level. Such linkages are reflected, for instance, in the 
formalist vs. anti-formalist debate in the jurisprudence literature (see chapter four). 
These dimensions all seem to pick up on aspects of individuals’ beliefs about the 
validity and ‘rightness’ of rules and principles-based approaches. The grounds of 
legitimacy and fairness tend to vary for rules- and principles-based approaches, and 
will hold differing appeal for different kinds of individuals. The belief in the 
legitimacy of a rules-based approach reflects a formalist mentality and a narrow 
reliance on officials and preceding rules (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991; Alexander, 
1999). Based on the model proposed by Coglianese (2007), a rules-based preference 
may reflect a focus on procedural legitimacy. In contrast, a principles-based approach 
may emphasise the ‘substance over form’. Principles, as studied in this project, seem 
to reflect a belief in individual rights and a consequentialist mentality; in particular, 
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the legitimacy of the principles, and their active interpretation, is dependent on 
engaging a diverse and inclusive interpretive community which has a certain degree 
of mutual trust (Dworkin, 1979; Alexander, 1999; Ford, 2010; Black, 2008).  
Last but not the least, is a factor reflecting concerns about the potential for 
manipulation and fraud that might be opened up or facilitated by either rules- or 
principles-based approaches. This factor seems to be the driving force behind recent 
calls for regulatory reform in the finance sector, and the increasingly urgent 
appreciation of the need for a re-kindling of public trust in the accounting profession. 
The conceptual discussions within accounting and auditing, and the level of concern 
expressed, alerts us to the fact  that this factor may weigh exceptionally heavily at this 
time and be a particularly significant determinant of individuals’ preferences towards 
rules and principles. A rules-based mentality would be more likely to invite creative 
compliance that subverts quality of financial reporting as demonstrated in a wave of 
corporate scandals (Sawabe, 2005). The concern about manipulation associated with a 
principles-based approach is somewhat different; because principles-based regulation 
is “premised on the concepts of ‘co-regulation’ or ‘enforced self-regulation’” (Ford, 
2010, p.4) and the adaption of principles reflects “legislative faith in regulatory 
expertise, objectivity, fairness, and capacity” (Ford, 2010, p.11); some people are 
concerned that principles give too much leeway to the managers and decision makers 
generally; too much space for interpretation and the biased and self-serving exercise 
of discretion. Principles, by highlighting the responsibility of the individual decision 
maker and placing the emphasis on substance, give a certain encouragement to 
practitioners to act in ‘good faith’ in using them (Wustemann & Kierzek, 2007; 
Sawabe, 2005; Schipper, 2002 cited by Keim & Grant, 2003, p.404-405; Amat et al., 
1999; Carter & Marchant, 2011; Black, 2001); they thus have a moral appeal to many 
commentators. On the other hand, they seem to many to open up a space for 
exploitation and, in particular, exploitation of the close relationship between the 
regulator and the regulated fostered by principles-based, and generally more 
interpretative, approaches (Carter & Marchant, 2011; Benston et al., 2006, p.171).  
Table 7.1 shows my initial speculation on how these dimensions would be collapsed 
and grouped into four distinctive groups based on the connections among dimension 
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emerging from the theory and focus groups discussion. The empirical part of the work 
will further investigate the groupings statistically (see chapters eight and nine).  
Grouping 1 Grouping 2 Grouping 3 Grouping 4 
Concreteness  
Uniformity 
Certainty  
Complexity 
Need for closure 
Efficiency 
Need for 
Security 
Vagueness  
Flexibility 
Effectiveness 
Creativity  
Empowerment  
 
Ethics  
Legitimacy 
Fairness 
Manipulation 
Gaming the rules 
Exploiting discretion 
associated with principles 
Interpretative bias and abuse 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The task of this chapter has been to specify, explain and justify the various 
dimensions of preference I expect to underlie dispositions towards rules and 
principles. In achieving this task I drew on, and brought together, my analysis of 
various streams of literature dealing, often only implicitly, with preference for rules 
and principles, and my analysis of the focus group discussions which were designed 
to supplement and support my reading of the literature.    
I provided in this chapter a preliminary conceptual framework of the dimensions 
underpinning dispositions towards rules and principles. On my analysis of the prior 
literature and the focus group meetings, 14 conceptually distinct dimensions emerged. 
Each dimension is discussed above. These dimensions were crucial in guiding my 
development of “items” for inclusion in the empirical work.  
I appreciate that there is a great deal of conceptual overlap and interconnection among 
these 14 dimensions. Full exploration of the inter-relationships of these dimensions 
will be taken up in chapter nine as an empirical question. At this stage I tentatively 
propose that the 14 dimensions might very likely, I hope plausibly, be related in terms 
of four factors.  
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Chapter 8: Initial item pool testing and reduction 
8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I focus on explaining and documenting the process of creating and 
testing the initial items pool. The process follows the conventional scaling and 
attitude questionnaire development literature (see chapter two for an overview). The 
objective is to produce a short instrument with adequate psychometric properties. 
Later on a distinct sample will be used to further test and validate the instrument (see 
chapter nine).  
8.1.1 Overview 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 clarifies the basic elements in the 
design of an attitude questionnaire; section 8.3 focuses on explaining the rationales 
and results of the qualitative methods of the piloting work, including subject matter 
experts interview as well as peer review session; section 8.4 discusses the use of 
online survey for the current project; section 8.5 outlines the issues involved in 
conducting quantitative analysis on the preliminary item pool. The results of the 
reliability analysis of the 28 subscales are also reported; section 8.6 focuses on further 
item reduction by performing principle component analysis on the cleaned up items 
set. The analysis shows that there are two dominant factors underlying the 
dispositions towards rules and principles. In addition, although it’s not the focus of 
this project, an ad hoc analysis carries out on the remaining items to further explore 
the effects of the minor factors which emerged in the process; section 8.7 concludes 
the chapter. 
8.2 Preliminary item pool 
The following sections discuss elements and considerations in the process of 
designing the preliminary item pool for this stage of work. 
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8.2.1 Generating a pool of preliminary items  
With rules and principles defined (chapter four) and a prior dimensional structure 
postulated (chapter seven), it was necessary to generate a pool of items that measure 
each dimension. Within the scaling literature such dimensions are referred to as 
factors (DeVellis, 1991; Netemeyer et al., 2003) because they are elusive abstractions 
which cannot be observed or measured directly (DeVellis, 1991). In order to 
operationalise factors, items are required to ‘tap’ or ‘cover’ the domain of the 
construct (Netemeyer et al., 2003).   
8.2.2 The scaling method: Likert scale  
Likert scale is most appropriate for studies exploring attitude patterning (Oppenheim, 
1992, p.189). It uses fixed choice response formats and measures the strength/ 
intensity of attitude (Rattery & Jones, 2007, p.235). In this project, I asked subjects to 
give numerical indication on their degree of preference of the statement by selecting 
from 1-5. A score 5 equals to the most favourable attitude, and score 1 equals to the 
least favourable attitude.  3 is the middle point for undecided or a neutral opinion. The 
benefit of having a neutral point is that it allows respondents to be honest about their 
choice rather than being forced to choose either extreme (Cox, 1980).  
8.2.3 Self checking criteria for item Generation 
In the process of creating items for the initial items pool, the research student 
followed self-checking criteria (table 8) to evaluate the initial face and content 
validity of the items. In addition, a weekly meeting with the primary supervisor of this 
PhD project was also held for him to go through each individual item with the 
research student to ensure the items were conceptually relevant and could be 
understood clearly. Moreover, each item has a cited reference or a source to show 
where she has taken the inspiration from.  
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Table 8 Self-checking criteria for the initial preliminary item pool 
Biased questions Does this item seem likely to divide responses into 
extremes? 
Leading/ loaded questions Does this item seem likely to influence the proportion 
of respondents? 
Vague or ambiguous Is this item clearly written? 
Social desirability of the item Does this item trigger response reflecting the socially 
desirable views, rather than the individual’s true view? 
Irrelevant items Is this item relevant to the concepts? 
Solution: an excel sheet is created with the theoretical or empirical sources for the 
questionnaire item (see appendix one). 
Source: Nigel, 1973; Oppenheim, 1992; Rattray & Jones, 2007. 
8.2.4 Rationale for the multiple-items approach 
Another decision I had to make at this stage was to determine the number of the items 
to be generated for the preliminary item pool.  
Because I am trying to measure a new multiple dimensional construct, at this stage, it 
is difficult to say which items will strike a chord with the participants. Hence, I opt to 
adopt a multiple items approach because multiple items give more consistent results, 
and also cancel out ambiguities as the underlying dimension will be shared by more 
than one item (Peter, 1979). Further by using multiple items, provided they all relate 
conceptually to the same dimension, we would reduce the instability due to particular 
wording, emphasis, mood changes and so on (Oppenheim, 1992, p.147). In addition, 
too few items may not produce a reliable measure. The reliability coefficient alpha 
tends to be too low to meet the acceptability criteria when there are few items on a 
scale (Loewenthal, 1996, p.22). 
Loewenthal (1996) guidance was adopted to help determining the number of items 
needed for each dimension. According to her, 5-16 items should be enough for 
assessing a single ‘factor’. To achieve this, one needs to start with 10-30 items per 
subscale in the preliminary item pool.  
The decision to have negative questions (preferences) is theory-driven as there are 
arguments for and against each approach instead of merely one directional argument. 
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In addition, for the scale construction purpose, mixing negatively and positively 
worded items is also helpful in minimizing the ‘yes saying’ tendency of the 
respondents (Loewenthal, 1996, p.24; Churchill, 1979).  
 A positively worded item is one where high scores indicate the more 
preferences towards the rules or principles; 
 A negatively words item is one where high scores indicate the less preferences 
towards the rules or principles. 
The initial item pool needs to compose twice as much - 32 items per dimension (8 per 
quadrant). 
 4 x4 x 14 x 2=448 items for the preliminary item pool  
The decision to have 448 items for the initial item pool was intended to be over- but 
not under inclusive to ensure the construct had been adequately sampled (DeVellis, 
1991). The justification for this approach was twofold. First, it is easier to remove 
than to add items at later stages (Clark & Watson, 1995). Secondly, adopting this 
approach increases the probability that all dimensions will be adequately covered and 
represented which enhances content validity (Netemeyer et al, 2003).  
8.3 Piloting stage one:   
Before recruiting a large sample and conducting any statistical testing on the 
questionnaire, qualitative methods such as subject experts’ interviews and peer review 
sessions were used to check the items to establish face and content validity.  
8.3.1 Qualitative piloting: Peer review panels 
The goals of the peer review panels were: 1) to screen out inappropriate items; 2) to 
check and establish face and content validity of the items. 
8.3.1.1 Ethical approval 
I obtained ethical approval for both carrying out the focus groups as well as the 
subject experts interviews from the Institutional Ethical Review Committee of the 
University of Glasgow.  
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8.3.1.2 Participants for the peer review sessions 
Students were recruited via emails and 11 participants had agreed to take in part in the 
study. Two judging panels were organised with five and six participants in each 
session. It was a convenience sample because the researcher had asked her fellow 
PhD colleagues to help with the research, some others were involved too because they 
were friends or flatmates of these colleagues of hers. The actual operationalisation of 
these sessions was similar to those focus groups which have been carried out 
previously (chapter six, section 6.4), therefore I will not go into more details here.  
8.3.1.3 The descriptive data of the sample  
Table 9 Demographic data for the peer review participants  
Descriptive data for the peer review panel No. 
Sample size 11 
Average age 25 
Average years in Education 17 years of formal education 
Background 7 from social science, 4 from science 
Asian 4 
White 7 
Female vs. Male 4 vs. 7 
Due to the time limitation and the length of the instrument, it was not practical or 
efficient to ask every participant to evaluate the whole instrument at one session. By 
splitting the questionnaire into 3 or 4 equivalent sets (by dimensions), we made sure 
that each dimension and the items in that dimension would be reviewed at least twice 
by different participant (Oppenheim, 1992). 
 To assist the judging process, a specific list of criteria for judging items has also been 
provided to the participants (see 8.2). 
List of things were being judged and discussed by the panel review sessions.  
I focused on getting an overall feeling on respondents’ views on 
1) the clarity of the wording 
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2) the likelihood the target audience would be able to answer the questions 
3) the layout and style of the online survey 
 
In addition, I also asked them to comment on the following issues: 
1) intro message of the questionnaire 
2) ranking the 14 dimensions according to individual personal preferences  
3) suitability of using students sample for this questionnaire 
8.3.1.4 Analysing the feedback 
In general, my analysis of the discussions of these two panels showed that participants 
were intuitively able to recognise and understand the items without much explanation. 
They also agreed that the items were written in a way which is consistent with their 
experiences with rules and principles.  
1) The outline and style of the online survey: 
Participants liked the layout of the online survey. The comment was that “it seems 
pleasant and easy to use”. Another important suggestion related to recruiting people 
for the online survey is: to give future participants monetary incentives to encourage 
them to fill in it online rather using methods such as a paper and pencil approach.  
2) One of the suggestions that I have taken on board from the discussions of the 
individual judging panels is to randomise the orders of the questions and avoid 
presenting emotive or controversial items at the beginning of the online survey. 
3) The main problem being raised is that the definitions of 'principles' may seem 
difficult to grasp for some of the participants, these people needed more explanation 
on the nature of the principles referred to in this questionnaire.  
4) The task of ranking the significance of the 14 dimensions according to participant’s 
own personal preference proved to be difficult. For the reason that each individual has 
different perception of the 14 dimensions as well as their associated contextual 
considerations. I did contemplate the option to include a brief explanation of all 14 
dimensions, but that would make the already lengthy questionnaire to be even more 
cumbersome.  In addition, it would have been a risky choice since it could have been 
leading for respondents. Hence, the test of ranking these 14 dimensional was dropped. 
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5) Participants felt that a student sample will be appropriate for this research as they 
would be familiar with using rules and principles as presented in the questionnaire.  
8.3.1.4.1 Improvements made after the panel review sessions 
Taking the feedbacks on board, subsequently I developed a brief introductory 
message for the online survey which including my definitions of the rules and 
principles, as well as some real-life examples that participants can relate themselves 
to (see appendix two). Such attempts did not mean to restrict or limit participants’ 
valuations towards our questions, instead it was an attempt to be open and transparent 
in my underlying positions and I invited participants to share them with the research 
team, rather than just assume that we were in agreement with the underlying 
assumptions. 
8.3.2 Qualitative piloting: the subject matter experts  
In addition to the peer review panels, subject experts review sessions are used to  
1) judge on whether the items may seem to be related to the dimensions of the 
issue as they would see it;  
2) help us to identify some of the less relevant or effective items; 
3) examine whether the current dimensions have covered the rules vs. principles 
preferences space/ any missing dimensions? 
Because the experts have limited time they could spend on reviewing the 
questionnaire, the main objective is for them to examine whether the 14 conceptual 
dimensions sufficiently cover the constructs I am proposing here.  
The selection of the experts is based on the following (Ramirez, 2002, p.2): 
1) Practitioners who can comment on how meaningful or relevant the 
questionnaire item might be; 2) persons who have rich survey research 
experience. 
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 Table 10 Demographic data of the experts 
ID Position Working 
experience 
Qualification Profession 
1 Faculty International officer  >10 year PhD Higher 
Education 
2 Professor of financial 
regulation 
>15 years PhD Professor 
3 Professor of Jurisprudence >15 years PhD Professor 
4 Director, Trade Finance, 
Scotland & Ireland 
>15 years Professional 
qualification 
Financial 
Services 
5 Deputy Head of Investment 
Banking Division 
>20 years Professional 
qualification 
Financial 
Services 
6 MD of Private Banking >20 years Qualified 
lawyer 
Financial 
Services 
The procedure of carrying out these subject matter experts' meetings is similar to the 
face-face interviews. A voice recorder was used to record the meeting, with experts’ 
permission for us to use the information. The experts were asked to read through all 
the items and delete the ones that in their opinion were not relevant to rules and 
principles. Meanwhile, they were asked to provide an alternative version of the 
deleted statement as they see fit.  
8.3.2.1 Problems identified by the experts and subsequent steps taken 
Experts have recognised that the length of the questionnaire may put some potential 
participants off but they thought that there were no substantial conceptual or practical 
dimensions missing from the current form. All of them agreed that the items tapped 
the domain of the construct, and items, on average resonated with their own 
experiences of dealing with rules and principles. Notwithstanding, they have 
suggested a few things that could be improved about the initial item pool:  
1) Emotive or provocatively worded items:  
Emotionally provocative items were suggested to be deleted by experts. One financial 
director thought the item of ‘If one decides to go for a very much rule-based 
profession, then one does not need to be very creative at all.’ was too strong and 
should be deleted. Another example is this “When being confronted with a Rule, 
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made by someone else, even if I don’t totally agree with it, consciously I tend to just 
follow it.’ Another example is this Q139: "Strict compliance with rules can seem 
impersonal and cold but that is actually a small price to pay for the fairness that strict 
rules deliver." All these items were subsequently removed at this stage.  
2) Theoretically wrongly located items / ambiguously worded items 
Some items have been placed in the wrong theoretical dimensions. Because of the 
intricate inter-relationships among these theoretical dimensions, it is sometimes a 
rather difficult task to decide which dimension one item should be located in. For 
instance: ‘people who need the security of rules never break new ground, and never 
achieve very much professionally’. After reading this statement, some experts thought 
it is about ‘creativity’: Different people are able to use / break rules in a creative way 
to advance their career. Whereas, it had been initially located in the dimension of 
‘need for security’. Experts suggested that such problematic items should either be 
deleted or be placed it into a more appropriate dimension instead. This item was 
dropped following the experts’ advice.  
Taking experts’ suggestions on board, I subsequently relocated 10 items (3% of the 
total items in the initial pool) from the draft which was shown to the experts. 
8.3.3. The outcome after qualitative review stage of piloting 
Figure 3 Reduction of the initial items pool via qualitative steps 
 
For the statistical reason articulated in Loewenthal (1996), I intentionally kept an 
equal number of items for each subscale: 6 per rule/ principles subscale for 14 
dimensions: 6x4x14=336, 13 items were further eliminated based on experts’ 
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suggestions: such as items were ambiguous, irrelevant, or repetitive. After this 
procedure, 323 items were left in the preliminary items pool.   
8.4 Online survey  
As shown in diagram 8.2, after the pre-testing stage, I subsequently end up with 323 
items in the initial pool (see appendix one). I advanced to the quantitative phase of 
work by adopting an internet-based online survey with user friendly features such as 
easy navigation, time alert and exit message, etc. The rationales for choosing an 
online survey were twofold: 1) the administration and the data entry of an online 
survey is the more efficient and requires the least amount of time compared with other 
forms of survey such as postal or paper and pencil. More importantly, compare with 
the pen and paper way of collecting survey data, the online data entry is instantaneous 
and highly accurate; 2) the secondary PhD supervisor, who is a professor in the 
psychology department, has conducted research using online surveys and he provided 
a free account for the research student to set up an online website using 'questionpro'
46
 
for this project.  
8.4.1 Ethical Approval and Privacy Note 
To achieve a larger sample size for the quantitative stage of piloting, I was required to 
apply for a separate ethical approval (in addition to that previously obtained for 
purpose of conducting focus groups) from the Research Ethics Committee of College 
of Social Sciences at the University of Glasgow.  
A covering letter explaining the study together with researcher’s contact method was 
issued to every participant at the beginning of the survey (see appendix four). 
Participants were asked to stop at any point of the online survey if they felt 
uncomfortable with the content. All responses were used anonymously: data will not 
be held associating responses to named participants. 
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 At the time, when the questionnaire firstly went online, the instrument was previously named as 
MPPR: measurement towards principles and rules. http://attitudestorulesandprinciples.questionpro.com 
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8.4.2 Sample recruitment for the online survey 
A convenience sample was used by approaching students in the University of 
Glasgow’s premises such as library, cafeteria and public lectures. Interested students 
were given a consent letter, and were asked to leave the research student their contact 
emails; shortly after they would receive an email from the researcher with the online 
link to the survey and also later on to arrange payment. The logo of The University 
Glasgow was also used in the online survey, to add authenticity to the survey. 
Participants were sent an invitation email to the webpage of the online survey. In the 
email, I gave detailed and clear instruction on how to fill in the online form. The 
survey was self-administrated in the sense that participants were able to complete the 
survey at the comfort of their chosen locations and at their convenience. A submission 
date was indicated in order to improve completion rate and arrange for payment. 
Comparing with the conventional pen and paper way of collecting survey data, the 
online data entry is instantaneous and more accurate. More importantly, the 
administration of pen and paper –based survey takes much longer and requires more 
organizations from both the researcher and participants: such as they have to all be in 
one location at once to enable the collection of the papers. The cost will likely to be 
high if a postal method were applied; there is also a question about the mails may 
arrive at different dates causing complexities in data entry. 
The standard approach to monetary reward in experimental research in psychology is 
to pay £5 cash for each completed survey. Numerous meetings (locations were 
usually the university library and cafeteria for convenience and easy accessibility) 
have been arranged between the researcher and the participants for payment once the 
researcher has been notified by the completion of the online survey. Participants 
would have to sign a receipt/ consent form to give permission for this research to use 
their data. 
8.4.3 Demographic data analysis of the preliminary item pool 
The demographic variables of the participants who have filled in the 323 items of the 
online preliminary item pool are presented in table 8.4 below.  
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Table 11 Demographic statistics of respondents for the online preliminary item pool 
Gender: Female: 43 (48%); Male: 47 (52%); total: 90 
Ethnicity: Asia (including China): 30 (33%); Europe: 45 (50%); Others: 15 (17%); total: 90 
Highest level of education attained: Some college: 19 (12%); Bachelors: 33 (37%); Masters 
/MBAs: 23 (26%); Ph.D:15 (17%); total: 90 
Age:  18-21:5 (6%); 21-25: 41 (46%); 25-30: 24 (26%); over 30: 20 (22%); total: 90 
8.4.4 Limitations of online survey and our remedy 
It has been argued that, based on the large amount of information available online, it 
is hard to compete for the participants’ attentions for them to dwell on the online 
survey long enough to complete the whole questionnaire (Robins, Trzesniewski, 
Tracy, Gosling, & Potter, 2002). Thus, the way to compensate that was to use 
monetary incentives to encourage participants to improve the completion rate and 
accuracy of the data entry. Such an approach has also been approved by the previous 
participants in the peer review sessions (section 8.3.1.4). 
Prior research shows that incentives help to reduce falsehoods, because the 
respondents may feel morally obligated to take more care in completing the survey 
(Burns & Bush, 2000). Further, studies have proven that incentives can improve data 
quality in terms of greater response completeness and greater accuracy, reduce item 
non-response rate and elicit more feedback (Willimack et al., 1995).  
Following the standard practice in psychological experiments research, out of 90 
participants, 70 of them have received £5 for completing the survey, which is 78% of 
total participants. The rest of the 20 were recruited through the research student’s own 
social network, such as through friends or friends of friends, and these people did not 
require payments.    
8.4.5 Testing people’s ability in distinguishing between rules and principles 
During the first four weeks of publishing the online preliminary item pool, I had an 
extra test, which was designed to examine individuals’ ability to accurately locate the 
statement as either a rule or a principle. The statements were cited mostly from the 
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legal regulatory theory and they are classic examples of rules and principles as posited 
by Dworkin (see chapter four). People were asked to give ratings demonstrating their 
judgment of the degree, to which they agree the specific statement to be a rule or a 
principle (1 = definitely a rule; 2 = looks more like a rule than a principle; 3 = not sure; 4 = 
looks more like a principle than a rule; 5 = definitely a principle). Once I had gathered a 
sufficient sample size for it, n=55, the test was subsequently removed from the online 
survey package.  
Table 12 A test on whether individuals can distinguish between rules and principles 
Statement Mean SD Total  
1 “Promises should be kept.” 4.02 1.3 N=54 
2 “All fire doors should be inspected, once per month, by the 
designated “duty holder” in accordance with instructions.” 
1.5 0.86 N=55 
3 “For a will to be valid, in England and Wales, it must be signed by 
two witnesses.”  
1.52 0.88 N=54 
4 “No one should profit from his own wrong.”  3.92 1.19 N= 53 
5 “Customer orders should be dispatched within one business day.” 2.63 1.38 N=49 
6 “Everyone should have equal opportunities”.  3.73 1.44 N=51 
7 “In their capacity as company directors, individuals must act in the 
interests of shareholders.”  
3.33 1.29 N=52 
8 “Employees ought not to make private outgoing calls unless 
approval has been obtained from their immediate supervisor.” 
1.67 0.83 N=49 
9 “Information in accounts must be relevant and reliable, and if a 
choice exists the relevance of the information should be maximized.” 
2.7 1.33 N=50 
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Taking all nine histograms as a whole, there is a clear pattern demonstrating the 
individuals’ ability to distinguish between rules and principles. Such empirical 
evidence shows some preliminary support for the distinctions between rules and 
174 
 
174 
 
principles as postulated by Dworkin (1979). In other words, individuals are able to 
distinguish accurately between a rule and a principle and such distinction is in 
agreement with the conceptual model which was expounded in chapter four.  
Statement 5 “Customer orders should be dispatched within one business day” and 
statement 9 “Information in accounts must be relevant and reliable, and if a choice 
exists the relevance of the information should be maximized” are particularly 
interesting and desire perhaps some more exploration. The histograms showed that in 
agreement with Dworkin (1967), there seem to be situations where people cannot tell 
rules from principle. That is because  the individual judgment on the differences 
between rules and principles might not be exclusively absolute. It might also 
dependent on the individual’s appreciation/ analysis of the contexts. In contrast, for 
some statements such as “Promises should be kept”, an overwhelming consensus was 
reached on considering it as being a principle.   
8.5 Piloting: quantitative analysis 
At the quantitative stage of piloting, I had two objectives: 1) to remove problematic 
items and reduce the size of the initial item pool to a much shorter questionnaire 
which then could be used in conjunction with other psychological tests (see chapter 
nine, part two); 2) to explore the dimensionality of the dispositions to rules and 
principles. 
8.5.1 Sample size  
Kline (cited by Brace et al., 2006, p.310) argues for a 20:1 ratio, meaning that for 
each expected factor there should be 20 participants. In chapter seven, a four groups 
structure had been tentatively suggested, thus a sample size of 20 x 4 = 80 seems to be 
adequate for the purpose of this stage of the empirical work. I acknowledge that the 
sample size at this stage is not optimal; however I argue that the influence of sample 
size is reduced when the factor loading is higher (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang & 
Hong, 1999, p.85). Recently Lei and Lomax (2005) suggest a sample size closes to 
100 is adequate for estimating parameters accurately (p.1). For this stage of study, I 
decided to follow Steven’s (2002) Guideline of Statistical Significance for 
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Interpreting Factor Loadings. Steven’s guidance is based on sample loadings and he 
recommends that statistically acceptable loading for 50 participants is 0.72, for 100 
participants 0.50 and for 200-300 participants: 0.29-0.38. The sample size in this 
study is close to 100, thus a loading of 0.50 is adopted.  
8.5.2 On using students as research subjects  
While using student subjects might sometimes lead to limit external validity (Hughes 
& Gibson, 1991), the literature suggests that students are an appropriate surrogate for 
managers when the tasks being studied involve basic human information processing 
and decision-making tasks (Wynder, Baxter, & Laing, 2012, p.4). In a study designed 
to assess the suitability of using business students as surrogates for managers in 
decision-making situations, Remus (1986) found no significant differences between 
student and manager groups. Thus, the use of students as subjects in this study is 
justifiable on the grounds that I am studying basic aspects of human information 
processing and decision-making. 
8.5.3 Normality distribution 
The skewness and kurtosis (see appendix three) for the items from the preliminary 
pool were mostly ranged from -1 to +1, which are considered as ‘excellent’ for most 
psychometric purposes. Whilst, a few items had skewness and kurtosis between -2 
and +2, which are considered as ‘satisfactory’ for research in the field of human 
attitudes and behaviour (George & Mallery, 2005, p.98-99). Furthermore, researchers 
(Cudeck, Barnes, Cote, & Malthouse, 2001; Nunnally, 1978) outline how it is unusual 
for Likert scales to follow a normal distribution. Scholars such as Bentler and Yuan 
(1999) note “real data sets in practice seldom follow normal distributions” (p.184) 
whilst Cudeck et al (2001) state “virtually no variable follows a normal distribution” 
(p.80). 
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Table 13 Extremely skewed items 
Items with extremely skewed items Skewness Kurtosis  
q19.  One big problem with rules is that some people keep 
following them even when they are clearly morally dubious. 
-1.96 5.64 
q30. Principles tend to be a durable basis for problem solving 
in changing circumstances.   
-1.47 2.00 
q72. When Principles-based approaches to problems are 
working well, the outcomes generated will predictably, and 
with some certainty, reflect the values, culture, and interests of 
those affected. 
-1.29 2.47 
q130. Principles based approaches to problems provide a 
valuable space for debate in which good creative solutions can 
be developed. 
-1.19 2.17 
Only 4 out of 323 items (1%) did not achieve the normality criteria as discussed 
above and therefore have been taken out at this point (table 13 above) 
8.5.4 Missing data 
The survey approach usually suffers from the consequences of missing data when 
participants ignore certain questions (Bryman, 2004). SPSS has specific functions in 
analysing missing values of the dataset. See appendix three for missing data counts. 
Missing responses were replaced with the mean of that item; item mean substitution 
provides an adequate representation of the original data for Likert type scales 
(Downey & King, 1998). I did not adopt the listwise method at this stage, as the 
sample size at 90 became perilously small for factor analysis. 
8.5.5 Internal consistency reliability 
A large portion of this section focuses on documenting and reporting on the internal 
consistency reliability of the individual scale item analysis. Internal consistency 
reliability reflects the degree to which each item is intercorrelated with other items in 
the pool, thus it indicates how well the items fit together conceptually (Parsian 
&Dunning, 2009).  
The Cronbach’s alpha is one of the most commonly used procedures for measuring 
internal consistency reliability (Bryman & Cramer, 1999; Aaker et al., 1997). 
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According to Gliem and Gliem (2003, p. 84) “Cronbach’s alpha is a reliability test 
technique that requires only a single test administration to provide a unique estimate 
of the reliability for a given test. Cronbach’s alpha is the average value of the 
reliability coefficients one would obtain for all possible combinations of items when 
split into two half-tests.” In this way, Cronbach’s alpha was intended to remove 
‘garbage’ items which displayed low levels of internal consistency reliability 
(Churchill, 1979). In the study, 28
47
 dimensional subscales was analysed and 
presented (table 16). 
The objective of dropping certain items is to increase the overall Cronbach’s alpha of 
the subscale. There are four indicators were adopted in helping to determine whether 
to drop an item or not: 
1) The corrected item - total correlation is used in a small sample size, which 
removes the score for the item from the total score for the dimension, prior to the 
correlation. Items with lower than 0.3 item-total correlation are deleted (Kline, 1993; 
Rattray & Jones, 2007, p.237).  The reason I chose a lenient 0.3, rather than a higher 
threshold, is because it is preferable to retain items and remove them at subsequent 
stages if they consistently have an adverse effect on the scale’s psychometric 
properties (Rattray & Jones, 2007).  
2) The inter-item correlation: keep the items which are within 0.3 < x< 0.8 (Rattray 
& Jones, 2007).
 
3) Alpha if item deleted—this is probably the most important column in the SPSS 
outcomes. This represents the scale’s Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for 
internal consistency if the individual item is removed from the scale. I want to drop 
the items where the alpha, if deleted, is higher than the overall alpha, which is the 
estimated value of alpha if the given item were removed from the model (Kaplan & 
Saccuzzo, 1997).  
                                                 
47
 Dimension 14 x 2 (rules and principles) = 28. 
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4) Besides discarding items according to these statistical indicators, items which are 
inconsistent with the remaining subsets should be eliminated (Rattrary et al., 2007
48
). 
This would require subjective judgment, however the conceptual framework 
postulated in chapter seven provides some guidance in helping to determine whether 
different items tap into the same dimension.  
8.5.5.1 Reversed items 
Before performing the Cronbach’s alpha’s tests, all the negatively worded items have 
been reverse coded to ensure all items are commutated in the same direction.    
8.5.5.2 Ways to improve the Cronbach’s alpha 
Effort has been made to increase the alpha, such as by relocating some items into the 
more conceptually appropriate dimensions to strengthen the grouping effect, rather 
than composing fresh new items from the scratch (Zander & Kogut, 1995, p.83). 11 
items have been relocated into a different dimensional subscale.  
8.5.6 Cronbach’s alpha analysis for 28 subscales 
Tables below show one example of the kind of results were obtained for need to reach 
closure dimension (full report see appendix five). 
Table 14 Internal reliability of rules scales in the reaching closure dimension 
Reaching closure_ 
Rules 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for scale 85 16.1 17.9 4.2 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.68 2.29 3.07 .76 1.33 .08 
Item Variances 1.24 .95 1.41 .42 1.44 .03 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.28 .04 .49 .45 11.95 .02 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Scale 
Variance if 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Squared 
Multiple 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
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 They remind us that it is important to revise the questions and retain those ones that truly reflect/ are 
true representations of the theoretical dimensions, even if they have poor psychometric statistics.   
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Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
q199rev 13.48 13.02 .41 .26 .670  
q260rev 13.78 14.46 .33 .13 .692  
q219rev 13.56 13.44 .42 .30 .665  
q270 13.25 12.76 .51 .33 .637  
q59 13.28 12.09 .58 .40 .613  
q224 13.00 13.38 .36 .26 .685  
Cronbach's Alpha .70 
Table 15 Internal reliability of principles scales in the reaching closure dimension 
Reaching closure_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for scale 83 19.2 16.8 4.1 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.19 2.61 3.75 1.14 1.44 .20 
Item Variances 1.07 .73 1.43 .70 1.95 .05 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.33 .15 .61 .46 6.39 .02 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q257rev 16.55 13.05 .36 .16 .72  
q88rev 16.44 12.20 .46 .30 .68  
q45rev 15.96 11.77 .53 .34 .68  
q124 15.70 12.84 .52 .40 .68  
q314 15.40 12.10 .54 .47 .66  
q307 15.71 11.51 .47 .30 .69  
Cronbach's Alpha .72 
Two out of 14 dimensional subscales, had maintained 4 items instead of 6. That was 
because extra two items were eliminated due to their low and negative inter-item 
correlations. This happened usually when 1) the question is too hard to understand so 
student had to guess; 2) item require ‘technical’ knowledge or skill that is different 
from the rest of the items (accounting knowledge for instance).  
Table 16 items being omitted due to the negative inter-item correlations 
Dimension Items from principles-subscale Items from rules-subscale  
Ethics_ principles 
subscale: q285 correlated 
negatively with q228. 
The negative inter-item 
q228. Principle-based approaches 
in business field will promote a 
more socially responsible decision-
making. 
q249. The more Rules we have, the 
more we have to rely on so-called 
experts and they are just not in a 
position to deal effectively with 
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correlations were found 
between q249 and q279 in 
the Ethics_rules subscale. 
 
 
q285. People disagree so much 
about what Principles mean and 
imply that they can never serve as 
a sensible basis for ethical 
decision-making in the public and 
business spheres. 
moral issues. 
 
 
q279. It is alright to put your own 
interests first so long as you do not 
actually violate any Rules. 
 
 
For Efficiency_principles 
subscale; q150 correlated 
negatively with q261. 
 
To keep equal number of 
items, Efficiency_rules 
subscale also discarded 
the two items with the 
highest Cronbach’s alpha 
if item-deleted: q243, 
q142. 
q150. In my experience, Principles 
often operate like rules of thumb, 
cutting efficiently through to the 
crucial factors. 
q261. Principles based approaches 
to decision-making require 
deliberation in every case and 
that’s a depressing inefficient way 
to go about things. 
243. I find that consideration of the 
applicable Rules generally takes me 
quickly to the heart of a problem. 
 
 
142. The problem with Rules is that 
they quickly multiply to the point 
where decision-making gets entirely 
bogged down in impenetrable webs 
of Rules and exceptions. 
 
 
 
It is not appropriate to compare the alpha between two scales with unequal items, I 
therefore decided on equal items for each subscale. Finally, the remaining number of 
the cleaned up items: 12x6x2+ 2x4x2= 160 items
49
. 
Table 17 A summary of the Cronbach’s alpha for all 14 dimensional subscales 
Dimension Cronbach’s alpha Dimension Cronbach’s alpha 
 Rules Principles  Rules Principles 
Certainty 0.70 0.68 Efficiency 0.67 0.52 
Complexity 0.72 0.74 Fairness 0.68 0.72 
Abstractness vs. 
Concreteness 
0.69 0.71 
legitimacy 
0.66 0.70 
Creativity 0.72 0.77 Manipulation 0.76 0.66 
Empowerment 0.73 0.73 Reaching 
Closure 
0.70 0.72 
Effectiveness 0.67 0.61 Need for 
security 
0.75 0.63 
Uniformity vs. 
flexibility 
0.76 0.60 
Ethics 
0.63 0.65 
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 Six items (equal number of both positive / negative items for rules and principles) were kept for 12 
out of 14 dimensional subscales; the ethics and efficiency dimension had 4 items for each subscale.  
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Alpha equals or greater than 0.50 is satisfactory for a new instrument (Pelzang, 2010). 
My results showed that all 14 dimensional scales had alphas over 0.60 (apart from the 
principles subscale for the dimensions of efficiency). In particular, the alpha 
coefficient varies between 0.52 and 0.77 for principles dimensional subscales and 
between 0.63 and 0.76 for the rules subscales. This shows the current version of the 
instrument has a satisfactory level of internal consistency. I have also obtained high 
variances for all 28 subscales: high variance means the instrument has a wide spread 
of scores, which suggests participants were easier to differentiate. Consistent with 
prior research, the results (appendix five) showed that reverse worded items 
consistently have a relatively lower Cronbach’s alpha and item-total correlations 
compare to the positively worded items (Weijters et al., 2009, p.2). 
Based on the satisfactory reliability of the current version of the instrument, I then 
proceeded to undertake factor analysis to explore the dimensionality of the structure 
of dispositions to rules and principles, as well as to further reduce the size of the DRP.  
8.6 Exploratory Factor analysis (EFA) 
EFA technique serves to further reduce the size of the instrument by grouping similar 
items together and reveal the construct dimensionality. It is important to note how 
reliability tests for all subscales were intentionally obtained prior to EFA. The logic 
being that conducting factor analysis on a pool of unreliable items results in a 
‘garbage–in-garbage-out’ scenario and tends to result in conceptually irrelevant 
dimensions being identified (Churchill, 1979). Therefore, EFAis built on initial 
reliability analyses and helps ‘pool’ items into underlying factors. 
EFA is a commonly used method in survey-based research. “It is a mathematical 
procedure which reduces a correlation matrix containing many variables into a much 
smaller number of factors or super-variables. Such super-variables cannot be 
measured directly and their nature have to be inferred from the relationships of the 
original items with the abstract super-variables” (Howitt & Cramer, 2008, p.330). It 
therefore could be carried out to help reduce the size of the questionnaire and also 
gives a clear overview of the underlying factors that are shared by multiple items. It is 
reasonable to use an EFA to generate a theory about the constructs underlying the 
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measures when the researchers do not have strong theory about the structures 
underlying the constructs (Bryman & Cramer, 1999).  
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a type of extraction method of EFA and it 
explores the interrelationship of variables. It provides a basis for the removal of 
redundant or unnecessary items in a developing measurement (Rattray & Jones, 2007, 
p.239) and can identify the associated underlying concepts, domains or subscales of a 
questionnaire (Oppenheim, 1992; Ferguson & Cox, 1993).  In PCA, all the variance 
of a variable (total variance) is analysed. Total variance consists of both specific and 
common variables. Common variance refers to the variance shared by the scores of 
subjects with the other variables, and specific variance describes the specific variation 
of a variable. Therefore, PCA is supposed to be highly reliably and without error 
(Bryman & Cramer, 2005).  
Although there are differences between principles component analysis and factor 
analysis theoretically, practically, however, “the solutions generated from principles 
component analysis differ little from those derived from factor analysis techniques 
(Field, 2000, p.434). The terms of factor analysis and PCA are often used 
synonymously in this context. In practice, however, PCA is most commonly used.  
A factor is a group of items which are collated together, and are usually conceptually 
related. Unrelated items, those that do not group together, do not define the construct 
and should be deleted (Parsian & Dunning, 2009). With PCA, the removal of 
redundant items within a developing measure occurs is an iterative process (Rattray & 
Jones, 2007). The main criticism of PCA however, is that the first two dominant 
factors account for the maximum of the variance explained; this will often lead to a 
situation where “most variables have high loadings loaded predominantly on the first 
factor, and small loadings on all other factors” (Field, 2000, p.438). This poses a 
challenge for the interpretation of the factors.  
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8.6.1 Factor loading and factor scores 
Factor scores and factor loadings are separate concepts
50
. Factor loading is the 
coefficient of correlation between the component (or factor) and the variables, and the 
larger the number, the more likely it is that the component underlies that variable 
(Brace et al., 2009, p.348). Factor scores are “the scores of a subject on a […] factor” 
(Rietveld & Van Hout 1993, p.292). These two also have different usages. Factor 
loadings will be used to determine “substantive importance of a particular variable to 
a factor” (Field, 2000, p. 425), whereas factor scores will be mainly used in regression 
analysis.  
8.6.1.1 The choice of rotation 
According to Field (2005, p.3): Factor rotation can help to make the interpretation of 
the factors easier. Rotation “maximises the loading of each variable on one of the 
extracted factors whilst minimising the loading on other factors” (Rattray & Jones, 
2007, p.239). Rotation works through the absolute values of the variables whilst 
keeping their differential values constant. Varimax, quartimax and equamax are 
orthogonal rotations whereas direct oblimin and promax are oblique rotations (Field, 
2005). The choice of appropriate rotation should be based on whether there are some 
pre-assumed conceptual reasons on whether the factors should be conceptually related 
or not (Field, 2000, p.439). In addition, varimax rotation also produces an identity 
matrix between the variables so saved factor pattern matrix scores is not correlated. 
In chapter four, I have proposed an orthogonal relationship between rules and 
principles, which distinguished on the basis of Dworkin. As a result, the choice of 
rotation for the EFA is varimax.  
                                                 
50
 Note that varimax (a rotation that creates orthogonal factors) gives only one rotated matrix of factor 
loadings, whereas promax (a rotation that creates non-orthogonal/oblique factors) generates two rotated 
matrices – a pattern matrix and a structure matrix.  In other words, the distinction between pattern 
coefficients and structure coefficients is not relevant in varimax rotations. 
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8.6.1.2 Checking for multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity refers to variables which are highly correlated with one another 
(Field, 2000). This causes difficulties in determining the unique contribution of the 
variable to a factor (Field, 2000, p.444). In the SPSS, the intercorrelation can be 
checked by using Bartlett’s test of Sphericity, which “tests the null hypothesis that the 
original correlation matrix is an identity matrix” (Field 2000, p. 457). For factor 
analysis to work, the Bartlett’s test of Sphericity needs to be statistically significant. 
In addition, the KMO produces the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy and Bartlett’s test (Field, 2005, chapters 11 and 12). The KMO value should 
be greater than 0.5 if the sample is adequate for factor analysis purposes (George & 
Mallery, 2005).  
8.6.1.3 Criteria for factor extraction and item removal  
Following the well-established statistical procedure with regards to questionnaire 
development, four main criteria are used to determine how many factors should be 
retained: 
1) The eigenvalue >1:  however this criterion needs to be considered along with 
others because it tends to produce too many factors (Rattray & Jones, 2007). 
2) A scree plot to illustrate the descending variances that account for the factors 
extracted in graph form. The factors that lie before the point at which eigenvalue 
begins to drop can be retained (Parsian & Dunning, 2009). 
3) Single item factors will be eliminated, given the need to develop multi items 
measures. (Rattray & Jones, 2007) 
 4) Rule four is usually referred to as the psychological interpretability of the solution: 
the judgment of item elimination therefore is theory-driven.  
8.6.2 Initial principles component analysis on the 160 items 
This stage of PCA is still focused on data reduction, because 160 items are a lot of 
items to work with; the aim is to filter out more redundant items and trim down the 
size to a more manageable length. 
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The first un-rotated principle component analysis revealed 40 factor loadings with 
87% variance explained. Because the scree plot produced too many factors, this made 
interpretation difficult (Netemeyer et al., 2003). More importantly, unsurprisingly 
almost all items loaded highly onto factor one. This solution was not useful for 
purpose of the current project. I then applied varimax rotation onto the dataset, this 
time it showed 27 factors whose eigenvalue greater than one whilst explained up to 
77% of the total variance (see figure 4). Whilst after dropping redundant items, the 
remaining 69 out of the initial 160 items were able to explain equivalent amount of 
variance, suggesting a large degree of redundancy in the dataset. 
 
Figure 4 Scree Plot for the initial 160 items 
 
Performing a PCA on 69 items produced predominantly two factors (see figure 5), 
which were essentially 'preference for rules' and 'preferences for principles'. Among 
these 69 items, 22 items were loaded onto factors 1 and 2. The Scree Plot of the 
remaining 22 items revealed that there were dominantly two clear factors with 
eigenvalue greater than one (see figure 6 below). Further 7 items were eliminated at 
this stage because they had 1) less than 50% loadings on any factors; or 2) loaded 
significantly onto more than one factor at one time; or 3) they were single factor 
items. The remaining 15 items were loaded onto the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 factors out of the 22 
items, whist responsible for 50% of variance explained. 
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Figure 5 Scree Plot for the 69 items 
 
Figure 6 Scree Plot for the remaining 22 items 
 
Lastly, an ad hoc analysis was conducted on the remaining items after removing the 
items which loaded exclusively and highly on factor 1 and 2.  A varimax factor 
rotation showed 13 out of 47 items loaded strongly on four clear factors which 
explained up to 60% of total variance.
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Figure 7 Flow chart depicts the process taken to achieve the final number of items in 
chapter eight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial item pool  
448 items 
 
After peer review session 
376 items 
 
After subject experts  
319 items (after removed 4 
extremely skewed items) 
 
 
Varimax rotation on 160 items resulting 27 factors 
with 77% variance explained, 91 items with loading 
<.50 were omitted 
Varimax rotation on the remaining 69 items  
(Iterative process applying PCA) factor extraction 
between 2- 6  
After Cronbach’s alpha on 
the319 items leaving 160 
cleaned items 
 
 
 22 items loaded highly and exclusively on the 
first 2 dominant factors (preference for rules 
and preference for principles), 51% variance 
explained 
Ad hoc PCA analysis on the remaining 47 (69-
22) items, four factors solution underlying 
disposition to rules and principles 
 15 items with two-factors solution 
(preferences for rules, preferences for 
principals) explained 50% total variance  
 13 items with four-factors solution explained 
60% total variance 
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8.6.3 Rules and principles subscale (15 items) 
After factor rotation, the factor analysis showed that there were primarily two 
dominant factors: which may be labelled as ‘preferences to rules’ and ‘preferences to 
principles’. These two dominant factors counted for over 50% of the variance 
explained from the data. 
The KMO statistics is .84 which is excellent (Kaiser, 1974). For the current data, 
Bartlett’s test is highly significant (p <0.0001), and I am able to proceed to rotated 
factor analysis. A measure of the multicollinearity is given by the determinant of the 
R Matrix, or correlation matrix, usually denoted as ǀRǀ, with values of ǀRǀ greater than 
.00001 generally being regarded as acceptable for the purposes of factor analysis 
Figure 8 Scree Plot of the 15 items DRP 
 
Table 18 The factor loading (Factor structure coefficients) of the DRP preliminary study 
Items Component 
Principles Rules 
1 307. I tend to be comfortable with the ambiguities associated 
with Principle-based decision-making. 
0.72   
2 311. Principles promote engagement and responsibility among 
employees thereby increasing their enthusiasm for the task. 
0.7   
3 284. Action that is based on Principles has the strongest claim 
to legitimacy.  
0.74   
4 280. Principles work well in situations where there are 
conflicting interests, because they make room for 
communication involving the affected parties that leads to 
more thorough and reliable analysis. 
0.72   
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5 132. I prefer Principles-based approaches because they engage 
people positively and openly in the decision-making process 
and thus reduce the likelihood of manipulation. 
0.74   
6 63. Principles are too broad and vague to be any use in 
devising creative solutions. 
0.62   
7 88. The problem with Principles is that they do NOT have the 
kind of structure that lets you be confident that you have really 
and finally got a firm answer. 
0.53   
8 45. I don’t like Principles-based approaches to decision-
making since they never seem to give clear-cut solutions, and 
if you are unlucky, you have to go back and revise the 
decision. 
0.56   
9 56. I prefer things to be set in the form of concrete Rules.   0.82 
10 152. I like to work in settings where tasks and expectations are 
defined and standardised by clear Rules. 
  0.81 
11 79. I often find myself wishing that there were more precise 
Rules to guide me through complex and unstructured 
situations. 
  0.74 
12 167. I tend to judge the fairness of an outcome according to the 
degree of its compliance with Rules.  
  0.61 
13 59. I rely on Rules to fulfil my desire for a firm answer. 
 
  0.68 
14 223. Rule-based regulation is seldom very effective, because 
no matter how tightly it is designed it always leaves 
exploitable ambiguities and loopholes. 
  0.51 
15 98. I sometimes feel as if I am living in a kindergarten since 
there are just too many detailed Rules forbidding me from 
doing things. 
  0.56 
The above component matrix shows that the both rules and principles subscale 
contain positively and negatively worded items. Schouten et al (2010, p.8) argue that 
factor loading higher than 0.6 shows the adequacy of the sample size for the research. 
In this analysis, 6 out of 8 items (factor 1), 5 out of 7 items (factor 2) showed loadings 
> 0.60. Therefore, the sample size was adequate for this current stage of study. 
Factor 1 seems to reflect putative benefits of a principles-based approach found in the 
accounting literature (Black, 2008 & 2001; Ford, 2010; Hill, 2007), in terms of 
increasing the use of judgment and felt of accountability (Ford, 2010, Black et al., 
2007; Black, 2001; ICAS 2006 a&b). This is reflected for example in Q311 
“Principles promote engagement and responsibility among employees thereby 
increasing their enthusiasm for the task”. Further, the type of person who found 
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principles appealing might also appreciate the ‘weighing’ style of thinking associated 
with using principles; one may tend to feel comfortable with ambiguous information 
and feel a higher need to examine all relevant evidence in the light of  principles, 
instead of reaching closure by using clear-cut rules. Because the legitimacy of 
principles is linked to a perceived democratic approach in the decision-making, it 
echoes Black (2001) and Ford (2010) refer to as the ‘interpretive community’. The 
pre-requisite for such a community is a ‘mutual trust’, which will in turn reduce the 
likelihood of manipulative behaviours. Three negatively worded items (Q63, Q88, 
Q45) were also loaded highly and positively onto factor 1. Collectively these three 
items suggest a contrasting preference towards the imprecise and unstructured 
approach entailed in using principles. Because the negatively worded items will be 
reverse scored, the lower of the scores expresses a higher tolerance of  less clear cut 
answers; in contrast, the higher of the scores indicates a lower level of tolerance 
towards principles.  
Factor 2 seems to express a positive appreciation for rules, in particular rules’ ability 
in providing clear-cut and structured approach to decision-making, thus fulfilling 
one’s desire to reach closure on matters. This is reflected for instance in Q59 “I rely 
on Rules to fulfil my desire for a firm answer”.  Because of such a desire, this type of 
individual would be more likely to rely on rules to structure tasks, and in particular 
tend to judge the fairness of an outcome to the degree, that decision-making was in 
compliance with rules. Q223 and Q98 are negatively worded items. Thus, the higher 
the scores the lower preference expressed towards rules; the lower of the scores 
suggests a higher preference towards rules.  
8.6.3.1 Reliability of the rules and principles subscale (15 items) 
Table 19 Reliability of the principle subscale 
Principles subscale n mean Variance SD No. of 
items 
 
 84 26.3 35.5 5.9 8  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximu
m/Minim
um 
Variance 
Item Means 3.29 2.72 3.66 .94 1.35 .07 
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Item Variances 1.17 .97 1.55 .58 1.59 .04 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.40 .18 .65 .47 3.69 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
 
q132 22.90 27.72 .63 .43 .81  
q284 23.04 27.82 .58 .46 .82  
q280 22.93 28.50 .56 .41 .82  
q311 22.63 27.85 .62 .52 .82  
q63rev 22.98 26.60 .54 .49 .83  
q88rev 23.57 28.82 .47 .38 .83  
q45rev 23.10 28.087 .56 .44 .82  
q307 22.86 26.51 .62 .59 .81  
Cronbach's Alpha .84 
 
Table 20 Reliability of the rules subscale 
Rules subscale n mean Variance SD No. of 
items 
 
 86 19.48 35.17 5.93 7  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximu
m/Minim
um 
Variance 
Item Means 2.78 2.56 3.05 .49 1.19  
Item Variances 1.42 1.1 1.63 .54 1.49  
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.42 .12 .71 .59 5.88  
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
 
q59 16.69 26.59 .61 .43 .81  
q56 16.78 24.48 .79 .65 .78  
q152 16.43 24.86 .77 .60 .79  
q167 16.7 27.01 .50 .37 .83  
q79 16.65 25.6 .64 .48 .81  
q223rev 16.92 29.46 .41 .27 .84  
q98rev 16.7 27.81 .43 .29 .84  
Cronbach's Alpha .84 
Cronbach’s alpha for both rules subscale and principles subscale is 0.84. The 
corrected-item-to-total scale correlation of the items from the rules-scale, ranged from 
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0.43-0.77; items from the principles-subscales were ranged from 0.47-0.63. The 
internal consistency of rules and principles subscales is considered to be reliable.  
8.6.4 An ad hoc analysis on the remaining items (resulting 13 items) 
The KMO statistic is .66 which is mediocre (Brace et al., 2006). The determinant of 
correlation matrix of this data is .036 which is greater than the necessary value of 
.00001. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a problem for these data. The Bartlett’s test 
of Sphericity is highly significant (p <0.0001), and I am able to proceed to factor 
analysis. 
Figure 9 Scree Plot of the 13 items an ad hoc analysis 
 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings  
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
compone
nt 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulati
ve% 
Total %Of 
Variance 
Cumulat
ive % 
Total %Of 
Variance 
Cumulati
ve % 
1 3.37 25.89 25.89 3.37 25.89 25.89 2.15 16.51 16.51 
2 1.82 14.0 39.90 1.82 14.0 39.90 2.04 15.68 32.19 
3 1.46 11.22 51.12 1.46 11.22 51.12 1.95 14.97 47.16 
4 1.18 9.04 60.16 1.18 9.04 60.16 1.69 13.0 60.16 
Extraction Method: Principle Component Analysis 
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Table 21 Factor loadings of the ad hoc analysis of the minor factors 
 items Factor
1 
2 3 4 
1 18. I feel comfortable with tasks that involve the 
interpretation and use of Principles. 
.76    
2 64. The advantage of Principles-based approaches is 
that they facilitate communication about the issues 
and we can be quite sure that the outcomes emerging 
really take careful account of all the important factors. 
.73    
3 66. Principles based approaches improve decision-
making by enabling decision makers to approach 
problems from new perspectives. 
.72    
4 109. The best decision-making emerges from the 
intelligent application of abstract Principles to 
concrete cases. 
.50    
5 290. Rules fail as regulation because they play into 
the hands of the unscrupulous, those who are most 
willing to take conscious advantage of them. 
 .84   
6 301. Rules always seem to multiply and become ever 
more complicated so that eventually only a few 
specialists are able to understand and interpret them. 
 .74   
7 11. Rules block any further development of the 
children and novices. 
 .65   
8 201. Principles appeal to me as I like ideas that are 
expressed in abstract forms. 
 -.50   
9 99. Principles leave the people who have to use them 
wide open to harmful accusations of personal bias in 
their decision-making. 
  .81  
10 33. Principles are always wide open to manipulation 
because they require interpretation, which is often 
arbitrary. 
  .74  
11 217. Smart people can always twist Principles to suit 
their own point of view. 
  .64  
12 235. The beauty of Principles is that they can be 
creatively extended in their scope to help generate 
justifiable solutions to novel problems. 
   .85 
13 175. Principles appeal to me because I find that their 
abstraction makes them easy to work with and adapt 
to particular cases. 
   .78 
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Some researchers argue that the absolute magnitude of factor loadings is the most 
important element in determining the reliability of a factor solution. Consistent with 
Schouten et al (2010, p.8), current result shows that: 3 out of 4 (factor 1), 3 out of 4 
(factor 2), 3 out of 3 (factor 3), and both 2 items (factor 4) showed loadings > 0.60. 
Thus, I can be confident that this factor structure is reliable. I did not look more into 
these items for this part of work is not the main focus, nonetheless, future work would 
be conducted on analysing these items and see whether they could be incorporated 
into the main DRP instrument.  
8.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have reported on the process leading to the development of an initial 
15 item instrument. I described the generation of the initial item pool, and the 
qualitative and quantitative stages of the piloting. The results of the initial item pool 
were tested in the pilot stage’s field work, via both the peer group reviews and the 
subject experts review sessions. The summary of the feedback and suggestions of 
both qualitative studies have been presented and subsequent improvements have been 
made to the initial items pool. The direct result of such exploratory sessions was to 
enable us to obtain a shorter questionnaire with established face and content validity. 
After the qualitative piloting stages, a preliminary draft with 323 items was 
transferred to an online version in randomised order
51
 and this version was 
subsequently completed by 90 subjects. A series of statistical tests such item analysis 
(Cronbach’s alpha and reliability test) were conducted on these items, and  resulted in 
us being able to eliminate many weak items and get down to 160 items with sound 
reliability. More statistical procedures such as factor analysis were conducted in order 
to further reduce the size of the instrument and explore the dimensionality of the 
structure. At the end of this process there emerged a 15 item instrument, with two 
dominant factors, preference for rules and preference for principles, which explained 
50% of total variance. Moreover, the 15 items displayed good reliability. In addition, 
led by curiosity, an ad hoc analysis was performed on the remaining items which were 
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 It means that rules items and principles items as well as different dimensional items were separately 
and randomly arranged.  
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loaded largely on the minor factors after removing the influence of the items loaded 
exclusively on factors 1 and 2. This analysis resulted 13 items with a four-factor 
structure. Further confirmatory work will be conducted and reported in chapter nine 
on the 15 items. 
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Chapter 9 Part one: Further refinement of the instrument 
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter reports on the confirmatory and validating work carried out on the 15 
items that resulted from the primary item pool (described in chapter eight). In the 
process, I also provide empirical responses to the six research questions which were 
proposed in chapter one, section 1.5. 
9.1.1 The overview of the chapter  
The organisation of the chapter is as follows: Section 9.2 describes the necessary 
considerations for the conduct of the empirical work. Section 9.3 explores and 
prepares the data for further analysis. Section 9.4 examines the rules and principles 
subscales using a large independent sample. I also explain the rationales for further 
item removal (see the preliminary factor analysis chapter 8, section 8.6.3 and 8.6.4). 
Section 9.5 shows evidence supporting the internal consistency reliability of the DRP. 
Section 9.6 examines the correlations between rules and principles subscales. Section 
9.7 examines whether there are any gender, ethnicity and age differences in relation to 
dispositions towards rules and principles.  
In part two of this chapter, I focus on reporting and presenting the results for testing 
and establishing the convergent and divergent validity of the DRP.  
In part three of this chapter, I present the predictive validity test results of the DRP. In 
particular, the effect of the demographic variables on the interactions between 
individuals’ DRP scores and their behavioural intention was also investigated.   
9.2 Preparation for the empirical study: some preliminary considerations  
9.2.1 Objective of the current EFA 
In contrast to the previous EFA (chapter 8, section, 8.7), the aims of this current factor 
analysis were to examine: 1) whether the same items would group together and fall 
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onto the same factors; 2) whether the basic factor structure of the questionnaire 
remains stable on a new sample. In other words, this time I use the factor analysis to 
confirm the preliminary factor solution which was emerged on a relatively small 
sample size (n=90).  
9.2.2 Sample size for factor analysis for confirmatory purpose 
The confirmative factor analysis part of this research had a sample of up to 474, 
which was considered as excellent compared to the published research in the field of 
behaviour accounting, which often suffer from small sample size (Ball, 2008). The 
larger the sample size, the more powerful and robust the result will be statistically.   
I was aware that it is not advisable to use the same respondents for both development 
and validation of an instrument. Thus in this project among the 474 respondents, only 
34
52
 respondents had also previously filled in the preliminary online items pool. That 
was 7% of the total sample size, which is too small a group to have any adverse 
impact on the statistical outcomes.   
9.2.3 Sample recruitment  
The researcher primarily used two ways to achieve the sample: firstly I recruited 
students who were studying at the University of Glasgow. I have obtained 
permissions to access mass e-mails / class lists to contact a large number of students 
and get instant multiple replies. Campus recruitments were also employed, as students 
were randomly approached in the premise of University of Glasgow: library, public 
lecture theatres, and cafeteria. During the process, I have encountered some 
unexpected challenges. Because of the disruption of the snow season, many lectures 
were cancelled during the couple of weeks of running up to the Christmas holiday. 
Therefore, the researcher had to rely on her social contacts and connections to recruit 
additional subjects. Hence the second channel of recruiting was to utilise the 
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 Technically speaking, the administration of these two versions of online survey was almost 2 years 
apart, the memory bias of these 34 participants might had would not be expected to pose a big threat to 
the accuracy of the data.   
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researcher’s personal social contacts and connections to recruit non-student subjects 
(social networks such as the facebook and linkedin, her contact lists from personal 
emails). This approach was sensible because the questionnaire is generic in its content 
and presents no risk to anyone. Individuals from different professions (such as 
banking and IT) should also be able to relate to the content. 
The participants were sent an email shortly after they expressed agreement to take 
part in the project. In the email, a link was provided to direct them to the online 
survey
53
. They would also be informed on issues such as privacy and data anonymity 
(see chapter six, section 6.3.4 for more information).  
The online survey consisted of a battery of scales, including DRP (15 items) and a 
range of scales that were relevant for the validation purpose: Higgins RFQ (11 items), 
Sternberg’s thinking style scale (65 items), Need for closure scale (40 items), 10 
Items Big5 personality traits scale, Social desirability scale (13 items), Dialectical 
self-scale (32 items). It takes on average 45miniutes to complete.  
This part of work was carried out using the same web survey. Thus, the ethical 
approval which I had previously applied for administering the preliminary item pool 
online was also applicable to this stage of study (chapter eight, section 8.4.1).  
9.2.4 Monetary incentive and ICAS seed funding   
This part of the research was partially sponsored by the ICAS (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland) Seedcorn grant, £700. The rest of the funding was put up by 
the Secondary PhD supervisor, who provided £500 cash for paying the participants.  
9.3 Exploring the data 
I begin by looking at the descriptive statistics (mean, variance, kurtosis and 
skewness), of the sample. This step will help us to understand our data better. Table 
22 shows that the all 15 items’ distributions are within an acceptable range for the 
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purpose of our factor analysis. Both values of the kurtosis and skewness ranged 
between -1 and +1, which is considered as excellent for most psychometric purpose 
(George & Mallery, 2005, p.98-99).  
Table 22 Descriptive statistics of the 15 items from previous factor solution (n=474) 
 Code Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
1 Q1 3.14 1.06 -.02 -1.22 
2 Q3 3.21 1.15 -.26 -1.06 
3 Q4 2.80 1.14 .25 -1.07 
4 Q5 3.26 1.12 -.38 -.82 
5 Q6 2.74 1.12 .39 -.82 
6 Q7 3.16 1.11 -.32 -.96 
7 Q8 3.72 .94 -.99 .81 
8 Q9 2.28 .94 .99 .81 
9 Q11 3.58 1.07 -.66 -.39 
10 Q12 3.66 .90 -.77 .17 
11 Q13 3.36 .98 -.49 -.55 
12 Q14 3.70 .91 -.90 .66 
13 Q15 2.30 .91 .90 .66 
14 Q16 3.70 .91 -.90 .66 
15 Q17 3.22 1.03 -.35 -.84 
9.3.2 Respondents’ profile 
Table 23 Gender of the respondents 
Male: 251 53% 
Female: 180 38% 
Missing data: 43 9% 
Total: 474 100% 
Table 24 Age range of the respondents 
Age range Size Percentage 
18-25 178 38% 
26-35 156 33% 
36-60 80 17% 
Missing data 60 12% 
Total 474 100% 
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Table 25 Ethnic backgrounds of the respondents 
Nationality Size Percentage 
White (including English, Scottish, 
Irish, other EU countries and United 
states) 
122 26% 
Black, or Black African (including 
other Black) 
17 4% 
East Asian (including Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, other Asian) 
242 51% 
South Asian ( including China, Japan 
and Korean) 
66 14% 
Others mixed backgrounds 25 5% 
Missing data 2 0.4% 
Total 474 100% 
9.4 Confirmatory analysis of DRP scales 
Based on the discarding criteria presented in chapter eight (section 8.6.1.3): items 4, 
6, 1, 9, 15, were further removed. Four out these five items were negatively worded 
items. Consistent with prior research, negatively worded items tend to affect the factor 
structure adversely. The final 10 items are all positively worded and loaded strongly 
onto one factor at a time. Scree plots showed that there are clearly two dominant 
factors. 
KMO statistic is 0.75 which is acceptable (Kaiser, 1974). Bartlett’s test is highly 
significant, indicating that the sample is adequate for factor analysis. Determinant is 
.23 which is greater than .00001, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem for 
the current data. Two factors explain 47% of total variance, factor one is responsible 
for 25% and factor two is responsible for another 20% of variance.  
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Figure 10 Scree Plot for the final 10 items 
 
Table 26 Factor loading of the final 10 items in DRP 
 Rotated Component Matrix Factor loadings 
   Rules Principles 
1 7. I prefer things to be set in the form of concrete Rules. .74  
2 5. I rely on Rules to fulfil my desire for a firm answer. .72  
3 11. I like to work in settings where tasks and expectations are 
defined and standardized by clear Rules. 
.73  
4 17. I tend to judge the fairness of an outcome according to the 
degree of its compliance with Rules. 
.68  
5 3. I often find myself wishing that there were more precise Rules to 
guide me through complex and unstructured situations. 
.62  
6 12. I prefer Principles-based approaches because they engage 
people positively and openly in the decision-making  process and 
thus reduce the likelihood of manipulation. 
 .69 
7 8. Principles promote engagement and responsibility among 
employees thereby increasing their enthusiasm for the task. 
 .66 
8 14. Principles work well in situations where there are conflicting 
interests, because they make room for communication involving the 
affected parties that leads to more thorough and reliable analysis. 
 .65 
9 10. Action that is based on Principles has the strongest claim to 
legitimacy.   
 .58 
10 13. I tend to be comfortable with the ambiguities associated with 
Principle-based decision-making. 
 .57 
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Based on collated item loadings of each factor, the scoring system for commutating 
rules and principles score is: Rules score = (Q7+Q5+Q11+Q17+Q3)/5; Principles 
score = (Q14+Q12+Q13+Q8+Q10)/5. 
9.4.1 Interpretation of the factors 
The two factors solution confirmed our previous conceptual proposition: The factors 
that affect preference for rules were different from those driving a preference for 
principles. According to Dworkin (1967, 1997), Black (2001; 2008), Ford (2010) and 
ICAS (2006 a&b) et al., principles tend to focus more attention on substance rather 
than form, thus users of principles would be expected to derive more feeling of 
empowerment and accountability towards the decision-makings; Whilst the pre-
dominant focus of a rules-based approach tends to be on form and compliance, thus 
users of rules tend to primarily focus on reaching closure by following clear-cut rules. 
Factor one expresses a preference for rules. Five items grouped together suggest a 
preference for taking a rules-based approach in decision-making; for example, the 
preference for concreteness, neutrality, and fairness apparently provided by pre-
defined rules. Such a preference for clear-cut answers to problems perhaps reflects an 
underlying anxiety about ambiguity and uncertainty, and discomfort in dealing with 
complex and unstructured tasks. Furthermore, some individuals prefer using rules 
because they seem to have the potential to help bring ‘closure’ on problems and 
situations, as reflected in Q3 (Bailey et al., 2007). It reflects the fact that this type of 
person is high in need for prescriptive answers to a question or structure, as opposed 
to tolerate to unstructured tasks or ambiguities (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994)
54
.  
Factor two expresses a preference for principles and draws together items reflecting 
various dimensions of that preference. The factor reflects, in for example Q14, 
positive appreciation of the idea that the application of principles requires ‘weighing’ 
of relevant considerations, including principles in a holistic fashion (Dworkin, 1979; 
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 An alternative perspective would emphasise weaknesses of rules in dealing with unstructured 
problems in ambiguous situations (Ohman, et al., 2006), particularly those that require innovative 
adoptions of rules, and applying them in new situation (Booth & Winzar, 1993). 
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Maines et al., 2003; Sullivan, 1992; Huhn, 2003; Korobkin, 2000). It shows positive 
appreciation for the abstract characteristic of the principles as they allow room for 
individual discretion and judgment (Black, 2001 & 2008; Ford, 2010). This in turn 
improve the feeling of empowerment and accountability (see chapter three, section 
3.3.1.1), and as a result reduce the likelihood of manipulation (Ford, 2010). Finally, it 
expresses the notion that they allow more transparent dialogues among players in a 
shared ‘interpretive community’ (Ford, 2010). And because a ‘mutual trust’ is the pre-
requisite for such a community, for some people principles have the strongest claim to 
legitimacy.  
9.5 Evidence supporting the reliability of the DRP  
9.5.1 Internal consistency reliability  
I use Cronbach’s alpha coefficients to examine the internal consistency of the 
instrument. The concept of Cronbach’s alpha has been explained in detail in chapter 
eight, section 8.5.5. Bowling (1997) argues that an alpha >0.5 is an indication good 
internal consistency (also see, Pelzang, 2010), whereas an alpha of 0.7 or above is 
considered excellent by Howitt and Cramer (2008).  
Table 27 Reliability of the rules subscale 
Rules subscale n Mean Variance SD No. of items  
 475 16.36 14.26 3.78 5  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum/
Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.27 3.16 3.57 .41 1.13 .03 
Item Variances 1.19 1.06 1.29 .23 1.21 .01 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.35 .30 .44 .14 1.45 .002 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q5 13.12 9.61 .50 .25 .68  
q7 13.2 9.41 .53 .30 .67  
q11 12.79 9.70 .52 .29 .67  
q17 13.16 10.04 .48 .24 .69  
q3 13.15 9.95 .42 .18 .71  
Cronbach's Alpha .73 
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Table 28 Reliability of the principles subscale 
Principles subscale n Mean Variance SD No. of items  
 469 18.04 8.37 2.89 5  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum/
Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.61 3.36 3.74 .38 1.11 .02 
Item Variances .86 .78 .96 .18 1.23 .004 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.24 .12 .34 .22 2.85 .004 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
Q8 14.31 5.8 .38 .14 .55  
Q10 14.48 6.06 .32 .14 .58  
q12 14.39 5.67 .44 .20 .52  
q13 14.68 5.88 .32 .12 .58  
Q14 14.32 5.98 .37 .15 .55  
Cronbach's Alpha .61 
Rules subscale yields an excellent 0.73 and principles subscale obtained a satisfactory 
0.61. Within the field of psychometric testing, well-established instruments such as 
Need for Closure (NFC, 1994), which contains five subscales. The individual 
reliability alphas are: 0.62 for close-mindedness; 0.67 for discomfort with ambiguity; 
0.7 for decisiveness, preference for order =0.67 and finally preference for 
predictability is 0.82. Therefore, the alphas of the DRP are believed to be competitive 
comparing with other commonly used psychometric instruments.  
9.5.2 Test re-test Reliability 
I examined the test-retest reliability of the DRP with a sample of 35 University 
students. The same students were sent a link asking them to complete the online 
survey again 12 weeks later; the purpose of this has been briefly mentioned as a 
reliability check. I obtained a usable sample of 30 responses. The test-retest 
correlation between these two rules scores = 0.78 (p<0.01). For the principles 
subscale: the test-retest correlation between these two principles scores is 0.70 
(p<0.01). The general rule is that for academic research purpose, the correlation 
should be no less than 0.7 (Wuensch, 2006, p.4). This part of work provided an 
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empirical response to the RQ 1: the dispositions to rules and principles are stable over 
time. 
9.6 Relationships between rules and principles subscale (response to RQ2) 
Pearson correlation was conducted between the rules and principles scores for the 474 
participants. Statistics show that, for rules score M= 3.1, SD= .95; while, for 
principles score, M= 3.44, SD= .95. A weak correlation (measure of an effect size) r = 
.12 between rules and principles scores was obtained. Due to the large sample size the 
significance level is not a good guide for estimating the magnitude of the correlation 
between rules and principles. According to Cohen (1977): .1 = small, .3=medium, and 
.5=strong. The numbers are measures of an effect size. Despite being correlated 
significant at a 99% confidence level, rules and principles had only 12% of variance 
in common. Furthermore, because we deal with data measured on an ordinal scale, 
Spearman’s Rho was also used to calculate the correlation between rules and 
principles. The result indicated an orthogonal relationship between rules and 
principles, (rs=0.07, p=0.13, not significant, two tailed).  
The low correlation found between factors one and two, lent empirical support for our 
conceptualisation of principles, based on Dworkin’s view (1977), as orthogonal to 
rules, as distinct from competing views which see rules and principles as poles of a 
continuum (Cunningham, 2007). This part of work provided empirical response to 
RQ2.   
9.7 Demographic variables analysis   
This part of analysis is to examine the RQ 6: “Are there any gender and ethnic 
differences in terms of individuals’ dispositions to rules and principles?” One of the 
long-standing topics in psychometric assessment is the relationship between group 
and individual differences, and many studies in the field have dedicated to investigate 
the degree to which various demographically defined groups vary on individual 
characteristics. With this in mind, it is potentially valuable to gain scientific 
knowledge in how various demographic groups differ in their dispositions to rules and 
principles.  
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9.7.1 Gender factor scores analysis 
The DRP instrument itself was found to be gender neutral. T-test on the males’ and 
females’ DRP scores showed that there was no statistically significant difference. The 
result is in line with past findings that most gender differences in personality variables 
are trivial in size (Goldberg et al., 1998). 
Table 29 Gender statistics 
Miss data= 43 Rules Principles 
Male=251; Female =180 Male Female Male Female 
Mean 3.19 
(SD=0.88) 
3.12 
(SD=0.97) 
3.46 
(SD=0.89) 
3.53 
(SD=0.82) 
Figure 11 Males and females DRP scores 
 
9.7.2 Ethnic group analysis 
Participants in the following two groups were excluded from the analysis, due to their 
limited sample size compared with the other three dominant ethnic groups: African 
group, n=17 people; other mixed background, n=25.  
Group 1 = The White group including people from Europe and other white 
backgrounds such as United States; Group 2= The South Asian group including 
Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi; Group 3= The East Asian group including China, 
HK, Japan and Korea. 
Table 30 Ethnic groups DRP scores 
 Ethnic group n Mean SD. 
Rules White 122 3.24 .83 
South Asian 242 3.2 .97 
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East Asian  66 3 .81 
Total 429   
Principles White 122 3.52 .83 
South Asian 242 3.46 .89 
East Asian  66 3.54 .79 
 429   
Figure 12 Ethnic groups DRP scores 
 
The ANOVA analysis on the full sample size (n=429) showed that there were no 
significant mean differences for the rules and principles scores between the White 
group, the South Asian group and the East Asian group. Furthermore, there was no 
significant mean difference between the two Asian groups.  
9.7.3 Age analysis   
I did not find age to be statistically significant in relation to the DRP scores. One way 
ANOVA was carried out comparing the means between group 1 (age 18-25), Group 2 
(age 26-35) and Group 3 (age are over 36). Miss data: n= 60. 
Table 31 Three age groups DRP scores 
 Age range N mean SD. 
Rules 18-25 178 3.2 .91 
26-35 156 3.2 .89 
>36 80 3.1 .99 
Total 412   
Principles 18-25 178 3.45 .87 
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26-35 156 3.52 .84 
>36 80 3.57 .75 
Total 412   
Figure 13 Three age groups DRP scores comparison 
 
One possible reason for the little differences of the DRP scores detected among these 
three age groups could due to the fact that the sample for the current study did not 
have a large age variation, which would have allowed for more statistical differences 
to emerge.  
9.8 Summary and conclusion of part one 
In this part of the analysis, I presented the two dimensional structure of the DRP. 
Factor loadings showed that a 10 items instrument could explain 46% of total 
variance. The reliability of rules and principles subscales have been examined and 
established by the Cronbach’s alpha and test and re-test procedures. A weak 
correlation between rules and principles scores indicated relative separation between 
disposition towards rules and principles. In addition, tests have been performed to 
investigate the variability of DRP scores and factors including gender, ethnicity and 
age. Factor structures have also been compared between different demographic 
groups: in terms of male vs. female; White vs. Asian; younger age vs. mature age 
group, identical factor structures were found between the two groups being compared. 
This is to test for measurement equipment. This part of the work showed that DRP as 
a psychometric instrument is gender and age neutral and does not discriminate people 
from different ethnic backgrounds. 
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Chapter 9 Part two: Convergent and Divergent validity of DRP 
9.9 Overview  
In this section I focus on reporting the convergent and divergent validity of the DRP. 
This part of the work includes correlation analysis with a list of established 
instruments chosen for their conceptual relevance. Because of the sufficient sample 
size, I have chosen listwise method to remove cases with more than one variable 
missing. This decision caused a variation in the sample sizes for the tests being 
reported in the following sections.  
This part of work helps give an empirical answer to RQ5:  
“Whether the DRP will show a meaningful relation with one's other 
psychological characteristics, and relevant measurements, such as one’s 
thinking style and personality traits?” 
9.10 The justification of use shorter version of scales  
It is a well-known fact that long full-length instruments encompass better 
psychometric properties than the shorter versions (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, Jr., 
2003, p.505), but there is an inevitable trade-off between cost and 
effectiveness/precision (Burisch, 1997). More importantly, shorter version 
instruments allow the researcher, in situations like this, to carry out studies that would 
otherwise be practically infeasible with long instruments. For the stated practical 
reasons, and at the expense of some precision in measurement, I have chosen the 
shorter versions of the following instruments: The Social desirability scale, the 
Sternberg’s thinking style scale, and the shorter version of the Big5 test referred as the 
TIPI. 
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9.11 Evidence supporting the validity of DRP 
The Pearson correlation coefficients analysis between DRP scores and other relevant 
measures was used to examine and establish the convergent and divergent validity of 
the DRP (e.g. see Mumford et al., 2006).  
To confirm convergent validity, DRP scores are expected to correlate significantly, but 
not so highly as to suggest that they are actually measuring identical constructs, in the 
predicted direction and with relevant and more established measures. In this case, the 
correlation of the instrument was tested against some of the traits measured by the 
TIPI test (i.e. openness, extraversion, and conscientiousness), the need for closure 
scale with its five dimensional subscales, and the dimensional scales in the 
Sternberg’s thinking style scale.  
To confirm divergent validity, DRP scores are expected to have marginal or poor 
correlations with chosen measures, in this case: some traits such as emotional stability 
as measured by the TIPI, the global score of the DSS (Dialectical Self scale), and 
regulatory focus as measured by Higgin’s RFQ (Regulatory Focus Questionnaire). In 
addition, to ensure that responses to the DRP are not merely reflecting the need for 
social approval, a test of correlation with a socially desirability scale is also included: 
I expect the DRP responses to correlate poorly with the social desirability scale.  
The justification for some of the theoretical expectations regarding the directions and 
relationships between the DRP and these above mentioned instruments has been 
discussed in detail in chapter five, where various propositions have been hypothesised 
regarding the conceptual linkages between the DRP and these constructs.   
Many other widely recognised psychometric measurements clearly have potential 
relevance to individuals’ dispositions towards using rules and principles (such as the 
law and compliance scale, the MBTI, Rest’s moral reasoning scale DIT), but due to 
time and resources constraints affecting the collection of data in respect of a battery of 
tests, the researcher decided to limit the number of convergent and divergent tests to 
the five mentioned above. 
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9.11.1 Divergent validity of DRP 
9.11.1.1 DRP and Higgins RFQ  
RFQ distinguishes between two different kinds of achievement orientation - 
promotion orientation and prevention orientation (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 
1997 & 1998). The RFQ asks 11 questions in total, of which the promotion subset (6 
questions) measures individuals’ subjective history of promotion success with items 
such as “How often have you accomplished things that got you ‘psyched’ to work 
even harder?” The prevention subset (5 questions) measures subjective history of 
prevention success with questions such as “Not being careful has gotten me into 
trouble at times” (reverse scored). The response scales for these questions range from 
1 (never or seldom) to 5 (very often). 
In this project, the sample size n = 332, the mean for the promotion focused score M = 
20, SD = 3.46; the mean for the prevention focused score M= 16.04 and SD = 3.59.  
Table 32 DRP and Higgins RFQ
55
 
A significant but small negative correlation was obtained between rules-orientation 
and promotion-focused orientation. My initial proposition was that rules-orientation 
would correlate positively with prevention-orientation; whilst principles-orientation 
would correlate positively with promotion-orientation (chapter 5, section 5.7.3). The 
present result however does make intuitive and conceptual sense, as highly rules-
oriented individual would be less concerned with achieving positive objectives instead 
they would be more pre-occupied with ensuring the absence of negative outcomes 
(ensure correct rejections; be careful) and ensuring against the presence of negative 
outcomes (ensure against errors of commission; avoiding mistakes), thus indicating a 
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 ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2 tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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 Expected correlation sign =v; unexpected correlation sign = x; expect no correlation: NO 
 Signs
56
 Promotion Prevention 
DRP Rules scale V -.12
**
 -.01 
DRP Principles scale No .06 -.02 
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negative relationship with promotion orientation (r= -.12**, p<0.05). As expected, 
dispositions towards principles did not correlate with prevention-focused orientation.  
Despite the fact that a significant correlation was obtained, it was marginal, thus 
indicating that DRP and RFQ are not measuring the same psychological construct.  
9.11.1.2 DRP and the socially desirability test 
I used the short version of the Marlow’s social desirability (MCSD form C). The 
MCSD form C developed and validated by Reynolds (1982) consists of 13 items, 5 
keyed true and 8 false. Sample n = 332. Social desirability scores mean = 19.4, SD = 
2.62. 
Table 33 DRP and Socially desirability test 
 Signs Rules Principles 
Socialdesire No -.03 -.01 
The DRP is proven not simply another measure of people's attitudes towards social 
approval as the MCSD sets out to measure.   
9.11.1.3 DRP and the DSS 
The Dialectical self-scale assesses dialectical thinking in the domain of self-
perception (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). DSS includes three factors: corresponding 
to contradiction (e.g., “When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with 
both”), cognitive change (e.g., “I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change 
under different contexts”), and behaviour change (e.g., “I often change the way I am, 
depending on who I am with”). The scale was designed to be a ‘global’ measure of 
dialecticism, and all three subscales are related to self-concept inconsistency. 
Therefore, I used an overall DSS score in my analyses. Sample N=308, DSS 
(mean = 3.74, SD = 0.512). 
 
Table 34 DRP and DSS 
 Signs Rules Principles 
DSS No -.07 -.03 
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There was no significant correlation between the global DSS score and DRP scores, 
the result therefore supported my theoretical expectation of that the dispositions to 
rules and principles are conceptually and empirically different from one’s cognitive 
ability to think about contradictory and ambivalent facts and issues.  
9.11.2 Convergent validity of DRP 
9.11.2.1 DRP and the Ten Item Personality Inventory TIPI 
TIPI is a 10 items personality trait instrument (Gosling et al., 2003), which gives a 
very quick measure of the Big 5 personality traits. Each item consists of two 
descriptors, separated by a comma, using the common stem, ‘‘I see myself as:’’. Each 
of the five items was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 
(agree strongly).  
 
Sample N=306. Mean for extraversion (mean= 4.32, SD = 1.37); Agreeableness 
(mean= 4.87, SD = 1.22); Conscientiousness (mean = 5.08, SD = 1.33); Emotional 
stability (mean = 4.74, SD = 1.35); Openness (mean = 4.95, SD = 1.21). 
 
Table 35 DRP and TIPI
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 Signs Rules Principles 
Extraversion V .05 .13
**
 
Agreeable No .12** .01 
Conscientious V -.01 .07 
Emotion stability No -.04 -.02 
Openness V -.10 .14** 
 
The above table shows that: there are the patterns of correlations persisting across 
three out of the five personality traits (Extraversion, agreeableness, and openness). 
Although the correlations were statistically significant, they only accounted for small 
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 ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed); Expected sign =v; unexpected 
sign = x; expect no correlation: NO. 
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portion of the variances, which indicated that DRP is not a measure of personality 
trait. In line with my propositions in chapter five (section 5.5), I found that individuals 
who are predominantly principles-oriented were more extraverted (r=.13**, p< 0.05) 
than people who are more rules-oriented (r=.05, not significant). Further, people who 
are predominantly rules-oriented were less likely to be open-minded (r=-.10), whilst a 
principles-orientation correlated significantly and positively with openness (r=.14**, 
p< 0.05). An unexpected positive and significant correlation emerged between the 
disposition towards rules and agreeableness  (r=.12**, p< 0.05), implying that people 
who are rules-oriented tend to be more cooperative and participative to work with 
others, this might explain the fact that people who like rules tend to be more 
susceptible to external influence. Such a characteristic fits in the profile of a person 
with an external locus of control (chapter five, section 5.6.1). 
Contrary to my expectations, the conscientiousness of the Big5 personality traits did 
not correlate significantly with either the rules or principles score. In chapter five 
(section 5.5.1), I proposed that the multiple facets of the conscientiousness would 
correlate positively and significantly with either rules or principles. Nonetheless in 
this present version of the TIPI, it only provides a global score of the 
conscientiousness, as a result, no significant relation was detected between the 
conscientiousness and the DRP scores. Further research will have to adopt a more 
sophisticated version of the personality traits scale to investigate the specific 
relationships between rules and principles and the multiple facets of the 
conscientiousness. 
As expected, no meaningful correlation was found between the emotional stability 
with the DRP subscales, which suggests that emotional stability does not affect the 
individuals’ rules and principles dispositions. 
9.11.2.2 DRP and Need for closure 
The original 'need for closure' scale was developed by Webster and Kruglanski in 
1994. It includes 47 items. There are five factors underpinning one’s 'need for closure' 
construct. They are: preference for order and structure; affective discomfort caused by 
ambiguity; decisiveness of judgments and choices; desire for predictability; and 
closed-mindedness.  
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The sample size for this correlation n = 138, this test has a noticeably smaller sample 
size than the other tests due to the fact that it had a lie detector requirement which 
removed the subjects whose scores in the 'lie items' were greater than 15.  
The statistics for the NFC: Global score, M= 148.7, SD = 38.07; Order, M = 39.42, 
SD = 10.35; Predictability, M = 28.70, SD = 7.76; Decisiveness, M = 26.09, SD = 
8.12; Ambiguity, M = 34.02, SD = 9.95; Close-mindedness, M = 23.71, SD = 5.24. 
Table 36 DRP and Need for closure
58
 
 Signs Rules Principles 
Needforclosure V .03 -.09 
Order V .20** .04 
Predictability V .18
**
 -.24*** 
Decisiveness V -.16* .02 
Avoid ambiguity No .06 -.02 
Close-minded V .26
***
 -.15* 
 
The NFC global score was not related significantly to either disposition towards rules 
or principles. However, there were significant and expected correlations between the 
NFC dimensional scales and DRP scores. The overall patterns in terms of the 
directions and magnitudes of the correlations were in line with what I have expected 
from the examination of the prior literature (see chapter five subsection 5.7.1). 
The characteristics of an individual who is predominantly rules-based includes items 
such as: high preferences for predictability (r=.18**, p< 0.05) and order (r=.20**, p< 
0.05) and more close-minded (r=.26, p< 0.01). The ambiguity subscale however, did 
not correlate significantly with either rules or principles scores, the pattern being that 
rules scores had a higher need to avoid ambiguity (r=.06), while principles scores 
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level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed); Expected sign =v; unexpected 
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correlated negatively with tolerance for ambiguity (r=-.02), indicating that the more 
principles-oriented a person has the higher tolerance for ambiguity.  
The correlations between principles scores and predictability (r=-.24***, p< 0.01) and 
closed-mindedness (r=-.15*, p< 0.1) were significant and negative, the results were in 
line with prior research. For instance, people who have a higher ‘urge’ to reach 
decision and are less willing to wait for emerging information (Kruglanski et al., 
2007). In other words, this type of person may be inclined to be close-minded and to 
‘seize’ upon the information which is already available. Often this translates into the 
first appropriate solution they encounter (Mannetti et al., 2006) and then they ‘freeze’ 
(do not let subsequent information affect their conclusion). This style is in contrast 
with the use of a principles-based approach.  
A marginally significant but negative correlation was obtained between disposition 
towards rules and one’s decisiveness dimension (r=-.16*, p< 0.1). Decisiveness 
subscales comprise items such as “I tend to struggle with most decisions” and “When 
trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's confusing” 
(reverse item). My results showed that more reliance on rules would cause one to be 
less decisive. Indeed, individuals with higher rules-orientations tend to have higher 
need for clear-cut answers in order to avoid confusion and ambiguity.  
9.11.2.3 DRP and Sternberg’s thinking style 
In this project, the Thinking Styles Inventory –revised II (TSI-R2) version was used. 
The Thinking Styles Inventory is based on Sternberg’s theory of mental self-
government (Zhang, 2010, p. 276). The Thinking Styles Inventory (TSI, Sternberg 
and Wagner, 1992) is a self-report test about different strategies and ways that people 
use to solve problem, to carry out tasks, and make decisions. It involves 65 items, 
each item falling into one of the 13 different style scales. 
 The mean scores for the 13 thinking styles, respectively are: Legislative (M = 4.80, 
SD = 1.07); executive (M = 4.68, SD = 1.13); Judicial (M = 4.69, SD = 1.07); Global 
(M = 4.25, SD = 0.96) ; Local (M = 4.4, SD = 1.09); Liberal (M = 4.59, SD = 1.14); 
Conservative (M = 4.39, SD = 1.15); Hierarchic (M = 4.77, SD = 1.12); Monarchic 
(M = 4.6, SD = 1.06); Oligarchic (M = 4.41, SD = 1.1); Anarchic (M = 4.26, SD = 
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1.1); Internal (M = 4.49, SD = 1.0); External (M = 4.75, SD = 1.1). Sample size, 
n=334. A more detailed discussion on each thinking style can be found in chapter 5, 
section 5.7.2.  
Table 37 DRP and Sternberg’s thinking style59 
 Signs Rules Principles 
Legislative V .03 .15*** 
Executive V .17
***
 .05 
Judicial No .05 .09 
Global V .06 .04 
Local V .19
***
 .12** 
Liberal No .02 .06 
Conservative V .13
**
 .01 
Hierarchic V .10 .15*** 
Monarchic No .10 .11** 
Oligarchic V .12
**
 .10* 
Anarchic V .15
***
 .03 
Internal No .004 -.01 
External V .11
**
 .10 
 
Note: Table 5 in chapter five has elaborated on each thinking style.  
I found that in terms of thinking functions: rules-oriented individuals tended to 
display a more executive thinking style (r=.17***, p < 0.01). The result fits with the 
conceptual description of an executive style which has preference for following and 
implementing rules and instructions (Sternberg, 1997). Principles orientation on the 
other hand, correlated positively and significantly with a legislative thinking style 
(r=.15***, p< 0.01). A principles-based approach in decision-making allows space for 
individual judgment and discretion (ICAS, 2006a). Thus, people with a legislative 
style of thinking are more likely to prefer a principles-based approach in decision-
making. 
                                                 
59
 ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed); Expected sign =v; unexpected 
sign = x; expect no correlation: NO; sample size= 334. 
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Both rules (r=.12**, p < 0.05) and principles (r=.10*, p< 0.1) obtained positive and 
significant correlations with oligarchic style, which is characterised as lack of skill in 
prioritising tasks and managing resources and time (Sternberg, 1997). These people 
often need some extra direct guidance or other forms of assistance to make them more 
effective in setting priorities. This result is not unusual, within organisational 
contexts, as rules and principles are often being put in place to help employees with 
time and task management. The stronger relationship between rules and oligarchic 
style somehow suggested that, compared with principles, people with oligarchic style 
tend to rely more on rules to provide orders, 
Principles-orientation was found to correlate positively and significantly with both 
monarchic (r=.11**, p< 0.05) and hierarchic thinking styles (r=.15***, p< 0.01). The 
result revealed that while people with principles orientation tend to take in a network 
of competing information, they prefer to prioritise or weigh these tasks or information 
according to their significance and relevance, and focus on one aspect at a time.  
I found both rules- and principles-orientation correlated highly and positively with a 
local thinking level. Previously, in chapter five, I have proposed that rules-orientation 
will be more likely to direct one’s attention to concrete and minor details (local style) 
(Sternberg, 1997; Zhang, 2006). The comparisons of the magnitude of correlation 
between rules (r=.19***, p< 0.01) with local think style, and principles (r=.12**, p< 
0.05) with local thinking style showed that a rules-orientation will be more likely to 
be local level-focused. Furthermore, these types of people also tend to be more 
conservative, rather than liberal, in their thinking (r =.13**, p< 0.05). This implies 
that they tend to stick with rules and procedures, minimise the opportunity for change, 
avoid ambiguous situations, and prefer routines in life (Sternberg, 1999).  
The correlations between the DRP and liberal thinking styles were not significant. 
However the magnitude of the correlation between liberal style and disposition to 
principles score (r=.06) was higher than its correlation with rules score (r=.02); the 
direction of magnitude was in line with my previous proposition (section 5.7.2). 
Finally, individuals who are predominantly rules-based tend to have an anarchic style 
(r =.15***, p< 0.01), People with anarchic thinking style are more aware of each 
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individual rule but have difficulty in linking them together to evaluate how the task at 
hand contributes to the overall picture (Zhang, 2006, p.1179).  
An unexpected significant and positive correlation was found between rules and 
external thinking style (r=.11**, p<0.05). The literature leads us to speculate that a 
rules-based person would be more internally based. Meanwhile, no significant 
correlation was found between principles score and external thinking.  
9.12 Summary of the convergent and divergent validity of the DRP 
9.12.1 Convergent validity of the DRP 
Table 38 Correlations supporting the convergent validity of the DRP 
 Signs Rules Principles  
Order V .20** .04 
Predictability V .18** -.24*** 
Decisiveness V -.16* .02 
Ambiguity V .06 -.02 
Closemindess V .26*** -.15** 
Extraversion V .05 .12** 
Agreeableness V .12** .01 
Openness V -.1 .14** 
Legislative V .03 .15** 
Executive V .17** .05 
Local V .19*** .12** 
Conservative V .13** .01 
Hierarchic V .1 .15*** 
Monarchic V .1 .11** 
Oligarchic V .12** .10* 
Anarchic V .15*** .03 
External V .11** .1 
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9.12.2 Divergent validity 
Table 39 Correlations supporting the divergent validity of the DRP 
 Signs Rules Principles 
Promotion V -.12** -.01 
Prevention V .06 -.02 
Social desire No -.03 -.01 
DSS No -.03 -0.1 
Emotional 
stability 
No -.04 -.02 
9.12.3 Interpretation of the overall result  
Table 40 Psychological profile of rules-based vs. principles based individuals 
Expected linkages Negative linkages  Positive linkages 
Rules-orientation Less promotion-
focused (r=-.12**, 
p<0.05). 
Need for order (r=.20**, p < 0.05); predictability 
(r =.18**, p < 0.05); close-minded (r =.26***, p 
< 0.01); executive thinking style (r=.17**, p < 
0.05); oligarchic style (r=.12**, p < 0.05); Local 
style (r=.19***, p< 0.01); conservative (r =.13**, 
p < 0.05); anarchic style (r =.15***, p < 0.01); 
external in thinking style (r=.11**, p< 0.05).  
Principles-
orientation 
Less closed-minded 
(r=-.15**, p< 0.05), 
higher tolerance for 
unpredictability (r=-
.24***, p < 0.01). 
Extraverted (r=.12**, p< 0.05); more open-
minded and flexible (r=.14**, p< 0.05); 
legislative in their thinking (r=.15**, p< 0.05); 
monarchic (r=.11**, p< 0.05) and hierarchic 
(r=.15**, p< 0.05) in their way of synthesising 
information. 
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Rules-oriented individuals tend to be less promotion-focused (r=-.12**, p<0.05), but 
have a relatively stronger need for order (r=.20**, p < 0.05) and for predictability (r 
=.18**, p < 0.05). They are more close-minded (r =.26***, p < 0.01). I have found 
that in terms of thinking functions: rules-oriented individuals will tend to display a 
more executive thinking style (r=.17**, p < 0.05), which is characterised as a 
preference for following and implementing rules and instructions (Sternberg, 1997). 
Rules-oriented individuals would tend to be high in oligarchic style (r=.12**, p < 
0.05), which signifies that these people reply heavily on rules in prioritising tasks and 
allocating resources (Sternberg, 1997).  
People who are rules-oriented tend to find comfort in working on tasks that mainly 
require them to focus on concrete and minor details (local style) (r=.19***, p< 0.01) 
(Sternberg, 1997; Zhang, 2006). These people also tend to be more conservative, 
rather than liberal, in their thinking (r =.13**, p < 0.05), which suggests that they tend 
to stick with rules and procedures (Sternberg, 1999). Finally, individuals who are 
predominantly rules–based tend to have an anarchic style (r =.15***, p < 0.01): 
focusing narrowly on details and segments rather than seeing a bigger picture. 
Contrary to my expectation, I also found people with a rules-orientation tend to be 
more externally based in their scope of thinking (r=.11**, p< 0.05), indicating that 
they prefer socialising. 
Principles-oriented individuals are more extraverted (r=.12**, p< 0.05), less closed-
minded to new situations (r=-.15**, p< 0.05), and have higher tolerance for 
unpredictability (r=-.24***, p < 0.01). They are more open to new information and 
are flexible (r=.14**, p< 0.05). They are more legislative in their thinking (r=.15**, 
p< 0.05) indicating their confidence with using their own judgment. Their way of 
synthesising information is more monarchic (r=.11**, p< 0.05) and hierarchic 
(r=.15**, p< 0.05), which shows that they are more willing to take in a wide array of 
information and prioritise them according to their contribution to the tasks/ decisions 
at hand.   
 
However, contrary to the theoretical expectations, I did not find evidence supporting 
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the theoretical associations between promotion focused, global and liberal thinking 
and preferences towards a principles-based approach. This indicated that further 
empirical work may be needed to look into this in more depth.  
 
I had expected conscientiousness and external thinking to correlate positively and 
significantly with principles-orientation. The result did not support my presumptions. 
Future work would include performing correlation analysis with a more sophisticated 
Big five instrument, like the 20 items TIPI for instance. 
9.13 Discussion and Summary of the validity test results  
No study to date has provided empirical evidence of a direct relationship between the 
construct of dispositions to rules and principles and other psychological constructs 
such as regulatory focus, thinking styles as well as need for closure. I sought to do so 
by investigating the relationships between DRP and a spectrum of eminent 
psychometric constructs. How do my findings square with the propositions that were 
developed in chapter five? In this current case, I found various small but expected 
correlations between the DRP constructs and the identified constructs, and have been 
able to demonstrate to some degree, that individuals’ dispositions to rules and 
principles are not measuring the same constructs as any of the measurements which 
have been applied here, although they are conceptually related. 
 The correlation analysis showed relatively stronger relationships between the DRP 
and the constructs at the level of the cognitive styles such as: Need for closure and 
Sternberg’s thinking style. The correlations between the DRP and some of the Big5 
personality traits seem to be significant but only counted for small portion of variance. 
These findings support my theoretical expectation with respect to the psychological 
location of the DRP, it is should be regarded as more to do with the cognition of the 
individuals rather than the personality traits.  Nevertheless, in order to be in a position 
to draw strong causal inferences from the DRP regarding behaviours, I will need to 
move on from correlation analysis, to tests of the predictive validity of the DRP 
instrument (chapter nine, part three). 
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Chapter 9 Part three: Predictive validity of the DRP 
9.14 Predictive validity 
I examined the predictive validity of DRP in a sub-sample drawn from the total 
sample (n=474).  This sample comprised 89 participants. This part of analysis is to 
provide answer to research question RQ4: 
“Are dispositions towards rules and principles predictive of individual’s actual 
behaviour in response to rules or principles-based social cognitive tasks / 
situations?” 
In section 9.5.1 and 9.5.2, I have established that DRP is stable and persist over time. 
In part two of this chapter, I have also established that DRP is related to other stable 
individual characteristics in expected and meaningful way. That is, it captures 
measurable, stable and enduring individual characteristics. As such, am interested to 
see whether one’s DRP scores would have a significant correlation with one’s 
behavioural intentions in response to the designed real-life task scenarios. In other 
words, the predictive validity of a psychometric instrument is to examine how 
accurate it can predict an individual’s actual behavioural intention across contexts. I 
recognise that in general, a measure of global characteristics, such as the DRP should 
not be expected to predict with high accuracy in every specific context. The DRP 
should, however, predict the expected intentions (Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998). I 
acknowledge that much of the variance in individual behaviour is attributable to the 
situation and the specific contextual features of that situation. I also examine how well 
the combination of the both one’s rules and principles scores can help improve the 
predictions of one’s behavioural intentions across all eight scenarios as measured by 
multiple regression models. 
9.14.1 Attitudes, behavioural intention and behaviour 
There is a consensus that the single best predictor of an individual’s behaviour is 
simply his or her intention to engage in that behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977; 
Ajzen, 1991). Behavioural intention (BI) is indicator of readiness and plan to perform 
a particular behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977). Thus, BI is “assessed by the 
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subject’s indication of his or her intention or willingness to engage in various 
behaviours with respect to a given person or object questions” (Kim & Hunter, 1993, 
p.332). Likert scale is used to measure the strength of the intention. BI is 
operationalised by questions such as “I intend to take/ act / choose (rules or 
principles-based approach” in this current project. In this study, I was primarily 
interested in investigating the empirical link between dispositions towards rules and 
principles and behavioural intentions. I did not attempt to develop a full behavioural 
model in the way Fishbein & Ajzen (1977) did.  
BI has been found to have sufficient predictive validity in relation to behaviour, 
suggesting that respondents in general are able to accurately rate their intention to 
perform certain behaviour in question (CHIRr online research source
60
). Within the 
domain of health behaviours, BI explains 19% to 38% of variance of behaviour choice 
(see CHIRr online research source for a list of relevant research). According to 
Fishbein & Ajzen (1977), the explained variance become bigger when 1) there is a 
high level of specificity, for instance: specific behaviour directed towards a given 
target in a given context at a given time should predict the specific behaviour quite 
well because this attitude exactly corresponds to the specific behaviour; 2) subjects 
feel their perceived control over the circumstance is high. The variance will be more 
likely to be high in this case: Measuring students’ attitudes towards attending the 
management accounting lectures every Thursday at 2pm in the lecture room ABC (a 
hypothetical location). In other cases a behavioural criterion could be more general in 
terms of it is aggregated a range of actions, targets, contexts and times, in these cases, 
the variances would be lower.  
9.14.2 A summary of eight scenarios  
Like prior studies such as Mirshekary et al (2009), I too created both professional and 
personal vignettes. Five of the scenarios were about professional tasks and the rest 
three were about personal life, on a scale of 1 to 4, participants were asked to “reflect 
on your own behaviour and indicate in what kind of approach you would take”. These 
                                                 
60
 http://chirr.nlm.nih.gov/behavioral-intention.php accessed in July 2013. 
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scenarios were written in very simple and clear English so participants could scan 
them quickly. I have deliberately avoided composing too complex scenarios in terms 
of using technical jargons.  
There were several considerations in creating the content of the scenarios: 1) I have 
consulted prior literature and found that some accounting/business issues have been 
frequently used in vignettes, such as: financial reporting, investment decision, 
customer cares and finally health and safety issues (Black et al., 2007); 2) the content 
should not be too obvious to warrant predominantly one-sided approach rather than 
inviting a more balanced choice. 3) The issue should be relevant and important to the 
chosen subjects such as: flat cleaning rota, work-life balance, and managing one’s 
social life. And finally, all eight scenarios were reviewed by two supervisors and 
consequently, I believe they were comprehensive enough to capture the target 
participants’ common experiences with rules and principles.  
Table 41 Summary of the eight scenarios 
Scenario  Summary 
S1 Approaches in financial reporting 
S2 Managing one’s own fitness regime 
S3 Approaches in researching potential investment targets 
S4 Managing one’s own work-life balance 
S5 Managing one’s flat cleaning rota 
S6 Approaches in allocating financial loans 
S7 Approaches in ensuring health and safety in a large 
organisation 
S8 Approaches in ensuring customer satisfaction 
 
Three out eight scenarios had reversed rating in terms of the scenario choices. This 
was used to control for users who would select a fixed number across all scenarios.  
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9.15 Part one: DRP and BI (correlation analysis and multiple regression) 
9.15.1 The correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis is used to examine whether there is a connection between one’s 
DRP scores and her BIs with respect to rules and principles-based cognitive tasks. In 
the next step, multiple regression models are used to examine whether there is a 
causal relationship, and if so, how much behavioural variation can be explained by 
one’s DRP scores.  
Previous researches have shown that in general, the attitude or motivational type of 
scales tend to be negatively skewed (Pintrich, et al., 1993, p.810). Although the 
frequency distributions are not provided here, the means are the followings: for the 
DRP scales, the rules scores are negatively skewed (M = 3.13, SD = 0.75) and 
principles scores are also negatively skewed (M = 3.64, SD = 0.62). The scores for 
scenario 2, 5 and 7 out of the eight scenarios were reversed, to ensure the consistency 
of the meanings of all scenarios’ scorings. The current usable sample size, for the 
predictive testing was n = 89.  
Table 42 Descriptive Statistics of the eight scenarios 
 N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
S1 89 2.43 .85 .18 -.53 
S2 89 2.29 .96 .26 -.84 
S3 89 2.40 .76 .25 -.21 
S4 89 2.09 .94 .41 -.77 
S5 89 2.48 1.07 .07 -1.02 
S6 89 2.24 .77 .18 -.30 
S7 89 2.31 .91 .16 -.77 
S8 89 2.28 .84 .25 -.44 
Scenario 
Average 
89 2.31 .56 -.19 .43 
 
The correlation table showed that both rules and principles scores correlated 
significantly with each individual score of across eight scenarios (see table 43). Rules 
scores correlated significantly with seven out of the eight scenarios. Principles scores 
also correlated significantly with seven out of the eight scenarios. In scenario 4, 
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balancing one’s work and life, principles score did not correlate with the preferred 
approach. In scenario 5, cleaning rota for a shared flat, rules score did not correlate 
with the preferred approach. It is interesting to notice that both these two scenarios are 
personal in nature. Later analysis will look more into this. 
A scenario average score (SAV) was then calculated by taking the average of the 
aggregate scores for eight scenarios: SAV (M= 2.31, SD=0.56). The DRP scores 
explained 40% of the BI with respect to rules and principles-based social tasks. It is a 
relatively high predictive value in the field of cognitive behaviour research, especially 
for a new instrument. For instance, Ghiselli and Barthol (1953) concluded that 
predicting / criteria correlation were range from 0.14 to 0.36 with a central tendency 
of 0.22. Guion and Gottier (1965) conclude that a predictive validity of personality 
inventories very seldom exceeded a correlation of 0.30. Schmitt, Gooding, Noe, & 
Kirsch (1984) suggest a middle value of 0.21. More recent research in reasoned action 
theory shows BIs account for between 20% and 30% of the variance in health 
behaviours (Gibbons, online resources
61
). 
Table 43 Summary of the rules and principles correlations with eight scenarios
62
 
 S1 S2R S3 S4 S5R S6 S7R S8 SAV 
Rules .27*** .24** .30*** .26*** .14 .23** .25** .33*** .40*** 
Principles -.21** -.18* -
.29*** 
-.13 -
.34*** 
-
.28*** 
-.20* -
.36*** 
-
.40*** 
Note: For the scenario scoring: chose option1=prefer a principles-based approach; 
choose option 2= prefer a principles -based approach than a rules-based approach; 
choose option 3=prefer a rules-based approach than a principles -based approach; 
choose option 4= prefer a rules-based approach. S2, S5 and S7 are reverse scored. 
SAV =average score across the eight scenarios 
                                                 
61
 http://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/brp/constructs/intent-expect-willingness/index.html accessed on the 
July 2013. 
62
 ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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9.15.2 Part two: The Multiple Regression analysis 
A series of regression analyses were conducted using rules and principles scores as 
predictors and the scenario scores as the dependent variable. I entered variables into 
the regression models in three models. In the first model, I regressed scenario score on 
the rule score. In the second model, I entered the principle score instead of the rule 
score. By entering the variables in steps, I can evaluate the relative significance of the 
contribution of the each variable (comparisons between the ∆R2)63. In the final model, 
I entered both rule and principles scores as independent variables. The results for the 
eight scenarios are shown in the following Tables. 
9.15.2.1 Analysis for the professional scenarios  
Table 44 Multiple regression for professional scenarios 
Scenario 1: Approaches in Financial reporting  
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
t P Adjusted 
R2 
Overall F 
 
Significance of 
F 
Model 1 
Constant 1.49 .38 
      
Rules .30 .12 .26*** 2.55 0.01 6% 6.49 .01 
Model 2 
Constant 3.47 .53 
   
   
Principles -.29 .14 -.21** -2.0 0.05 3% 4.0 .05 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
2.49 .65 
   
   
Rules 
 
Principles 
 
.28 .12 .25** 2.43 0.02 
8% 5.06 .008 
-.26 .14 -.19* -1.86 0.07 
Scenario 3: Approaches in researching takeover targets 
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
t P Adjusted 
R2 
Overall 
F 
 
Significance of 
F 
Model 1 
Constant 
 
1.47 
 
.34 
      
Rules .30 .10 .30 2.88 .005 8% 8.28 .005 
                                                 
63
 Adjusted R
2 (∆R2) was chosen because it gives a good indication of how well the model generalises 
and its value should be identical to R
2
.  
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Model 2 
Constant 3.7 .47 
      
Principles -.36 .13 -.29 -2.8 .006 8% 7.9 .006 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
2.73 
 
.57 
      
Rules 
 
Principles 
.28 .10 .27 2.77 .007 
14% 8.08 .001 
-.33 .12 -.27 -2.7 .008 
Scenario 6: Approaches in allocating financial loans 
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
t P Adjusted 
R2 
Overall 
F 
 
Significance of 
F 
Model 1 
Constant 
 
1.51 
 
.34 
      
Rules .23 .11 .23 2.17 .03 4% 4.72 .03 
Model 2 
Constant 3.48 .47 
      
Principles -.34 .13 -.28 -2.67 .009 8% 7.12 .009 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
2.74 .59 
      
Rules   
 
Principles 
.21 .10 .21 2.04 .04 
10% 5.76 .004 
-.32 .13 -.26 -2.55 .01 
Scenario 7: Approaches in ensuring health and safety issue in a large organisation 
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
t P Adjusted 
R2 
Overall F 
 
Significance of 
F 
Model 1 
Constant 
 
1.36 
 
.41 
      
Rules .31 .13 .25 2.43 .02 5% 5.89 .02 
Model 2 
Constant 3.39 .57 
      
Principles -.30 .16 -.2 -1.91 .06 3% 3.63 .06 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
2.39 .71 
      
Rules   
 
Principles  
 
.29 .12 .24 2.31 .02 
8% 4.58 .01 
-.27 .15 -.18 -1.77 .08 
Scenario 8: Ensuring customer services satisfaction 
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
t P Adjusted 
R2 
Overall 
F 
 
Significance of 
F 
Model 1 
Constant 
 
1.14 
 
.36 
      
Rules .37 .11 .33 3.23 .002 10% 10.45 .002 
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Model 2 
Constant 4.05 .5 
      
Principles -.49 .14 -.36 -3.6 .001 12% 13 .001 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
2.89 .60 
      
Rules 
 
 
Principles 
 
.34 .11 .30 3.16 .002 
21% 12.13 .0001 
-.46 .13 -.34 -3.5 .001 
All three models were significant for the professional scenarios as shown in the table 
above. In scenario one, both rules and principles scores were significant predictors for 
the scenario scores: for rules, t (87) = 6.49, p =0.01; for principles, t (87) = 4, p =0.05. 
From the magnitude of the t-values I can say that the rules score had slightly more 
impact than the principles score. The final model consisted both rules and principles 
score, F= 5.06 and was also highly significant (p< 0.01). Rules score had a higher 
standardised beta value than the principles score, this revealed that rules score 
contribute more to the outcome of the model. The coefficient (b) for rules score was 
positive indicating a positive relationship between one’s rules score and BI. In 
contrast, b value was negative for principles score, suggesting a negative relationship 
between one’s dispositions to principles and BI. In model 1, rules score by itself 
accounted for 6% of overall variance in individuals’ scenario choices. In model 2, 
principle score by itself accounted for 3% of the overall variance. Finally the last 
model, when both scores were added as predictors, the explanatory power increased to 
8%.  
For scenario three, when it comes to choose an approach in researching takeover 
targets, both rules and principles scores contributed highly and significantly to the 
model, F= 8.08, p< 0.01. The pattern continued as the rules score had a positive 
relationship (b=.27) with the BI, while the principles score had a negative relationship 
(b= -.27).  
In scenario six, principles score (t=-2.67, p< 0.01) had more impact on the one’s 
scenario score than rules score (t=2.17, p< 0.05). In the third model, when both rules 
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and principles were used, the explanatory power of the model increased to 10% from 
4% as predicted by rules score on its own. 
For health and safety issues, rules score seemed to contribute more to the model, 
t=2.43, p<0.05. Whereas for principles score, t= - 1.9, p< 0.1, and it was only slightly 
significant at 90% confidence level. The final model had the biggest explanatory 
power, ∆R2: 8%.  
In scenario eight, principles score (t=-3.6, p< 0.01) had more impact on the one’s 
scenario score than the rules score (t=3.23, p< 0.01). In the final model, when both 
rules and principles were used, the explanatory power of the model increased to 21%. 
In scenario five, six and eight I recognised that principles scores contribute more to 
the scenario choice as measured by t and ∆R2. In scenario one and seven, rules score 
was seen as contributing more to the model. Lastly, in scenario three, rules and 
principles scores had made an equal contribution to the model.   
Scenarios 8 obtained the highest ∆R2 (21%) value compare with the rest of the seven 
scenarios. This may suggest that participants were more strongly engaged with this 
one particular scenario. My speculation for the high ∆R2 is that it could be something 
to do with participants’ individual personal experience. They were mostly familiar 
with the theme of this scenario. The scenario was concerned with using principles-
based or rules-based approaches to better serve customers.  
9.15.2.2 Analysis for the private life scenarios  
Interesting results were observed for the rest of the three private life scenarios. In 
general, lower ∆R2 were obtained across three scenarios in comparison with the ∆R2 in 
the professional context.  
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Table 45 Multiple regression for personal life scenarios 
Scenario 2: Managing one’s own fitness regime (private life) 
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
T P Adjusted 
R
2
 
Overall 
F 
 
Significance of 
F 
Model 1 
Constant 1.32 .43 
      
Rules .31 .13 .24 2.35 0.02 5% 5.53 .02 
Model 2 
Constant 3.31 .6 
      
Principles -.28 .16 -.18 -1.73 0.09 2% 2.98 .09 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
2.29 .74       
Rules 
 
Principles 
 
.29 .13 .23 2.24 .02 7% 4.08 .02 
-.25 .16 -.16 -1.59 .12 
Scenario 4: Managing one’s own work-life balance  
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
t P Adjusted 
R
2
 
Overall 
F 
 
Significance of 
F 
Model 1 
Constant 1.07 .42 
      
Rules .33 .13 .26 2.54 .01 6% 6.44 .01 
Model 2 
Constant 2.79 .59 
      
Principles -.19 .16 -.13 -1.19 .24 1% 1.42 .24 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
1.69 .73 
      
Rules   
 
Principles  
 
.32 .13 .25 2.45 .02 
6% 3.76 .03 
-.16 .16 -.11 -1.04 0.3 
Scenario 5: Managing one’s flat cleaning rota 
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
t P Adjusted 
R
2
 
Overall 
F 
 
Significance 
of F 
Model 1 
Constant 1.86 .48 
      
Rules .2 .15 .14 1.33 .19 1% 1.77 .19 
Model 2 
Constant 4.58 .64 
      
Principles -.58 .17 -.34 -3.31 .001 10% 10.97 .001 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
4.01 .81 
      
Rules   
 
Principles 
.17 .14 .12 1.15 .25 
11% 6.17 .003 
-.56 .17 -.33 -3.22 .002 
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In the context of managing one’s own fitness regime, rules score tended to have a 
bigger impact than the principles score. The final model showed that both rules and 
principles scores contributed significantly to the BI.  
Rules score was a useful predictor in the context of helping to manage one’s own life- 
work balance: t= 2.54, p =0.01. Whereas, principles score did not predict the BI 
significantly.  
Principles score was useful in predicting choices in managing one’s flat cleaning rota, 
t=-3.31, p=.001, and was responsible for 10% of one’s behavioural variance.  
9.15.2.3 Overall result and summary 
Regression model with DRP predicting the average scores of all eight scenarios  
Table 46 Multiple regression for scenario average score 
Scenario Average 
Variables B Std. 
error 
Standardised 
β 
t P Adjusted 
R
2
 
Overall 
F 
 
Significance 
of F 
Model 1 
Constant 1.4 .24 
      
Rules .29 .07 .39 4.0 .0001 15% 15.9 .0001 
Model 2 
Constant 3.6 .33 
      
Principles -.35 .09 -.39 -3.95 .0001 15% 15.6 .0001 
Model 3 
Constant 
 
2.65 .38 
      
Rules 
 
Principles 
 
.27 .07 .37 4.0 .0001 
27% 17.12 .0001 
-.33 .08 -.36 -4.0 .0001 
The overall result demonstrated that both rules and principles scores were useful 
predictors in predicting one’s BI with respect to rules and principles related 
approaches. The rules-oriented individuals tend to have a strong and consistent 
tendency to choose rules-based approaches in dealing with cognitive tasks; on the 
other hand, the principles-oriented individuals tend to have a consistent and strong 
tendency to choose principles-based approaches for the same task. In particular, for 
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the scenario average score, both model 1 (rules score as the sole independent variable) 
and 2 (with principles score as the sole independent variable) were significant and 
they explained up to 15% of the variance. This result suggested that both rules and 
principles scores had equivalent predictive power. The 3
rd
 model which included both 
scores, yielded the largest explanatory power (∆R2 =27%). This showed that when 
both DRP scores are used, the model has the largest predictive power.  
9.16 Using DRP rules and principals scores as predictors 
In previous sections, I have established that DRP scores were significant and useful 
predictors when it comes to predicting one’s BIs. In this section, one way ANOVA 
was used to provide empirical evidence to show that: People who have predominantly 
chosen rules-based scenario approaches would have higher rules scores than people 
who have predominantly chosen principles-based scenario approaches, and vice versa.  
Before carrying out ANOVA analysis, three assumptions have to be met. Firstly, to 
meet the independence of observation assumption is met by the designed the project 
in which, each participant filled in the online survey once and independently.  
Secondly, skewness and kurtosis values were checked to establish the normality of the 
dependent variables (Table 42). Finally, Levene’s test of equality of error variances 
was performed. Among the eight scenarios, the homogeneity assumption for scenario 
1, 3, 5 and 8 was violated. Nonetheless “the measures of homogeneity of variance64 
act more as a warning than as a disqualifier” (George & Mallery, p. 2005, p.151). 
Thus, to rectify the homogeneity assumption, an adjusted F test (The Welch statistic) 
was performed, instead of the Levene’s test.  
9.16.1 Two categories of scenario scores 
The ANOVA analysis compared 1) the rules scores between people who have chosen 
a rules-based approach and people who have chosen a principles-based approach for 
the same scenario. 2) Same analysis procedure was applied to the principles scores.  
                                                 
64
 Homogeneity of variance: in other words, the spread of scores in each condition should be roughly 
similar (the spread of scores is reflected in the variance, which is simply the standard deviation 
squared). 
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The dependent variables were one’s DRP scores, and the independent variable was 
the rules and principles category. Subjects were categorised into two groups as 
identified by their scenario scores. Group 1 included the people who have chosen 
choice 1 and 2. Group 2 included people who selected choice 3 and 4. 
9.16.4.1.1 Professional scenario analysis 
For scenario 1, people who have chosen a rules-based scenario approach had a higher 
rules score (M= 3.38, SD=0.6) than people who have chosen a principles-based 
scenario approach (M=2.94, SD=0.81). And this difference was significant, Welch F 
(1, 87) =8.89, p=.004 significant at 99% confidence level. On the other hand, there 
was no significant mean difference for the principles scores between people who have 
chosen a rules-based scenario approach and people who have chosen a principles-
based scenario approach,  F (1, 87) = 2.7, p= .10. 
In scenario 3, people who have chosen a rules-based scenario approach had a higher 
rules score (M= 3.37, SD =0.53) than people who have chosen a principles-based 
scenario approach (M=2.97, SD= 0.85). And such difference was significant, Welch F 
(1, 87) = 7.84, p=.006 significant at 99% confidence level. On the other hand, people 
who have chosen a principles-based scenario approach (M= 3.73, SD= 0.65) had a 
higher principle scores than people were in the rules-based scenario approach group 
(M= 3.5, SD=0.55), and the mean differences was significant, F (1, 87) =3.15, p=.08 
significant at 90% confident level.  
Table 47 Two categories of ANOVA for professional scenarios 
Scenario 1: Approaches in Financial reporting (professional life)
65
  
Dispositions People who were in 
Rules approach group 
People who were in 
Principles approach 
group 
F Sig 
Rules scores 3.38  (SD: 0.6) 2.94 (SD: 0.81) 8.89** .004 
Principles scores 
 
3.51  (SD: 0.68) 3.72  (SD:0.55) 2.7 .10 
Scenario 3: Approaches in research potential targets 
66
 
                                                 
65
 Sample size: Principles n=50, rules n=39 
66
 Sample size: Principles n=52, rules n=37 
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Dispositions People who were in 
Rules approach group 
People who were in 
Principles approach 
group 
F Sig 
Rules scores 3.37 (SD: 0.53) 2.97 (SD: 0.85) 
Welch 
7.84*** 
.006 
 
Principles scores 
 
3.50 (SD: 0.55) 3.73 (SD: 0.65) 3.15* .08 
Scenario 6: Approaches in allocating financial loans
67
             
Dispositions People who were in 
Rules approach group 
People who were in 
Principles approach 
group 
F Sig 
Rules scores 3.34 (SD: 0.65) 3.03 (SD: 0.79) 3.47* .07 
Principles scores 
 
3.43 (SD: 0.65) 3.74(SD: 0.58) 5.29** .02 
Scenario 7: Approaches in ensuring health and safety in a large organisation
68
 
Dispositions People who were in 
Rules approach group 
People who were in 
Principles approach 
group 
F Sig 
Rules scores 3.31 (SD: 0.71) 3.01 (SD:0.77) 3.5* 0.06 
Principles scores 3.61 (SD: 0.56) 3.65 (SD: 0.66) 0.11 0.74 
Scenario 8: Approaches in ensuring customer satisfaction
69
 
Dispositions People who were in 
Rules approach group 
People who were in 
Principles approach 
group 
F Sig 
Rules scores 3.4 (SD: 0.59) 2.98 (SD: 0.80) 
Welch 
8.07*** 
.006 
Principles scores 3.37 (SD: 0.67) 3.80 (SD: 0.53) 10.59*** .002 
 
In scenario 6, people who have chosen a rules-based approach had a higher rules 
score than people who have chosen a principles-based approach in the context of 
allocating financial loans; F (1, 87) = 3.47, p=.07; people who have chosen a 
principles-based approach had a higher principles score than people who have chosen 
a rules-based approach, F (1, 87) =5.29, p=.02 significant at 95% confidence level. 
                                                 
67
 Sample size:  Principles n=58; rules n=31 
68
 Principles n=52; rules n=37 
69
 Principles n=56; rules n=33 
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In scenario 7, people who have chosen a rules-based approach had a higher rules 
score than people who have chosen a principles-based approach in the context of 
ensuring health and safety, F (1, 87) = 3.5, p=0.06, significant at 90% confidence 
level; no significant difference was found for principles score between these two 
categories, F (1, 87) = 0.11, p=0.74. 
In scenario 8, people who have chosen a rules-based approach had a higher rules 
score than people who have chosen a principles-based approach in the context of 
ensuring customer satisfaction; Welch F (1, 87) = 8.07, p=.006 significant at 99% 
confidence level; Similarly, people who have chosen a principles-based approach had 
a higher principles score than people who have chosen a rules-based approach, F (1, 
87) =10.59, p=.002 significant at 99% confidence level. 
9.16.4.1.2 Personal scenario analysis 
Table 48 Two categories of ANOVA for personal life scenarios 
Scenarios 2: Managing one’s own fitness regime 70 
Dispositions People who were in Rules 
approach group 
People who were in 
Principles approach group 
F Sig 
Rules scores 3.29 (SD: 0.56) 3.03 (SD: 0.85) 
Welch 
3.01* 
.09 
Principles scores 
 
3.51 (SD: 0.59) 3.71 (SD: 0.63) 2.18 .14 
Scenarios 4: Managing one’s own work-life balance71 
Dispositions People who were in Rules 
approach group 
People who were in 
Principles approach group 
F Sig 
Rules scores 3.36 (SD: 0.73) 3.03 (SD: 0.75) 3.92** .05 
Principles 3.54 (SD: 0.63) 3.68 (SD: 0.62) 1.03 .31 
Scenarios 5: Managing one’s flat cleaning rota72 
                                                 
70
 Sample size: principles n=54, rules n= 35 
71
 Sample size: Principles n=59; rules n=29 
72
 Sample size:  Principles n=47; rules n=42 
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Dispositions People who were in Rules 
approach group 
People who were in 
Principles approach 
group 
F Sig 
Rules scores 3.21(SD: 0.68) 3.06(SD: 0.82) .88 .35 
Principles scores 
 
3.49 (SD: 0.63) 3.76(SD: 0.58) 4.43** .04 
 
For managing one’s fitness regime, there was a significant mean difference for rules 
between people in the rules-based approach scenario and people in the principles-
based approach scenario, Welch F =3.01 and slightly significant at 90% confidence 
level. 
When using dispositions to rules to predict scenario two with respect to managing 
one’s work-life balance, there was a significant mean difference between the rules-
based and principles-based approach groups, F (1, 87) =3.92, p=0.05 significant at 
95% confident level; For principles score, F (1, 87) = 1.03, p= 0.31 not significant.  
There was a significant difference between two groups’ principles scores with respect 
to the scenario which described managing the flat cleaning rota, F (1, 87) = 4.0, p=.04 
significant at 95% confidence level. No significant difference was found for one’s 
rules scores between the two groups, F (1, 87) =.88, p=.35.  
9.16.4.1.3 Overall result and discussion  
Taken all results together, participants tended to respond to the cognitive task 
scenarios in line with their dispositions towards rules and principles scores. In 
particular, people who have chosen a rules-based approach in scenarios would tend to 
have significantly higher rules scores than those who have chosen a principles-based 
approach for the same scenario. On the other hand, people who have chosen a 
principles-based approach in scenarios tend to have significantly higher principles 
scores than those who have chosen a rules-based approach for the same scenario.  
9.16.2 Four categories of scenario scores 
My primary goal was to determine whether there are any significant differences 
between participants’ rules scores and principles scores as categorised by four 
scenario choices. I also wanted to know which specific pairs of means are 
significantly different, therefore I continued with a post hoc test. If the assumption of 
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homogeneity of variance has been met (Equal Variance Assumed) – the most 
commonly used test is the Tukey (HSD) test. If the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance has been violated (Equal Variance Not Assumed) – the Games-Howell test is 
then selected. 
Subjects were assigned into four groups as identified by their scenario scores. Group 1 
were the people who have chosen a definitely principles-based approach. Group 2 
contained individuals who have chosen the more principles than rules based approach. 
Group 3 were the ones who have chosen the more rules than principles based 
approach. Last group 4, included the people who have chosen the definitely rules-
based approach.   
9.16.4.2.1 Professional context scenarios analysis  
Table 49 Four categories ANOVA scenario 1 
 Scenario 1: Financial reporting  
Preferred 
Approaches 
Group 1 
(n=11) 
Group 2 
(n=39) 
Group 3 
(n=29) 
Group 4 
(n=10) 
F Sig 
Rules 
2.8 
(SD:0.80) 
2.98 
(SD:0.82) 
3.42 
(SD:0.64) 
3.28 
(SD:0.48) 
2.98** 0.04 
Principles 
3.71 
(SD:0.74) 
3.73 
(SD:0.50) 
3.61 
(SD:67) 
3.22 
(SD:0.67) 
1.95 0.13 
 
In scenario one, I found that there were significant differences of one’s rule score 
among four groups categorised by participant’s scenario scores, F (3, 85) = 2.98, 
p=.04 significant at 95% level. The same pattern did not found for the principles 
scores. In other words, there were no significant differences of one’s principles scores 
for people in the four groups as separated by the scenario scores. 
 
The plots also have been adjusted (re-scaled) to provide a clearer picture of the linear 
relationship between the variables. That is, the plot is to show notable difference 
between the groups. 
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Figure 14 Four categories ANOVA scenario 1 
 
Levene test showed insignificant results for DRP, I then proceeded to Tukey post hoc 
analysis. 
Post Hoc Test results by preferred approach to scenarios  
Scenario 1 
 
Preferred 
four 
approaches  
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error Sig. 
Rules 
score  
Group 3 Group 1 .62* .26 .08 
Group 2 .44* .18 .07 
 Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that people in group 3 (M 
= 3.42, SD = 0.64) had a significantly higher rules score than people in group 1 (M = 
2.8, SD = 0.8) and group 2 (M =2.98, SD = 0.82). However the rules scores for people 
in group 4 was not significantly different comparing with the rules scores for people 
in group 2 and 1. These results suggested that disposition to rules score indeed has a 
significant impact on individuals’ BI in scenario one.  
Together with the graphs, the overall result showed that people who have chosen a 
more rules-based approach tended to have significantly higher rules scores than 
people who have chosen a more principles-based approach in scenario 1.  
241 
 
241 
 
 
Table 50 Four categories ANOVA scenario 3 
 Scenario 3: Researching takeover targets 
Preferred 
Approaches 
Group 1 
(n=8) 
Group 2 
(n=44) 
Group 3 
(n=30) 
Group 4 
(n=7) 
F Sig 
Rules 
2.78 
(SD:1.12) 
3 
(SD:0.8) 
3.32 
(SD:0.52) 
3.6 
(SD:0.50) 
2.72** .05 
Principles 
4.25 
(SD:0.42) 
3.64 
(SD:0.64) 
3.53 
(SD:0.52) 
3.34 
(SD:0.70) 
3.74*** .01 
I found that one’s DRP scores differed significantly between the four groups. For 
rules, F (3, 85) = 2.72, p=.05 significant at 95% confident level; for principles: F (3, 
85) = 3.74, p=0.01 significant at 99% confident level. 
Figure 15 Four categories ANOVA scenario 3 
 
For rules scores, Levene statistic is significant, the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance has been violated (Equal Variance Not Assumed); I proceeded to use Games-
Howell results instead. 
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 Scenario 3 
 
Preferred 
approaches 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. error 
Sig. 
  
 
Rules 
score 
Group 2 Group 4 -.6* 
.23 
.09 
 
 Scenario 3 
 
Preferred four 
approaches 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. error 
Sig. 
  
 
Principles 
score 
Group 1 
Group 2 
.61** .23 .04 
Group 3 .72** .24 .02 
Group 4 .91*** .31 .02 
Post hoc comparisons using the Games- Howell test indicated that people in group 2 
(M = 3, SD = 0.8) had a significantly lower rules score than people in group 4 (M = 
3.6, SD = 0.5). People in group 1 (M=4.25, SD= 0.42) had a significantly higher 
principles score than people in all the other three groups (2, 3 & 4). Overall results 
showed that the DRP scores have an effect on individual BI in scenario three. 
Specifically, people with higher principle scores would tend to be more likely to 
choose a more principle-based approach. People with higher rule scores would be 
more attracted to a more rules-based approach. 
Table 51 Four categories ANOVA scenario 6 
 Scenario 6: Allocating financial loans 
Preferred 
Approaches 
Group 1 
(n=14) 
Group 2 
(n=44) 
Group 3 
(n=27) 
Group 4 
(n=4) 
F Sig 
Rules 
2.83 
(SD:0.9) 
3.09 
(SD:0.75) 
3.33 
(SD:0.68) 
3.4 
(SD:0.49) 
1.60 .20 
Principles 
3.93 
(SD:0.69) 
3.68 
(SD:0.54) 
3.44 
(SD:0.62) 
3.35 
(SD:0.94) 
2.38** .05 
Consistent with the previous results, I found that the dispositions towards principles 
scores differed significantly among the four groups: F (3, 85) = 2.38, p=0.05 
significant at 95% confident level. In particular, the higher one’s principles score, the 
more likely one was attracted to a principles-based scenario approach. In contrast, 
there were no significant differences of the rules scores for people in the four groups 
as separated by the scenario scores. 
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Figure 16 Four categories ANOVA scenario 6 
 
 Scenario 6 
 
Preferred 
approaches 
Mean Difference 
Std error 
Sig. 
 
 
Principle
s  score 
Group 1 Group 3 
.48** .19 .05 
Post hoc analysis suggested that the disposition towards principles scores differed 
significantly between people in group 1 (M=3.93, SD=0.62) and people in group 3 
(M=3.44, SD=0.69). It showed that the higher one’s principles score the more likely 
one is to choose a principles-based approach in the context of the allocation of 
financial loans.  
Table 52 Four categories ANOVA scenario 7 
 
 
Scenario 7: Health and safety issue 
Preferred 
Approaches 
Group 1 
(n=18) 
Group 2 
(n=34) 
Group 3 
(n=28) 
Group 4 
(n=9) 
F Sig 
Rules 
2.76 
(SD:0.80) 
3.15 
(SD:0.73) 
 
3.29 
(SD:0.73) 
 
3.36 
(SD:0.68) 
2.29* .09 
Principles 
4.0 
(SD:0.53) 
3.47 
(SD:0.66) 
3.69 
(SD: 0.47) 
3.36 
(SD:0.75) 
4.01*** .01 
 
The ANOVA result showed that DRP scores had significant effect on one’s preferred 
approach in the context of ensuring health and safety: For rules score, F (3, 85) = 
2.29, p=.09 significant at 90% level. For principles score, F (3, 85) = 4.01, p= 0.01 
significant at 99% confidence level.  
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Figure 17 Four categories ANOVA scenario 7 
 
The diagram for principles scores by group (Figure 17) showed a sudden spike in the 
group 3, suggesting that people with higher principles scores have chosen a rules-
based approach rather than a more principles-based approach. One way to explain this 
result, is to use the ‘strong vs. weak’ context argument offered by Hayenes et al 
(2008, p.88). According to them, powerful situations such as safety and healthy was 
assumed to elicit BI specific to the situation while in weak situations individual 
differences may become more apparent. In this scenario, contextual features such as 
safety and health concern seems to ‘activate’ a rules-orientation in individuals who 
otherwise have a more stable and consistent principles-orientation in other situations. 
Future studies could be focused more on exploring this contextual interaction and 
one’s DRP scores.  
 
 Scenario 7 
 
Preferred four 
approaches 
Mean Difference 
Std error 
Sig.  
 
Rules 
score 
Group 1 Group 3 -.54* 0.22 .08 
 
 Scenario 7 
 
Preferred four 
approaches 
Mean Difference 
Std error 
Sig.  
 
Principles 
score 
Group 1 
Group 2 .54*** 0.17 .010 
Group 4 .64** 0.24 .04 
Post hoc analysis revealed that the DRP scores were significantly different between 
four groups. In particular, people who have chosen a more rules-based scenario 
approach (M= 3.29, SD=0.73) had a significant higher rules score than those in group 
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3 (M= 2.76, SD=0.8). The same pattern was found for principles scores: there was a 
significant difference between group 1 (M=4, SD=0.53) and both group 2 (M=3.47, 
SD=0.66) and group 4 (M=3.36, SD=0.75). It showed that the higher one’s principles 
score the more likely one is to choose a principles-based approach in the context of 
financial loans allocation.  
Table 53 Four categories ANOVA scenario 8 
 Scenario 8: Customer satisfaction 
Preferred 
Approaches 
Group1  
(n=15) 
Group 2 
(n=41) 
Group 3 
(n=26) 
Group 4 
(n=7) 
F Sig 
Rules 
2.65 
(SD:0.83) 
3.1 
(SD:0.76) 
3.38 
(SD:0.63) 
3.46 
(SD:0.43) 
3.78*** .01 
Principles 
3.95 
(SD:0.65) 
3.73 
(SD:0.48) 
3.42 
(SD:0.66) 
3.2 
(SD:0.74) 
4.28*** .007 
Finally, once again in scenario eight, I found that the DRP scores were significantly 
different between four groups: For rules: F (3, 85) = 3.78, p=.01 significant at 99% 
confident level. For principles: F (3, 85) = 4.28, p=.007, significant at 99% confident 
level. 
Figure 18 Four categories ANOVA scenario 8 
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 Scenario 8 
 
Preferred four 
approaches 
Mean Difference 
Std error 
Sig.  
 
Rules 
score 
Group 1 
Group 3 -.73*** .23 .01 
Group 4 -.8* .33 .08 
 
 Scenario 8 
 
Preferred four 
approaches 
Mean Difference 
Std error 
Sig.  
 
Principl
es 
score 
Group 1 
Group 3 .53** .19 .03 
Group 4 .75** 
.27 .03 
People who have chosen a more rules based scenario approach (group 3 and 4) had a 
significant higher rule score than people who have chosen a more principles-based 
approach (group 1). The same pattern was held for principles scores: a significant 
difference between group 1 and both group 3 and 4. Specifically, it showed that there 
was a matching effect between one’s disposition towards rules and principles and 
their BI in dealing with customer services. 
9.16.4.2.2 Personal context scenarios analysis 
Table 54 Four categories ANOVA scenario 2 
 Scenario 2:managing one’s fitness regime  
Preferred 
Approaches 
Group 1 
(n=20) 
Group 2 
(n=34) 
Group 3 
(n=24) 
Group 4 
(n=11) 
F Sig 
Rules 
2.8 
(SD:0.88) 
3.17 
(SD:0.81) 
3.23 
(SD:0.55) 
3.43 
(SD:0.56) 
2.12 .10 
Principles 
3.74 
(SD:0.66) 
3.69 
(SD:0.62) 
3.59 
(SD:0.48) 
3.35 
(SD:0.79) 
1.14 .34 
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Figure 19 Four categories ANOVA scenario 2 
 
Table 55 Four categories ANOVA scenario 4 
 Scenario 4: One’s life work balance 
Preferred 
Approaches 
Group 1 
(n=28) 
Group 2 
(n=32) 
Group 3 
(n=22) 
Group 4 
(n=7) 
F Sig 
Rules 
2.88 
(SD:0.82) 
3.16 
(SD:0.67) 
3.31 
(SD:0.77) 
3.51 
(SD:0.61) 
2.15 .1 
Principles 
3.74 
(SD:0.62) 
3.62 
(SD:0.61) 
3.54 
(SD:0.62) 
3.54 
(SD:0.71) 
.52 .67 
 
Figure 20 Four categories ANOVA scenario 4 
 
Scenario two and four did not show significant results. The speculated reason for the 
lack of significance is due to the highly personal nature of the contents of these 
scenarios: governing one self’s personal fitness and work-life balance. These are the 
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areas in one’s life which could be operated with minimal social constraint.  However 
although not significant the general tendencies of the directions of the mean 
differences were in line with my expectations and the results obtained in the 
professional scenarios.  
Table 56 Four categories ANOVA scenario 5 
 Scenario 5: Cleaning flat rota 
Preferred 
Approaches 
Group 1 
(n=19) 
Group 2 
(n=28) 
Group 3 
(n=22) 
Group 4 
(n=20) 
F Sig 
Rules 
2.89 
(SD:0.76) 
3.18 
(SD:0.85) 
3.19 
(SD:0.72) 
3.24 
(SD:0.64) 
.84 .48 
Principles 
4.01 
(SD:0.56) 
3.59 
(SD:0.55) 
3.65 
(SD:0.62) 
3.32 
(SD:0.62) 
4.61*** .005 
I found that disposition towards principle scores were significantly different across all 
four groups: F (3, 85) = 4.61, p=0.005 significant at 99% confident level. No 
significant rules scores differences were detected between the four groups.   
Figure 21 Four categories ANOVA scenario 5 
 
  
 Scenario 5 
 
Preferred four 
approaches 
Mean Difference 
Std. error 
Sig.  
 
Principles 
score 
Group 1 
Group 4 .69*** 0.19 .002 
Group 2 .42* 0.17 .08 
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Together with the graphs, the post hoc result revealed that the higher one’s principles 
scores the more likely one will choose a principles-based approach in managing flat 
cleaning rota.  
9.16.4.2.3 Overall result and discussion 
The results from four categories analysis are consistent with those of previous two 
categories analysis. The overall results showed that there were significant differences 
of one’s DRP scores among the four groups as categorised by one’s scenario scores. 
The analysis confirmed the earlier results (two categories analysis 9.16.1), that is a 
rules-oriented scenario approach will be more likely to be chosen by predominantly 
rules-oriented individuals. The same pattern holds true for the principles-based 
scenario approaches. Another issue observed from the ANOVA results is that the 
DRP scores have relatively more predictive power in the domains that are 
professional in nature rather than personal. This shows that the dispositions towards 
rules and principles scores may be more pertinent to professional and organisational 
contexts rather than private life situations.  
9.17 Four categories of DRP scores 
This part of analysis is to examine the differences among different levels (high, low as 
judged by the score’s distance from the mean) of one’s DRP scores in relation to 
one’s scenario scores. Mean for rules M=3.13, SD= 0.75; mean for principles scores 
M= 3.63, SD= 0.62. This part of analysis highlights the extent that, individual’s DRP 
scores are consistent across contexts.  
 
Figure 9.12 Distribution of the four categories DRP scores 
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Figure 22 Four groups of DRP scores  
 
Interesting patterns are found in the above diagram: The scores of the dispositions to 
rules and principles are orthogonal; scores are evenly distributed across segments. In 
other words, the four segments are intended to be orthogonal (uncorrelated) from each 
other, though there are small positive correlations between the four categories. In 
geometry
73, orthogonal means “at right angles to something else”; in psychology 
orthogonal means “statistically independent of an experimental design: such that the 
variants under investigation can be treated as statistically independent,” for example, 
“the concept that creativity and intelligence are relatively orthogonal (i.e., unrelated 
statistically) at high levels of intelligence.”  
The one-way ANOVA for the four groups
74
 as categorised by one’s DRP scores 
produced a consistent overall pattern: Group two (HRLP) and group four (LRHP) had 
                                                 
73
 Internet source http://www.skeptically.org/logicalthreads/id15.html access on the 1st of Feb 2014, 
13:44pm. 
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the largest and most significant mean differences across scenarios. Since the DRP 
scores consistently predicted better in the professional domain rather than in the 
personal domain, I primarily focused on examining the business / public life 
scenarios
75
: 
Table 57 Four categories DRP scores ANOVA for professional scenarios 
 Scenario HRHP 
N=22 
HRLP 
N=27 
LRLP 
N=19 
LRHP 
N=21 
F 
value 
Sig. 
Scenario 1 
Financial 
reporting  
Mean 2.4 
(SD:0.73) 
2.78 
(SD:0.85) 
2.21 
(SD:0.85) 
2.19 
(SD:0.87) 
2.6 .05 
Scenario 3 
Take-over targets 
Mean 2.32 
(SD:0.78) 
2.78 
(SD:0.70) 
2.53 
(SD:0.61) 
1.9 
(SD:0.7) 
6.38 .001 
Scenario 6 
Allocating loans 
Mean 2.14 
(SD:0.77) 
2.48 
(SD:0.7) 
2.32 
(SD:0.75) 
1.95 
(SD:0.8) 
2.14 .09 
Scenario 8 
Ensure customer 
satisfaction 
Mean 2.36 
(SD:0.9) 
2.67 
(SD:0.68) 
2.16 
(SD:0.90) 
1.8 
(SD:0.68) 
5.0 .003 
The post hoc analysis showed that a similar pattern across all four business scenarios. 
Across all four scenarios, group two (HRLP) had the highest scores whereas group 
four (LRHP) obtained the lowest scores. The differences were significant across all 
four scenarios. In addition, in scenario three, there was also a significant mean 
difference between group three and group four. 
Table 58 Post Hoc analysis for 4 groups of DRP scores 
 Groups Mean Difference Std.error Sig. 
Scenario 1 Group 2 – Group 4 0.59* .24 .07 
Scenario 3 Group 2 – Group 4 
Group 3 – Group 4 
0.87*** 
.62** 
.20 
.22 
.001 
.03 
Scenario 6 Group 2 – Group 4 .53* .22 .08 
Scenario 8 Group 2- Group 4 .86*** .23 .002 
                                                                                                                                            
HRLP = individuals who have higher than average rules scores but with lower than average principles 
scores (2). 
LPLR = individuals who have both their rules and principles scores lower than the average scores (3). 
LRHP = individuals who have lower than average rules scores but with higher than average principles 
scores (4) 
75
 Scenario seven was not reported here due to its insignificant results. 
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Figure 23 Mean plots of the four categories of DRP scores in professional scenarios 
 
 
The graphs showed that Individuals with evidencing a DRP predisposition are held to 
be more likely to choose their matching approach in these situations.  
9.17.1 Overall result and discussion 
In line with my expectations, the largest and most significant mean differences came 
from group 2 and group 4. This result was consistent with all previous analysis and 
confirmed that DRP scores are meaningful when comes to predict individuals’ BI 
across varying contexts: The more rules-oriented one is the more likely one will 
choose a more rules-based approach. In contrast, individuals who are predominantly 
principles-oriented will be more likely to choose principles-based approaches. 
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9.18 Scenario context analysis 
In this project, I am primarily interested in examining the disposition-BI link, which is 
“internal and generally less susceptible to uncontrollable external factors” (Kim & 
Hunter, 1993, p.333). I am however aware that the salient contextual features might 
trigger different people differently as prior literature found (Haynes et al., 2008). For 
instance, in section 9.16.4.1, scenario seven, I found that relatively principles-oriented 
people have chosen a rules-based approach in ensuring health and safety in a large 
organisation; this showed that the context (safety and health) seemed to activate a 
rules-orientation in otherwise principles-oriented people. I intend to explore this 
‘framing’ effect between the contextual features and one’s DRPs in future empirical 
work. 
Another interesting finding is that the DRP scores possibly contributed more to one’s 
decision-making in the domain of professional life (∆R2: 21%) than personal life 
(∆R2: 11%). The result is in line with Haynes, et al (2008)’s study, who found that 
accounting students seemed to adopt quite different personality profiles in different 
situations (at work vs. private socialising). In particular, they found that psychometric 
assessments such as the MBTI (Myers-Briggs type Indicator) and the TBI 
(Typotypical behaviour indicator) accounted 40% of preferences for thinking styles in 
business settings, but decreased to 13% in social situation.  
9.19 Demographic variable analysis 
In this part of work, I focus on investigating whether various demographic factors 
affect the interactions between individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles 
and their BI across contexts.  
9.19.1Checking the gender neutrality of the scenarios  
A series of t-tests on both genders’ individual scenario scores have been conducted to 
check for the gender biases of the scenarios. The overview t-test results confirmed 
that there was no apparent (at least statistically powerful enough) gender biases 
present in the eight scenarios.     
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9.19.2 A summary of the regression model of demographic variables  
To control the demographic variables effects on people’s BI, I run a regression model 
while control for gender and ethnicity effect.  
Table 9.41 Regression models while control for demographic variables  
Scenario average  
Variables B Std. 
error 
Beta T P Adjusted 
R
2
 
Overall 
F 
 
Significance 
of F 
Model 1 
Constant 
2.8 
 
     
 
28%                 7***           .0001 Rules 
Principles 
Gender 
Ethnicity 
.3 
-.4 
.2 
-.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.4*** 
-.4*** 
.16 
-.09 
 
4.2 
-4.1 
1.6 
-.95 
 
.0001 
.0001 
It was found that DRP still significantly predict BI after controlled the effects of the 
personal variables such as gender and ethnicity, and the coefficients showed none of 
these two variables were significant.  
9.19.3 Gender analysis in relation to contexts 
Extant literature in various areas of academic research has consistently reported both 
psychological and cognitive differences between genders (Chung & Monroe, 1998).  
Females for example, are often viewed to have more interdependent, relational, sense 
of self (Madson & Trafimow, 2001; Gilligan, 1988) and to be more empathetic than 
males (Neff, 2003). Thus one might expect women to be more mindful towards 
demands arising from the contexts. On the other hand, there is evidence to support 
that females are more submissive and tend to focus on conforming and maintaining 
harmony (Chapman et al., 2007).  
In order to determine whether there are any differences between males’ and females’ 
DRP scores, in relation to scenarios, one way ANOVA analysis was held. Male was 
coded as 1; female was coded as 2. Male n=45; female n=37, miss data n= 7 
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Table 59 The Mean comparisons for rules scores between male and female 
The Mean comparisons for rules scores between male and female   
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
S1 2.86 
(SD:1.0) 
2.7 
(SD:0.35) 
2.7 
(SD:0.73) 
3.2 
(SD:0.92) 
3.18 
(SD:0.66) 
3.68 
(SD:0.46) 
3.56 
(SD:0.38) 
3.1 
(SD:0.42) 
S2 2.55 
(SD:0.69) 
3.04 
(SD:0.97) 
2.8 
(SD:0.95) 
3.42 
(SD:0.61) 
3.16 
(SD:0.51) 
3.47 
(SD:0.7) 
3.52 
(SD:0.52) 
3.2 
(SD:0.72) 
S3 2.32 
(SD:0.76) 
3.53 
(SD:1.34) 
2.83 
(SD:0.79) 
3.16 
(SD:0.87) 
3.19 
(SD:0.51) 
3.46 
(SD:0.44) 
3.8 
(SD:0.45) 
3.1 
(SD:0.14) 
S4 2.36 
(SD:0.62) 
3.21 
(SD:0.76) 
3.12 
(SD:0.64) 
3.31 
(SD:0.78) 
3.2 
(SD:0.83) 
3.34 
(SD:0.7) 
3.5 
(SD:0.42) 
3.8 
(SD:1.1) 
S5 2.52 
(SD:0.6) 
2.31 
(SD:0.71) 
3.05 
(SD:0.7) 
3.42 
9SD:1) 
3.04 
(SD:0.89) 
3.2 
(SD:0.52) 
3.26 
(SD:0.73) 
3.16 
(SD:0.52) 
S6 2.26 
(SD:0.6) 
3.37 
(SD:0.87) 
2.98 
(SD:0.63) 
3.21 
(SD:0.88) 
3.3 
(SD:0.87) 
3.42 
(SD:0.51) 
3.53 
(SD:0.5) 
3*
76
 
 
S7 2.64 
(SD:0.76) 
2.94 
(SD:0.88) 
3.06 
(SD:0.68) 
3.31 
(SD:0.83) 
3.13 
(SD:0.91) 
3.37 
(SD:0.56) 
3.17 
(SD:0.6) 
3.73 
(SD:0.81) 
S8 2.49 
(SD:0.75) 
3.1 
(SD:0.99) 
2.95 
(SD:0.66) 
3.19 
(SD:0.89) 
3.31 
(SD:0.75) 
3.47 
(SD:0.49) 
3.53 
(SD:0.50) 
3.53 
(SD:0.42) 
Across all eight scenarios, females participants consistently showed larger rules 
scores than males’ participants for all four groups. The same pattern did not hold true 
for principles scores.  
Table 60 The Mean comparisons for principles scores between male and female 
 The Mean comparisons for principles scores between male and female   
Principle Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
S1 3.71 
(SD:0.83) 
3.7 
(SD:0.68) 
3.79 
(SD:0.47) 
3.72 
(SD:0.60) 
3.7 
(SD:0.73) 
3.5 
(SD:0.62) 
2.88 
(SD:0.73) 
3.45 
(SD:0.41) 
S2 3.8 
(SD:0.74) 
3.69 
(SD:0.62) 
3.89 
(SD:0.75) 
3.58 
(SD:0.56) 
3.51 
(SD:0.53) 
3.7 
(SD:0.45) 
3.33 
(SD:0.76) 
3.4 
(SD:1.0) 
S3 4.32 
(SD:0.46) 
4.13 
(SD:0.42) 
3.67 
(SD:0.75) 
3.59 
(SD:0.61) 
3.54 
(SD:0.49) 
3.51 
(SD:0.59) 
3.16 
(SD:0.75) 
3.8 
(SD:0.28) 
S4 3.87 
(SD:0.66) 
3.66 
(SD:0.6) 
3.64 
(SD:0.74) 
3.6 
(SD:0.53) 
3.57 
(SD:0.62) 
3.43 
(SD:0.73) 
3.3 
(SD:0.89) 
4
77
 
 
S5 4.1 
(SD:0.50) 
3.9 
(SD:0.63) 
3.58 
(SD:0.7) 
3.57 
(SD:0.46) 
3.7 
(SD:0.67) 
3.58 
(SD:0.65) 
3.31 
(SD:0.69) 
3.28 
(SD:0.61) 
                                                 
76
 Single respondent. 
77
 Two respondents.  
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S6 3.89 
(SD:0.89) 
4 
(SD:0.54) 
3.7 
(SD:0.62) 
3.67 
(SD:0.48) 
3.52 
(SD:0.63) 
3.32 
(SD:0.67) 
3.13 
(SD:0.5) 
4
78
 
S7 4.04 
(SD:0.52) 
3.94 
(SD:0.59) 
3.56 
(SD:0.72) 
3.27 
(SD:0.64) 
3.72 
(SD:0.61) 
3.71 
(SD:0.39) 
3 
(SD:0.67) 
4.07 
(SD:.12) 
S8 3.85 
(SD:0.71) 
4.2 
(SD:0.43) 
3.88 
(SD:0.54) 
3.61 
(SD:0.46) 
3.36 
(SD:0.61) 
3.48 
(SD:0.74) 
2.87 
(SD:1.0) 
3.4 
(SD:0.53) 
 
The table showed whether the mean differences would be statistically significant.  
Table 61 ANOVA analysis between males and females 
 Scenario 
Choice
79
 
DRP  Sum of 
squares  
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
S1 Group 2 
 
 
Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
2.18 
22.05 
24.23 
1 
32 
33 
2.18 
.69 
3.16* .08 
Group 3 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
1.77 
8.91 
10.68 
1 
26 
27 
1.77 
.34 
5.17** .03 
S2 Group 2 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
2.86 
16.87 
19.74 
1 
28 
29 
2.86 
.60 
4.75** .04 
S3 Group 4 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
0.7 
0.82 
1.52 
1 
5 
6 
.7 
.16 
4.27* .09 
S4 Group 1 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
4.8 
13.14 
17.95 
1 
26 
27 
4.8 
.51 
9.5*** .005 
S5 Group 1 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
2.97 
7.39 
10.35 
1 
17 
18 
2.97 
.43 
6.8** .02 
S6 Choice 1 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
3.98 
5.93 
9.91 
1 
11 
12 
3.98 
.54 
7.38** .02 
S7 Group 4 Principles Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
2.28 
2.27 
4.55 
1 
7 
8 
2.28 
.32 
7.03** .03 
No gender difference was detected for scenario eight: Serving customers.  
ANOVA analysis evaluating the difference between the rules scores of males and 
females showed significant interaction between gender and context. For instance, in 
scenario one: there was a significant rules score difference between males (M=2.7, 
                                                 
78
 Single respondent 
79
 Grouped by scenario choices from 1-4. 
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SD= 0.7) and females (M= 3.2, SD= 0.9) for group 2, F (1, 32) = 3.16, p=.08 
significant at 90% confident level. Out of the seven scenarios that show significant 
differences, scenario seven was the only one in which the disposition to principles 
was significantly different for people in group 4 between males and females, F (1, 8) 
=2.28, p=0.03. Nonetheless, one needs to be cautious in interpreting this result due to 
the limited sample size (n=9) in group 4.  
Figure 24 Gender choice distributions across eight scenarios 
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The graphs showed the sample sizes of different scenario choice for males and 
females across eight scenarios. 
Table 62 Regression model for gender and DRP 
Scenario Overall F (Sig) ∆R2 Male 
β 
Female 
β 
 Male Female Male Female Rule 
Scores 
Principle 
score 
Rule 
score 
Principle 
score 
S1: Approach on 
Financial 
reporting 
3.48** 2.0 10% 5% .27* -.20 .28 -.22 
S2: Managing 
own fitness 
regime  
6.55*** .6 20% 3% .41*** -.18 .16 -.11 
S3:Approach on 
researching 
takeover targets 
10.2*** .4 30% 3% .44*** -.28** .06 -.16 
S4: Managing 
one’s own work-
life balance  
5.6*** .4 17% 3% .41*** -.13 .16 -.05 
S5: Managing 
one’s own flat 
cleaning rota 
5.1*** 1.8 16% 4% .25* -.31** -.04 -.30* 
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S6: Approach on 
allocating 
financial loans  
6.2*** 2.1 20% 6% .41*** -.16 .08 -.34** 
S7: Approach on 
ensuring health 
and safety 
4.0** 1.2 12% 1% .16 -.34** .25 .05 
S8: Approach on 
ensuring 
customer 
satisfaction 
8.7*** 3.2** 26% 11% .37*** -.32** .26 -.35** 
Scenario average 16.1*** 3.1** 41% 10% .49*** -.35*** .27 -.33** 
As expected, the regression results showed that there were gender differences in the 
interaction between DRP scores and BI as evidenced by scenario responses: The DRP 
predicts male behaviour better than the female behaviour. The DRP scores 
collectively explained a large 41% of male BI, while only 10% for female BI. In other 
words, contextual cues activated males and females dispositions to rules and 
principles to different degrees. Men tend to be more consistent with their dispositions 
towards rules and principles and stick with such dispositions across contexts. In 
particular, the ANOVA results showed that the more rules-oriented a male is, the 
more likely he would stick to a rules-based approach. Women, on the other hand, are 
more sensitive to contextual cues and therefore, the impact of their dispositions on 
behaviour was relatively weaker than for men, instead, their rules and principles 
related BI are more likely to be dictated by contexts. The small predicted variance 
obtained for the female participants, however should not be regarded as a reason to 
dismiss the predictive validity of DRP entirely for women. Rather it is possible that 
the measurement would be valid and reliable for women in some specific contexts.   
My overall result appears to fit the gender differences postulated by the contemporary 
research in psychology, that women will ‘compromise’ their principles according to 
the contexts; they are more sensitive to the contextual cues. One explanation for the 
current result offered by the self-efficacy literature is that women may feel less 
powerful and have less objective power in organisational settings. In other words, 
they encompass lower self-efficacy and have less self-confidence. Another possible 
explanation is that women are more adaptable and agreeable to others and their 
surroundings (Chapman et al., 2007). Moreover, they are more nurturing and co-
operative in teams and organisations than men (Huang, 2002). As a result of these two 
combinations, women are better at reading the complex contextual cues as tested in 
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our social tasks than men. This made them to be more mindful about the contexts 
rather than sticking to their dispositions as men do. 
9.19.4 Ethnicity differences analysis  
A one way-ANOVA was carried out to determine whether or not the White group 
differed from the Asian group in relation to their DRP scores with respect cognitive 
tasks. The results supported the presumption that there is a cultural difference in the 
way people response to rules- and principles-based contexts. Sample size: n= 80, 
missing data n= 3, other backgrounds (mixed or Black), n=6, excluded from analysis. 
The Western group (including all EU countries, USA) was coded as 1, n=36; The 
Asian group (including Chinese, Pakistani, Indian, Japanese, Korean) was coded as 2, 
n=44.  
Table 63 The Mean comparisons for rules scores between two ethnic groups 
The Mean comparisons for rules scores between Western and Asian group   
 Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 
 Western Asian Western Asian Western Asian Western Asian 
S1 3.1 
(SD:0.66) 
2.8 
(SD:0.89) 
2.6 
(SD:0.74) 
3.28 
(SD:0.83) 
3 
(SD:0.56) 
3.75 
(SD:0.54) 
3.2 
(SD:0.28) 
3.4 
(SD:0.49) 
S2 2.4 
(SD:0.6) 
3.26 
(SD:0.89) 
2.75 
(SD:0.71) 
3.5 
(SD:0.80) 
3.11 
(SD:0.50) 
3.32 
(SD:0.62) 
3.45 
(SD:0.41) 
3.57 
(SD:0.61) 
S3 2.55 
(SD:0.97) 
3.47 
(SD:1.2) 
2.6 
(SD:0.65) 
3.34 
(SD:0.85) 
3.11 
(SD:0.36) 
3.4 
(SD:0.59) 
3.4 
(SD:0.52) 
4
80
 
   (0000) 
S4 2.8 
(SD:0.76) 
3.1 
(SD:0.88) 
2.9 
(SD:0.71) 
3.5 
(SD:0.52) 
2.8 
(SD:0.6) 
3.4 
(SD:0.8) 
3.1 
(SD:0.2) 
3.8 
(SD:0.7) 
S5 2.7 
(SD:0.6) 
3.4 
(SD:0.7) 
2.8 
(SD:0.8) 
3.6 
(SD:0.8) 
2.7 
(SD:0.7) 
3.3 
(SD:0.8) 
3.2 
(SD:0.5) 
3.3 
(SD:0.7) 
S6 2.6 
(SD:0.8) 
3.1 
(SD:1.0) 
2.8 
(SD:0.6) 
3.6 
(SD:0.7) 
3.5 
(SD:0.7) 
3.3 
(SD:0.7) 
3
81
 
(SD:1.0) 
3.8 
(SD:0.3) 
S7 2.5 
(SD:0.6) 
3.4 
(SD:0.8) 
2.9 
(SD:0.7) 
3.3 
(SD:0.8) 
3.1 
(SD:0.6) 
3.4 
(SD:0.8) 
2.9 
(SD:0.5) 
3.7 
(SD:0.6) 
S8 2.6 
(SD:0.7) 
2.9 
(SD:1.0) 
2.7 
(SD:0.7) 
3.3 
(SD:0.8) 
3.0 
(SD:0.6) 
3.7 
(SD:0.5) 
3.5 
(SD:0.4) 
3.4 
(SD:0.5) 
 
                                                 
80
 Two respondents 
81
 Two respondents 
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Table 64 The Mean comparisons for principles scores between two ethnic groups 
The Mean comparisons for principles scores between Western and Asian group   
 Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 
 Western Asian Western Asian Western Asian Western Asian 
S1 3.5 
(SD:0.53) 
3.68 
(SD:1.0) 
3.84 
(SD:0.45) 
3.59 
(SD:0.55) 
3.55 
(SD:0.73) 
3.72 
(SD:0.47) 
3.4 
(SD:0.85) 
3.06 
(SD:0.54) 
S2 3.78 
(SD:0.68) 
3.62 
(SD:0.7) 
3.72 
(SD:0.67) 
3.79 
(SD:0.46) 
3.51 
(SD:0.49) 
3.53 
(SD:0.47) 
3.75 
(SD:0.19) 
2.9 
(SD:0.79) 
S3 4.35 
(SD:0.55) 
4.2 
(SD:0.35) 
3.66 
(SD:0.65) 
3.52 
(SD:0.69) 
3.5 
(SD:0.35) 
3.68 
(SD:0.45) 
3.6 
(SD:0.46) 
2.8
82
 
(0000) 
S4 3.9 
(SD:0.5) 
3.5 
(SD:0.8) 
3.5 
(SD:0.7) 
3.7 
(SD:0.5) 
3.7 
(SD:0.6) 
3.5 
(SD:0.5) 
3.7 
(SD:0.2) 
3.4 
(SD:0.9) 
S5 4.0 
(SD:0.6) 
3.9 
(SD:0.6) 
3.5 
(SD:0.6) 
3.7 
(SD:0.5) 
4.0 
(SD:0.3) 
3.6 
(SD:0.5) 
3.5 
(SD:0.5) 
3.2 
(SD:0.7) 
S6 4.2 
(SD:0.6) 
3.6 
(SD:1.0) 
3.6 
(SD:0.6) 
3.8 
(SD:0.4) 
3.7 
(SD:0.1) 
3.4 
(SD:0.6) 
3.7 
(SD:0.4) 
3 
(SD:1.4) 
S7 4.1 
(SD:0.5) 
3.8 
(SD:0.7) 
3.5 
(SD:0.6) 
3.4 
(SD:0.6) 
3.6 
(SD:0.4) 
3.7 
(SD:0.5) 
3.6 
(SD:0.5) 
3.2 
(SD:0.9) 
S8 4.1 
(SD:0.53) 
3.8 
(SD:1.0) 
3.7 
(SD:0.5) 
3.7 
(SD:0.4) 
3.5 
(SD:0.6) 
3.4 
(SD:0.6) 
3.4 
(SD:0.5) 
3.1 
(SD:0.9) 
The mean comparison tables between Western and Asian groups showed that in 
general, Asian participants had higher rules scores than Western participants.   
ANOVA analysis is to show whether the mean differences would be statistically 
significant.  
Table 65 ANOVA analysis between two ethnic groups 
 Scenario 
Choice
83
 
DRP  Sum of 
squares  
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
S1 Group 2 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
3.8 
20.4 
24.2 
1 
33 
34 
3.8 
.62 
6.16** .02 
Group 3 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
3.72 
7.56 
11.28 
1 
25 
26 
3.72 
.30 
12.30*** .002 
S2 Group 1 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
3.29 
9.76 
13.15 
1 
16 
17 
3.29 
.61 
5.4** .03 
S3 Group 2 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
5.19 
20.81 
26 
1 
36 
37 
5.19 
.58 
8.98*** .005 
S4 Choice 2 Rules Between groups 2.8 1 2.8 7.3*** .01 
                                                 
82
 Two respondents 
83
 Grouped by scenario choice from 1-4. 
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Within Groups 
Total 
10.3 
13.1 
27 
28 
.4 
S5 Group 1 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
2.1 
6.1 
8.2 
1 
14 
15 
2.1 
0.4 
4.9** .05 
S6 Group 2 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
5.7 
18.2 
23.9 
1 
41 
42 
5.7 
.4 
12.9*** .001 
Group 4 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.64 
.1 
.74 
1 
2 
3 
.64 
.04 
16* .06 
S7 Group 1 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
2.7 
6.2 
8.9 
1 
13 
14 
2.7 
.5 
5.7** .03 
 Group 4 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
1.5 
2.2 
3.7 
1 
7 
8 
1.5 
.3 
4.7* .07 
S8 Choice 3 Rules Between groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
3.1 
7.0 
10.1 
1 
23 
24 
3.0 
.3 
10.1*** .004 
The ANOVA analysis showed that rules scores differed significantly between the 
Western and the Asian groups across scenarios. For instance, in scenarios one: the 
Asian group had a significant higher rules score than the Western group in both group 
2 and group 3, F (1, 33) = 6.16, p= .02 significant at 95% confident level.  
Figure 25 Ethnic choice distributions across eight scenarios 
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Table 66 Regression analysis for ethnicity and DRP 
Scenario Overall F (Sig) ∆R
2
 Western 
β 
Asian 
β 
 Western Asian Western Asian Rules 
Scores 
Principl
es 
score 
Rules 
score 
Principl
es 
score 
S1: Approach on 
Financial 
reporting 
.5 3.6** 3% 11% .1 -.1 .33** -.27* 
S2: Managing 
own fitness 
regime  
5.2*** 3.1** 19% 9% .50*** .01 .13 -.36** 
S3:Approach on 
researching 
takeover targets 
5.9*** 1.8 22% 3% .42*** -.22 .14 -.27* 
S5: Managing 
one’s own flat 
cleaning rota 
2 3.4** 6% 10% .2 -.2 -.1 -.35** 
S6: Approach on 
allocating 
financial loans  
1.4 2 8% 9% .22 -.13 .1 -.30* 
S8: Approach on 
ensuring 
customer 
satisfaction 
4.7** 5*** 22% 20% .32** -.29* .31** -.37** 
Scenario average 7.0*** 6*** 25% 19% .42*** .29* .26* -.44*** 
The result of the regression analysis on Western vs. Asian group showed that DRP 
scores predicted well for both cultural groups (t were significant for all scenarios apart 
from scenario four and seven). The overall result suggests that both rules and 
principles scores contribute significantly to Western and Asian groups’ responses to 
rules- and principles-based cognitive tasks: the ∆R2 are 25% for Western group, and 
19% for Asian group. The comparison between the ∆R2 revealed that DRP scores 
could possibly predict BI better for the Western participants than for the participants 
from Asian background. In other words, the Westerners are more logical and 
consistent with injunctive norms (such as rules and principles) in their decision-
making (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009).  In contrast, Asians are more context-driven, 
in the sense that they watch the external cues closely and are flexible to modify their 
approaches to suit the actual situation and pragmatism (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). 
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For instance, using Twenty Statements Test (TST), it has been found that the East 
Asians participants modified their view of the self to reflect the context they were in 
(Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009).  
9.19.5 Summary: demographic variables in relation to context 
Personal variables such as gender and ethnicity have significant impacts on the 
interaction between one’s DRP scores, in particular the rules scores and their BI 
across contexts. Both rules and principles were useful predictors in decision-making 
involving rules and principles. Results from regression models however, showed that 
DRP scores were particularly powerful predictors for men and Westerners. On the 
other hand, the impact of dispositions towards rules and principles is less powerful for 
women and Asians. This might be explained by the fact that the BI of women and 
Asians are more contexts driven (Buchtel & Norenzayan, 2009; Gilligan, 1982). In 
addition, the examination of the DRP scores of each ethnic group confirmed that on 
the whole, Asians had significantly higher rules scores than Westerners, as suggested 
by prior research (Hofstede, 1997).  
The analysis for all three demographic variables showed that the Durbin-Watson 
statistics only drops below the critical value of 1.0 in two scenarios out of eight, more 
importantly the rest of six Durbin-Watson statistics were close to 2. Thus our method 
of analysing the data was acceptable. 
9.20 Conclusion and summary of chapter nine 
In this chapter, I have reported and presented the process to further refine the DRP 
instrument, on a diverse international sample (n=474). The principle component 
analysis confirmed that the instrument comprised two clear factors whilst explained 
46% of total variance. The present 10 items DRP has good internal reliability and a 
test-re test score showed that such disposition is stable and consistent over time. DRP 
is significantly correlated to conceptually relevant psychological constructs such as 
openness, extraversion of the Big5 personality traits, need for closure and various 
thinking styles as measured by Sternberg’s thinking style. The correlations were small 
to moderate indicating that DRP is not a replicate to any of these applied 
266 
 
266 
 
measurements. Meanwhile, DRP had marginal or poor correlation with constructs 
such as Higgins’ regulatory orientation, social desirability scale, and dialectical self-
scale, this showed that DRP measures a distinctive constructs.  
DRP scores are able to predict individuals’ BI with sound accuracy and consistency 
across contexts. A predominantly rules-oriented individual tends to be drawn to a 
more rules-based approach; whereas, a predominately principles-oriented individual 
will be more attracted to a more principles-based approach. The overall results 
suggested that DRP does have significant predictive power and people tend to strive 
to be congruent in their BI as reflected in the scenario scores with their internal 
predispositions. Although DRP as an instrument is gender, ethnic and age neutral, I 
found that there were significant gender and ethnicity differences when using the DRP 
scores to predict BI. The gender and ethnicity differences in the interaction between 
one’s DRP scores and context are not a reflection of the intellectual competence or 
capabilities; instead they reflect differences in behavioural preferences/ styles. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion and future thoughts 
10.1 Overview  
The main objectives of this final chapter are to provide a brief review of the project, 
reflecting on the main findings arising from the empirical work, and on the main 
contributions, in context of the research objectives set at the outset. This chapter will 
also provide a more critical evaluation of the strengths and limitations of the different 
methods employed, and more importantly an extension of this discussion to address 
what these limitations imply for the validity and reliability of the finding of the 
project has produced. This chapter will also identify the implications and 
contributions of the work. Moreover, it offers some recommendations for further 
research that could make use of, or become possible because of, the psychometric 
instrument - DRP, developed here.  
The empirical work of this PhD is geared to the development and validation of a 
psychometric instrument. I have documented and reported the empirical work and 
outcomes in detail in chapter eight and nine. Therefore, in this final chapter my 
reflection on the empirical findings will focus on how they bear on the research 
questions proposed in chapter one (section 1.5). For a summary of the relation of 
research questions and findings see table 63. 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 10.2 provides a summary of the empirical 
findings; section 10.3 provides a critical evaluation of the research methods adopted 
here; section 10.4 discusses the contributions of the research; section 10.5 speculates 
on the implications of this project; section 10.6 provides some thoughts on the further 
work can be done with the instrument. Section 10.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
10.2 Summary of the findings 
I developed and validated a psychometric instrument to measure individual’s 
dispositions towards rules and principles. The development of the instrument was 
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theory driven (see chapter seven). The final refined scale comprises 10 items: five 
items for measuring dispositions for rules and five items for measuring dispositions 
for principles, respectively. These two subscales (rules-based and principles-based 
dispositions) have proven sound psychometric properties in terms of construct validity 
and reliability.  
Table 67 A summary of research findings in response to research questions 
Research questions Section  Results Procedure 
RQ1: Do individuals have (stable) 
dispositions towards Rules and 
Principles? 
(9.5.2) Yes  Test-retest of the rules and principles 
scales.  
RQ2: Are individuals’ dispositions 
towards rules and principles 
independent and distinctive? In other 
words, does the relationship between 
individuals’ dispositions towards 
rules and principles tend to be 
orthogonal? 
(8.4.5) 
(9.6) 
Yes There is a weak relationship between 
rules and principle sub-scales, 
indicating they are independent from 
each other.  
RQ3: What are the conceptual 
structure generally underlying 
individuals’ dispositions to rules and 
principles (DRP)? 
(9.4) Identificati
on of a 2 
factor 
structure 
A 2 factors structure emerged from the 
data analysis. The factors are: 
preferences for rules; preferences for 
principles.  
RQ4: Are dispositions towards rules 
and principles predictive of 
individuals’ actual behaviour in 
response to rules or principles-based 
social cognitive tasks / situations? 
(9.15) 
(9.16) 
Yes  Predominately rules-oriented 
individual would be more likely to 
choose a rules-based approach across 
contexts rather than a principles-based 
approach; and, vice versa for a 
predominately principles-oriented 
individual.  
RQ5: Do DRP scores have a 
meaningful and expected relation 
with individuals’ other 
psychological characteristics, and 
relevant measurements, such as 
thinking style and personality trait 
measures? 
Chapter 
9, part 2 
Yes The overall conclusion is that the DRP 
instrument captures distinct 
psychological constructs. This 
conclusion was supported by the fact 
that DRP instrument was correlated 
with psychological constructs it 
related to more significantly than the 
ones it supposed not to.  
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RQ6: Are there any gender and 
cultural differences in terms of 
individuals’ dispositions to rules and 
principles? 
(9.7) 
(9.19) 
Yes  The instrument is gender and age 
neutral and does not discriminate 
people from different ethnic groups. 
However, I did found that gender and 
ethnicity have effects on the 
interaction between one’s DRP scores 
and contexts. 
RQ1: Do individuals have (stable) dispositions towards Rules and Principles?  
Test-retest reliability analysis with 30 Glasgow University full time students found 
that over a period of three months, both rules and principles subscales have significant 
correlations with the scores obtained in the first attempt. This part of the work proved 
that dispositions towards rules and principals are stable across time. 
RQ2: Are individuals’ dispositions towards rules and principles independent and distinctive? 
In other words, does the relationship between individuals’ dispositions towards rules and 
principles tend to be orthogonal? 
The conceptualisations of rules and principles studied in this project were based on 
Dworkin’s view (1979; see chapter four, section 4.4). Prior research consisted mainly 
of conceptual discussions on the pros and cons of rules and principles. In particular, 
there was not yet, to my knowledge, any direct empirical testing of individuals’ views 
of rules and principles and whether their views were in line with, for instance, 
Dworkin’s conceptualisation. More detail on criticisms of Dworkin’s rules and 
principles conceptualisation can be found in chapter four, section 4.5. My extensive 
qualitative research, including focus group discussions (section 6.6), peer groups and 
subject expert review sessions, examined Dworkin’s views of rules and principles. 
The discussions provided some direct, although preliminary, empirical evidence 
supporting the view that individuals view rules and principles as separate constructs, 
rather than as points on a continuum separate in degree, and that their views on the 
nature of a principle are, by and large, consistent with Dworkin’s view. 
Chapter eight (section, 8.4.5) reports on how I conducted a test on people's ability to 
distinguish rules from principles based on Dworkin’s conceptualisation. The overall 
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result across nine statements showed that individuals were capable of distinguishing 
rules from principles, and the basis of their judgment is in agreement with the 
conceptual distinctions between rules and principles as postulated by Dworkin 
(chapter four).  
In section 9.6, I reported the results of Pearson and Spearman’s Rho correlation 
between the DRP’s rules and principles scores of a large sample (n=474). While a 
weakly significant but marginal correlation of 12% was obtained in Pearson test, 
Spearman’s Rho showed that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between disposition to rules and principles. The overall result lends empirical 
evidence for the orthogonal relationship between rules and principles.  
RQ3: What are the conceptual structure generally underlying individuals’ dispositions to rules 
and principles (DRP)? 
Section 9.4 showed a factor analysis solution of the DRP. That result confirmed that 
previous factor solution emerged in chapter eight, section 8.6.3. There were two 
distinctive and dominant factors underlying the construct: preference for rules and 
preference for principles. The interpretation of the two factors can be found in section 
9.4.1. 
RQ4: Are dispositions towards rules and principles predictive of individuals’ actual behaviour 
in response to rules or principles-based social cognitive tasks / situations? 
A series of statistical analysis was conducted between the rules and principles scores 
and the scores of the eight scenarios: correlation analysis (9.15.1); one-way ANOVA 
(9.16), multiple regression analysis (9.15.2). The findings were consistent across all 
methods: the DRP has sound predictive validity (chapter 9 part 3). DPR is able to 
predict individual’s BIs in terms of choosing either rules or principles-based 
approaches in cognitive tasks. The ∆R2 for the average scenario score is 27%, which 
is comparable to the published research in the field of attitudes and behaviour 
prediction (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977).  
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RQ5: Do DRP scores have a meaningful and expected relation with individuals’ other 
psychological characteristics, and relevant measurements, such as thinking style and 
personality trait measures? 
A detailed discussion in response to RQ5 can be found in chapter 9, part 2. The 
convergent and divergent validity of the DRP have been examined and established. 
DRP correlated more strongly with cognitive styles such as the need for closure and 
some dimensions of the Sternberg’s thinking style, than it’s with personality traits 
such as openness, extraversion as well as the agreeableness. As a result, with caution, 
I interpret that dispositions towards rules and principles should be viewed more as a 
cognitive style rather than a personality trait. Future empirical work may investigate 
the relationships between the DRP and other psychological constructs such as Rest’s 
moral reasoning capability.  
RQ6: Are there any gender and cultural differences in terms of individuals’ dispositions to 
rules and principles? 
With regard to RQ6, the instrument itself is gender and age neutral and does not 
discriminate people from different ethnic backgrounds (section, 9.7). However, I 
found that demographic variables such as gender and ethnicity have effects on the 
interaction between people’s DRP scores and their scenario choices (chap nine, 
section 9.19). Furthermore, when using DRP scores to predict BI, I found that men are 
more stable than women in their choice of a rules- or principles-based approach. At 
the same time their BIs are better predicted by their dispositions towards rules and 
principles (∆R2 is 41%). Consistent with prior research (Neff, 2003; Gilligan, 1982), 
women on the other hand, are more responsive to the contextual cues. That is, the 
impact of their dispositions on BIs was relatively weaker than for men (∆R2 is 10%). 
When using the DRP instrument to predict Western and Chinese groups’ behavioural 
choices in relation to rules- or principles-based approaches, I found that overall, the 
Asian group had significant higher rule scores than the Western group. More 
importantly, the regression model revealed that Westerners behaved more consistently 
with their DRP’s rules and principles scores (section 9.19.4: ∆R2 is 25%). In other 
words, the East Asian respondents seem to be more context sensitive and less 
272 
 
272 
 
governed by an internal disposition (∆R2 is 19%). Such a cultural behavioural 
difference might be explored from the point of view of the difference between 
analytical and holistic thinking patterns (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). Spencer-
Rodgers et al (2009, p.30) reviewed a number of prior studies on cross-situational 
consistency of the self-concept, and they conclude that East Asian hold more 
‘context-specific’ self-beliefs and perceptions. To illustrate, Nisbett et al. (2001) 
found that East Asian would be more flexible and willing to adjust their self-beliefs 
according to situational cues. In contrast, Westerners are more consistent in their 
internal disposition and BIs, this shows in their tendency of more linear in thinking 
and higher ‘need for consonance’ (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009).  
10.3 Critical assessment of the methods applied  
10.3.1 A positivist stance   
As any other research projects, this current work also inevitably suffers some 
problems due to the research methods it has adopted. In the following section, a 
critical assessment to the strengths and limitations of the different research methods 
employed will be provided. More importantly, an extension of this discussion will 
address what these limitations imply for the validity and reliability of the findings, 
this PhD has produced.  
The research is conducted pre-dominantly within a positivist paradigm. Therefore a 
quantitative survey method was adopted as the main research method. In chapter two 
and eight, I have explained the rationales for adopting such a method as it allows 
efficient data collection and ensures high accuracy in data input. Consequently, data 
analysis process can be more accurate and efficient. Furthermore, the use of online 
format allows obtaining quantitative data from a large number of people.  
The limitations of an online-based survey approach are: 1) it dismisses the rich 
contextualised interpretation of the research phenomenon that is under investigation; 
2) in this project, participants were left to complete the survey in their own time in the 
locations of their convenience. In other words, the completion of the online survey 
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was without the supervision of the researcher. It is well known that the internet has a 
large amount of information and my survey was competing for the participants’ 
attention online. Thus, it was suggested that a more tightly controlled experimental 
environment would give more concentrated responses, hence better statistical results.  
This research is not entirely positivistic, since it has also benefited from employing 
qualitative methods such as focus groups and subject matter experts interviews 
especially at the early stage of item generation. Ping (2004) for instance, notes that 
“…focus groups can reveal the specific language the study population uses to 
communicate regarding these constructs. This information is then used to improve the 
phrasing of the item stems, and thus reduce measurement error.” (p.134). Therefore, 
the use of focus groups has facilitated a more accurate instrument calibration for this 
project. 
Due to lack of an instrument that taps into the exact same psychological constructs, 
the construction of the items for the DRP instrument was mainly theory-driven. 
Theory-driven constructs pay dividends in terms of face validity and operational 
guidance. The terms used to characterise dimensions underlying rules and principles 
therefore, represent more than merely lexical preferences. As a result, it could be that 
some items are not written as clearly as they could have been. But again, many 
confusing and ambiguous items were filtered out via subject-matter expert’s review 
and peer review panels at early stage. In total, the whole set of items have been 
piloted on more than 30 people before it went public. This empirical approach was 
therefore capable of yielding a description of the measured construct unbiased by my 
own blind spots.  
10.3.2 Using hypothetical scenarios to proxy BI 
The predictive validity of DRP was determined by assessing participants’ likelihood 
to perform certain actions by rules- and principles-based approaches, not their actual 
behaviours or abilities to performances in those situations. Thus, a potential limitation 
of the current study was that BI was measured by a vignettes-based approach instead 
of actual decision-making and or problem-solving using rules or principles. This 
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limitation can be addressed through further research, for instance, experiments on 
actual accounting decision-making involving rules and principles-based approach. 
Vignettes are “stories about individuals and situations which make reference to 
important points in the study of perceptions, beliefs and attitudes” (Hughes, 1998, p. 
381 cited by Leighton, 2010, p.234). Some studies have concluded that people 
respond to vignettes in much the same way as they would if faced with a real life 
situation (Leighton, 2010, p.234) and that respondents are less likely to give socially 
acceptable responses than if asked directly (Leighton, 2010, p.234). 
Further advantages of using vignettes within this context include: 
• They do not require participants to have in-depth or technical knowledge of 
topics and provides a focus for those without any working experiences.  
• They offer a useful tool to highlight people’s experiences with using rules and 
principles in daily decision-making and problem-solving.  
Perhaps the biggest methodological questions for those using vignettes in quantitative 
research have been about validity (Flaskerud, 1979 cited by Wilks, 2004, p.82). In 
other words, how far the situation depicted in a vignette genuinely represents the 
phenomenon being explored (Wilks, 2004, p.82). The common remedy for that is to 
have experts who are not the target subjects of the study to ‘pilot’ the scenarios to 
check the ‘realness’ of the hypothetical account presented (Leighton, 2010, p.235). 
For this project, all eight scenarios were submitted to both two PhD supervisors to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the contents.  
In this research, a spectrum of real-life based scenarios was constructed which ranges 
from one’s social life, flat cleaning to professional settings such as financial reporting; 
student loans allocation; customer services etc. The potential advantage of such wide 
range of social conditions is that dispositions towards rules and principles can be 
investigated across varied contexts. A potential drawback of using several vignettes is 
that respondents may not answer all the vignettes. In this study, 89 participants had 
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completed all eight vignettes. The speculated reason for it was probably due to the 
relevance and comprehensiveness of the scenarios.  
10.3.3 Using test-retest in validating reliability 
Disposition to rules and principles are hypothesised to be stable over time. Thus, test-
retest reliability was adopted to demonstrate this. However, the test retest reliability 
was limited by: 1) access to data sources; 2) memory biases for instance: the memory 
of the first attempt of the administration may influence the second (Eysenck 1994)
84
; 
3) the result may also deflate as the people views and or experiences with the test 
subject has changed substantially over the period during two administrations; 4) 
participants may not be as careful when completing the instrument a second time.  
Another potential criticism to the test retest method is that the time intervals for an 
instrument are subjective: ranging from a few hours to as long as 6 month after the 
initial testing. However, two weeks to one month is generally considered as 
acceptable for re-testing (Waltz et al., 2005 cited by Devon et al, 2007, p. 160). The 
chosen the time interval should be long enough that participants do not remember 
their original answers, but not long enough for their attitudes to the material to have 
changed. A three months period has been chosen for this purpose, and the results have 
supported the RQ1.  
Besides the use of test-retest reliability, I have also used Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
to show internal consistency reliability. It is the prevalent methods used in field of 
questionnaire development and validation. The benefits of Cronbach’s alpha include: 
it can be performed with single test administration, requiring less efforts than methods 
such as split half, test-retest (Devon, et al., 2007). Moreover, it is the best estimate of 
reliability because most major sources of error are due to the sampling of instrument 
contents (Nunally, 1967). The potential problem with this measure is that an inflated 
alpha can be achieved by simply adding more items into the scale (Rattrary et al., 
                                                 
84
 The result may inflate as participants remember how they responded to items on the first 
administration and simply answer that way again.  
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2007). Thus, in this current project, coefficient alpha was computed for rules and 
principles subscales distinctly rather than for the entire scale. 
For future research, it is suggested that the current instrument should be re-tested in a 
variety of settings and with different samples to assess how far groups of people are 
able to use the DRP.  
10.3.4 The sample and sampling method  
Finally, from a sampling perspective, due to budget and time constrain, this project 
used a convenience sampling approach. The convenience sample primarily included a 
significant proportion of young adults who are students in their mid and late twenties. 
Such way of sampling may suffer coverage ‘error’ (Dillman, 2000) or sample 
selection bias which may compromise population inferences (Tomaskovic-Devey et 
al., 1994). However, it is believed that this is a practical limitation that all research 
has to face. Ashton & Karmer (1980) experiments showed that when study judgment 
in general for practical situations, using students as surrogates is justifiable. 
Nonetheless, if the objective of the study is the specific implementation of an 
accounting standard, then it is desirable to have practitioners as subjects.  
I realise that a more diverse set of age ranges of the participants and a more 
randomised sampling procedure could have been adopted to improve the validity of 
the exploratory study. As a result, the generalisability of the findings might be 
restricted to some extent. Therefore, there is room for improvement. Thus, further 
research is also recommended to be conducted with different groups of people in 
order to ascertain whether similar results would be achieved. For instance, for further 
research opportunities: the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) has 
kindly agreed to let us  access its members via a mailing-list In this way, I could 
conduct further empirical research using accounting practitioners as subjects.  
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10.4 Contribution 
The development of an instrument that can psychometrically measure individuals’ 
dispositions to rules and principles is a very ambitious project. In addition, the 
research is located in an interdisciplinary space, between accounting, legal philosophy 
and regulation theory, and psychology, more importantly, where there is relatively 
little empirical work to guide it, as compared with PhD projects more unilaterally 
located in traditionally heavily researched accounting topics. Another factor which 
made this project challenging was that the project took the research student beyond 
the ground of her basic training in accounting and law, into areas of psychology, as 
for the purpose of the research she had to read and follow the theories and 
methodological procedures in the psychological literature. Despite these challenges, 
this PhD has achieved what it set out to achieve and was able to make some 
considerable contributions to both the theories and practices within the accounting 
regulatory reform arena and beyond. One primary outcome of this PhD is to have 
produced an instrument that is general enough to explore a large variety of possible 
theoretical and practical problems, not just confined in the domain of accounting and 
finance. 
10.4.1 Contribution to the theory  
That conceptual confusion abounds amongst researchers can be seen consistently in 
the publications of rules vs. principles debate (Hail et al., 2010). For the first time, this 
project advances the rules and principles debate research paradigm from a conceptual 
to an empirical domain, in the form of the individuals’ dispositions to rules and 
principles measurement that is the DRP instrument. Principally, this current research 
has tested and supported Dworkin’s paradigm on rules and principles debate. This 
specifically related to the conceptualisations of rules and principles (1979; see chapter 
4, section 4.4 for more details) where more conceptually-oriented approach 
predominate. In addition, adopting an interdisciplinary approach and advancing the 
rules and principles debate literature via the adoption of a mixed methods approach 
are also considered original theoretical contributions of this kind.  
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10.4.2 The potential value of the DRP in behavioural accounting research 
Becker (1967) distinguishes behaviour accounting research from other forms of 
accounting research by suggesting that behavioural research applies theories and 
methodologies from behavioral sciences to take into account the characteristics of 
practitioners on accounting information processing. On the basis of this view, the 
current instrument can potentially make a considerable contribution to the academic 
research in the field of behavioural research in relation to rules- and principles-based 
regulation. In fact, the prior lack of these measurements may be one of reasons why 
progress has been static in studies of variation of practitioners’ behaviour in relation 
to different types of regulations in accounting and auditing. I believe that this PhD 
work will provide a stimulus for future research along the lines of rules and principles 
related behaviour in accounting and auditing. The current research was driven by a 
relatively new research focus: ‘fit’ effect between the type of the accounting 
regulation (rules vs. principles) and the type of the practitioners (rules vs. principles) 
(Herron & Gilbertson, 2004; Jamal & Tan, 2008; 2010; see chapter 1, section 1.4). 
DRP instrument can be applied in areas examining the interplay (fit vs. misfit) 
between the nature of the accounting/ financial regulations and the information 
processing and judgement of the users. The ‘fit’ effect is worth pursuing as 
researchers have argued that when there is a fit present between the type of 
accounting regulation and dispositions of the individuals, a higher level of ethical 
reasoning might be produced (Abdlmohammadi et al., 2009; Herron & Gilbertson, 
2004; Jamal & Tan, 2008; 2010).  
10.4.3 Understanding accountants psychological profile  
Within the domain of social psychology, rules and principles are often implied to 
being linked to stable personal characteristics (need for closure, some dimensions of 
the thinking styles as well as some of the traits from the Big5 personality trait model). 
However the presumptions lack clear empirical evidence. This PhD unprecedentedly 
attempted to explore these psychological linkages and provided empirical responses to 
these presumptions. Psychometric profiling of the individuals will help to determine 
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whether predominate rules / principles-based individuals will display systemically 
different characters as indicated by other psychological constructs. 
Wheeler (2001) calls for more empirical research to be carried out to investigate the 
personality of accounting students and professionals, to “better understand the 
personality traits of the individuals who make up the profession and how that affect 
their performance” (Haynes, et al. 2008, p.82). Moreover, it is also important to “be 
aware how they might compare with the patterns of people of other disciplines” 
(Brown, 2006, p.302). 
Booth and Winzar (1993, p.114) concluded that accounting students prefer structured 
learning experiences supported by frameworks of rules and concepts; furthermore, 
they do not perform as well with unstructured, ambiguous case or essay questions. 
One view, then, is that the typical accounting professional’s personality fits well with 
a rule oriented construction of the work required in an accounting and auditing 
context. On this view accountants, by personal inclination and training, are thought to 
favour clear rules with the literal text requiring a focus on well specified facts. On the 
other hand, this “typical”85 accountant can be characterized as likely to be less 
comfortable when dealing with less structured (less rule determined) situations, that 
required some balancing of competing considerations and attention to a spectrum of 
relevant information to be considered in a more holistic fashion in light of the abstract 
principles (Maines, Bartov, Fairfield, Iannaconi, Mallett, Schrand, Skinner & Vincent. 
2003; Sullivan, 1992; Korobkin, 2000). 
Conventional research usually applies MBTI for measuring the personality type of the 
accounting professionals. Prior evidence shows that the most common type is the 
‘STJ’ (sensing, thinking and judging) (Stetson, 2007; Wolk & Nikolai, 1997). A STJ 
type of individual fits well with a rules-based construction of the work required in 
auditing and accounting context (Brown, 2006). Despite being a hugely popular 
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  I do not mean to subscribe to a stereotyped view of the accountant, but recognize such views a one 
type of reason underlying some preferences and arguments in respect of the rules versus principles 
question in an accounting context. 
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instrument, MBTI has been suffering low ‘test-retest reliability’. Further, the 
construct validity of the MBTI has been called into question: the psychometric 
properties of MBTI are deemed to be dubious and it has been argued that some 
subscales such as S-N and T-F suffer of low validity
86
. Given the overwhelming 
amount of research that has been done using MBTI for investigating individual 
differences of accounting professionals, generalisability of these findings remains 
limited. DRP allows the study of individual differences beyond personality, and, in 
this respect, it offers a valid and convenient measure. Therefore, there would be 
fruitful future research to be carried out using an alternative instrument such as the 
current DRP.  
10.4.4 Contributing to the gender and ethnicity studies in accounting 
Given the scant evidence in the behavioural accounting research regarding the gender 
and ethnicity differences in terms of decision-making related to accounting / auditing 
issues (Francis, Hasan, Park, &Wu, 2013), the findings of this PhD filled in the void 
by highlighting the differences in behavioural styles of each demographic group when 
predicted by DRP. In the context of the international trend for convergence on a 
global accounting standard, and gender equality at work place, the knowledge of the 
gender and ethnicity differences in relation to dispositions to rules and principles as 
measured by DRP, would help the regulatory bodies to identify different needs of 
each gender, and to develop more effective training strategies or courses to facilitate 
members of different ethnic backgrounds or countries.  
The individuals’ dispositions to rules and principles measurement could potential 
make a contribution to the better understanding and further examination of the 
systemic differences between male and female students in relation to their learning 
styles. Given there are research supporting that male and female seem to have 
distinctive way of perceiving and processing information (Francis, Hasan, Park & 
Wu, 2013) , the course contents of university accounting education tend to be 
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 http://www.psychometric-success.com/personality-tests/personality-tests-popular 
tests.htm#sthash.CrMRfzYj.dpuf accessed on the September of 2013. 
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criticised as being too rules-based and over emphasizing on mastery of the 
calculations rather than helping students to develop skills (DeBerg & Chapman, 2012) 
the knowledge of such would be fed back to lecturers or teachers to help them to 
better appreciate the gender differences and adjust their approaches to these two 
groups.  
10.5 The implications 
10.5.1 Implication of DRP in Accounting research 
Further analysis of behavioural variation in relation to rules and principles will be 
possible now given that researchers have a means to classify people into either rules- 
or principles oriented groups easily. Given that the instrument has reasonable 
predictive power, it can be used in conjunction with experiments where participants 
will be asked to solve real accounting problems and tasks (such as earning 
management, aggressive financial reporting decisions, ethical decision-making). This 
design can answer research questions such as: whether a rules-based auditor will be 
more or less likely to curb earnings management, or whether there are any systematic 
differences between the abilities to curb earning management and between rules-
oriented and principles-oriented auditors. Understanding how practitioners make 
judgments and decisions under conditions of rules and or principles is important to 
suggest remedies. 
10.5.2 Implication of DRP in recruitment and HR 
As recognised in the personality and performance research, there is an ‘attraction’ 
effect/ or ‘pre-selection’, whereby people actively select educational and professional 
experience whose requirements fit with their dispositions and styles (Caspi, Roberts, 
& Shiner, 2005). Individuals experience higher on-job satisfaction and performance 
when there is an alignment between their individual styles and the job criteria (Hogan 
& Holland, 2003). In contrast, individuals will experience more tension and stress 
when there is a ‘misfit’. In this way, the knowledge of one’s rules and principles 
dispositions becomes essential at the recruitment screening stage. It helps to quickly 
identify and group individuals into either 'comfortable with rules' or 'comfortable with 
282 
 
282 
 
principles' groups. Furthermore, appropriate training programs can be developed to 
more quickly create and reinforce those desirable characteristics and reduce the 
effects of those less desirable ones. On the other hand, if high-quality performances 
appears to be triggered by stimulus built into the work setting and tasks, firms (other 
researchers) understand why these ‘embedded contextual triggers’ are effective. This 
is particularly pertinent if an organisation is considering modifying or removing some 
of these contextual cures.  
• Talent screening and selection  
Companies strive to recruit individuals who are good fit to the company culture and 
environment. It is vital for the HR to have a reliable and quick tool to assess people at 
the screening stage and only focus on the candidates who have a natural fit with the 
company culture. DRP can be used in conjunction with other psychometric 
instruments to build a psychological profile of the candidates to help HR to select 
suitable candidates.  
• ‘Fit effect’ between dispositions and the nature of the task 
When there is a ‘fit effect’ between the nature of the task and the dispositions of an 
individual, she/he will experience an increased feeling of enthusiasm and efficacy for 
the task. It is therefore vital to match the right people with the right kind of job.  
• Gender and ethnicity differences  
According to findings of the current PhD, men and women have different behavioural 
styles when it comes to specific contexts in relation to rules and principles. This 
knowledge is useful in identifying any specific needs of females or males when 
working with rules-/ principles-based approach. Allowances may need to be made in 
training for the fact that female practitioners may be more responsive to context than 
male colleagues, in contrast male practitioners may not be as responsive to contextual 
nudges designed to guide their behaviour.   
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A cross-cultural work force is increasingly becoming the norm for major multi-
national organisations. Rules or principles-based approach may not be effective as a 
mean to communicate with Asian people
87
, whereas Westerners may appreciate more 
and learn more effectively from rules and principles. A more context-based approach 
may be more effective to the Asians since they tend to place more attention and 
emphasis on context-specific information (Nisbett et al., 2001; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 
2009).  
10.5.3 Implication of DRP in policy-making 
Dispositions are not necessarily set in the stone, in other words, they may be relatively 
malleable in the sense that appropriate training can either reinforce or deactivate 
certain dispositions (Katz, 1993). This gives rise to the importance of matching the 
forms of the on-job continual training and the mentalities of the accounting 
practitioners. Coglianese and his colleagues highlight this need, by arguing that, 
“many accountants are not sufficiently trained to make the requisite business-based 
judgment calls. Under a principles-based system, many accountants could need to 
undergo significant training to acquire new skills” (2004, p.14).  
As shown in section 9.17, individuals can be identified and categorised into high or 
low groups according to their DRP scores. The highly rules-oriented individuals could 
benefit from a more context-based, inductive training, which builds concepts from the 
specific to the general (Blundell & Booth, 1988, cited by Booth & Winzar, 1993, 
p.114). Such form of training might compensate these people’s cognitive biases such 
as ‘urge’ to ‘freeze’ on information and lower tolerance for ambiguity. For instance, 
tasks involving the generation of hypotheses may benefit from a more principle-based 
approach. Remedies to improve the ability to work with different accounting 
regulations may include: facilitating elements such case studies, problem-solving 
exercises and interactive group works. These tools would be beneficial for training 
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 The test-re test was conducted on a sample mainly comprised local students (British) with a few 
exceptions of Asian participants, the reliability of the DRP for the Asian group is yet to be examined 
separately in a later study. 
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individuals to feel more competent with the use of principles (Brown, 2006). On the 
other hand, highly principle-oriented individuals may also take value from learning to 
approach certain tasks in a more linear, step by step manner. Such an approach deems 
more favourable in situations where keeping records and detailing of voluminous 
administrative information are critical. 
 Implication to other financial services related professions 
The implication of research using DRP instrument also has potential in other financial 
services related professions and roles, beyond the scope of accounting and auditing 
professions, for instance: insurance function, investment banking, and pension fund, 
etc.    
10.6 Future work 
10.6.1 Scale structure  
DRP is still an exploratory instrument requiring further research. The instrument at its 
current state however, is able to measure the individual dispositions towards rules and 
principles reliably. The current factor structure is simple and there could be space for 
a more complex structure. A sophisticated structural equation modelling method 
could be applied to further confirm the internal theoretical structure of the 
questionnaire. Future improvement can also be carried out to investigate the 
correlation between each individual item of the DRP (10 items in total) against the 
scores of predictive tests on a sample mainly comprises professionals.  
10.6.2 Examine the ‘fit & misfit’ effect 
In line with current regulatory reform, future work could explore the fit (misfit) effect 
between person, task and environment. Person variables relate to the rules and 
principles orientation of the decision-maker; Task variables are concerned with 
characteristics of the task: fraud detection vs. administrative documentation for 
instance; environment variable is referred to the conditions and characteristics 
surrounding an individual while she conducts a task: auditing environment vs. 
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taxation environments for instance. Based on the prior findings of the regulatory focus 
theory (more details see chapter one, section 1.4): When there is a fit effect (match) 
between an individual’s preferred mean for goal pursuits and their regulatory 
orientation, the quality of decision-making and or performance tends to be higher than 
when there is a mismatch between these variables. Therefore, the logical hypothesis 
would be when there are matches between person, task and the environment in terms 
of rules and principles orientations (see the figure below) individual practitioner 
would be expected to produce between decisions or performance. In contrast, the 
quality of decision-makings will be lower if there is misfit between these variables.   
Figure 26: The fit effect: framework for experimental studies on the interactions between rules and 
principles and individual judgment and decision-making  
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10.6.3 Examine the ‘priming effect’ 
Dispositions are stable and supposed to be chronic, but it may be induced by context 
temporarily. For instance, by framing the circumstances and their presentations to an 
individual certain orientations may even be deliberately induced; framing effects are 
well explored in ‘regulatory focus’ research (Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002).  
For instance, a principles-oriented individual might be ‘primed’ into more ‘rules-
oriented’ in her approach indecision-making because of the way a task being 
presented to her. In other words, people are responsive to contextual stimulus. In 
chapter nine, section 9.18, it was found that relatively principles-oriented people have 
chosen a rules-based approach in ensuring health and safety in a large organisation; 
this showed that the context (safety and health) seemed to activate a rules-orientation 
in otherwise principles-oriented people. 
10.6.4 Examine the moderating variables 
In addition, variables such as trust and risk-taking might play moderating roles in 
affecting individuals’ behaviours in relations to rules and principles. Subsequently, 
future work could extend the current research by examining the moderating role of 
trust and risk propensity on individuals’ rules and principles dispositions and BIs.  
10.6.5 Using DRP in conjunction with verbal protocols  
Another way to use the DRP in future empirical work will be to use it in conjunction 
with verbal protocols. It is a method which subjects are asked to verbally explain to 
researcher their thought process when they performing a task. For instance, researcher 
could ask an auditor to think aloud while she performs a hypothetical auditing 
problem using rules and principles-based approach. In this way, researcher could 
identify the significant variables that are most likely to account for a large amount of 
variation in one’s decision-making process.   
287 
 
287 
 
10.7 Conclusion 
Accounting regulatory reform remains critical for countries such as United Kingdom, 
which has over half million qualified accountants and students who are studying to 
become qualified accountants, that is nearly the highest number per capita in the 
world and more than the rest of the European Union put together
88
. A disposition to 
be comfortable and competent with either rules or principles may have large 
aggregate effect for the accounting profession, especially regarding the recruitment 
and continuous on-job training. Furthermore, as perhaps evidenced by a series of 
auditing malpractice cases and the recent credit crisis, the one-size fits all approach to 
training and policy design may not be the most effective in terms of getting the best 
out of people. In addition, the number of female accounting professionals entering the 
industry and the number of international students who aim at obtaining an accounting 
degree are growing rapidly. Whilst, the conventional way of conducting accounting 
trainings still treats all the participants homogenously and practitioners are expected 
to behave in uniformity regardless of their gender and/or ethnicity. The empirical 
results from this research highlight the fact that the individual element, and in 
particular dispositions towards rules and principles, should not be disregarded when 
accounting policies, training, and education are being considered and developed.  
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 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jun/13/accountants-audit-corruption-fraud 
accessed on the September 2013. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 – Preliminary item pool (323 items) with respective source 
 14 Dimensions Source of 
inspiration 
1 1. Need for closure  
2 High Rule  
3 24.  I tend to get worried if I do NOT have clear Rules to help me make a 
definite final decision. 
Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994 
4 97. I regularly find myself in time-constrained situations, where I really 
need exact Rules to help me clarify things and reach decisions. 
Need for Closure 
Scale 
5 79. I often find myself wishing that there were more precise Rules to 
guide me through complex and unstructured situations. 
Need for closure 
scale 
6 202. In the absence of firm Rules it is really difficult to get closure and 
that can be quite depressing. 
Tolerance to 
ambiguity scale 
7 224. I like the finality of clear cut Rules. Bailey et al.  2007 
8 188. People need clear Rules to tell them when to stop looking for more 
factors to draw into their decision making. 
Bailey et al.  2007 
9 59. I rely on Rules to fulfil my desire for a firm answers. Bailey et al.  2007; 
Need for closure 
scale 
10 103. Perhaps the best thing about Rules is that they put boundaries to the 
information that is needed for decision-making. 
Cunningham, 2007 
11 236. There is something very satisfying about the way Rules settle 
things. 
Need for closure 
scale, tolerance to 
ambiguity scale 
12 270. If I don’t have precise Rules to guide me, I find decision-making 
tends to become stressful and tiring. 
Need for closure 
scale, tolerance to 
ambiguity scale 
13 273. I prefer to work with Rules because I know that they will always 
deliver an answer. 
Mayseless & 
Kruglanski 1987 
14 315. The great thing about Rules is that they impose a kind of closure. Need for closure 
scale, tolerance to 
ambiguity scale 
15 Low Rule  
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16 92. Rules might give quick answers but often those answers turn out to 
be unsatisfactory and need to be reopened. 
Mayseless & 
Kruglanski 1987 
17 199. Rules are for people who want the closure of a decision, even if it is 
NOT a very good decision. 
Bailey et al.  2007 
18 219. Rules tend to end up being applied mechanically, with every box 
needing to be ticked, and that makes it irritatingly difficult to get closure. 
Sunstein, 1996 
19 192. Without clear and strong Rules it is very easy to sink into an 
intolerable chaos of indecision. 
Bailey et al.  2007 
20 High Principle  
21 1. Principles support swift decision making by keeping an open-ended 
evidences collecting process, this ensures a accurate evaluation of the 
situation. 
Bailey et al.  2007 
22 Solutions based on Principles tend to be more durable than decisions 
based on other approaches 
Bailey et al.  2007 
23 I tend to prefer to use Principles, because rather than offer simple 
answers, they could open things up for the exercise of professional 
judgment. 
ICAS, 2006; Ford, 
2010 
24 Low Principles  
25 2. Principles are just time consuming and energy-draining, In the case of 
facing pressing deadlines, 
Bailey et al.  2007 
26 296. I tend to become anxious when using Principles-based approaches 
to decision making because they leave me uncertain about whether I 
have got the right answer. 
Need for closure 
scale 
27 257. The problem with Principles is that they rarely give definite answers 
to problems, they always leave room for argument and for someone to 
try and reopen things. 
Need for closure 
scale 
28 13. When working with Principles, I sometimes find myself slowly 
grinding to a halt in an agony of indecision. 
Sternberg's thinking 
style 
29 88. The problem with Principles is that they do NOT have the kind of 
structure that lets you be confident that you have really and finally got a 
firm answer. 
Sternberg's thinking 
style 
30 45. I don’t like Principles-based approaches to decision making since 
they never seem to give clear-cut solutions, and if you are unlucky, you 
have to go back and revise the decision. 
Experts opinion 
31 I don’t like Principles-based approaches to decision-making since they 
never seem to give clear-cut solutions, and if you are unlucky, you have 
to go back and revise the decision. 
Bailey et al.  2007 
32 2. Ethics / Morality  
33 High Rule  
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34 153. Tighter Rules and regulations are the key to the improvement 
professional moral standards in the business world. 
Nigel, 1973: 
attitude to Law 
35 145. I feel guilty if I break Rules. Nigel, 1973; 
Tangney, 1999 
36 158. I feel ashamed if I break Rules. Tangney, 1999 
37 233. Rules support morality by helping people to overcome their 
personal biases. 
Arjoon, 2006 
38 207. Rules should be obeyed because they generally indicate the morally 
right course of action. 
Nigel, 1973: 
attitude to Law 
39 146. I don’t often feel able to question Rules  
 
Nigel, 1973: 
attitude to Law 
40 89. We have a moral duty to obey Rules, even when they don’t seem to 
yield the best solution. 
McBarnet & 
Whelan, 1991; 
Schmicke et al., 
1997 
41 277. Following the given Rules is usually the surest way to moral 
behaviour. 
Alexander, 1999; 
42 279. It is alright to put your own interests first so long as you do not 
actually violate any Rules. 
ICAS, 2006; 
43 Low Rule  
44 193. A Rules based systems undermines professional judgment and 
thereby provides an environment where manipulation can flourish. 
Herron & 
Gilbertson, 2004, ; 
Herdman, 2002; 
Sama & Shoaf, 
2005 
45 14. Rules focus attention to issues of obedience and disobedience, rather 
than doing the right thing. 
Satava et al., 2006 
46 183. Rules allow people to distance themselves for the immorality of 
actions they are involved in. 
Nigel, 1973 
47 184. Rules promote 'box-ticking' mentalities and undermine real ethical 
awareness and concern. 
Cunningham, 2007 
48 106. Rules often make things seem right that really are very wrong. Focus group; 
Turiel, 1983 
49 One big problem with rules is that some people keep following them 
even when they are clearly morally dubious. 
Arjoon, 2006; 
ICAS, 2006 
50 7. An arrogant “I know best” mentality always lies somewhere behind 
rule breaking. 
Experts opinion 
51 114. When someone says 'I followed the Rules' you can be sure they 
have done something morally wrong. 
Focus group 
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52 281. Moral development comes through the kind of reasoning and debate 
that Rules make redundant. 
Kohlberg, moral 
reasoning stages 
model, Turiel, 1983 
53 222. The breaking of Rules is morally justified if it is done to achieve 
Principles. 
Kohlberg, moral 
reasoning stages 
model; ICAS, 2006 
54 249. The more Rules we have, the more we have to rely on so-called 
experts and they are just not in a position to deal effectively with moral 
issue. 
Ford, 2010 
55 232. Rule following is usually a way of avoiding one’s responsibility to 
think and act morally. 
Schmicke et al., 
1997; McBarnet & 
Whelan, 1991; ; 
Alexander, 1999 
56 High Principle  
57 228. Principle-based approaches in business field will promote a more 
socially responsible decision-making. 
Cunningham, 2007 
58 309. The use of Principles enables true morality since they require 
decision makers to have understanding of those who are affected. 
Cunningham, 2007 
59 238. The great thing about Principles-based approaches to regulation is 
that they build ethical commitment into compliance with the intentions 
of the standard setters. 
Cunningham, 2007 
60 313. Principles–based approaches enable open communications across 
levels in an organization, and that’s the best way to combat unethical 
conduct. 
Cunningham, 2007 
61 138. I prefer to work with Principles as they allow me to shape decisions 
in line with my moral values. 
Arjoon, 2006 
62 Low Principle  
63 190. Principles are just too vague and weak to deal with the intensity and 
frequency of unethical behaviour in public and business life 
Bratton, 2004; 
Alexander, 2009 
64 230. Principles are NO good for the ethical development of young 
professionals; they learn better with clear Rules-based guidelines. 
Experts view 
65 218. I think few people at work understand how to use Principles to 
assess the ethical implications of their professional conducts. 
Experts view 
66 285. People disagree so much about what Principles mean and imply that 
they can never serve as a sensible basis for ethical decision making in the 
public and business spheres. 
Cunningham, 2007 
67 3. Creativity  
68 High Rule  
69 221. Rules help to shape and focus problems and provide clear structures Kern, 2006 
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for creative problem solving. 
70 2. Real creativity whether in art, science, or business always emerges 
from a deep understanding of the rules that shape the field. 
Kern, 2006 
71 3.  Rules help to shape and focus problems and provide clear structures 
for creative problem solving. 
Kern, 2006 
72 255. Real creativity whether in art, science, or business always emerges 
from a deep understanding of the Rules that shape the field. 
Kern, 2006 
73 34. One should NOT expect experts to conform to Rules. Kern, 2006 
74 Low Rule  
75 206. Intensive Rule-based working environment limit the inventiveness 
of the people who work there. 
Amabile, 1998; 
McCrae,1987; 
Beraidi and 
Rickards, 2006 
76 41. Rules tend to get in the way of  innovation because they always lag 
behind the pace of innovation. 
Amabile, 1998; 
McCrae,1987; 
Beraidi and 
Rickards, 2006 
77 191. Rules are entirely unfit for the management of highly dynamic 
domains such as financial innovation. 
FSA, 2007; ICAS, 
2006; Ford, 2010 
78 61. Whether in poetry or business the tighter the Rules the more fun 
there is to be had in the creative process. 
Experts suggestion 
79 197. Rules do not encourage original thinking as they assume themselves 
equal to any situation. 
Amabile, 1998; 
McCrae,1987; 
Beraidi and 
Rickards, 2006 
80 38. Rules get in the way of innovation and the new; they are always 
designed for yesterday. 
FSA, 2007; ICAS, 
2006; Ford, 2010 
81 High Principle  
82 211. I am most comfortable working with Principles because they allow 
freedom for imagination and creative thinking. 
Focus group 
83 2. A principles-oriented working environment fosters creativity. Beraidi and 
Rickards, 2006 
84 148. One of the best things about principles is that their adaptability 
allows us to be reasonably confident that we have the tools to cope with 
new problems and issues as they crop up.   
Black, 2008 
85 Principles based approaches improve decision-making by enabling 
decision makers to approach problems from new perspectives. 
Ford, 2010 
86 214. To cope with new and changing situations, where creativity is at a 
premium, you really need  Principles.  
Kirsi-Mari 
Vihermaa 2008 
293 
 
293 
 
 
87 304. Using a Principle- based approach, I often gain an overall feeling 
about a project which enables creative solutions to flow. 
Amabile, 1998; 
Sternger, 1999 
88 7. I am most comfortable working with principles because they allow 
freedom for creative thinking. 
Amabile, 1998 
89 8. The beauty of principles is that they can be creatively extended in their 
scope to help generate justifiable solutions to novel problems. 
Amabile, 1998 
90 130. Principles based approaches to problems provide a valuable space 
for debate in which good creative solutions can be developed.  
Focus group 
91 Low Principle  
92 1. Principles are fine in theory but in practice the often put break on 
innovation and creative thinking. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
93 288. Principles are not able to keep pace with, and regulate, the kind of 
creativity that has characterized the financial sector in recent times. 
Alexander, 2009 
94 3. Principles are too broad and vague to be any use in devising creative 
solutions. 
Hoffman & Patton, 
1997 
95 73. Working with Principles is not practical because it  makes demands 
of decision-makers in terms of creativity and imaginativeness that very 
few people can meet. 
Experts view 
96 4. Complexity  
97 High Rule  
98 318. Creating more Rules is the most effective way to regulate any 
complex situation. 
Alexander, 2009 
99 2. Decision-making in complex situations quickly becomes very tedious 
if it isn’t determined by clear rules. 
Tolerance to 
ambiguity scale 
100 3. I often find myself wishing that there were more precise rules to guide 
me through complex and unstructured situations. 
Sternberg's thinking 
style; tolerance to 
ambiguity scale 
101 295. I like to deal with complex situations by breaking them parts and 
finding and applying the right Rules for each part.  
Sternberg's thinking 
style 
102 Low Rule  
103 117. In complex situations it becomes is very difficult to predict how 
Rules will be interpreted and applied, in which case they are pretty much 
worthless. 
Focus group; Ford, 
2010 
104 254. I sometimes feel that we are all being slowly crushed by the weight 
of evermore detailed Rules. 
FSA 2007, 
105 181. Rules-based approaches to things often break-down in complicated Sternberg's thinking 
294 
 
294 
 
cases. style 
106 121. I really can’t keep up with all the new Rules I ought to know about. Black, 2001 
107 60. Rules really only work in very simplest of situations. Braithwaite, 2002 
108 128. I find that in complex situations the letter of the Rules always 
begins to obscure the underlying substance of the situation. 
FSA, 2007; ICAS, 
2006 
109 227. If you get into the habit of relying on Rules, you will soon find that 
you aren't able to think for yourself when faced with new and tricky 
situations.  
ICAS, 2006; 
Sternberg, 1999; 
Black, 2001 
110 262. With the increasing complexity of modern life the necessity for 
tightly framed and very specific Rules and procedures becomes ever 
more obvious. 
Focus group 
111 301. Rules always seem to multiply and become ever more complicated 
so that eventually only a few specialists are able to understand and 
interpret them.  
Black, 2001 
112 322. Rule - based systems seem inevitably to develop to the point of 
“Rule overload”; the point where they begin to collapse under the weight 
of their internal inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Black, 2001 
113 High Principle  
114 141. Principles are indispensable when interests conflict, because they 
allow decision makers room for the creative construction of compromise 
solutions. 
Braithwaite, 2002 
115 280. Principles work well in situations where there are conflicting 
interests, because they make room for communication involving the 
affected parties that leads to more thorough and reliable analysis.  
Black, 2008 
116 78. Principles are vital in complex business situations such as negotiation 
and contracting, where solutions often best built on consensus about 
objectives and values. 
Braithwaite, 2002 
117 229. If things are at all complicated you need Principles to fill in the gaps 
left by Rules. 
Braithwaite, 2002 
118 87. In complicated problem solving situations where the way forward is 
NOT obvious, effective solutions must be built on Principles.  
Braithwaite, 2002 
119 177. I prefer to keep things simple by working with a few key Principles. Braithwaite, 2002 
120 303. I prefer to work with Principles because they allow some freedom 
for negotiation of solutions which I find is the only way to effectively 
cope with the complexity of this rapidly changing and uncertain world. 
Braithwaite, 2002; 
Ford, 2010; FSA, 
2007 
121 Low Principle  
122 282. The problem with Principles is that people interpret them differently 
and it can become impossible to disentangle the confusions that grow up 
around the competing interpretations. 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
295 
 
295 
 
123 291. Because Principles are unpredictable they make decision making 
much more complicated than it needs to be. 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
124 137. I often feel as though I am being tricked when people start making 
artful use of Principles to negotiate complicated situations. 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
125 67. Principles are too open to interpretation and do NOT cope well in 
complex situations where there are substantial conflicts of interest. 
Experts opinion 
126 245. Principles introduce pointless complexity in decision-making by 
allowing room for unnecessary debate. 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
127 31. The problem with Principles is that they need to be interpreted and 
interpretation can quickly become an impossibly complicated business. 
Ford, 2010; 
Coglianese et al., 
2004; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
128 147. I don’t like having to resort to Principles because justifications fo 
which Principles should apply and what relative weights they should 
carry always seem to be either obscure or impossibly complicated. 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
129 5. Empowerment  
130 High Rule  
131 I feel more confident in situations where I know there are precise rules to 
follow. 
Focus group 
132 239. I like to know that my decisions have got the weight of Rules 
behind them and that they are going to hold, whether people like it or 
not. 
Hall & Renner, 
1991 
133 4. Clear rules let people know what they need to do and give them the 
foundation and justification to get on with it. 
Focus group 
134 244. When I have clear Rules to work with I become much more 
confident and decisive.  
Thomas & 
Velthouse, 1990 
135 115. I am rarely so painfully aware of my powerlessness as when 
working with Rules. 
Bratton, 2003 
136 62. I am always more confident in decisions which I know have been 
made on the basis of firm Rules.  
Bratton, 2003 
137 4. I tend to lack confidence, and feel rather nervous, in situations where I 
have NOT been given Rules. 
Self-efficacy 
theory: Bandura, 
1991 and 1998 
138 Low Rule  
139 35. You need to loosen the net of Rules around people if you want to 
engage their energies.  
Focus group; Locus 
of control 
296 
 
296 
 
140 319. It's hard to find value and inspiration in activities that are dominated 
by Rules. 
 
 
Focus group; Locus 
of control 
141 3. It's really difficult for me to get enthusiastic about activities that are all 
about rule following. 
Focus group; Locus 
of control 
142 107. I always feel rather detached and disengaged from Rule following 
tasks.  
Focus group; Locus 
of control 
143 86. The real purpose of Rules is to provide reasons to punish people.  Focus group; Locus 
of control 
144 157. Rules put an end to discussion and debate and in the long run 
undermine community values and cohesion that thrive on such 
exchanges. 
Skitka and Morgan 
-'the double-edged 
sword of a moral 
state of mind'. 
145 High Principle  
146 212. I like the fact that Principles, rather than offering simple answers, 
open things up for the exercise of judgement. 
Cohen et al., 2011; 
Black, 2001 
147 2. Principles promote more engagement and responsibility among 
employees thereby increasing their enthusiasm for the task. 
Focus group 
148 171. Only a proactive Principle-based approach supports the 
development of good judgement. 
Thomas & 
Velthouse 1990 
149 298. The use of Principles forces people to think about what they are 
doing, they then put more of themselves into the task and derive more 
value from it. 
Cohen et al., 2011; 
Locus of control by 
Rotter, 1966 
150 314. I enjoy Principle-based approaches to problem solving and 
decision-making because they tend to involve me in debates and 
discussion. 
FSA 2007; focus 
group 
151 I become more vocal when defending myself with Principles. Focus group 
152 21. Having the freedom to use Principles at work signals acceptance and 
trust, and is in itself a great motivator.  
Focus group; locus 
of control; Cohen et 
al., 2011 
153 263. Using Principles has helped me to become more aware of my 
capacities and confident in my judgment.   
Focus group; locus 
of control; Cohen et 
al., 2012 
154 Low Principle  
155 108. When working with Principles, I often find myself indecisive and 
unable to be confident in my own judgment. 
ICAS, 2006; Dunn 
et al., 2003 
156 300. It is difficult to be fully committed to decisions based on Principles, 
because they always seem rather arbitrary and never quite securely 
justified.  
Dunn et al., 2003 
297 
 
297 
 
157 198. I do NOT really feel comfortable using Principles. 
 
 
Dunn et al., 2003 
158 6. Manipulation  
159 High Rule  
160 70. To discourage people from manoeuvring within the Rules we need 
more and tighter Rules.  
Alexander, 2009 
161 208. I prefer Rules because they are objective. Sunstein, 1995 
162 75. I favour Rules in many situations because they tend to minimize the 
scope for self-interested manipulation. 
Ford, 2010; Carter 
& Marchant, 2011 
163 268. We need more precise Rules to curb unwanted creativity in the 
financial market. 
Alexander, 2009; 
Cunningham, 2007 
164 Low Rule  
165 1. Rules manipulation creates an unlevel playing field, providing an 
unfair advantage to those who are smart enough to practice "get around 
the rules". 
Shah, 1996 
166 96. Rules fail as regulation because they try to impose the kind of 
controlling and directing relationship that people tend to react against, 
subvert, and manipulate.   
Ford, 2010; Black, 
2001; Arjoon, 2006 
167 223. Rule-based regulation is seldom very effective, because no matter 
how tightly it is designed it always leaves exploitable ambiguities and 
loopholes.  
FSA, 2007; ICAS, 
2006 
168 290. Rules fail as regulation because they play into the hands of the 
unscrupulous, those who are most willing to take conscious advantage of 
them. 
ICAS, 2006 
169 292. Rules are never effective against the determined manipulator who 
will always find another loophole. 
Shah, 1996 
170 7. Rules are never a very effective way of controlling behaviour, because 
'clever' people will always think of ways to get around them. 
Sawabe, 2005; 
Benston et al., 
2006; McBarnet & 
Whelan, 1991 
171 215. The trouble with Rules is that the powerful can always manipulate 
them in their own interests without actually breaking them. 
Bratton, 2003 
172 65. More detailed and strictly enforced Rules are the answer to the kind 
of manipulations that have gone on in the financial market. 
Alexander, 2009 
173 320. The problem with Rules is that they encourage a mentality that 
learns how to exploit the gap between the letter and the spirit of 
regulation.  
ICAS, 2006a&b; 
McBarnet & 
Whelan, 1991 
174 High Principle  
298 
 
298 
 
175 250. Principles based approaches are generally effective and free of 
manipulation because they focus on the real risks and desired outcomes, 
rather than on mere compliance. 
ICAS, 2006 
176 275. Principles facilitate a co-operative and trusting relationship between 
the regulators and those regulated, and thus reduce the risk of 
manipulation. 
Ford, 2010; Black, 
2001 
177 3. Principles promote the self-regulation among business practitioners 
and public could be monitoring over these business practices. 
Black, 2001; Black, 
2008; Ford, 2010 
178 4.  Principles require users to justify their decision making process, thus 
reducing the potential for manipulation. 
Black, 2001; Black, 
2008; Ford, 2010 
179 132. I prefer Principles-based approaches because they engage people 
positively and openly in the decision making process and thus reduce the 
likelihood of manipulation. 
Black, 2001; Black, 
2008; Ford, 2010 
180 6.  The great advantage of Principles-based approaches decision-making 
is that they involve personal judgement and that restores some personal 
responsibility to the process. 
Sennetti et al., 
2007; Carpenter et 
al 2011; Cohen et 
al., 2011 
181 Low Principle  
182 136. The introduction of consideration of Principles by decision-makers 
gives an unfair advantage to the articulate who are good at justifying 
their point of view. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
183 186. Principle-based approaches would only work if everyone acted in 
good faith and that doesn’t happen in the real world. 
 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
184 4. Principles are by their nature too loose to be of any use in deterring 
manipulative misconduct. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
185 33. Principles are always wide open to manipulation because they require 
interpretation, which is often arbitrary. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
186 44. Because the use of Principles is highly subjective, it is very 
vulnerable to subtle, sometimes almost unnoticed, pressure and 
distortion. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
187 217. Smart people can always twist Principles to suit their own point of 
view.  
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
188 265. Principles allow the unscrupulous to abuse the trust that people put 
in them. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
189 7. Security and comfort  
190 High Rule  
191 151. The great thing about Rules is that they take the blame if things go 
wrong and that is very liberating.  
Ohman, et al 2006; 
Pentland, 1993 
299 
 
299 
 
192 91. It's reassuring to know that there are Rules that will supply clear 
answers to issues that I might face. 
 
 
Salter & 
Niswander, 1995; 
Donelson, McInnis, 
& Mergenthaler, 
2012 
193 271. If I am criticized my first reaction is to look to the Rules to check 
that I have in fact done the right thing. 
Ohman, et al 2006; 
Pentland, 1993 
194 4. I feel less threat of unfair treatment when I know that people who 
manage me follow the rules of conducts. 
Ohman, et al 2006; 
Pentland, 1993 
195 234. I am most comfortable when I know my behaviour conforms with 
Rules. 
Ohman, et al 2006; 
Pentland, 1993 
196 102. Rules, and Rule compliance, are absolutely vital defenses against 
troublesome litigation. 
Salter & 
Niswander, 1995; 
Donelson, McInnis, 
& Mergenthaler, 
2012 
197 Low Rule  
198 162. I always feel vulnerable when using Rules because they make errors 
obvious and hard to dispute. 
 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Mergenthaler 
et al., 2012 
199 120. Rules are dangerous because they help people to cocoon themselves 
from criticism, even from self-criticism. 
 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Mergenthaler 
et al., 2012 
200 178. Rule-based decision making is designed to insulate decision 
makers’ from criticisms and accusations. 
 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Mergenthaler 
et al., 2012 
201 187. I find that it is impossible to comply with all of the Rules all of the 
time and that leaves me feeling anxious. 
 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006; Mergenthaler 
et al., 2012 
202 80. I hate precise rules and always feel that they are hanging over me 
waiting to catch me out. 
 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006, 
203 220. I think Rules are made to keep us on the defensive; to keep us 
always open to the blame that we have broken this or that Rule. 
 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006, SEC, 2003; 
Swinson, 2004, 
cited by Arjoon, 
2006 
204 High Principle  
205 144. Using Principles give me an extra layer of protection since I always 
know that I can at least justify my use of principles to myself.  
 
ICAS, 2006; 
Bogoslaw, 2008; 
Arjoon, 2006 
206 "119. I feel at ease and confident when making decisions based on 
Principles, perhaps because I know that it is difficult to challenge such 
ICAS, 2006; 
Bogoslaw, 2008; 
300 
 
300 
 
decisions and impossible to show that they are definitely wrong. Arjoon, 2006 
207 18. I feel comfortable with tasks that involve the interpretation and use of 
Principles. 
 
 
ICAS, 2006 
208 Low Principle  
209 125. The subjective judgments associated with Principles are 
uncomfortably difficulty to defended if ever put under serious challenge. 
Mergenthaler et al., 
2012 
210 111. It is difficult to justify decisions based on Principles and that can 
leave you feeling vulnerable. 
Mergenthaler et al., 
2012 
211 99. Principles leave the people who have to use them wide open to 
harmful accusations of personal bias in their decision-making.  
 
Focus groups; 
Somerville, 2003; 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006 
212 36. Principles-based approaches to decision-making leave far too much 
to chance. 
 
Black, 2008; 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006 
213 15. The problem with Principles is that they are easy to understand but 
difficult to know for sure whether they have been used appropriately. 
Somerville, 2003; 
Dickey & Scanlon, 
2006 
214 22. The problem with Principles is that you never really know where you 
are with them;  You can NOT be confident about how they will be 
interpreted and weighed.  
 
Coglianese, 2004; 
Black, 2008; Carter 
& Marchant, 2011 
215 200. I never feel secure when making decisions based on Principles. 
 
Mergenthaler et al., 
2012 
216 276. When decisions are based on Principles they are inevitably 
subjective and that introduces a personal element that I can never really 
be comfortable with. 
Mergenthaler et al., 
2012 
217 286. With Principles-based decision making there is no absolutely firm 
ground for the decision-maker to dig her heels into and over time and 
under pressure it is very easy for standards to slip. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
218 8. Fairness  
219 High Rule  
220 58. Fairness generally requires that the Rules be followed to the letter. ICAS, 2004 
221 2. I prefer to follow strict codes of conducts to achieve fairness ICAS, 2005 
222 3. If not guided by binding rules, decision making is always liable to 
become corrupted and unfair. 
Focus group 
223 139. Strict compliance with Rules can seem impersonal and cold but that 
is actually a small price to pay for the fairness that strict Rules deliver. 
Dworkin, 1979 
301 
 
301 
 
 
224 68. I feel that I am under threat of unfair treatment unless I know that 
people are constrained by Rules. 
Blader & Tyler, 
2003 a & b 
225 I tend to judge the fairness of an outcome according to the degree of its 
compliance with Rules. 
Van Den Bos, Lind, 
& Wilke, 1997 
226 7. In a decent society people have a right to expect that they will be 
treated strictly in accordance with the Rules. 
Authoritarian 
personalities by 
Rigby, 1982 
227 54. At work, I tend to treat all Rules as binding Rules and feel compelled 
to follow them well. 
 
Authoritarian 
personalities by 
Rigby, 1982 
228 28. Fairness follows from the consistent application of strict Rules. Blader & Tyler, 
2003 a & b 
229 317. Rules are never perfect of course, but all in all sticking to them 
generally the fair thing to do. 
 
Authoritarian 
personalities by 
Rigby, 1982 
230 Low Rule  
231 267. No Rule takes all relevant factors into account and for this reason 
Rules are commonly very unfair. 
Sunstein, 1995;  
Schauer, 1991a; 
Shapiro, 2009 
232 149. Rules are dangerous because they ask to be applied without to 
regard to consequences in the particular case. 
Sunstein, 1995;  
Schauer, 1991a; 
Shapiro, 2009 
233 123. I sometime recognize that Rules I have applied have, all things 
considered, resulted in unfair outcomes. 
Sunstein, 1995;  
Schauer, 1991a; 
Shapiro, 2009 
234 122. The problem with Rules is that they try to treat people and cases as 
if they were all the same when in fact they are different. 
 
Sunstein, 1995;  
Schauer, 1991a; 
Shapiro, 2009 
235 240. If you want to be fair you need to have the courage to break Rules  Schminke et al., 
1997 
236 104. Rules are very often just an excuse for acting unfairly. 
 
 
Sunstein, 1995;  
Schauer, 1991a; 
Shapiro, 2009 
237 289. One should never let Rules stand in the way of acting in accordance 
with one's own sense of what is right and fair. 
Schminke et al., 
1997 
238 305. It seems to me that Rules generally tend to be applied to benefit of 
certain people over the others. 
Authoritarian 
personalities by 
Rigby, 1982 
239 High Principle  
302 
 
302 
 
240 269. A Principle-based approaches to problem solving are fairer because 
they tend to be more open to debate and bargaining. 
Ford, 2010 
241 135. Only Principles-based decision making can provide solutions that 
are adequately tailored to individual cases. 
Dworkin, 1967; 
1997; ICAS, 2006 
242 308. Fairness requires that we always treat people in accordance with 
Principles; because Principles allows no short-cuts. 
Dworkin, 1967; 
1997; ICAS, 2006 
243 155. Principles-based approaches promote fairness in decision making by 
requiring an open consideration and weighing of relevant factors and 
information.  
Dworkin, 1967; 
1997; ICAS, 2006 
244 7. Principles-based decisions are generally more transparent and open to 
demands for justification, and thus generally fairer. 
Ford, 2010, ICAS, 
2006 
245 53. Principles-based decision-making requires that attention be paid to 
the particular features of the case and that leads to fairer outcomes. 
Dworkin, 1967; 
1997; ICAS, 2006 
246 Low Principle  
247 169. The outcomes of decision-making based on the weighing of 
Principles are just too unpredictable to be thought of as fair.  
Cunningham, 2007 
248 The introduction of consideration of Principles by decision-makers gives 
an unfair advantage to the articulate who are good at justifying their 
point of view. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
249 Principles-based decision makings are too subjective and value-laden to 
be considered as fair. 
Ford, 2010; Carter 
& Marchant, 2011 
251 9. Efficiency  
252 High Rule  
253 310. Clear and detailed Rules are the recipe for optimal efficiency in 
decision making 
 
Focus group 
254 195. If I don’t have precise and binding Rules to keep me on the right 
track I become hopelessly inefficient. 
Twining & Miers, 
2001 
255 226. Rules save time and energy by giving people a clear structure to 
work with. 
Sunstein, 1995 
256 243. I find that consideration of the applicable Rules generally takes me 
quickly to the heart of a problem. 
Focus group 
257 134. For me Rules are vital time-saving devices. Sunstein, 1995 
258 112. People get things done more easily and faster when they have exact 
Rules to guide them. 
 
259 32. The more Rules people have to guide them the more efficient they 
become. 
Experts view 
303 
 
303 
 
260 Low Rule  
261 170. In practice it is rare to find Rules that can be applied smoothly and 
efficiently; they never seem to quite precisely fit the case. 
Pincus, 2000 
262 69. The time one spends on studying and learning the Rules of an 
organization will delay the real problem solving process. 
Focus group 
263 209. Rules simplify and speed up decision-making processes but at the 
too high a price of excluding some considerations. 
Dworkin, 1997; 
Cunningham, 2007 
264 260. Rules suit people who don't have the patience for really thoughtful 
decision making. 
 
 
Braithwaite(2001) 
cited Frederick 
Schauer’s 
‘argument from 
efficiency’ 
265 20. Rules get in the way of efficient decision-making. Farber, 1999 
266 40. Rules impose an essentially inefficient approach to decision–making 
that requires “that all the boxes be ticked”, all the supposedly relevant 
data gathered, before a decision is made; even when the decision maker 
already knows the right thing to do. 
ICAS, 2006 
267 52. Rules don't take account of the full picture of a given situation so the 
answers they give often need to be revisited. 
Sternberg's thinking 
style 
268 283. Rules restrict the use of judgement and thereby tend to get in the 
way of good decision-making. 
ICAS, 2006 
 142. The problem with Rules is that they quickly multiply to the point 
where decision-making gets entirely bogged down in impenetrable webs 
of Rules and exceptions. 
ICAS, 2006; 
Sternberg, 1999; 
Black, 2001 
271 High Principle  
272 150. In my experience, Principles often operate like rules of thumb, 
cutting efficiently through to the crucial factors.   
Korobkin, 2000 
273 124. Principles support swift and firm decision making by keeping 
evidence collecting and evaluation processes well focused on the key 
features of the situation. 
Korobkin, 2000 
274 46. Principles improve efficiency in situations that require case specific 
solutions. 
Alexander, 1999 
275 30. Principles tend to be a durable basis for problem solving in changing 
circumstances. 
Ford, 2010; FSA, 
2007 
276 82. Solutions based on Principles tend to be more durable than solutions 
that are based on other approaches.  
Ford, 2010; FSA, 
2007 
277 83. The flexible nature of Principles promotes efficiency. Korobkin, 2000 
278 248. Principles efficiently focus attention and evidence gathering on the 
factors that are really important in the case at hand. 
Alexander, 1999 
304 
 
304 
 
279 Low Principle  
280 174. Few people have both the capability and experience needed to 
efficiently work with Principles. 
Experts opinion 
281 2. Principles allow people to indulge in unnecessary debates and this 
slows down the problem solving process. 
Dworkin, 1997 
282 261. Principles based approaches to decision-making require deliberation 
in every case and that’s a depressing inefficient way to go about things. 
Tebbit, 2005 
283 126. Decision–making based on Principles always requires the weighing 
of competing Principles, and that is generally a rather time consuming 
activity. 
Dworkin, 1997 
284 10. Effectiveness  
285 High Rule  
287 253. Rules may not be perfect, but they get the job done and within 
tolerable levels of error.  
Sunstein, 1995 
288 116. It is when things must be done and done right that I most appreciate 
the value of Rules. 
Sunstein, 1995 
289 241. Rules are the most effective mechanism to safeguard public 
interests.  
Alexander, 2009 
290 180. Rules are the effective way to get things done in difficult situations. Sunstein, 1995 
291 76. Rules are the most effective tool for someone who has a low 
tolerance for mistakes. 
Sunstein, 1995 
292 Low Rule  
293 143. People tend to feel isolated and anxious, and eventually become 
rather ineffective, when they are managed by rigid Rules.  
Focus group 
294 94. Rules focus on process not outcomes and are rarely an effective 
means of achieving desired ends. 
ICAS, 2006 
295 173. Rules are fine in simple and stable situations but quickly lose any 
effectiveness when serious conflicts of interest come onto the scene. 
Braithwaite, 2002 
296 113. Rules promote a formalist, 'box-ticking', mentality which just isn’t 
effective in novel situations not clearly foreseen by the Rule makers.  
Schauer, 2001 
297 302. The more Rules are applied to people, the less effective they seem 
to be in controlling them. 
Picciotto, 2007 
 312. To be effective and get “results” you need to be able to break the 
Rules.  
Zhang &Arvey, 
2009 
298 High Principle  
299 172. In situations where there are serious conflicts of interests, decisions Braithwaite, 2002 
305 
 
305 
 
need to be hammered out in terms of Principles because they provide real 
effective resolution. 
300 205. Principles are the most effective tool against arbitrary and 
unreasonable decisions. 
Braithwaite, 2002 
301 237. The most effective decision making comes through the use of a high 
level Principles because they encourage a focus on outcomes rather than 
on complicated prescriptions and procedures. 
Ford 2008; Hopper 
& Stainsby, 2006 
cited by Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
302 252. Principles are very effective because they engage and promote self-
regulation. 
FSA, 2007 
303 306. The great thing about Principles-based approaches to problems is 
that they go on generating effective solutions in new and challenging 
environments where other approaches break down.   
FSA, 2007  
304 Low Principle  
305 258. Principles are usually too vague to effectively determine or even 
seriously guide decisions in real world situations. 
Bailey et al., 2007; 
Carpenter., 2007 
306 1. People who use Principles tend to be less effective in detecting or 
deterring misconduct. 
Cunningham, 2007 
307 272. In practice decision-makers rarely have the level of expertise that’s 
needed to support effective Principles-based decision-making.   
Experts opinion 
308 3. Principles only work effectively when those involved all behave in 
good faith and in a trusting manner. 
Cunningham, 2007 
309 11. Uniformity vs. Flexibility  
310 High Rule for uniformity  
311 We need Rules to help us identify and eliminate sub-standard behaviour. Gary 1988; 
Sunstein, 1995 
312 204. I like to see everyone working and competing under the same Rules. 
 
Gary 1988; 
Hofstede, 1997 
313 294. In the current climate, there is an urgent need for more Rules to 
standardize conduct.  
 
CPI (California 
Personality 
inventory) 
314 6. I like to work in settings where tasks and expectations are defined and 
standardized by clear rules. 
CPI (California 
Personality 
inventory) 
315 Low Rule for uniformity  
316 11. Rules block any further development of the children and novices. Turiel, 1983; Rest 
DIT 
317 The problem with rules is that they try to treat people and cases as if they 
were all the same when in fact they are different. 
CPI (California 
Personality 
306 
 
306 
 
inventory) 
318 4. We need urgently to cut back on our reliance on rules, and allow 
people freedom to develop and grow. 
Focus group 
319 High Principle for flexibility  
320 194. I find Principles based approaches to issues most satisfactory 
because they allow a satisfying consistency and coherence to be 
developed, on the basis of common principles, operating across different 
cases and fields. 
Zhang & Arvey, 
2009 
321 161. Principles are effective in complex situations, where other 
approaches often break-down, because their flexibility allows them to 
stretch and remain applicable either directly or by analogy. 
Braithwaite, 2002 
322 247. Treatment based on Principles is almost always more satisfactory 
than that emerging from other approaches because Principles allows 
more flexibility to be exercised in consideration of the precise features 
and mitigating circumstances of a case. 
Dworkin, 1997 
323 17. What I like best about Principles, is their flexibility and the fact that I 
can use them to create solutions that are that is tailored to the needs of 
the particular, individual, case. 
Dworkin, 1997 
324 Low Principle for flexibility  
325 37. Principles are too flexible to be helpful in supporting comparisons 
among decisions made in different cases. 
Cunningham, 2007 
326 179. Unfortunately, the inherent flexibility and responsiveness of 
Principles based-approaches tends to be quickly undermined by 
practitioners forging tacit agreements about how Principles should be 
interpreted and applied. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
327 216. The problem with Principles is that their very flexibility introduces 
an unacceptable risk that in some cases they will be interpreted and 
applied in idiosyncratic, even perverse ways. 
Carter & Marchant, 
2011 
328 12. Abstract vs. concrete  
329 High Rule for concrete  
330 164. I find that even in supposedly simple situations I can easily become 
“tied in knots” if I do NOT have clear rules to work with. 
Sternberg's thinking 
style 
331 110. Hard and specific Rules, with all vagueness cut away, are the best 
foundation for sensible decision making. 
Hart, 1961; Raz, 
1975 
332 105. The plainer and more concrete the Rules get, the easier they are to 
use and better are the outcomes they provide. 
Sunstein, 1995 
 56. I prefer things to be set in the form of concrete Rules Bailey et al.  2007; 
Need for closure 
scale 
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333 Low Rule for concrete  
334 1. Over time Rules, in any area, have the tendency to become ever more 
cumbersome, so that eventually they are hindrance rather than a help. 
Black, 2008; 2001 
335 2. I sometimes feel that we are all being slowly crushed by the weight of 
evermore detailed Rules. 
Black, 2008; 2001 
336 3. I sometimes feel as if I am living in a kindergarten since there are just 
too many detailed Rules forbidding me from doing things. 
Focus group 
337 4. I really can’t keep up with all the new Rules I ought to know about. Black, 2008; 2001 
338 5. More often than not detailed concrete Rules are an obstacle to rational 
judgment and good decision-making. 
Focus group 
339 High Principle for abstract  
340 307. I tend to be comfortable with the ambiguities associated with 
Principle-based  decision-making. 
Sternberg's thinking 
style 
341 201. Principles appeal to me as I like ideas that are expressed in abstract 
forms. 
ICAS, 2006; 
Cunningham 2007; 
Black, 2001; 
Mergenthaler, 2009 
342 109. The best decision making emerges from the intelligent application 
of abstract Principles to concrete cases.  
Dworkin, 1997, 
1967 
 Principles appeal to me because I find that their abstraction makes them 
easy to work with and adapt to particular cases. 
Dworkin, 1997, 
1967 
343 Low Principle for abstract  
344 256. Principles just aren’t “down-to-earth” enough to either sensibly 
guide or control people’s behaviour. 
 
Cunningham, 2007 
345 287. Principles are too vague to be of any use for real decision-making 
making. 
Cunningham, 2007 
346 12. When I start work on a new task, I really need more concrete 
guidance which can NOT be given by Principles. 
Cunningham, 2007 
347 5. Principles should be replaced by more specific rules for decision 
making. 
Cunningham, 2007 
348 13. Legitimacy  
349 High Rule  
350 127. Decisions made in accordance with the Rules, have a natural 
legitimacy. 
Tyler (2006) ; Hart, 
1961; Raz, 1975 
351 246. I get very irritated by people who think they know better than the 
Rule-makers, and who think they have the right to decide which rules to 
Tyler (2006) 
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apply and which to ignore. 
352 159. Rules made by authorized bodies ought to be respected and 
followed. 
French & Raven 
(1959) 
353 77. Rules give decision-making a valuable legitimacy that helps give 
people the confidence they need to follow through on the required action.   
French & Raven 
(1959); Raz, 1975 
354 49. When you take on a role you take on the responsibility to follow, 
without question, the Rules associated with that role 
Tyler, 2006; 
Authoritarian 
personalities by 
Rigby, 1982 
355 Low Rule  
356 163. People really have to start evaluating the legitimacy of any given 
Rules before they decide to follow them. 
Milgram, 1965; 
Locus of control 
357 100. Any legitimacy that seems to attach to Rules is generally false or 
spurious.   
Milgram, 1965; 
Locus of control 
358 165. Rules are made to suit the powerful. Dworkin, 1967, 
1997 
359 259. In the end even the best intentioned of Rules are illegitimately 
twisted, in interpretation and application, to serve the powerful. 
Dworkin, 1967, 
1997 
360 274. Rules are often used by smart people to add “legitimacy” to their 
illicit motivations and actions. 
Dworkin, 1967, 
1997 
361 High Principle  
362 101. Principles-based decisions tend to be more legitimate because they 
draw on values and engage the subjectivity, integrity and care, of the 
decision makers. 
Ford, 2010; Black, 
2008 
363 284. Action that is based on Principles has the strongest claim to 
legitimacy.   
Dworkin, 1997 
364 225. Decisions are really legitimate only when they are based on 
Principles that are well anchored in established values. 
Dworkin, 1997 
365 297. Action based on Principles tends to be strongly legitimated by the 
social grounding of the Principles drawn into the analysis by the 
participants.  
Dworkin, 1967, 
1997; Ford, 2010; 
Black, 2001 
366 26. Decisions based on Principles have the strongest claim to legitimacy 
because they are grounded in a rational analysis and weighing of issues. 
Ford, 2010; 
Dworkin, 1997; 
1967 
367 189. For me, respect for Principles is central to professional life.  Expert opinion 
368 Low Principle  
369 166. Principles are very often not actually produced by any properly 
constituted “law-making” body and in such case they have NO real 
Cunningham, 2007 
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legitimacy. 
370 168. Principles tend to involve subjective bias which undermines their 
legitimacy. 
Cunningham, 2007 
371 131. Principles often seem just to have been plucked from the air, and 
have NO legitimacy as such. 
Cunningham, 2007 
372 264. There is never much legitimacy to be found in the trading-off of one 
Principle and consideration against another in the real practice of 
principles-based decision-making.  
Cunningham, 2007 
373 16. Principles are too subjective to carry any real legitimacy. Cunningham, 2007 
374 14. Certainty  
375 High Rule  
376 1. Rules appeal to me because they bring certainty into an otherwise 
chaotic world. 
Focus group 
377 210. People prefer Rule-based decisions because they deliver more 
definite directions. 
Need for closure 
scale 
378 140. The world is in a sorry state of chaos because people NO longer 
have the respect for Rules that past generations did. 
Focus group 
379 4. The value and attraction of Rules originates in their precise and certain 
nature. 
Nelson, 2003; 
Twining & Miers, 
1999; Cunningham, 
2007 
380 43. Rules are my survival toolkit in unfamiliar and risky situations. 
 
 
Hofstede, 2001; 
Tolerance of 
ambiguities scale 
381 50. By reducing uncertainty and making it easy to predict actions and 
their consequences, clear Rules really help me to feel more able to get 
things done. 
Focus group 
382 176. I like the predictability of Rules give; the way they settle in advance 
what is to be done in particular situations. 
Focus group 
383 Low Rule  
384 156. Unfortunately Rules seldom fit cases so perfectly that they 
determine the outcome. 
ICAS, 2006 
385 196. The trouble with Rules is that they involve interpretation and 
therefore seldom deliver the certainty they promise.  
Black, 2001 
386 3. The problem in practice with even clear Rules is that you can rarely be 
absolutely sure if and how they will be applied. 
ICAS, 2006 
387 48. Rules have a formal uniformity, but in practice they need to be 
interpreted and applied, and that introduces enormous variability and 
unpredictability. 
ICAS, 2006 
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388 High Principle  
389 1. The advantage of Principle-based approaches is that they facilitate 
communication about the issues and we can be certain that the outcomes 
emerging really take careful account of all the important factors. 
Dworkin, 1997; 
ICAS, 2006 
390 2. When Principle-based approaches to problems are working well, the 
outcomes generated will predictably, and with some certainty, reflect the 
values, culture, and interests of those affected. 
Dworkin, 1997; 
ICAS, 2006 
391 293. The use of Principles promotes dialogue, helps to build mutual 
understanding, and leads to lasting solutions.    
Ford, 2010 
392 4. Principles work well in situations where there are conflicting interests, 
because they make room for communication involving the affected 
parties that leads to more thorough and reliable analysis. 
Dworkin, 1997; 
Braithwaite, 2002 
393 323. The really wonderful thing about working with Principles is that 
some room is made for new perspectives to emerge in the analysis: That 
is worth giving up control for. 
Sternberg's thinking 
style; Locus of 
control 
394 Low Principle  
395 316. Principles give too much discretion to decision-makers, and 
undermine the predictability that is so crucial to social cohesion. 
 
 
Schipper 2003; 
Sennetti et al., 
2011; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
396 182. The fundamental problem with Principles-based approaches to 
decision-making is that the outcomes of the process are unpredictable; 
you never know what to expect. 
Schipper 2003; 
Sennetti et al., 
2011; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
397 185. If people are allowed to operate on the basis of Principles control is 
given up, subjectivity comes into play, and outcomes become 
unpredictable: I can never be comfortable with that. 
 
Schipper 2003; 
Sennetti et al., 
2011; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
398 
71. Principles-based decision-making undermines the certainty and 
uniformity of treatment of cases that is vital in many walks of life. 
 
  
Schipper 2003; 
Sennetti et al., 
2011; Carter & 
Marchant, 2011 
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Appendix 2- Introductory message for the online survey 
Dear Respondent, 
My name is Ying Feng and I am a PhD student at the University of Glasgow, 
Scotland (U.K.), studying individual’s dispositions in relation to Rules and Principles. 
I would be very grateful if you would assist me in my research by completing the 
questionnaire, below, which should take you about 30-45 minutes to complete.  
I appreciate that I am asking you to give a considerable amount of time to this, but it 
is really only with the help of generous individuals that I can gather the data I need to 
complete my work.  
I am confident that the output of my studies will be useful in helping to develop our 
understanding of how people respond to Rules and Principles which eventually will 
be of considerable practical value.  
I hope that you will find the questionnaire interesting and perhaps thought provoking. 
I believe that it contains nothing of disturbing nature and I see no risks associated 
with its completion. However, if you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, 
you can withdraw from the survey at any point. Basic data collected will be held 
within my immediate research group which consists just of myself and my two PhD 
supervisors at the University of Glasgow: Professor Paddy O’ Donnell and Dr John 
McKernan. I hope ultimately to publish my work in my PhD thesis which, if accepted, 
will be a publicly available document. 
Your participation is of course entirely voluntary. 
Regardless of whether you choose to participate, please let me know if you would like 
a summary of my findings. To receive a summary, please e-mail me at 
y.feng.1@research.gla.ac.uk . 
Thank you very much for your time and support. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Ying Feng  
I consent to the use of my responses to this questionnaire for the research purposes 
referred to above  
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This study concerns rules and principles and for clarification I want to begin by 
explaining what I mean by the terms “rule” and “principle”: 
 
Rules, for the purposes of this study, are always applicable in an all-or-nothing 
fashion. Rules don't have weights in other words, when a rule is valid, we have to take 
it into consideration; when it is not valid, it contributes nothing to the decision. A 
typical rule dictates that in circumstances X, behaviour of type Y ought, or ought not 
to be followed.  
 
Some rules: 
1) "A will is invalid unless signed by three witnesses"; 
2) "A fire door must be made available within 100 feet of each employee"; 
3) "In the event of fire the elevator must not be used, except by persons who require 
the assistance of a wheelchair, and who are accompanied by an authorized safety 
officer".  
 
Principles, in contrast to rules, do have weights and they contribute to a decision by 
bringing different reasons into consideration rather than by dictating a particular 
decision. Principles can conflict with each other, and decision makers have to assign 
weights to different principles to resolve such conflicts. 
 
Some principles: 
1) "No man shall profit from his own wrong"; 
2) "Promises should be kept";  
3) "Everyone has a right to freedom of speech".
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Appendix 3- Descriptive Statistics for 323 items (including miss data analysis) 
 
 
N 
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Sample Valid Missing % Missing 
Q1 90 89 1 1.1 3.85 .97 -1.30 1.84 
Q2 90 88 2 2.2 3.51 1.06 -.38 -.96 
Q3 90 89 1 1.1 3.66 1.02 -.72 -.19 
Q4 90 88 2 2.2 2.48 1.15 .35 -1.08 
Q5 90 88 2 2.2 3.36 1.12 -.41 -.86 
Q6 90 87 3 3.3 3.74 1.05 -1.36 1.37 
Q7 90 86 4 4.4 3.37 1.09 -.23 -1.22 
Q8 90 89 1 1.1 3.73 1.04 -.67 -.49 
Q9 90 89 1 1.1 3.35 1.03 -.43 -.72 
Q10 90 88 2 2.2 2.75 1.25 .31 -1.01 
Q11 90 88 2 2.2 2.60 1.12 .54 -.47 
Q12 90 87 3 3.3 2.86 1.13 .13 -1.29 
Q13 90 89 1 1.1 2.90 1.13 .01 -1.23 
Q14 90 87 3 3.3 3.78 1.03 -.66 -.38 
Q15 90 89 1 1.1 3.67 .96 -.86 .29 
Q16 90 88 2 2.2 3.16 1.21 .00 -1.38 
Q17 90 89 1 1.1 3.75 .99 -1.20 .93 
Q18 90 88 2 2.2 3.82 .85 -.78 .25 
Q19 90 89 1 1.1 4.17 .84 -1.96 5.64 
Q20 90 89 1 1.1 3.30 1.04 -.08 -1.10 
Q21 90 89 1 1.1 3.92 .88 -.96 1.01 
Q22 90 87 3 3.3 3.49 1.00 -.63 -.45 
Q23 90 89 1 1.1 3.51 1.07 -.50 -.54 
Q24 90 88 2 2.2 2.75 1.19 .16 -1.26 
Q25 90 88 2 2.2 2.93 1.14 .14 -1.06 
Q26 90 88 2 2.2 3.38 1.02 -.55 -.62 
Q27 90 89 1 1.1 3.27 1.23 -.12 -1.23 
Q28 90 89 1 1.1 2.73 1.24 .31 -1.04 
Q29 90 89 1 1.1 3.45 .93 -.41 -.93 
Q30 90 88 2 2.2 3.75 .70 -1.47 1.90 
Q31 90 89 1 1.1 3.53 .97 -.47 -.88 
Q32 90 88 2 2.2 2.49 1.06 .38 -.96 
Q33 90 89 1 1.1 3.35 1.12 -.48 -.78 
Q34 90 89 1 1.1 2.64 1.35 .29 -1.30 
Q35 90 89 1 1.1 3.57 .93 -.44 -.30 
Q36 90 89 1 1.1 2.90 1.06 .21 -1.17 
Q37 90 85 5 5.6 3.04 1.05 -.01 -1.27 
Q38 90 87 3 3.3 3.38 1.18 -.35 -.94 
Q39 90 89 1 1.1 3.72 .97 -1.03 .54 
Q40 90 89 1 1.1 3.49 1.08 -.32 -1.04 
Q41 90 88 2 2.2 3.48 .98 -.57 -.72 
Q42 90 89 1 1.1 3.22 1.18 -.15 -1.27 
Q43 90 87 3 3.3 3.16 1.25 -.46 -1.03 
Q44 90 89 1 1.1 3.53 1.01 -.68 -.44 
Q45 90 89 1 1.1 2.73 1.08 .40 -.97 
Q46 90 88 2 2.2 3.76 .90 -.97 1.11 
Q47 90 87 3 3.3 3.82 .97 -1.02 .73 
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N 
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Sample Valid Missing % Missing 
Q48 90 86 4 4.4 3.34 1.10 -.17 -1.10 
Q49 90 89 1 1.1 3.24 1.31 -.51 -1.12 
Q50 90 88 2 2.2 3.38 1.17 -.64 -.54 
Q51 90 88 2 2.2 3.63 1.16 -.63 -.72 
Q52 90 88 2 2.2 3.78 .86 -.88 .28 
Q53 90 88 2 2.2 3.77 .83 -.43 -.19 
Q54 90 88 2 2.2 3.31 1.14 -.63 -.74 
Q55 90 89 1 1.1 3.85 1.06 -1.10 .79 
Q56 90 89 1 1.1 2.69 1.19 .06 -1.24 
Q57 90 87 3 3.3 3.74 .96 -.99 .60 
Q58 90 89 1 1.1 3.04 1.21 -.24 -1.01 
Q59 90 88 2 2.2 2.80 1.15 .04 -1.24 
Q60 90 88 2 2.2 3.18 1.13 -.07 -1.27 
Q61 90 88 2 2.2 2.30 1.08 .71 -.22 
Q62 90 88 2 2.2 3.08 1.17 -.29 -1.07 
Q63 90 88 2 2.2 2.58 1.25 .56 -.83 
Q64 90 87 3 3.3 3.62 .99 -.49 -.51 
Q65 90 88 2 2.2 3.26 1.25 -.19 -1.14 
Q66 90 88 2 2.2 3.78 .95 -1.02 .79 
Q67 90 88 2 2.2 3.17 1.18 -.12 -1.22 
Q68 90 88 2 2.2 3.44 1.15 -.71 -.42 
Q69 90 89 1 1.1 3.01 1.21 .21 -1.16 
Q70 90 87 3 3.3 2.45 1.20 .44 -.89 
Q71 90 88 2 2.2 3.00 1.16 -.04 -1.11 
Q72 90 89 1 1.1 4.00 .87 -1.29 2.47 
Q73 90 88 2 2.2 2.63 1.04 .56 -.75 
Q74 90 87 3 3.3 3.17 1.19 -.30 -1.04 
Q75 90 88 2 2.2 3.23 1.24 -.19 -1.27 
Q76 90 88 2 2.2 3.60 1.13 -1.12 .46 
Q77 90 88 2 2.2 3.68 .84 -1.38 1.80 
Q78 90 88 2 2.2 3.97 .85 -1.43 2.93 
Q79 90 89 1 1.1 2.82 1.23 .16 -1.21 
Q80 90 89 1 1.1 3.13 1.24 .03 -1.36 
Q81 90 89 1 1.1 3.01 1.22 .05 -1.20 
Q82 90 89 1 1.1 3.66 .92 -.81 .55 
Q83 90 88 2 2.2 3.40 1.01 -.40 -.43 
Q84 90 87 3 3.3 3.75 .94 -1.09 .85 
Q85 90 88 2 2.2 2.97 1.08 .13 -1.18 
Q86 90 88 2 2.2 2.35 1.30 .84 -.45 
Q87 90 89 1 1.1 3.52 1.05 -.69 -.14 
Q88 90 89 1 1.1 3.24 1.10 -.22 -1.17 
Q89 90 89 1 1.1 3.22 1.30 -.43 -1.12 
Q90 90 89 1 1.1 3.58 1.09 -.52 -.71 
Q91 90 88 2 2.2 3.40 1.07 -.98 -.06 
Q92 90 89 1 1.1 3.51 1.01 -.55 -.51 
Q93 90 89 1 1.1 3.38 1.17 -.66 -.57 
Q94 90 89 1 1.1 3.30 1.15 -.07 -1.12 
Q95 90 89 1 1.1 3.38 1.10 -.40 -.95 
Q96 90 89 1 1.1 3.72 .93 -.97 1.13 
Q97 90 87 3 3.3 3.06 1.11 -.17 -1.15 
Q98 90 89 1 1.1 3.22 1.28 .03 -1.45 
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N 
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Sample Valid Missing % Missing 
Q99 90 87 3 3.3 3.37 1.04 -.28 -.83 
Q100 90 89 1 1.1 2.67 1.05 .87 -.24 
Q101 90 88 2 2.2 3.44 1.04 -.54 -.52 
Q102 90 86 4 4.4 3.49 .95 -.46 -.56 
Q103 90 89 1 1.1 3.34 1.01 -.86 -.35 
Q104 90 88 2 2.2 2.82 1.08 .43 -.83 
Q105 90 89 1 1.1 3.34 1.07 -.48 -.49 
Q106 90 88 2 2.2 3.39 1.09 -.11 -1.16 
Q107 90 87 3 3.3 3.23 1.17 .07 -1.32 
Q108 90 88 2 2.2 2.55 1.12 .53 -.91 
Q109 90 89 1 1.1 3.70 1.04 -.61 -.30 
Q110 90 89 1 1.1 2.71 1.08 .11 -1.07 
Q111 90 89 1 1.1 3.01 1.11 -.17 -1.38 
Q112 90 89 1 1.1 3.45 1.01 -.80 -.13 
Q113 90 88 2 2.2 3.66 .97 -.89 .24 
Q114 90 88 2 2.2 2.70 1.11 .25 -.87 
Q115 90 88 2 2.2 3.15 1.07 -.13 -.94 
Q116 90 87 3 3.3 3.24 1.20 -.40 -1.11 
Q117 90 87 3 3.3 3.44 1.11 -.42 -.84 
Q118 90 89 1 1.1 3.30 1.03 -.32 -.73 
Q119 90 89 1 1.1 3.19 1.05 -.10 -1.18 
Q120 90 88 2 2.2 3.50 1.06 -.35 -.98 
Q121 90 89 1 1.1 3.24 1.14 -.01 -1.30 
Q122 90 87 3 3.3 3.86 .95 -1.03 .58 
Q123 90 89 1 1.1 3.64 .93 -.51 -.59 
Q124 90 88 2 2.2 3.49 .86 -.58 -.08 
Q125 90 88 2 2.2 2.92 1.04 -.09 -1.18 
Q126 90 88 2 2.2 3.36 1.01 -.58 -.89 
Q127 90 89 1 1.1 3.17 1.18 -.51 -.94 
Q128 90 88 2 2.2 3.52 .98 -.77 -.28 
Q129 90 89 1 1.1 3.15 1.16 -.20 -1.02 
Q130 90 88 2 2.2 3.81 .77 -1.19 2.17 
Q131 90 88 2 2.2 2.36 1.05 .61 -.44 
Q132 90 89 1 1.1 3.37 .99 -.59 -.50 
Q133 90 89 1 1.1 3.09 1.08 -.07 -1.15 
Q134 90 87 3 3.3 3.17 1.03 -.42 -.73 
Q135 90 86 4 4.4 3.27 1.09 -.11 -1.14 
Q136 90 88 2 2.2 3.30 1.01 -.28 -.88 
Q137 90 88 2 2.2 3.20 1.08 -.20 -1.38 
Q138 90 89 1 1.1 3.69 .95 -1.12 .99 
Q139 90 88 2 2.2 3.07 1.14 -.37 -.91 
Q140 90 89 1 1.1 2.81 1.31 .12 -1.36 
Q141 90 89 1 1.1 3.70 .87 -1.05 1.22 
Q142 90 87 3 3.3 3.64 1.01 -.47 -.87 
Q143 90 88 2 2.2 3.60 1.11 -.55 -.57 
Q144 90 89 1 1.1 3.56 1.10 -.74 -.33 
Q145 90 89 1 1.1 3.35 1.16 -.36 -.91 
Q146 90 89 1 1.1 2.55 1.25 .27 -1.34 
Q147 90 89 1 1.1 2.71 1.12 .31 -1.00 
Q148 90 89 1 1.1 3.62 .94 -1.46 1.78 
Q149 90 89 1 1.1 3.30 1.11 -.43 -.83 
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N 
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Sample Valid Missing % Missing 
Q150 90 88 2 2.2 3.39 1.09 -.39 -.86 
Q151 90 89 1 1.1 3.20 1.16 -.50 -.83 
Q152 90 89 1 1.1 3.03 1.16 -.20 -1.09 
Q153 90 88 2 2.2 2.65 1.27 .14 -1.24 
Q154 90 89 1 1.1 3.22 1.12 -.21 -.88 
Q155 90 87 3 3.3 3.86 .75 -.78 .88 
Q156 90 88 2 2.2 3.32 1.13 -.27 -1.13 
Q157 90 89 1 1.1 3.39 1.15 -.28 -1.09 
Q158 90 88 2 2.2 2.93 1.28 -.04 -1.19 
Q159 90 89 1 1.1 3.61 .89 -1.23 1.78 
Q160 90 89 1 1.1 3.01 1.21 -.30 -1.21 
Q161 90 88 2 2.2 3.76 .92 -1.30 1.70 
Q162 90 89 1 1.1 2.78 1.07 .07 -1.15 
Q163 90 88 2 2.2 3.52 1.11 -.80 -.13 
Q164 90 89 1 1.1 2.85 1.26 -.03 -1.29 
Q165 90 89 1 1.1 3.25 1.23 -.19 -1.18 
Q166 90 89 1 1.1 2.80 1.18 .23 -1.13 
Q167 90 88 2 2.2 2.78 1.25 .06 -1.36 
Q168 90 88 2 2.2 2.86 1.15 .04 -1.07 
Q169 90 88 2 2.2 2.73 1.18 .34 -1.03 
Q170 90 89 1 1.1 3.26 1.11 -.28 -1.04 
Q171 90 89 1 1.1 3.46 1.01 -.77 -.09 
Q172 90 88 2 2.2 3.66 1.00 -.59 -.46 
Q173 90 89 1 1.1 3.62 1.06 -.64 -.50 
Q174 90 87 3 3.3 3.14 1.22 -.31 -1.17 
Q175 90 88 2 2.2 3.67 1.00 -.76 -.02 
Q176 90 89 1 1.1 3.45 1.06 -.64 -.39 
Q177 90 88 2 2.2 3.74 .93 -1.13 .97 
Q178 90 88 2 2.2 3.56 .96 -.53 -.79 
Q179 90 87 3 3.3 3.56 .89 -.35 -.59 
Q180 90 87 3 3.3 2.82 1.09 -.01 -1.02 
Q181 90 87 3 3.3 3.61 .93 -.81 -.08 
Q182 90 88 2 2.2 3.07 1.01 -.34 -1.02 
Q183 90 88 2 2.2 3.63 1.08 -.67 -.31 
Q184 90 88 2 2.2 3.67 1.10 -1.00 .24 
Q185 90 88 2 2.2 2.78 1.14 .06 -1.21 
Q186 90 88 2 2.2 3.41 1.10 -.40 -.67 
Q187 90 88 2 2.2 3.10 1.11 -.41 -.98 
Q188 90 87 3 3.3 2.89 .98 -.07 -1.46 
Q189 90 87 3 3.3 3.91 1.05 -1.04 .61 
Q190 90 86 4 4.4 2.74 1.18 .16 -1.05 
Q191 90 86 4 4.4 3.01 1.13 .03 -.89 
Q192 90 87 3 3.3 2.98 1.11 -.01 -1.16 
Q193 90 87 3 3.3 3.38 1.10 -.43 -.96 
Q194 90 87 3 3.3 3.59 .90 -.86 .53 
Q195 90 87 3 3.3 2.57 1.20 .42 -.93 
Q196 90 87 3 3.3 3.18 1.12 -.17 -1.12 
Q197 90 87 3 3.3 3.66 1.11 -.64 -.64 
Q198 90 86 4 4.4 2.19 1.08 1.00 .28 
Q199 90 87 3 3.3 3.41 1.16 -.59 -.49 
Q200 90 87 3 3.3 2.31 1.09 .67 -.51 
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N 
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Sample Valid Missing % Missing 
Q201 90 86 4 4.4 3.53 1.00 -.46 -.68 
Q202 90 87 3 3.3 2.78 1.11 .03 -1.27 
Q203 90 87 3 3.3 2.53 1.18 .47 -.77 
Q204 90 86 4 4.4 3.24 1.11 -.34 -.67 
Q205 90 86 4 4.4 3.31 1.11 -.28 -.85 
Q206 90 87 3 3.3 3.55 1.06 -.79 -.14 
Q207 90 88 2 2.2 2.85 1.19 -.09 -1.23 
Q208 90 88 2 2.2 2.85 1.11 -.01 -1.17 
Q209 90 88 2 2.2 3.47 1.05 -.49 -.76 
Q210 90 88 2 2.2 3.38 1.02 -.68 -.41 
Q211 90 87 3 3.3 3.49 1.08 -.64 -.60 
Q212 90 87 3 3.3 3.83 .89 -1.06 .97 
Q213 90 88 2 2.2 3.32 1.14 -.37 -.72 
Q214 90 87 3 3.3 3.66 1.03 -1.01 .47 
Q215 90 87 3 3.3 3.76 1.05 -.75 -.13 
Q216 90 86 4 4.4 3.52 .98 -.61 -.26 
Q217 90 87 3 3.3 3.55 1.03 -.56 -.49 
Q218 90 87 3 3.3 3.30 1.06 -.57 -.60 
Q219 90 87 3 3.3 3.48 1.04 -.58 -.45 
Q220 90 88 2 2.2 3.20 1.19 -.24 -1.00 
Q221 90 88 2 2.2 3.03 1.13 -.36 -1.13 
Q222 90 87 3 3.3 3.51 1.18 -.60 -.56 
Q223 90 88 2 2.2 3.45 1.05 -.21 -1.22 
Q224 90 88 2 2.2 3.06 1.19 -.28 -.97 
Q225 90 86 4 4.4 3.50 1.08 -.60 -.60 
Q226 90 87 3 3.3 3.52 1.03 -.99 .25 
Q227 90 88 2 2.2 3.59 1.06 -.96 .30 
Q228 90 88 2 2.2 3.64 1.04 -.65 -.11 
Q229 90 87 3 3.3 4.02 .73 -.77 1.09 
Q230 90 88 2 2.2 2.33 1.21 .61 -.74 
Q231 90 88 2 2.2 3.24 1.09 -.28 -.98 
Q232 90 86 4 4.4 3.38 1.08 -.18 -1.15 
Q233 90 87 3 3.3 3.21 1.06 -.37 -.99 
Q234 90 87 3 3.3 3.17 1.12 -.20 -.85 
Q235 90 86 4 4.4 3.80 .81 -.99 1.47 
Q236 90 88 2 2.2 2.99 1.17 -.20 -.99 
Q237 90 87 3 3.3 3.53 .97 -.78 .13 
Q238 90 87 3 3.3 3.48 1.04 -.83 .04 
Q239 90 86 4 4.4 3.07 1.06 -.14 -.94 
Q240 90 87 3 3.3 3.48 1.10 -.47 -.72 
Q241 90 87 3 3.3 3.15 1.05 -.37 -.93 
Q242 90 85 5 5.6 2.95 1.10 -.18 -1.12 
Q243 90 86 4 4.4 3.06 1.02 -.25 -.65 
Q244 90 87 3 3.3 3.03 1.18 -.24 -1.05 
Q245 90 87 3 3.3 2.62 1.01 .48 -.81 
Q246 90 87 3 3.3 3.13 1.22 -.13 -1.10 
Q247 90 87 3 3.3 3.47 .94 -.65 -.16 
Q248 90 85 5 5.6 3.42 .96 -.53 -.74 
Q249 90 86 4 4.4 3.08 1.08 .24 -1.05 
Q250 90 87 3 3.3 3.31 1.07 -.30 -.91 
Q251 90 86 4 4.4 3.23 1.10 -.42 -.77 
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N 
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Sample Valid Missing % Missing 
Q252 90 85 5 5.6 3.60 1.09 -.77 -.17 
Q253 90 87 3 3.3 3.59 .90 -.66 -.01 
Q254 90 86 4 4.4 3.55 1.09 -.51 -.78 
Q255 90 84 6 6.7 2.93 1.21 -.11 -1.12 
Q256 90 87 3 3.3 2.80 1.07 -.07 -1.01 
Q257 90 86 4 4.4 3.38 1.00 -.99 -.02 
Q258 90 87 3 3.3 2.98 1.12 -.26 -1.14 
Q259 90 86 4 4.4 3.50 1.00 -.43 -.75 
Q260 90 87 3 3.3 3.69 .99 -.80 .11 
Q261 90 87 3 3.3 2.97 1.03 -.32 -1.07 
Q262 90 87 3 3.3 3.09 1.06 -.13 -.87 
Q263 90 87 3 3.3 3.72 1.06 -.90 .10 
Q264 90 86 4 4.4 2.83 .90 .05 -.75 
Q265 90 87 3 3.3 3.30 1.05 -.51 -.73 
Q266 90 87 3 3.3 3.08 1.12 -.16 -1.11 
Q267 90 87 3 3.3 3.39 1.07 -.61 -.63 
Q268 90 87 3 3.3 3.03 1.18 -.07 -.92 
Q269 90 87 3 3.3 3.40 .96 -.65 -.16 
Q270 90 87 3 3.3 2.83 1.09 -.09 -1.14 
Q271 90 87 3 3.3 2.99 1.18 -.07 -1.24 
Q272 90 86 4 4.4 3.16 .94 -.42 -.80 
Q273 90 87 3 3.3 2.74 1.14 .15 -1.18 
Q274 90 86 4 4.4 3.42 1.12 -.38 -.73 
Q275 90 87 3 3.3 3.37 1.07 -.55 -.43 
Q276 90 86 4 4.4 2.90 1.20 .21 -1.15 
Q277 90 87 3 3.3 2.72 1.26 .15 -1.23 
Q278 90 87 3 3.3 3.09 1.15 .01 -1.12 
Q279 90 86 4 4.4 2.50 1.18 .31 -1.01 
Q280 90 87 3 3.3 3.38 1.00 -.54 -.49 
Q281 90 85 5 5.6 3.41 1.07 -.36 -.69 
Q282 90 86 4 4.4 3.49 .94 -.70 -.13 
Q283 90 84 6 6.7 3.58 .95 -.99 .24 
Q284 90 86 4 4.4 3.28 1.07 -.35 -.78 
Q285 90 87 3 3.3 2.95 1.15 -.10 -1.13 
Q286 90 85 5 5.6 3.06 1.07 -.12 -1.01 
Q287 90 87 3 3.3 2.70 1.14 .23 -1.02 
Q288 90 87 3 3.3 2.91 1.19 -.16 -1.08 
Q289 90 87 3 3.3 3.74 .98 -.72 -.15 
Q290 90 85 5 5.6 3.51 1.04 -.31 -.89 
Q291 90 86 4 4.4 2.85 1.02 .04 -1.35 
Q292 90 86 4 4.4 3.50 1.09 -.44 -.87 
Q293 90 87 3 3.3 3.62 .96 -.72 -.22 
Q294 90 87 3 3.3 3.06 1.26 -.22 -1.04 
Q295 90 87 3 3.3 3.25 1.06 -.59 -.57 
Q296 90 87 3 3.3 2.93 1.18 -.08 -1.22 
Q297 90 85 5 5.6 3.52 .78 -1.21 1.41 
Q298 90 85 5 5.6 3.65 1.02 -.75 -.15 
Q299 90 85 5 5.6 3.44 1.11 -.51 -.65 
Q300 90 83 7 7.8 2.92 1.13 .06 -1.11 
Q301 90 84 6 6.7 3.33 1.03 -.58 -.54 
Q302 90 84 6 6.7 3.50 1.05 -.68 -.14 
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N 
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Sample Valid Missing % Missing 
Q303 90 85 5 5.6 3.45 1.03 -.59 -.44 
Q304 90 84 6 6.7 3.74 .85 -.90 .27 
Q305 90 85 5 5.6 3.48 1.09 -.61 -.66 
Q306 90 83 7 7.8 3.54 .98 -.96 .22 
Q307 90 85 5 5.6 3.45 1.19 -.72 -.44 
Q308 90 84 6 6.7 3.50 1.10 -.83 -.06 
Q309 90 85 5 5.6 3.55 1.05 -.77 -.03 
Q310 90 84 6 6.7 3.02 1.18 -.41 -1.20 
Q311 90 85 5 5.6 3.67 1.02 -1.11 1.02 
Q312 90 83 7 7.8 3.19 1.11 -.01 -.84 
Q313 90 84 6 6.7 3.60 1.00 -.68 .17 
Q314 90 85 5 5.6 3.75 .97 -.98 .54 
Q315 90 84 6 6.7 3.32 1.08 -.32 -.90 
Q316 90 85 5 5.6 3.02 1.11 -.15 -1.03 
Q317 90 84 6 6.7 3.48 1.09 -.82 -.05 
Q318 90 82 8 8.9 2.68 1.21 .12 -1.13 
Q319 90 85 5 5.6 3.40 1.10 -.47 -.71 
Q320 90 85 5 5.6 3.44 1.12 -.46 -.69 
Q321 90 84 6 6.7 3.48 1.07 -.45 -.80 
Q322 90 85 5 5.6 3.56 1.02 -.84 .27 
Q323 90 85 5 5.6 3.74 .93 -.83 .28 
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Appendix 4-Covering letter for the sample recruitment (preliminary items pool)  
Dear Respondent, 
 
My name is Ying Feng and I am a PhD student at the University of Glasgow, Scotland (U.K.), studying  
people’s dispositions in relation to Rules and Principles in public life domain. I would be very grateful 
if you would assist me in my research by taking in place in an experiment which you will be asked to 
complete a questionnaire online, which will take you about 1hr- 1hr 20 minutes to complete. 
 
I appreciate, of course, that this is a lot of time to ask of you, but I hope that the results of my work will 
be useful in helping to building a theory of how individuals respond Rules and Principles which will be 
of considerable practical value.  This work is vital to my PhD plan and it is therefore very important for 
me to have your responses to this questionnaire.  
 
Moreover, you will be rewarded. We will pay you around £5 per person plus we will provide some 
refreshments (Drinks and Cookies) to you during your participation. The location will be in a computer 
lab in Accounting and Finance department in the Main Building, and you will be instructed to log into 
a lab computer and then access the questionnaire online, you do not have to prepare anything in 
advance. 
 
Or if you cannot make it to the lab, but you are interested to take place, please also contact me and I 
will e-mail you the link to the questionnaire and once you complete it and by informing me, you will 
receive your rewards. 
 
I believe you to find the questionnaire interesting and perhaps thought provoking. I believe that it 
contains nothing of disturbing nature and I see no risks associated with its completion. However, if you 
feel uncomfortable answering any questions, you can withdraw from the survey at any point.  I 
guarantee that responses will be used anonymously and that data will not be held connecting response 
to named individuals. Basic data collected will be held within my immediate research group which 
consists just of myself and my two PhD supervisors at the university of Glasgow: Prof. Paddy 
O'Donnell and Dr John McKernan.  I hope ultimately to publish my work in my PhD thesis which, if 
accepted, will be a publicly available document.  
I believe you will take the time to complete this questionnaire and submit it online. Your participation 
is of course voluntary.  
 
Regardless of whether you choose to participate, please let me know if you would like a summary of 
my findings.  
 
If you are happy to get involved and participate in it, please e-mail me at y.feng.1@research.gla.ac.uk   
Thank you very much for your time and support.  
 
Sincerely,  
Miss Ying Feng (Olivia) 
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Appendix 5-Cronbach’s alphas for 28 dimensional scales 
Table 1 
Certainty _rules n mean Variance SD No. of items  
 82 16.95 16.2 4.02 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum / 
Minimum 
Varian
ce 
Item Means 2.83 2.42 3.42 1.0 1.42 .15 
Item Variances 1.14 .93 1.26 .32 1.34 .018 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.27 .07 .52 .44 7.03 .02 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q156REV 14.33 12.54 .30 .12 .70  
q92rev 14.49 12.63 .36 .18 .68  
q173rev 14.53 11.89 .41 .27 .66  
q242 13.98 11.24 .49 .34 .66  
q97 13.87 11.68 .40 .28 .62  
q176 13.51 10.99 .56 .42 .60  
Cronbach's Alpha .70 
Table 2 
Certainty 
_principles 
n mean Variance SD No. of items  
 83 19.88 14.5 3.8 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum / 
Minimum 
Varia
nce 
Item Means 3.31 2.92 3.66 .75 1.26 .10 
Item Variances 1.05 .89 1.29 .40 1.45 .02 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.26 .02 .47 .45 26.51 .02 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q64 16.24 11.01 .38 .36 .65  
q293 16.22 10.59 .50 .33 .61  
q280 16.48 11.25 .34 .16 .66  
q36REV 16.82 10.08 .50 .29 .61  
q182REV 16.96 11.38 .31 .25 .67  
q185REV 16.67 9.95 .45 .36 .62  
Cronbach's Alpha .68 
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Table 3 
Complexity_ 
Rules 
n mean Variance SD No. of items  
 84 16.27 18.78 4.3 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum/ 
Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.71 2.41 3.08 .67 1.28 .07 
Item Variances 1.26 1.05 1.58 .53 1.51 .05 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.30 .10 .57 .47 5.66 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
 
q227rev 13.74 14.44 .39 .20 .70  
q322rev 13.86 14.41 .43 .35 .69  
q301rev 13.83 14.42 .42 .30 .69  
q266 13.61 13.99 .43 .30 .67  
q79 13.19 13.02 .49 .38 .67  
q164 13.43 12.42 .54 .41 .65  
Cronbach's Alpha .72 
 
Table 4 
Complexity_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No. of items  
 84 19.3 16.8 4.1 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.22 2.79 3.56 .75 1.27 .09 
Item Variances 1.07 .88 1.23 .35 1.40 .01 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.33 .17 .46 .30 2.77 .01 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q85 16.37 12.53 .41 .21 .73  
q303 15.88 12.30 .48 .29 .71  
q237 15.77 12.35 .54 .34 .69  
q245rev 15.94 12.51 .46 .30 .71  
q147rev 16.06 11.77 .50 .27 .70  
q137rev 16.52 12.13 .48 .29 .704  
Cronbach's Alpha .74 
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Table 5 
Concrete_rules n mean Variance SD No. of items  
 83 16.29 17.78 4.22 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.72 2.51 3.08 .58 1.23 .04 
Item Variances 1.26 1.08 1.61 .53 1.50 .04 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.27 .02 .46 .44 19.83 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q254REV 13.78 13.42 .41 .24 .65  
q98REV 13.51 12.02 .51 .31 .62  
q321REV 13.76 13.90 .33 .20 .68  
q56 13.63 11.41 .61 .47 .58  
q110 13.57 13.76 .37 .30 .67  
q262 13.20 14.36 .30 .20 .69  
Cronbach's Alpha .69 
 
Table 6 
Abstract_ 
principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
 80 20.4 16.3 4.04 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.41 3.11 3.71 .60 1.20 .06 
Item Variances 1.12 .92 1.32 .41 1.45 .03 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.28 .09 .55 .47 6.47 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
 
q109 16.69 12.50 .38 .16 .69  
q201 16.84 12.37 .41 .19 .68  
q175 16.68 13.28 .30 .16 .71  
q287REV 17.12 10.24 .64 .47 .60  
q12REV 17.31 11.50 .46 .32 .66  
q256REV 17.19 11.96 .44 .27 .70  
Cronbach's Alpha .71 
 
Table 7 
Creativity_Rules n mean Variance SD No.of items  
 82 16.5 18.6 4.3 6  
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 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.75 2.35 3.09 .73 1.31 .10 
Item Variances 1.24 .99 1.44 .45 1.45 .02 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.30 .15 .46 .31 3.00 .10 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q299rev 13.94 13.39 .50 .31 .67  
q197rev 14.13 13.11 .53 .33 .66  
q41rev 13.99 14.11 .47 .29 .68  
q255 13.55 13.02 .48 .24 .67  
q221 13.40 13.95 .42 .21 .69  
q268 13.43 14.27 .34 .14 .72  
Cronbach's Alpha .72 
 
Table 8 
Creativity_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
 82 21.2 20 4.5 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.52 3.32 3.79 .48 1.14 .04 
Item Variances 1.19 .74 1.73 .99 2.34 .13 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.36 .18 .54 .36 3.03 .01 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q203rev 17.72 13.86 .52 .29 .74  
q63rev 17.83 12.69 .60 .41 .72  
q73rev 17.79 14.56 .51 .33 .74  
q66 17.35 14.95 .55 .38 .73  
q211 17.63 14.88 .50 .35 .74  
q304 17.40 16.22 .44 .25 .76  
Cronbach's Alpha .77 
 
Table 9 
Ethics_Rules n mean Variance SD No.of items  
 85 10.74 10.15 3.19 4  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum / 
Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.69 2.61 2.85 .24 1.09 .01 
Item Variances 1.33 1.14 1.61 .47 .05 .05 
Inter-Item .30 .13 .44 .31 .01 .01 
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Correlations 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
Q232rev 8.11 6.76 .40 .21 .57  
Q106rev 8.13 6.71 .40 .24 .57  
q207 7.89 5.81 .52 .29 .48  
Q153 8.09 6.35 .34 .20 .62  
Cronbach's Alpha .63 
 
Table 10 
Ethics_principles n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statics for scale 85 13.94 9.68 3.11 4  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.49 3.27 3.64 .37 1.11 .02 
Item Variances 1.23 1.06 1.47 .41 1.39 .04 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.32 .08 .62 .53 7.47 .04 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q230rev 10.31 5.17 .55 .43 .49  
q190rev 10.67 6.15 .40 .39 .61  
q309 10.39 6.55 .38 .31 .62  
q238 10.46 6.42 .42 .31 .59  
Cronbach's Alpha .65 
Table 11 
Empowerment 
_Rules 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for 
Scale 
84 16.8 20.1 4.5 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.81 2.42 3.39 .97 1.40 .13 
Item Variances 1.36 1.18 1.50 .33 1.28 .01 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.29 .11 .45 .34 4.73 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q90rev 14.41 14.20 .58 .389 .64  
q107rev 14.14 14.65 .42 .237 .68  
q42rev 14.05 14.50 .46 .294 .67  
q50 13.45 14.30 .51 .310 .65  
q244 13.80 14.95 .41 .285 .68  
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q4 14.33 15.84 .31 .199 .71  
Cronbach's Alpha .73 
Table 12 
Empowerment_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for scale 84 20.4 17.7 4.2 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.40 2.97 3.69 .73 1.25 .10 
Item Variances 1.17 1.03 1.38 .34 1.33 .02 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.30 .130 .52 .39 3.7 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q13rev 17.34 12.25 .53 .36 .66  
q111rev 17.46 13.01 .45 .32 .70  
q108rev 17.06 12.44 .47 .29 .68  
q311 16.75 13.45 .44 .37 .70  
q298 16.78 13.34 .45 .33 .69  
q263 16.73 13.44 .41 .25 .71  
Cronbach's Alpha .73 
 
Table 13 
Effectiveness_ 
Rules 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for 
scale 
79 17.1 15.05 3.88 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.85 2.52 3.61 1.09 1.43 .16 
Item Variances 1.14 .81 1.28 .48 1.59 .03 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.25 .10 .44 .35 4.93 .01 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q312rev 14.13 11.78 .31 .17 .65  
q302rev 14.42 11.25 .43 .27 .60  
q292rev 14.42 11.64 .40 .21 .63  
q273 14.16 12.18 .30 .14 .66  
q253 13.29 11.38 .47 .31 .60  
q180 14.04 10.73 .46 .27 .59  
Cronbach's Alpha .67  
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Table 14 
Effectiveness_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for scale 84 18.4 15.3 3.9 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.09 2.37 3.65 1.23 1.54 .24 
Item Variances 1.22 1.05 1.41 .38 1.37 .01 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.21 .06 .42 .41 6.68 .01 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
Q213 15.14 11.84 .30 .18 .60  
Q172 14.79 11.96 .32 .14 .57  
Q87 14.94 11.66 .34 .23 .57  
q186rev 15.84 10.75 .45 .29 .53  
q258REV 15.43 11.12 .36 .19 .56  
q51REV 16.07 11.14 .33 .22 .58  
Cronbach's Alpha .61 
 
Table 15 
Efficiency_ 
Rules 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for 
scale 
81 10.58 8.45 2.91 4  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.65 2.41 3.22 .82 1.34 .15 
Item Variances 1.06 .89 1.15 .26 1.29 .01 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.33 .27 .39 .12 1.46 .002 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q134 7.36 5.36 .43 .19 .62  
q32 8.1 5.09 .47 .22 .59  
q283rev 8.17 5.67 .42 .19 .62  
q40rev 8.11 5 .48 .24 .58  
Cronbach's Alpha .67 
 
Table 16 
Efficiency_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for scale 84 12.36 7.2 2.68 4  
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 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.09 2.58 3.42 .83 1.32 .16 
Item Variances 1.1 .92 1.48 .56 1.61 .07 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.21 .06 .32 .26 5.44 .01 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q81REV 9.39 4.19 .31 .11 .45  
q126REV 9.77 4.9 .31 .15 .44  
q83 8.96 4.59 .35 .16 .41  
q248 8.94 5.12 .30 .11 .48  
Cronbach's Alpha .52  
 
Table 17 
Fairness_ 
Rules 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for 
scale 
84 15.5 18.1 4.3 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.59 2.18 3.06 .87 1.40 .10 
Item Variances 1.26 .83 1.57 .75 1.91 .09 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.29 .15 .44 .29 2.98 .01 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q289REV 13.34 13.37 .50 .32 .64  
q240REV 13.06 12.85 .50 .26 .64  
q123REV 13.21 14.72 .37 .21 .68  
q28 12.80 12.46 .47 .23 .65  
q167 12.76 13.64 .31 .10 .68  
q139 12.47 12.97 .46 .24 .65  
Cronbach's Alpha .68 
 
Table 18 
Fairness_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for 
scale 
77 19.7 18.3 4.3 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.29 2.72 3.81 1.09 1.36 .12 
Item Variances 1.29 .68 1.59 .91 2.11 .08 
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Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.27 .10 .55 .46 4.31 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
 
q5 16.29 14.16 .34 .16 .71  
q53 15.83 15.42 .40 .24 .70  
q308 16.18 14.30 .33 .15 .72  
q169REV 16.45 11.88 .63 .51 .62  
q74REV 16.52 12.86 .53 .37 .66  
q300REV 16.84 12.66 .50 .36 .66  
Cronbach's Alpha .72 
 
Table 19 
Legitimacy_ 
Rules 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for 
scale 
88 17.4 16.4 4.1 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.89 2.45 3.60 1.10 1.45 .21 
Item Variances 1.23 .79 1.77 .97 2.22 .11 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.25 .04 .55 .51 13.46 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q274REV 14.93 12.44 .32 .19 .64  
q259REV 14.98 12.96 .31 .24 .64  
q163REV 15.05 12.59 .33 .15 .63  
q159 14.34 11.44 .43 .36 .60  
q49 13.95 12.15 .53 .38 .58  
q127 14.26 10.59 .45 .21 .59  
Cronbach's Alpha .66 
 
Table 20 
Legitimacy_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistics for scale 82 19.9 17.7 4.2 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.317 3.061 3.585 .524 1.171 .035 
Item Variances 1.227 1.042 1.369 .326 1.313 .016 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.284 .164 .434 .270 2.648 .007 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
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Deleted 
q166REV 16.71 13.22 .37 .21 .68  
q131REV 16.32 12.66 .47 .27 .65  
q168REV 16.84 13.05 .40 .17 .67  
q225 16.45 13.29 .42 .22 .67  
q284 16.63 13.27 .42 .20 .67  
q26 16.56 12.74 .54 .31 .63  
Cronbach's Alpha .70 
 
Table 21 
Manipulation_ 
Rules 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistical for 
scale 
80 16.6 20.2 4.5 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.77 2.48 3.29 .81 1.33 .14 
Item Variances 1.24 1.04 1.52 .49 1.47 .04 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.35 .13 .57 .43 4.24 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q320rev 14.05 15.64 .37 .28 .76  
q290rev 14.11 14.81 .56 .41 .71  
q223rev 14.01 14.14 .63 .45 .69  
q70 14.13 14.75 .45 .28 .74  
q241 13.39 14.80 .54 .36 .72  
q65 13.31 14.29 .47 .27 .73  
Cronbach's Alpha .76 
 
Table 22 
Manipulation_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
Statistical for 
scale 
87 18.17 15.75 3.97 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.03 2.39 3.38 .99 1.41 .18 
Item Variances 1.19 .98 1.66 .68 1.69 .06 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.25 .04 .52 .48 12.24 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q33REV 15.56 12.02 .34 .23 .64  
q10REV 14.99 11.48 .30 .19 .66  
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q217REV 15.78 12.13 .36 .20 .63  
q132 14.79 11.59 .37 .32 .59  
q118 14.87 11.39 .47 .36 .59  
q250 14.86 11.52 .43 .37 .60  
Cronbach's Alpha .66 
 
Table 23 
Security_Rules n mean Variance SD No.of items  
 87 17.8 21.2 4.6 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 2.96 2.48 3.39 .91 1.37 .10 
Item Variances 1.32 1.15 1.54 .39 1.34 .03 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.34 .14 .60 .46 4.26 .01 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q91 14.37 14.84 .63 .48 .68  
q231 14.54 15.79 .49 .30 .72  
q160 14.77 14.51 .57 .42 .70  
q80REV 14.90 14.63 .53 .29 .71  
q120REV 15.28 16.06 .46 .25 .73  
q220REV 14.94 16.92 .30 .12 .77  
Cronbach's Alpha .75 
 
Table 24 
Security_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
 80 19.76 13.83 3.72 6  
 Mean Minimu
m 
Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.29 2.68 3.83 1.15 1.43 .20 
Item Variances 1.09 .75 1.5 .75 2.0 .07 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.23 .05 .55 .50 11.70 .02 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q99rev 17.09 10.54 .33 .14 .60  
q286rev 16.77 10.35 .34 .31 .60  
q276rev 16.68 8.96 .46 .36 .55  
q18 15.94 11.12 .34 .15 .60  
q148 16.11 10.46 .43 .30 .57  
q144 16.22 10.43 .31 .20 .61  
Cronbach's Alpha .63 
332 
 
332 
 
 
 
 
Table 25 
 
Uniformity_ 
Rules 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
 83 18.8 24.7 4.9 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.13 2.74 3.41 .67 1.25 .06 
Item Variances 1.50 1.27 1.79 .52 1.41 .04 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.35 .20 .57 .37 2.83 .01 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
 
q34REV 15.35 17.47 .49 .29 .74  
q11REV 15.44 18.01 .53 .37 .72  
q27REV 16.02 17.12 .59 .44 .71  
q294 15.71 18.04 .47 .30 .74  
q234 15.58 19.56 .39 .19 .76  
q152 15.73 17.60 .58 .40 .71  
Cronbach's Alpha .76 
 
Table 26 
Flexibility_ 
Principles 
n mean Variance SD No.of items  
 82 19.8 12.7 3.6 6  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Maximum 
/Minimum 
Variance 
Item Means 3.29 2.77 3.82 1.05 1.38 .24 
Item Variances 1.09 .63 1.48 .85 2.35 .15 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
.19 .07 .36 .29 5.22 .01 
 Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
 
q194 16.18 10.03 .33 .21 .53  
q235 15.94 10.4 .32 .15 .54  
q161 15.99 9.92 .33 .16 .53  
q67rev 16.99 8.74 .34 .18 .52  
q37rev 16.93 9.03 .33 .17 .53  
q71rev 16.79 9.11 .29 .10 .55  
Cronbach's Alpha .60 
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Appendix 6-Eight scenarios  
 
1. As a finance director for an important branch of a large UK company, part of the 
duties one has is to send quarterly branch accounts to senior management of the 
parent company. Reporting guidelines have been provided by the head office to help 
ensure that the accounts show a true and fair view of the branch’s performance and 
position. 
 
Required approach for Paul:  (a) discussion of the qualities the senior management 
expect to find balanced in the accounts, including for example – relevance and 
reliability; (b) An explanation of the purposes for which the quarterly reports are used 
and discussion of the reporting headings normally considered relevant to those 
purposes; (c) Discussion of permissible accounting methods and approaches to 
important accounting estimations, and discussion of indicators of which methods and 
approaches might be appropriate in particular cases.  
 
Required approach for Martin: (a) A standard reporting format in terms of which the 
accounts are to be produced; (b) A detailed “chart of accounts” with associated rules 
for the classification of all kinds of expenses, income, assets and liabilities; (c) 
Comprehensive instructions indicating exactly which accounting  method should be 
employed covering a full range of issues and situations; (d) Precise instructions 
covering how any estimates which are necessary for the purposes of the accounts 
ought to be made and reported. 
 
Please reflect on your own behaviour and indicate what kind of situation you would 
be most comfortable in: 
1. Just like Paul's 
2. More like Paul's than Martin's 
3. More like Martin's than Paul's 
4. Just like Martin's 
 
2. When Tom makes an effort to improve his physical fitness he likes to set himself 
quite a specific diet and exercise plan. For example, he will decide in advance the 
particular days of the week and times when he must attend the gym and the exercise 
routines he ought to perform on each visit. Tom will enjoy keeping to his regular 
exercise plan even on those days when he isn’t really in the mood for exercise. 
 
When Jim makes an effort to improve his physical fitness he likes to be flexible. He 
will modify his diet, by for example cutting down on fatty foods, and he will visit the 
gym more often and generally take advantage of opportunities to increase the amount 
of exercise he takes. He will not try to impose a particular exercise regime on himself, 
knowing from experience that such an approach won’t work for him. 
 
Please reflect on your own behaviour and indicate what kind of approach you would 
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take: 
1 Just like Tom's 
2 More like Tom's than Jim's 
3 More like Jim's than Tom's 
4 Just like Jim's 
 
 
3. Lucy works as a research analyst for a private equity investment fund.  Her main task 
is to identify target companies that the fund might profitably invest in.  Her superiors 
have provided her with a checklist of issues to consider in her analysis. The checklist 
has been carefully developed through experience, and it highlights a wide range of 
economic performance, risk and governance factors which Lucy is expected to use as 
an “aide memoir” to guide her data collection and to help ensure that important issues 
are not overlooked. Lucy is required to rate the attractiveness of alternative 
investment possibilities and provide written justifications of her ratings based on her 
analysis of data collected and where appropriate her intuition. 
 
 Alison works as a research analyst for a private equity investment fund.  Her main 
task is to identify target companies that the fund might profitably invest in.  Her 
superiors have provided her with a checklist to structure her analysis. The checklist 
includes a carefully thought through set of economic performance, risk and 
governance factors, and Alison’s task is to gather all of the data the checklist indicates 
is needed. Once she has gathered all of the data, she enters it into a model which 
provides a score which is used to determine the attractiveness of each potential 
investment.  
 
Please reflect on your own behaviour and indicate what kind of situation you would 
work best in: 
1. Just like Lucy's 
2. More like Lucy's than Alison's 
3. More like Alison's than Lucy's 
4. Just like Alison's 
 
4. Jane is aware of the need to keep a balance between her social and work life, but she 
prefers take a flexible approach. She likes to “go with the flow” and takes advantage 
of social opportunities when they arise. She tends on average to go out socializing no 
more than twice a week, and when there is a clash she will generally put work 
commitments first. 
 
 Clare likes to keep her social life well regulated so that it doesn’t interfere with her 
work which is important to her. She confines herself going out no more than twice a 
week. Clare would be unhappy to break this rule of hers and she tries to plan ahead so 
that she is never pressed to do so. 
 
Please reflect on your own behaviour and indicate what kind of approach you would 
take: 
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1. Just like Jane's 
2. More like Jane's than Clare's 
3. More like Clare's than Jane's 
4. Just like Clare's 
 
5. John and three friends share an apartment which he likes to be kept clean. He prefers 
having a specific cleaning rota and wants to be able to know, in advance, who is 
responsible for what specific cleaning tasks on which days. He gets quite irritated if 
his flat-mates don’t respect the rota.   
 
Mark and three friends share an apartment which he likes to be kept clean. He does 
not see any need for a rota specifying who must do which tasks and when. He prefers 
a less formal system, but one in which keeping the flat clean is taken seriously and 
everyone does their fair share of the cleaning.     
 
Please reflect on your own behaviour and indicate what kind of approach you would 
take: 
1. Just like John's 
2. More like John's than Mark's 
3. More like Mark's than John's 
4. Just like Mark's 
 
6. As a finance advisor for a company that makes loans to university students. One’s job 
is to assess and make decisions on loan applications. The company has established 
criteria for deciding whether or not to a loan should be made to a particular applicant. 
 
Jennifer’s approach: She is required to make her decisions by “weighing up” an 
application in terms of the specified criteria. Some applications are strong on some 
criteria and relatively weak on others: Jennifer has been given no formula for 
weighing criteria and is expected to use her judgment in coming to decisions. In 
difficult cases she takes other factors into account – beyond those identified by the 
company as standard considerations. She likes and takes pride in the flexibility and 
discretion allowed to her in the decision-making process. She particularly appreciates 
the fact that she is never put in the position of having to mechanically reject 
“deserving cases” or vice versa. 
 
Anna’s approach: Her decisions are based on whether the particular applicant matches 
the specified criteria and all of which must be met before she can properly sanction a 
loan. She likes the predictability of the process. Just occasionally she feels that 
“deserving cases” have to be rejected because the application has not met all the 
necessary criteria, and vice versa. In such cases she takes a pride in neutrally applying 
the criteria irrespective of her own opinion and feelings about the decision.   
 
Please reflect on your own behaviour and indicate what kind of situation you would 
find most satisfying: 
1. Just like Jennifer's 
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2. More like Jennifer's than Anna's 
3. More like Anna's than Jennifer's 
4. Just like Anna's 
 
7. As someone has managerial responsibility for health and safety within a university 
with more than 25,000 students and 3,000 staff. Legislation provides only a bare 
sketch of the university’s duties in respect of health and safety, but over many years 
those in charge of health and safety within the university have developed detailed 
guidance and rules covering a wide range of issues and situations. 
 
Bob’s approach: He feels it is his duty to promote health and safety in the university 
by pressing for strict compliance with all the prescribed rules and procedures. Bob’s 
aim is build a culture of respect for health and safety through a “zero tolerance” 
approach towards breaches of the university health and safety and procedures. When 
breaches, of any kind, are reported his approach is to demand immediate action, 
covering rectification of the problem and where appropriate disciplinary action.   
 
Alan’s approach: He feels it is his duty to promote health and safety in the university 
by encouraging a flexible interpretation and application of the relevant rules and 
procedures that has regard to the real risk that various situations pose. Alan’s aim is to 
build a culture of respect for health and safety by engaging staff in thinking about 
health and safety matters, and helping them find reasonable solutions to problems, 
and be more alert to substantive issues and risks. When breaches are reported his 
approach is to involve the staff concerned in assessing and discussing the situation 
and negotiating appropriate solutions.      
 
Please reflect on your own behaviour and indicate in what kind of approach you 
would take: 
1. Just like Bob's 
2. More like Bob's than Alan's 
3. More like Alan's than Bob's 
4. Just like Alan's 
 
 
8. As someone who works as the customer services manager for a local organisation. As 
part of the job one manages a call centre which is responsible for monitoring 
customer satisfaction and promoting new services. One is trying to improve the 
working of the centre in terms of its efficiency, effectiveness, and the quality of its 
engagements with customers. 
 
Robert’s approach: He is now developing new job specifications and advice for the 
staff working in the centre, covering such things as the principles of time 
management in call handling, standards of courtesy, and listening skills. He plans to 
give the staff relatively loosely defined goals and to allow them flexibility in using 
their discretion in responding to customers concerns, taking various and sometimes 
contradictory factors into account. Robert recognizes that if service issues and new 
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service promotion opportunities are satisfactorily covered staff will need training in 
the development of their knowledge and understanding of the organisations services 
and new products. 
 
David’s approach: He is now developing new job specifications and advice for the 
staff working in the centre, covering such things as the specific minimum number of 
calls they ought to make each hour, how long each call should last, and the precise 
way staff should talk to customers to ensure courtesy and thorough coverage of 
issues. He plans to give the staff “scripts” to be strictly followed, in so far as is 
possible, when making calls so that service issues and new service promotion 
opportunities are satisfactorily covered. The scripts will be responsive to the 
information, concerning for example service opportunities revealed by the customer, 
gathered as a call proceeds, and their correct use will require training and monitoring 
of staff. 
 
Please reflect on your own behaviour and indicate which approach you would 
implement: 
1. Just like Robert's 
2. More like Robert's than David's 
3. More like David's than Robert's 
4. Just like David's 
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Appendix 7-Other Psychometric scales were used in this project 
 
Ten-Item Personality Inventory-(TIPI) 
 Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you.  Please write a number next 
to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should 
rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly 
than the other.            
1 = Disagree strongly 
2 = Disagree moderately 
3 = Disagree a little 
4 = Neither agree nor disagree 
5 = Agree a little 
6 = Agree moderately 
7 = Agree strongly 
I see myself as:  
1.    _____  Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
  
2.    _____  Critical, quarrelsome. 
  
3.    _____  Dependable, self-disciplined. 
  
4.    _____  Anxious, easily upset. 
  
5.    _____  Open to new experiences, complex. 
  
6.    _____  Reserved, quiet. 
  
7.    _____  Sympathetic, warm. 
  
8.    _____  Disorganized, careless. 
  
9.    _____  Calm, emotionally stable. 
  
10.  _____  Conventional, uncreative. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
TIPI scale scoring (“R” denotes reverse-scored items): 
Extraversion: 1, 6R; Agreeableness: 2R, 7; Conscientiousness; 3, 8R; Emotional Stability: 4R, 9; 
Openness to Experiences: 5, 10R.
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The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS)  
 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and 
decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. It is best to answer the 
following items with your first judgment without spending too much time thinking over any one 
question.  
Please circle “True” is the statement is true, and circle “False” if the statement is false to you 
personally.  
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.  
      True          False 
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. 
      True          False 
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. 
      True          False 
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they 
were right. 
      True          False 
5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.  
      True          False 
6. There have been occasions I took advantage of someone. 
      True          False 
7. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
      True          False 
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
      True          False 
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
      True          False 
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from mine. 
      True          False 
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
      True          False 
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
      True          False 
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.  
      True          False 
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Thinking Styles Inventory—Revised II (TSI-R2) 
 
Sternberg, R. J., Wagner, R. K., & Zhang, L. F. 
 
Tufts University, 2007 
 
This questionnaire is about the different strategies and ways people use to solve problems, to carry out 
tasks or projects, and to make decisions.  
 
To respond to this questionnaire, read each statement carefully and decide how well the statement fits 
the way that you typically do things at school, at home, or on a job.  Circle 1 if the statement does not 
fit you at all, that is, you never do things this way. For each statement, circle one of the 7 numbers next 
to the corresponding item number on the answer sheet.  Circle 7 if the statement fits you extremely 
well, that is, you almost always do things this way.  Use the values in between to indicate that the 
statement fits you in varying degrees. 
 
 1=Not At All Well,  2=Not Very well, 3=Slightly Well, 4= Somewhat Well, 
 5=Well, 6=Very Well, 7=Extremely Well 
 
 There are, of course, no right or wrong answers.  Please read each statement and circle the 
number on the scale next to the statement that best indicates how well the statement describes you. 
 
 Please proceed at your own pace, but do not spend too much time on any one statement. 
 
1. I prefer to deal with problems that require me to attend to a lot of details.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. When talking or writing about ideas, I prefer to focus on one idea at a time.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. When starting a task, I like to brainstorm ideas with friends or peers.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I like to set priorities for the things I need to do before I start doing them.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. When faced with a problem, I use my own ideas and strategies to solve it.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. In discussing or writing on a topic, I think that the details and facts are more important than 
the overall picture.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I tend to pay little attention to details.  1 2 3 4 5
 6 7 
8. I like to figure out how to solve a problem following certain rules.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I like to control all phases of a project, without having to consult with others.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I like to play with my ideas and see how far they go.  1 2 3 4
 5 6 7 
11. I am careful to use the proper method to solve any problem.  1 2 3
 4 5 6 7 
12. I enjoy working on things that I can do by following directions.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
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13. I stick to standard rules or ways of doing things.  1 2 3 4
 5 6 7 
14. I like problems where I can try my own way of solving them.  1 2 3
 4 5 6 7 
15. When trying to make a decision, I rely on my own judgment of the situation.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I can switch from one task to another easily, because all tasks seem to me to be equally 
important.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. In a discussion or report, I like to combine my own ideas with those of others.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I care more about the general effect than about the details of a task I have to do.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. When working on a task, I can see how the parts relate to the overall goal of the task. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I like situations where I can compare and rate different ways of doing things.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. When working on a project, I tend to do all sorts of tasks regardless of their degree of 
relevance to the project undertaken.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. When I’m in charge of something, I like to follow methods and ideas used in the past. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. I like to check and rate opposing points of view or conflicting ideas.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
24. I prefer to work on projects that allow me to put in a lot of detailed facts.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. In dealing with difficulties, I have a good sense of how important each of them is and in what 
order to tackle them.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. I like situations where I can follow a set routine.  1 2 3 4
 5 6 7 
27. When discussing or writing about a topic, I stick to the points of view accepted by my 
colleagues.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. I like tasks and problems that have fixed rules to follow in order to complete them. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. I prefer to work on a project or task that is acceptable to and approved by my peers. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. When there are several important things to do, I do those most important to me and to my 
colleagues.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. I like projects that have a clear structure and a set plan and goal.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
32. When working on a task, I like to start with my own ideas.  1 2 3
 4 5 6 7 
33. When there are many things to do, I have a clear sense of the order in which to do them. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34. I like to participate in activities where I can interact with others as a part of a team. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. I tend to tackle several problems at the same time because they are often equally urgent. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. When faced with a problem, I like to solve it in a traditional way.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
37. I like to work alone on a task or a problem.  1 2 3 4 5
 6 7 
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38. I tend to emphasize the general aspect of issues or the overall effect of a project.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. I like to follow definite rules or directions when solving a problem or doing a task. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40. I tend to give equal attention to all of the tasks I am involved in.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
41. When working on a project, I like to share ideas and get input from other people. 1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42. I like projects where I can study and rate different views or ideas.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
43. I tend to give full attention to one thing at a time.  1 2 3 4
 5 6 7 
44. I like problems where I need to pay attention to details.  1 2 3
 4 5 6 7 
45. I like to challenge old ideas or ways of doing things and to seek better ones.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46. I like situations where I interact with others and everyone works together.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47. I find that when I am engaged in one problem, another comes along that is just as important.
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48. I like working on projects that deal with general issues and not with nitty-gritty details. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
49. I like situations where I can use my own ideas and ways of doing things.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
50. If there are several important things to do, I focus on the one most important to me and 
disregard the rest. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
51. I prefer tasks or problems where I can grade the designs or methods of others.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
52. When there are several important things to do, I pick the ones most important to my friends 
and colleagues.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
53. When faced with a problem, I prefer to try new strategies or methods to solve it.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
54. I like to concentrate on one task at a time.  1 2 3 4 5
 6 7 
55. I like projects that I can complete independently.  1 2 3 4
 5 6 7 
56. When starting something, I like to make a list of things to do and to order the things by 
importance.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
57. I enjoy work that involves analyzing, grading, or comparing things.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
58. I like to do things in new ways not used by others in the past.  1 2 3
 4 5 6 7 
59. When I start a task or project, I focus on the parts most relevant to my peer group. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
60. I have to finish one project before starting another one.  1 2 3
 4 5 6 7 
61. In talking or writing down ideas, I like to show the scope and context of my ideas, that is, the 
general picture.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
62. I pay more attention to parts of a task than to its overall effect or significance.  1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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63. I prefer situations where I can carry out my own ideas, without relying on others. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
64. I like to change routines in order to improve the way tasks are done.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
65. I like to take old problems and find new methods to solve them.  1 2
 3 4 5 6 7 
 
legislative =(q5+q10+q14+q32+q49)/5 . 
 
executive =(q8+q11+q12+q31+q39)/5 . 
 
 judicial =(q20+q23+Q42+q51+q57)/5 . 
 
global=(q7+q18+q38+q48+q61)/5 . 
 
local=(q1+q6+q24+q44+q62)/5 . 
 
liberal =(q45+q53+q58+q64+q65)/5 . 
 
conservative =(q13+q22+q26+q28+q36)/5 . 
 
hierarchical =(q4+q19+q33+q25+q56)/5 . 
 
monarchic =(q2+q43+q50+q54+q60)/5 . 
 
 oligarchic =(q27+q29+q30+q52+q59)/5 . 
 
anarchic =(q16+q21+q35+q40+q47)/5 . 
 
internal =(q9+q15+q37+q55+q63)/5 . 
 
external =(q3+q17+q34+q41+q46)/5 . 
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Dialectical Self Scale (DSS)  
Instructions 
Listed below are a number of statements about your thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Select the 
number that best matches your agreement or disagreement with each statement. Use the following 
scale, which ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
 
             1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
           Strongly disagree                Neither agree                               Strongly 
agree 
         Nor disagree 
 
DT1  I am the same around my family as I am around my friends. (reversed) 
DT2  When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with both. 
DT3  I believe my habits are hard to change. (reversed) 
DT4  I believe my personality will stay the same all of my life. (reversed) 
DT5  I often change the way I am, depending on who I am with.    
DT6  I often find that things will contradict each other. 
DT7  If I’ve made up my mind about something, I stick to it. (reversed)  
DT8  I have a definite set of beliefs, which guide my behavior at all times. (reversed) 
DT9  I have a strong sense of who I am and don’t change my views when others disagree  
with me. (reversed) 
DT10  The way I behave usually has more to do with immediate circumstances than with  
my personal preferences. 
DT11  My outward behaviors reflect my true thoughts and feelings. (reversed)      
DT12  I sometimes believe two things that contradict each other. 
DT13  I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change under different contexts. 
DT14  I find that my values and beliefs will change depending on who I am with. 
DT15  My world is full of contradictions that cannot be resolved. 
DT16  I am constantly changing and am different from one time to the next. 
DT17  I usually behave according to my principles. (reversed) 
DT18  I prefer to compromise than to hold on to a set of beliefs. 
DT19  I can never know for certain that any one thing is true.      
DT20  If there are two opposing sides to an argument, they cannot both be right. (reversed) 
DT21  My core beliefs don’t change much over time. (reversed)   
DT22  Believing two things that contradict each other is illogical. (reversed) 
DT23 I sometimes find that I am a different person by the evening than I was in the morning. 
DT24  I find that if I look hard enough, I can figure out which side of a controversial issue  
is right. (reversed) 
DT25  For most important issues, there is one right answer. (reversed) 
DT26  I find that my world is relatively stable and consistent. (reversed) 
DT27  When two sides disagree, the truth is always somewhere in the middle. 
DT28  When I am solving a problem, I focus on finding the truth. (reversed) 
DT29  If I think I am right, I am willing to fight to the end (reversed). 
DT30  I have a hard time making up my mind about controversial issues. 
DT31  When two of my friends disagree, I usually have a hard time deciding which of  
them is right.         
DT32  There are always two sides to everything, depending on how you look at it. 
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The following SPSS syntax may be helpful: 
 
COMPUTE rdt1 = 8 - dt1. 
COMPUTE rdt3 = 8 - dt3. 
COMPUTE rdt4 = 8 - dt4. 
COMPUTE rdt7 = 8 - dt7. 
COMPUTE rdt8 = 8 - dt8. 
COMPUTE rdt9 = 8 - dt9. 
COMPUTE rdt11 = 8 - dt11. 
COMPUTE rdt17 = 8 - dt17. 
COMPUTE rdt20 = 8 - dt20. 
COMPUTE rdt21 = 8 - dt21. 
COMPUTE rdt22 = 8 - dt22. 
COMPUTE rdt24 = 8 - dt24. 
COMPUTE rdt25 = 8 - dt25. 
COMPUTE rdt26 = 8 - dt26. 
COMPUTE rdt28 = 8 - dt28. 
COMPUTE rdt29 = 8 - dt29. 
 
COMPUTE Score = MEAN(rdt1,rdt3,rdt4,rdt7,rdt8,rdt9,rdt11,rdt17,rdt20,rdt21, 
rdt22,rdt24,rdt25,rdt26,rdt28,rdt29,dt2,dt5,dt6,dt10,dt12,dt13,dt14,dt15,dt16, 
dt18,dt19,dt23,dt27,dt30,dt31,dt32) . 
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Need for Closure Scale 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your 
beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 
strongly disagree 
moderately disagree 
slightly disagree 
slightly agree 
moderately disagree 
strongly disagree 
 
01. I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success. 
02. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a different 
opinion. 
03. I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
04. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
05. I like to have friends who are unpredictable. 
06. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
07. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might happen. 
08. When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to expect. 
09. I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my life. 
10. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes. 
11. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
12. I would describe myself as indecisive. 
13. When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is I want. 
14. When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly. 
15. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset. 
16. I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment.(rev) 
17. I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently. 
18. I have never been late for an appointment or work. 
19. I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment. 
20. My personal space is usually messy and disorganized. 
21. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong. 
22. I have never known someone I did not like. 
23. I tend to struggle with most decisions. 
24. I believe orderliness and organisation are among the most important characteristics of a good 
student. 
25. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right. 
26. I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
27. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them. 
28. I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and requirements. 
29. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as possible. 
30. I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
31. I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 
32. I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 
33. It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind. 
34. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
35. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
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36. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own. 
37. I like to have a plan for everything and a place for everything. 
38. I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me. 
39. I believe that one should never engage in leisure activities. 
40. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's confusing. 
41. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. 
42. I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty. 
43. I feel that there is no such thing as an honest mistake. 
44. I do not usually consult many different options before forming my own view. 
45. I dislike unpredictable situations. 
46. I have never hurt another person's feelings. 
47. I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies). 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- 
Scoring the Need for Closure Scale 
 
1. Reverse items: 
 2-5-7-12-13-16-19-20-23-25-28-29-36-40-41-47. 
 
2. Sum the following items to form a lie score: 
 18-22-39-43-46. 
 
3. Remove the subject if the lie score is greater than 15. 
 
4. Sum all the items except for the above listed lie items to form the need 
 for closure scale. 
 
5. If factors are required, use the following scoring system. 
 
 Order: 1-6-11-20-24-28-34-35-37-47. 
 Predictability: 5-7-8-19-26-27-30-45. 
 Decisiveness: 12-13-14-16-17-23-40. 
 Ambiguity: 3-9-15-21-31-32-33-38-42. 
 Closed Mindedness: 2-4-10-25-29-36-41-44 
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Higgins RFQ  
1 never or seldom 
2 
3 sometimes 
4 
5 very often 
 
1 “Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of 
life?”; 
2 " “ Growing up, would you ever ‘cross the line’ by doing things that your parents 
would not tolerate?”; 
3 “How often have you accomplished things that got you “psyched” to work ever 
harder?”; 
4 " Did you get on your parents’ nerves often when you were growing up?”;  
5 “How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your 
parents?” 
6 " “Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were 
objectionable?” 
7 " “Do you often do well at different things that you try?”;  
8  “Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times.” 
9 “When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t 
perform as well as I ideally would like to do.”; 
10 “I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life." 
11 “ I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or 
motivate me to put effort into them.” 
 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire:  
COMPUTE promote = (6 - resp_1) + resp_3 + resp_7 + (6 - resp_9) + resp_10 + (6 - 
resp_11).  
COMPUTE prevent = (6 - resp_2) + (6 - resp_4) + resp_5 + (6 - resp_6) + (6 - resp_8)
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